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This dissertation is a study of the Mehdi Army’s campaign in the Tisa Nissan political district of 
Baghdad in the aftermath of the American-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. This study 
builds upon an examination of Baghdad’s history with a focus on the experience of Iraq’s shi’a 
underclass therein. It also draws from the author’s first-hand experience in the district during 
2008 in order to detail the origins of the Sadrist movement, trace the rise of the Mehdi Army 
militia during the post-Saddam era, and explain the reasons for, and the significance of, its 
collapse and dissolution in 2008.  
 
First and foremost, this dissertation is a study of the Mehdi Army’s rise and fall in Tisa Nissan, 
which is intended to illuminate the social forces that shaped the militia’s fortunes and, by 
extension, offer insights into the condition of Iraqi society. It is, therefore, both a study of war in 
the neighbourhoods of Baghdad, as well as a study of Baghdad’s neighbourhoods at war. It is 
intended to contribute to the existing scholarly literature on both modern Iraq and insurgency. 
This thesis also provides a balance to what has become an overwhelmingly occupier-centric body 
of literature on the events of the post-Saddam era. 
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i. “March Madness”  
At the end of March 2008, more than a year into the Americans’ highly touted initiative to restore 
order in and around Baghdad that was known as “the Surge”, the impoverished shi’a 
neighbourhoods on the city’s eastern periphery erupted in violence. Barrages of rockets were 
fired across the Tigris River toward the heavily fortified Green Zone that housed the upper 
echelons of the Iraqi government and the American-led Coalition; Iraqi-manned security 
checkpoints across eastern Baghdad were overrun or deserted; and the numerous neighbourhood-
level outposts that the Americans had established throughout the area came under heavy fire. 
Originating from the strongholds of Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mehdi Army militia, this intense 
and unexpected paroxysm of violence – dubbed “March Madness” by the Americans – appeared 
to demonstrate the enduring potency of Iraq’s so-called shi’a insurgency. 
 
The outburst in Baghdad came in response to the launch of a large-scale military offensive by the 
Iraqi government in the southern city of Basra.1 Shi’a militias hostile to the central government, 
the Mehdi Army foremost among them, had seized control of Basra following the withdrawal of 
British forces in 2007. Their control of the city had provided both a sanctuary from which to stage 
attacks against the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces, as well as access to the revenues 
generated at Iraq’s primary commercial outlet to the Persian Gulf. The Basra offensive, dubbed 
Operation Knight’s Charge, was thus orchestrated by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to reclaim 
the city and restore government rule.2  
                                                
1 Marisa Cochrane, “Special Groups Regenerate”, The Institute for the Study of War, August 29, 2008, 
pp.10-11, notes that the initial barrage of rockets fired at the Green Zone came on the day before the Basra 
offensive, presumably in anticipation thereof. The distinctions among the Mehdi Army, the Special Groups, 
and the locally-rooted armed factions that collectively formed Iraq’s “shi’a insurgency” are addressed in 
Chapters Three and Four.  
2 Rumors of an impending offensive by Mehdi Army and Special Group fighters under the direction of Iran 
also played a role in prompting Prime Minister Maliki to press the offensive on short notice – notably, 
without informing American commanders. The operation and its implications are detailed in Marisa 
Cochrane, “The Battle for Basra”, The Institute for the Study of War, May 31, 2008; and Anthony 
Cordesman, “Sadr and the Mahdi Army: Evolution, Capabilities, and a New Direction”, CSIS, August 4, 
2008, pp.18-20. 
 2 
The Basra offensive held deeper significance, however, as it also marked a violent re-escalation 
of the long-running rivalry between the factions of Iraq’s shi’a elite (foremost among them the 
Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and Prime Minister Maliki’s Da’wa Party) and the Sadrist 
movement, which represented Iraq’s demographically powerful but historically marginalized 
shi’a underclass.3 Tracing its immediate roots to the 1990s, when Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, 
Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, mobilized a sweeping grassroots movement of the 
underclass masses that challenged the power, privilege, and very legitimacy of the traditional 
shi’a establishment, this bitter intra-shi’a rivalry became a pivotal axis of conflict after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein.4  
 
In the early years of the post-Saddam era, the two blocs engaged in fierce fighting. The parties of 
the shi’a elite aligned themselves with the American-led Coalition, thereby ensconcing 
themselves at the heart of the emerging political order. Muqtada al-Sadr, on the other hand, 
positioned the Sadrist movement and the Mehdi Army at the forefront of “resistance”. A series of 
bloody clashes ensued during 2003 and 2004, which clearly delineated a class-based schism 
within Iraq’s shi’a population. Indeed, while a combination of political opportunism and mutual 
fear inspired by the rise of fanatical sunni militants would drive the two into an uneasy 
partnership in the years that followed, powerful intra-shi’a tensions persisted for the duration of 
Iraq’s sectarian war.5 When sectarian violence abated during the course of 2007, and the forces 
                                                
3 While the parties and politicians of Iraq’s shi’a elite are by no means a monolithic bloc, an 
“establishment” can nonetheless be identified – in significant measure through its historical opposition to 
the Sadrists. Discussed in International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme 
Council”, Middle East Report No.70, November 15, 2007. Lastly, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, 
which was originally known as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, has undergone several 
name changes since 2003. For the purpose of continuity, its present-day name is used throughout much of 
this dissertation. 
4 On the significance of intra-shi’a rivalry to the politics of the post-Saddam era, International Crisis 
Group, “Shiite Politics in Iraq”, p.i argues that: “more than sectarian conflict or confrontation between 
Anbari sheikhs and al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters, [intra-shi’a rivalry is] likely to shape the country’s future”. 
5 As discussed further in Chapter Three, intra-shi’a violence continued between the Sadrists’ Mehdi Army 
and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council’s Badr militia throughout the sectarian war – both in Baghdad, and 
across southern Iraq as well.  
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that had forged their unlikely alliance waned significantly, the stage was set for conflict to 
resume.  
 
Recognizing that the prime minister’s assault on Basra marked a declaration of renewed intra-
shi’a war, the Mehdi Army and its affiliates offered fierce opposition.6 Their counterattack in 
Basra broke the initial momentum of government forces and necessitated the infusion of 
reinforcements and American support, while simultaneous assaults in Baghdad were formidable 
as well. Significant numbers of shi’a security personnel stationed in the capital proved of dubious 
loyalty, either abandoning their posts or turning their rifles on their colleagues; satellite television 
broadcast the surrender of entire Iraqi units in the Mehdi Army stronghold of Sadr City; the 
principal Iraqi spokesman for counterinsurgency initiatives in Baghdad was kidnapped; and 
thousands of the Sadrist movement’s supporters took to the streets in protest.7 American forces in 
Baghdad (and their remaining Iraqi counterparts) thus braced themselves for a sustained 
offensive, which threatened to undo months of hard-fought progress.  
 
However, the escalation of hostilities, while intense, proved ephemeral. Rather than signaling 
either the start of a revitalized insurgency by the Mehdi Army or the onset of a bloody reckoning 
between competing demographic subsets of Iraq’s shi’a population, the fury of March Madness 
gave way to a general rout. In Baghdad, as in Basra and elsewhere across southern Iraq, 
American and Iraqi forces not only restored control over areas enveloped by violence during the 
outburst of late March, but they also drove the Mehdi Army from its core strongholds. Prominent 
militants were captured, killed, or forced to flee to Iran. The militia, once dominant across broad 
                                                
6 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shia Insurgency in Iraq, (London: Faber and Faber, 2009) 
p.255 observes that the ensuing battles marked “the biggest military confrontation between Muqtada’s 
militiamen and the Iraqi government since… 2004”.  
7 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.256-257.  
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swathes of the country, was battered and discredited to the point that Muqtada announced its 
wholesale dissolution in June of that year.  
 
ii. The Successes of the Surge Against the Mehdi Army  
In the prevailing narrative that has coalesced around the final years of American-led combat 
operations in Iraq, the dramatic collapse of the Mehdi Army is explained principally as the 
byproduct of Iraqi realpolitik and American perseverance and ingenuity.8 Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki’s decision to break with the Sadrist movement and turn on the Mehdi Army was 
instrumental in isolating the militia politically. Having made use of the Mehdi Army’s fighting 
prowess to check the onslaught of sunni militants and achieve a shi’a “victory” in Iraq’s sectarian 
war, Iraq’s prime minister was sufficiently secure in his position to turn on his enemy-turned-
ally-of-necessity.9 The cold calculations of intra-shi’a intrigue thus left the Mehdi Army exposed, 
rendering it all the more vulnerable to the American-led assault that followed. 
 
                                                
8 Commentators vary in their emphasis on particular factors in the fall of the Mehdi Army, but they almost 
universally cite the influence of the Surge, Prime Minister Maliki’s decision to facilitate American 
targeting of the Mehdi Army, and damage accrued to the militia’s reputation as a result of its misdeeds. 
See: Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History, (New York: Encounter, 2009) for a quasi-official 
account of US military actions during the Surge that focuses on America’s role in events, which argues 
(p.197) that “the change in American strategy in early 2007 was the critical variable that made any success 
possible”. For a critique that “parallels but challenges the military-centric conventional wisdom” of the 
Surge, see: Douglas Ollivant, “Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, 
New America Foundation, June 2011. Ollivant (a former US Army officer who oversaw aspects of the 
Surge’s design and execution) emphasizes the importance of Iraqi politics and presents an array of 
competing perspectives on the abatement of violence in Baghdad. Disagreements between Kagan and 
Ollivant are expounded in Tom Bowman, “As the Iraq War Ends, Reassessing the Surge” NPR, December 
16, 2011. Bernard Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 
2010 provides an overview of dominant trends in analysis of the Surge among foreign policy and defence 
establishment experts. 
9 Alternatively, it has been argued that Muqtada al-Sadr was complicit in the American-led targeting of the 
Mehdi Army. Realizing that he could no longer control his militia, the argument goes, and that the abuses 
of those acting in his name were badly damaging his reputation, Muqtada declared a ceasefire and 
acquiesced to the street-level persecution of shi’a militants by American and Iraqi forces. Noted in David 
Ucko, “Militias, Tribes and Insurgents: The Challenge of Political Reintegration in Iraq”, Conflict, Security 
& Development, October 2008, pp.361-362. The veracity of this theory is questionable yet, even if 
accurate, it does not explain the remarkably poor performance of shi’a militants in resisting the advance of 
the Surge. 
 5 
Accounts of America’s role in the Mehdi Army’s defeat emphasize both political will and 
military innovation. First, President George W. Bush’s decision to recommit American forces to 
Iraq via the Surge is widely cited as a critical precondition to the achievements that followed.10 
By allocating additional resources and reaffirming America’s intent to bring security and stability 
to Iraq (and to Baghdad in particular), American forces were well positioned to influence Prime 
Minister Maliki and to capitalize on the vicissitudes of Iraqi politics. Second, the successes 
achieved during 2007 and 2008 are attributed to the American military’s embrace of the strategies 
and tactics of counterinsurgency, or “COIN”.11 The Surge did not succeed, goes the argument, by 
virtue of additional manpower and renewed commitment alone, but because of critical 
adaptations to the manner in which operations were conducted.  
 
Breaking markedly from past practices of self-containment on isolated bases (a deliberate strategy 
built on the premise that the daily presence of foreign soldiers in the lives of Iraqi civilians 
provoked resentment, thereby stoking the very insurgency that the Coalition was attempting to 
quell), American forces spread out into the neighbourhoods of the Iraqi capital and pro-actively 
engaged the city.12 Efforts to kill or capture shi’a militants were paired with initiatives to restore 
                                                
10 As the Iraq war was the subject of intensive partisan debate in America, evaluations of the Surge and of 
the credit due to the Bush administration for positive developments in Iraq have remained fiercely 
contested. Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge”, p.89 notes how “political bickering… caused 
the public discourse to degenerate into partisan arguments focused on casualty figures and body counts”, 
which complicated the efforts of defence officials and policy experts to assess the Surge’s actual efficacy. 
For examples of the partisan nature of debate, see: Fred Barnes, “How Bush Decided on the Surge”, The 
Weekly Standard, February 4, 2008; George Packer, “Obama’s Iraq Problem”, The New Yorker, July 7, 
2008; Ed Henry, “Obama Not Planning to Credit Bush over Iraq ‘Surge’”, CNN, August 31, 2010. 
11 The extent to which Coalition Forces’ adoption of counterinsurgency approaches was responsible for 
improved conditions in Baghdad during the Surge remains contested, as does the overall efficacy of the 
strategies and tactics that came to dominate defence establishment circles at the time. See: Gian Gentile, 
“Freeing the Army from the Counterinsurgency Straightjacket”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 58, 2010, and 
Celeste Ward, “Countering the Military’s Latest Fad: Counterinsurgency”, The Washington Post, May 17, 
2009. Both authors not only dispute underlying assumptions of counterinsurgency theory, but also note that 
American commanders were employing certain aspects thereof well before the “revolutionary” changes of 
2007 and 2008. 
12 The rationale for the “super-FOB” approach (FOB being an acronym for “Forward Operating Base”, the 
designation given to the larger American military installations in Iraq) is discussed in David Kilcullen, The 
Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), pp.124-
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essential services, meet pressing public health needs, reform the government and the security 
services, and reinvigorate the economy. This multi-faceted offensive was designed to overwhelm 
the Mehdi Army, inflicting damage upon its fighters while simultaneously undermining popular 
support for its insurgent agenda.13  
 
On the other hand, in discussion of the Mehdi Army’s own contributions to its downfall, 
emphasis is commonly placed on the manner in which its internal troubles left it vulnerable to 
attack.14 The militia’s already-disjointed chain of command, for example, made the capture, 
death, or flight abroad of key leaders particularly destabilizing; while the abuses of its notoriously 
undisciplined rank and file eroded its base of popular support. As a result, once betrayed by its 
notional allies in the Maliki administration, the Mehdi Army was unable to fend off the 
intensified and recalibrated attentions of the Surge. 
 
While each of the factors noted above played a vital role in the success of the Surge vis-à-vis the 
Mehdi Army, the circumstances surrounding the militia’s collapse require closer inspection. At 
issue is the scope and speed of its apparent rout, and the fact that it was achieved without the 
costly and destabilizing violence anticipated by observers.15 From the Basra offensive in late 
                                                                                                                                            
129, in the context of a wider discussion of how American strategy adapted through the course of the post-
Saddam era.  
13 The American military’s doctrinal guide to counterinsurgency, “Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency” 
is available online: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. Among counterinsurgency’s most 
prominent advocates, strategic victory is achieved less through the application of violence, and more by 
winning the support of the populace amongst whom the insurgency is waged. Popular support is thus not 
simply an objective to be pursued as an end in and of itself, but rather something that can serve as a 
decisive strategic weapon. This notion was captured most famously by General Stanley McChrystal when, 
as the commanding officer of NATO forces in Afghanistan, he urged his subordinates to “think of 
counterinsurgency as an argument to earn the support of the people” who would thereafter isolate 
insurgents and facilitate conflict resolution. Quoted in Dexter Filkins, “Stanley McChrystal’s Long War”, 
The New York Times, October 14, 2009. 
14 Marisa Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, The Institute for the Study of War, 
January 2009, provides an overview of the Mehdi Army’s structural woes and leadership divides and the 
manner in which they contributed to its demise. 
15 Most notably, see: International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, Middle 
East Report No.72, February 7, 2008, pp.i-ii. Only a month prior to the violence of March 2008, the report 
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March through the remainder of 2008 there were fierce bouts of fighting, particularly in Baghdad, 
yet nothing on a scale that reflected the intense rivalry that existed between the Sadrist movement 
and its foes in the shi’a establishment, or the depth of Sadrist opposition to the American-led 
Coalition. 
 
How then, to account for the Mehdi Army’s precipitous decline and ultimate dissolution during 
the spring and summer of 2008? What caused the apparent implosion of the militia not only as a 
fighting force, but also as the vanguard of popular insurgency on behalf of Iraq’s long-suffering 
shi’a underclass? Had estimates fundamentally overstated the power of the Mehdi Army, or the 
depth of popular support for the Sadrist movement? Did the combination of a shifting political 
landscape and the counterinsurgency approaches of the American military simply overwhelm the 
militia? Alternatively, might the Mehdi Army’s seeming collapse have been a coordinated display 
of strategic patience, with Muqtada and his supporters seeking to avoid direct confrontation in 
order to fight another day?16  
 
iii. A View Beneath the Violence 
This dissertation is an attempt to explain the dynamics, and the implications, of the Mehdi 
Army’s collapse. Drawing from first-hand experience in the Tisa Nissan political district of 
                                                                                                                                            
characterized the “principal strongholds” of the Mehdi Army as “virtually unassailable”, warning of 
disastrous consequences should counterinsurgent forces attack them head-on. Similarly, Adam Goodman, 
“Informal Networks and Insurgency in Iraq”, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom: Advanced 
Research & Assessment Group, April 2008, p.18 predicted “civil war” if the Surge was used to attempt a 
decisive defeat of the Mehdi Army. Although Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mehdi Army had endured a series 
of setbacks through the course of 2007 (which left the former in Iranian exile, and the latter bristling under 
a unilateral ceasefire imposed in an effort to restore discipline and rehabilitate the militia’s tarnished 
image), the Mehdi Army was still widely regarded as a potent fighting force. Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, 
p.259 offers the view that the Mehdi Army and the Sadrist movement were in the midst of a resurgence in 
early 2008. “The movement’s reputation among the Shi’a had benefited from the long ceasefire during 
which the Mehdi Army had been effectively purged and brought more fully under Muqtada’s control… In 
Shi’a areas, particularly in Baghdad, it was losing its reputation as an umbrella for ever local warlord and 
racketeer”. 
16 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.263, 138 advances this theory, noting that Muqtada “always had a good 
sense of timing”, with a penchant for “swift retreats, politically and militarily, when faced with an 
adversary superior in strength”.  
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eastern Baghdad between February and December 2008, it presents a neighbourhood-by-
neighbourhood examination of the militia’s changing fortunes. Rooted in a study of Baghdad’s 
history, and building upon the experiences and observations of the author, his civilian and 
military colleagues on a US Army Human Terrain Team, and the American military personnel 
whom they supported, this thesis details the Mehdi Army’s rise to dominance in Tisa Nissan 
through the early years of the post-Saddam era – and explains the reasons for its fall during the 
course of 2008.17 
Figure 0.1 – Baghdad’s Political Districts 
18 
 
                                                
17 This work does not offer an overview of the broader currents of Iraqi history. It instead explores selected 
aspects thereof in depth. Readers new to the subject will be able to follow the text without additional 
reading, but would benefit by consulting Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2004) or Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007) for concise 
introductions to the country’s history. Suggestions for further reading (as well as comments on 
historiographical issues and points of contention among experts) are presented in the footnotes throughout. 
18 Map of Baghdad’s political districts in the post-Saddam era, adapted from The Institute for the Study of 
War: http://www.understandingwar.org/map/baghdad-city-districts.  
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The primary research that forms the core of this text is, in many respects, a byproduct of the 
Surge and its accompanying innovations. The Human Terrain System itself (a US Army 
programme developed to harness civilian academic expertise in support of military operations) 
was an idea that grew from the efforts of the American defence establishment to recalibrate its 
approach to ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.19 With military personnel returning from 
deployments to both conflicts lamenting a lack of insight into social and cultural issues and citing 
difficulty in understanding the “human terrain” of the battlefield as a key concern, the Human 
Terrain System was created to address identified needs.20 Had that innovation not taken place, the 
author, as a civilian, would have been unable to gain the sort of access to front-line American 
units (and, by extension, to the Iraqi people) that was essential to the work that follows.  
 
Furthermore, the neighbourhood-level insights that form the core of this work would likely have 
been unachievable without both the altered posture of American forces that came with the Surge, 
as well as the momentum it generated against the Mehdi Army. The decision to break out from 
the insular Forward Operating Bases that the military had constructed across Baghdad and 
establish a network of small patrol bases within the neighbourhoods of the Iraqi capital greatly 
increased opportunities for interaction with Baghdadis. Additionally, by pushing militants off of 
the streets and inserting American and Iraqi forces as the arbiters of law and order, the Surge 
altered the dynamic between Baghdadis and American personnel. Notions of “winning hearts and 
minds” aside, the declining local position of the Mehdi Army, the exodus from Baghdad of 
                                                
19 The official history of the Human Terrain System is presented online: 
http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/htsAboutHistory.aspx, and discussed further by the programme’s 
founders in Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro, “Reflections on the Human Terrain System During 
the First 4 Years”, PRISM, Vol.2, No.4, September 2011. 
20 The role of the HTT was, in the verbiage of the Human Terrain System’s official literature as presented 
online, to “conduct operationally relevant socio-cultural research and analysis… in order to enable 
operational decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share socio-cultural 
institutional knowledge”. The team’s mission was, in other words, to study the battlefield as a social 
environment, and advise military commanders on how to best navigate the features of its “human terrain”.  
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prominent militants, and the daily presence of American and Iraqi security personnel on the city’s 
streets created an environment that was increasingly conducive to face-to-face interaction.  
 
Thus, as American forces pressed deeper into the neighbourhoods of Tisa Nissan during the 
spring and summer of 2008, it was possible to look beneath the violence of the militia’s campaign 
and study the people and territory over which it had ruled. How had the Mehdi Army established 
itself across Tisa Nissan? How had different elements of the local population responded, and how 
had the militia’s insurgent campaign evolved? What accounted for the Mehdi Army’s ability to 
conquer the district during the initial years of the post-Saddam era, making it an integral part of 
the militia’s expansive domain within Baghdad, only to cede it in relatively sudden and 
unexpected fashion?  Lastly, what insights might the militia’s experience in Tisa Nissan offer into 
its overall fate, and into the broader dynamics of conflict in post-Saddam Iraq? 
 
iv. Insurgency, Civil Society, and the Death of the Mehdi Army 
When the American-led Coalition toppled Saddam Hussein, Muqtada al-Sadr was presented with 
an extraordinary opportunity. With his martyred father having drawn together the masses of 
Iraq’s shi’a underclass during the course of the 1990s, instilling a powerful sense of pride and 
solidarity within their battered ranks, Muqtada had the chance to engage a new, democratic Iraq 
at the head of one of the country’s only broadly based popular movements.21 
 
Rebuilding his father’s movement around the framework of the Mehdi Army militia, Muqtada 
launched an ambitious insurgent campaign. The Mehdi Army was to serve as the vanguard of a 
sweeping popular movement of Iraq’s downtrodden shi’a underclass, which would carry Muqtada 
to a position of national-level political and clerical power. Sadrist devotees were thus channeled 
                                                
21 The reasons for, and the implications of, the general absence of popularly supported political parties in 
post-Saddam Iraq are discussed in Chapter Three.   
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into the militia, fueling its massive expansion into a powerful force on the streets of Baghdad and 
across broad swathes of southern Iraq.22  
 
However, despite the militia’s impressive growth, and irrespective of an enduring affinity to 
Sadrist ideals among Iraq’s underclass shi’a (for whom Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr 
remained an object of near-universal veneration), Muqtada ultimately failed to rally a cohesive, 
mass-based insurgency.  
 
In examining the Mehdi Army’s fortunes in the neighbourhoods of Tisa Nissan, it appears that 
this outcome was determined in fundamental respects by the condition of Iraqi society. With the 
district’s residents ravaged and socially atomized by an array of forces that are detailed in the 
chapters that follow, civil society in Tisa Nissan was not only infertile ground for the cultivation 
of popular insurgency but, in places, toxic. On the one hand, the badly degraded state of civil 
society effectively precluded the mobilization of what became an increasingly conspicuously 
“silent” majority. Rather than shaping the character of the rekindled Sadrist movement, the great 
majority of Tisa Nissan’s underclass shi’a residents withdrew into the relative safety of their 
homes, seeking shelter from the chaos that threatened to consume them. On the other hand, the 
volatility, radicalism, and proclivity to extreme violence of those who asserted themselves at the 
militia’s core eventually destroyed the militia’s reputation.23 Rather than acting as the advance 
guard of a coherent popular movement, the Mehdi Army evolved into a disjointed, radical, and 
                                                
22 The actual numerical strength of the Mehdi Army remained a point of contention throughout its 
existence. Cordesman, “Sadr and the Mahdi Army”, p.14 notes the difficulty in assessing the militia’s exact 
strength, estimating a core membership between 25,000 and 40,000 along with an indeterminate number of 
facilitators drawn from Iraq’s several-million-strong shi’a underclass.  
23 It is possible, had Muqtada been able to revive the Sadrist movement under more stable, peaceful 
conditions, that he might have met with greater success. However, the argument that the Mehdi Army’s 
polarizing radicalism was, fundamentally, a product of the brutal violence that permeated the post-Saddam 
era is an unsatisfying explanation of the militia’s social evolution – principally because the Mehdi Army 
was one of the most active forces in perpetrating said violence.  
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exceptionally controversial entity that alienated many who might otherwise have supported 
Muqtada’s cause.  
 
Consequently, when the forces of the Surge pushed into the neighbourhoods of Tisa Nissan, and 
likewise into “Sadrist strongholds” elsewhere across Iraq, they were not, for the most part, 
confronted by a popular, mass-based insurgency. Their task, therefore, was not to “win over” a 
civilian populace that was either fervently loyal to, or solidly integrated within, the militia’s 
campaign. Instead, the challenge facing counterinsurgent forces was to identify and attack 
discrete militant networks of dubious local popularity – something that was accomplished with 
general success, and without an eruption of large-scale violence. 
 
Yet, while the Mehdi Army’s general lack of popular support greatly facilitated the advance of 
the Surge in Tisa Nissan, making the short-term establishment of security in the wake of March 
Madness significantly easier than it would otherwise have been, the same social forces that 
undermined the militia’s campaign also plagued counterinsurgency operations. Much as the 
militia had struggled to rally the district’s residents in support of its endeavour, the Americans 
and their partners in the Iraqi government met with minimal success in mobilizing the populace to 
sustain hard-fought security gains, revive economic activity, rebuild critical infrastructure, or 
rehabilitate local governance.  
 
Contrary to the standard narrative of the Surge, the short-term gains in security that were 
achieved by American and Iraqi forces in Tisa Nissan during the course of 2008 thus remained 
largely unconsolidated. With American forces withdrawing from the district in 2009, leaving Tisa 
Nissan in the hands of an Iraqi government that was both administratively ill equipped and also 
prejudicially disinclined to address its many woes, the district’s future prospects (and, likewise, 
the long-term efficacy of the Surge) appeared uncertain at best. Similarly, the future of Muqtada 
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al-Sadr and the rekindled Sadrist movement also remained unclear – though the limitations 
imposed by the degraded condition of Iraqi society on any further efforts to rally mass-based 
action had been made manifestly evident. 
 
v. Structural Overview 
The first chapter, A City Transformed – The Creation of Eastern Baghdad, sets the stage for the 
study of the Mehdi Army’s campaign in Tisa Nissan by charting the physical growth of eastern 
Baghdad and the forces that shaped its social development. It begins with a discussion of the 
mass migrations that, during the middle decades of the twentieth century, brought hundreds of 
thousands of impoverished shi’a farmers from southern Iraq to the nation’s capital. Through an 
examination of how these sweeping population movements transformed the city’s demographics, 
creating a massive, continually-expanding shi’a underclass on Baghdad’s eastern margins, the 
chapter traces the evolution of issues that would become central to the ideology of the Sadrist 
movement. The urban development programme of Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qassim’s 
revolutionary government of the late 1950s and early 1960s receives particular attention, as do 
the implications of the Iraqi state’s increasingly aggressive efforts to engineer social change. The 
totalitarian rule of the Ba’th Party is then surveyed, with emphasis on its efforts to reshape Iraqi 
society. The chapter concludes with analysis of the extent to which the Ba’th regime had asserted 
wholesale dominance over Iraq by the late 1970s, and an examination of the faltering efforts of 
shi’a militants to rally the capital’s underclass masses against the government.  
 
Chapter Two, The Sanctions Era – Shifts in Civil Society & the Rise of the Sadrist Movement, 
traces the rise of the Sadrist movement during the 1990s. The chapter begins with a survey of the 
disastrous policy decisions of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and early 1990s, which depleted 
the regime’s resources and forced radical changes to its governance strategy. Analysis focuses on 
how the contraction of state services and broadly felt economic and social shocks endured under 
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United Nations-imposed sanctions sparked grassroots tribal and religious movements among the 
Iraqi people – with emphasis on both the traditional authenticity of these “revivals”, and the ways 
in which the regime harnessed and manipulated them.  
 
The rise of Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, from relative obscurity to the preeminent 
position in Iraqi shi’ism, is then explained as having been inextricably linked to both the changes 
underway in Iraqi society and the regime’s recalibrated approach to maintaining domestic control. 
The controversy surrounding Sadr’s relationship with the regime is presented (Sadr’s supporters 
argue that he took advantage of the regime’s growing weakness to care for Iraq’s shi’a underclass 
at a time of extraordinary need, while his critics allege he was a regime collaborator who 
undermined the traditional shi’a elite to the advantage of Saddam Hussein), as is the way that 
Sadr built an enormous popular following among Iraq’s shi’a poor. The chapter continues with a 
discussion of Sadr’s ideology, and of how his populist militancy both broadened and deepened 
class-based divisions among Iraqi shi’a that would be central to the intra-shi’a violence of the 
post-Saddam era. It concludes with an analysis of how his mounting criticisms of the Ba’th 
regime precipitated his death in 1999. 
 
The third chapter, The Changing Fortunes of the Rekindled Sadrist Movement, traces the 
successes and failures of Muqtada al-Sadr as he attempted to resurrect his father’s movement in 
the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall. It begins with an analysis of the Mehdi Army’s initial 
efforts to influence post-Saddam politics by clashing with Coalition Forces and their Iraqi allies, 
and how Muqtada and his militia became leading symbols of resistance against both foreign 
occupation and Iraq’s emerging political order. The chapter then details how the exigencies of 
electoral politics and the escalation of sectarian violence induced the shi’a elite to reach out to the 
Sadrists, and how the rival shi’a blocs cooperated to achieve victory in a sectarian war against 
radical sunni militants. The process through which the Mehdi Army conquered large sectors of 
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Baghdad in the course of the fighting receives particular attention, as does the way that the city’s 
demographic landscape was transformed by killing and forced displacement. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the militia’s subsequent fragmentation, set in the context of Prime 
Minster Maliki’s decision to turn on the Mehdi Army and resume intra-shi’a conflict. 
 
Chapter Four, Tisa Nissan – District Overview, introduces the area study at the heart of this work. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the district’s local history. Elaborating on the migratory 
and urban development processes introduced in Chapter One, it surveys the local specifics of the 
district’s creation, settlement, and governance during the second half of the twentieth century. 
The rise of class-based tensions between the middle class and minority communities nearest to 
the city’s core and the predominantly shi’a residents of the district’s poorer, peripheral 
neighbourhoods is a main issue of focus, as is the way that this dynamic fueled the local 
popularity of the Sadrist movement during the 1990s.  
 
The second section of the chapter examines the local campaign of the Mehdi Army after the fall 
of Saddam Hussein. The process through which the militia came to dominate the district is 
surveyed, with a focus on the district’s concurrent demographic transformation. Discussion then 
turns to the encroachment of the Surge into Tisa Nissan, and the limited progress achieved during 
2007 and early 2008. The reasons for Tisa Nissan’s seeming intractability are examined, as are 
the ways in which American and Iraqi forces sought to remedy them. The chapter concludes with 
an analysis of the violence of March Madness, and how the fighting and its aftermath catalyzed 
major changes across the district.  
 
Chapters five through seven: Beladiyat & Mashtal – Communities Under Siege, Kamaliyah & 
Amin – Rallying the Masses, and Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr – Traction in the Remnants 
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of Tradition, present case studies of the hayys, or sub-districts, of Tisa Nissan.24 Each chapter 
examines a pair of hayys that shared certain commonalities with respect to the localized dynamics 
of violence, and explores the ways in which aspects of local society shaped the campaign of the 
Mehdi Army. These chapters begin with a summary of how each individual hayy was perceived 
by American forces in early 2008, and detail the immediate effects of March Madness. The core 
of each chapter then traces the overall trajectory of the militia’s rise and fall: examining how the 
Mehdi Army came to dominate the hayys in question, how it defended its conquests against the 
Surge, and the circumstances surrounding its collapse. 
 
The concluding chapter, Insurgency & Counterinsurgency on Uneven Terrain, begins by 
summarizing the effects of society’s degraded state on the Mehdi Army’s efforts to rally a 
popular insurgency in Tisa Nissan. It argues that distinct social characteristics from one area to 
the next had a decisive effect on the militia’s fate, and that the overall condition of the district’s 
human terrain had rendered the mobilization and long-term continuance of a coherent popular 
insurgency unfeasible. Focus then turns to the manner in which American and Iraqi forces pushed 
the militia out of Tisa Nissan during 2008. It is argued that the standard narrative of the Surge as 
a triumph of full-spectrum counterinsurgency, wherein counterinsurgent forces achieved success 
not merely through force of arms, but by undermining their enemy through the cultivation of 
popular support and the inducement of popular participation, bears little resemblance to events in 
Tisa Nissan. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the wider implications of the 
degraded condition of Iraqi society, including the ways in which this has influenced the violence 
of the post-Saddam era, and how it will continue to stunt Iraq’s development as a democracy.  
 
                                                
24 For the purposes of clarity and readability, the Arabic definite article, “al-“, has been omitted from place 
names and other proper nouns throughout this work. Exceptions come in the form of place-names such as 
al-asima, “the capital”, where the definite article is central to the translated meaning of the name, and in 
instances where full Arabic names of individuals are used. Reference to Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-
Sadr thus includes the definite article, while shorthand references are made simply to “Sadr”.   
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vi. Literature Review 
The first two chapters are based upon academic sources from a variety of disciplines. Chapter 
One’s discussion of Ottoman-ruled Mesopotamia and early Iraqi history draws from the historical 
scholarship of Hannah Batatu, Faleh Abdul Jabar, Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, 
Charles Tripp, and Samira Haj; while treatment of the mass-conversions to shi’ism that took place 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries also benefits from the work of Yitzak 
Nakash.25 The ensuing study of the sweeping rural-to-urban migrations of the twentieth century 
builds principally from the voluminous doctoral dissertation of W.A. Hilmi, supported primarily 
by the writings of Doreen Warriner, Doris Phillips, and Batatu.26 Hilmi’s work is likewise central 
to discussion of Baghdad at mid-century, supplemented by the urban studies-centric insights of 
John Gulick, Kahtan al-Madfai, Warriner, and Phillips, as well as the historical observations of 
Batatu.27 For contextual information on Iraqi politics during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century and the dynamics of the 1958 revolution and its aftermath, the works of Batatu, Uriel 
                                                
25 Hannah Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, (London: Saqi, 2004); 
Faleh A. Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, (London: Saqi, 2003); Faleh Abdul-Jabar (ed), Ayatollahs, 
Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq, (London: Saqi, 2003); Faleh A. Jabar 
and Hosham Dawod (eds), Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, (London: Saqi, 
2003); Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 
(London: IB Tauris, 1990); Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, “Some Reflections on the 
Sunni/Shi’i Question in Iraq”, British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1978; Peter 
Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, “The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure in 
Central and Southern Iraq, c. 1870-1958”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, 
1983; Tripp, A History of Iraq; Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power and Ideology, 
(Albany: SUNY Albany UP, 1997); Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003); 
Yitzhak Nakash, “The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes To Shiism”, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3. August 1994. 
26 W.A. Hilmi, Internal Migration and Regional Policy in Iraq, University of Sheffield, Doctoral 
Dissertation, 1978; Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A Study of 
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962); Doris Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration in Iraq”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.7, No.4, 1959; Batatu, The Old Social Classes. 
27 Hilmi, Internal Migration; John Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City in Physical and Cultural Change” 
Journal of the American Planning Association, 33:4, 1967; John Gulick, “Village and City: Cultural 
Continuities in Twentieth Century Middle Eastern Cultures” in Ira Lapidus (ed), Middle Eastern Cities: A 
Symposium on Ancient, Islamic, and Contemporary Middle Eastern Urbanism, (Berkeley: U California 
Press, 1969); Kahtan al-Madfai, “Baghdad”, in Morroe Berger (ed), The New Metropolis in the Arab 
World, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1963); Warriner, Land Reform and Development; Phillips, “Rural-to-
Urban Migration”; Batatu, The Old Social Classes. 
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Dann, Haj, the Slugletts, Roni Gabbay, and Marr are used most prominently.28 Concluding 
Chapter One, discussion of Ba’th Party rule and its implications for Iraqi society relies most 
heavily on the work of Kanan Makiya and Efraim Karsh; while treatment of the Ba’th regime’s 
posture toward its shi’a subjects is based largely upon the work of Jabar, the Slugletts, and 
Batatu.29  
 
Chapter Two’s survey of the Iraqi state’s declining fortunes from the late-1980s draws from an 
array of authors, including the Slugletts, Karsh, Abbas Alnasrawi, Amatzia Baram, and Patrick 
Clawson.30 Ensuing discussion of the changes that swept Iraqi society as a result of the state’s 
contraction (principally via the rise of tribalism and popular religiosity, and efforts of the state to 
manipulate and control both) relies heavily on the work of Baram and Jabar, benefiting also from 
the insights of Isam al-Khafaji, Jerry Long, and the Slugletts.31 Discussion of Mohammed 
                                                
28 Batatu, The Old Social Classes; Hanna Batatu, “The Old Social Classes Revisited”, in Robert Fernea & 
Wm Roger Louis, The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, The Old Social Classes Revisited, (London: IB Tauris, 
1991); Hanna Batatu, “Iraq’s Shi’a, their Political Role, and the Process of their Integration into Society”, 
in Barbara Stowasser (ed), The Islamic Impulse, (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Uriel Dann, Iraq Under 
Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, (Jerusalem: Israel UP, 1969); Roni Gabbay, Communism and 
Agrarian Reform in Iraq, (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958; 
Haj, The Making of Iraq; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq. 
29 Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, (Berkely: U California Press, 1998); 
Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World, (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1993); Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1991); Hannah Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin”, in 
Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (eds), Shi’ism and Social Protest, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1986); Hannah 
Batatu, “Iraq’s Shi’a, their Political Role, and the Process of their Integration into Society”; Hannah Batatu, 
“Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects”, Middle East Institute, 
Volume 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981; Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement; Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, “Some 
Reflections on the Sunni/Shi’i Question”.  
30 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Joe Stork, “Not Quite Armageddon: The Impact of the War on Iraq”, MERIP 
Reports, No. 125-126, July-September 1984; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein; Abbas Alnasrawi, The 
Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction & Development and Prospects, 1950-2010, (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1994); Abbas Alnasrawi, “Economic Devastation, Underdevelopment and Outlook”, in Fran 
Hazelton (ed), Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, (London: Zed Books, 1994); Amatzia 
Baram, “The Ruling Political Elite in Bathi Iraq, 1968-1986: The Changing Features of a Collective 
Profile”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.21, No.4, 1989; Patrick Clawson, “Iraq’s 
Economy and International Sanctions”, in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (eds), Iraq’s Road to War, 
(London: MacMillan, 1994). 
31 Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies, 1991-1996”, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1997; Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement; Faleh A. Jabar, 
“Shaykhs and Ideologues: Detribalization and Retribalization in Iraq, 1968-1998”, Middle East Report, 
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Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr’s career is built principally from Patrick Cockburn’s biography of 
Muqtada al-Sadr, the post-Saddam era reporting of the International Crisis Group, and a variety 
of non-academic works on post-Saddam Iraq such as those of Ali Allawi, Anthony Shadid, and 
Fouad Ajami.32 Lastly, analysis of the hardships of the sanctions era and their impact on Iraqi 
society draws from numerous authors, including Jabar, Kenneth Pollack, Peter Munson, Makiya, 
and Sarah Graham-Brown.33  
 
Chapter Three’s account of the Mehdi Army’s rise and fall builds from the observations and 
experiences of the author, while also relying heavily upon a fairly narrow range of sources – 
reflecting the often shallow and duplicative nature of much of the literature of post-Saddam Iraq. 
Most useful, and most widely cited, were the publications of the International Crisis Group and 
the Institute for the Study of War.34 The former provided balanced insights into macro- and 
                                                                                                                                            
No.215, Summer 2001; Faleh A. Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed Etatist 
Nationalism”, in Lawrence Potter and Gary Sick (eds), Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War, (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); Faleh A. Jabar, “Clerics, Tribes, Ideologies and Urban Dwellers in the South 
of Iraq: the Potential for Rebellion”, in Toby Dodge and Steven Simon (eds), Iraq at the Crossroads: State 
and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003); Isam al-Khafaji, “State Terror 
and the Degradation of Politics”, in Iraq Since the Gulf War; Isam al-Khafaji, “A Few Days After: State 
and Society in a post-Saddam Iraq”, in Iraq at the Crossroads; Jerry Long, Saddam’s War of Words: 
Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, (Austin: U of Texas Press, 2004); Sluglett and Farouk-
Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958. 
32 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr; International Crisis Group, “Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath”, 
Middle East Report No.6, October 1, 2002; International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr: Spoiler or 
Stabilizer? Middle East Report No.55, July 11, 2006; Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the 
War, Losing the Peace, (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007); Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near, (New York: 
Picador, 2005); Fouad Ajami; The Foreigner’s Gift: The Americans, The Arabs and the Iraqis in Iraq, (New 
York: Free Press, 2006). 
33 Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement; Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed Etatist Nationalism”; 
Faleh ‘Abd al-Jabbar, “Why the Intifada Failed”, Fatima Mohsen, “Cultural Totalitarianism”, Abbas 
Alnasrawi, “Economic Devastation, Underdevelopment and Outlook”, and Ayad Rahim, “Attitudes to the 
West, Arabs and Fellow Iraqis”, all in Iraq Since the Gulf War; al-Khafaji, “A Few Days After: State and 
Society in a post-Saddam Iraq” and Jabar, “Clerics, Tribes, Ideologies and Urban Dwellers in the South of 
Iraq: the Potential for Rebellion”; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, 
(New York: Random House, 2002); Peter Munson, Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the 
Prospects for Democracy, (Washington: Potomac Books, 2009); Peter Munson, “What Lies Beneath: 
Saddam’s Legacy and the Roots of Resistance in Iraq”, M.A. Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 2005; Makiya, Republic of Fear; Makiya, Cruelty and Silence; Sarah Graham-Brown, 
“Sanctioning Iraq: A Failed Policy”, Middle East Report No. 215, Summer 2000. 
34 International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics in Iraq”; International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-
Sadr”; International Crisis Group, “The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict”, Middle East 
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micro-level political and social developments, while the latter offered a quasi-official account of 
American efforts that benefits from the principal authors’ close ties to the American military. 
Press accounts and non-academic works on post-Saddam Iraq such as those of Allawi, Cockburn, 
and Shadid are used intermittently; while the works of authors affiliated with the American 
defence establishment (some of whom participated in the conflict) such as Kimberly Kagan, 
Ahmed Hashim, Anthony Cordesman, Munson and David Kilcullen are cited along with material 
disseminated by think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution.35  
 
From Chapter Four through the end of the study, analysis is based largely on primary research 
conducted in Baghdad. The observations and experiences of the author, his colleagues on a 
Human Terrain Team, and those of the American military personnel that the HTT supported 
during 2008 provide the core source material from which analysis is conducted.36 Secondary 
sources are also used to further substantiate observations and analysis, most notably David 
Finkel’s account of 2-16 infantry battalion’s deployment to eastern Tisa Nissan during the Surge, 
the reporting of the International Crisis Group on events in Baghdad (which contain footnotes that 
offer invaluable local specificity), and the Institute for the Study of War’s writings on American 
                                                                                                                                            
Report No. 52, February 27, 2006; International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the 
Surge”; Cochrane, “Special Groups”; Cochrane, “The Battle for Basra”, Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of 
the Sadrist Movement”. 
35 Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq; Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr; Shadid, Night Draws Near; Kagan, The 
Surge; Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006); 
Cordesman, “Sadr and the Mahdi Army”; Anthony Cordesman and Emma Davies, Iraq’s Insurgency and 
the Road to Civil Conflict, Volumes 1 & 2, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008); Anthony 
Cordesman, “Iraq: Creating a Strategic Partnership”, CSIS, “Third Review Draft”, February 2, 2010; 
Munson, Iraq in Transition; Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla; Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, 
“Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Displacement”, The Brookings Institution – University of Bern 
Project on International Displacement, October 2006; Jamille Bigio and Jen Scott, “Internal Displacement 
in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable Solutions”, The Brookings Institution – University of 
Bern Project on International Displacement, June 2009. 
36 Contextual and methodological concerns relating to the conduct of fieldwork that is utilized in these 
chapters are presented in Appendix A, while issues particular to specific areas or circumstances are detailed 
in footnotes within each chapter. The personal manuscripts of Dr. Nana Yaw Boaitey, a scholar who 
conducted ethnographic fieldwork across Baghdad during 2008, are also used with permission: Nana Yaw 
Boaitey, “The Gait of 9 Nissan”; Nana Yaw Boaitey, “Play and the Implications of Civil Society”; Nana 
Yaw Boaitey, “Civil Society, part II”; Nana Yaw Boaitey, “Civil Society, part III”; Nana Yaw Boaitey, 
“Toward Fedaliyah: An Assessment”. 
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military operations and the dynamics of shi’a violence.37 Assorted supplementary sources from 
policy organizations are also used, along with historical insights from Hilmi, Batatu, Gulick and 
others.38 
 
vii. A New Prose of Counterinsurgency?  
In a critique of the manner in which British officers and administrators documented military 
action in colonial India, the historian Ranajit Guha observed a distinct “prose of 
counterinsurgency”.39 Official accounts of insurgent activity, and of the operations mounted in 
response, invariably focused on British actions and interests, Guha noted, to the point that the 
indigenous people (and, indeed, the specifics of the insurgency itself) were largely absent from 
the text. Even when an author explicitly declared his intention to detail aspects of insurgency, 
focus would invariably shift back to a discussion of British concerns, while references to the 
insurgents were commonly couched in the dehumanizing vocabulary of nature and disease (e.g. 
floods, swarms, plagues).40 “The rebel has no place in this history as the subject of rebellion”, 
Guha lamented, insinuating that the ethnocentrism underpinning British documentation denied 
the indigenous people their rightful place in the narrative of their own lives.41 Instead, the British 
took center stage in the historiography of colonial India, amounting to a sort of intellectual 
imperialism that compounded the injustices of the Indian subcontinent’s colonial past.  
 
One need not transpose Guha’s causal explanations of racism and deliberate bias (nor subscribe to 
his interpretation of British colonial history) to acknowledge that a similar phenomenon is at 
                                                
37 David Finkel, The Good Soldiers, (New York: Sarah Crichton Books, 2009); International Crisis Group, 
“Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge”; Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”; 
Cochrane, “Special Groups”. 
38 Hilmi, Internal Migration; Batatu, The Old Social Classes; Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City”.  
39 Ranajit Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency”, in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty (eds), 
Selected Subaltern Studies, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988). 
40 Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency”, pp.45-46. 
41 Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency”, pp.70-71.  
 22 
work today in the literature of post-Saddam Iraq. Despite the growth of a sizable canon of texts 
by participants in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, remarkably little has been written that 
explores Iraq in rigorous detail, or which breaks new ground in the study of Iraqi society.42 On the 
contrary, the commonality that has united a great many of the texts ostensibly written about Iraq 
since 2003, irrespective of their immediate focus or political tilt, is that they have not, in fact, 
been about Iraq at all. Texts have instead been merely set in Iraq, utilizing the country as a 
medium for, rather than the subject of, discussion.  
 
In short, those who have gone to Iraq and had a front-line view of the post-Saddam era have 
returned to write, for the most part, about themselves. From personal stories of deployment 
experiences to assessments of the strategies and tactics employed by the occupying powers, the 
accounts of those who have navigated the terrain of post-Saddam Iraq have been overwhelmingly 
self-centered.43 Occasionally offering potted histories of Iraq, and typically deigning to explore 
                                                
42 This is noted explicitly by Munson (a Foreign Area Officer with the United States Marine Corps) in a 
statement on his motives for writing Iraq in Transition. Munson observes that “while numerous studies and 
histories had been published on Iraq pre-2003, and several high profile books detailing the military and 
policy aspects of events in 2003 and after were beginning to show up, none explicitly linked Iraq’s history 
and legacies to what was going on in the country post-invasion. What is more, the quickly growing 
literature on post-invasion Iraq focused on either policy and strategy critique or individual observations of 
soldiers or journalists. There was a significant gap for someone trying to learn about Iraqi society, culture, 
and politics in the new era.” Interview published on the Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH) blog: 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/08/iraq-in-transition/. His book further engages the issue, 
lamenting that “narratives in the West have pigeonholed Iraqis as bit players or legions of similarly 
costumed extras and focused almost exclusively on American officials, soldiers, and policies.” Munson, 
Iraq in Transition, p.6. 
43 Examination of online venues such as the Small Wars Journal http://smallwarsjournal.com/, where 
students and practitioners of counterinsurgency congregate to share experiences and offer insights, reveals 
an abundance of self-criticism and introspection regarding the successes and failures of contemporary 
counterinsurgency operations (as well as an array of historical studies of counterinsurgency campaigns), 
but a dearth of original, substantive work on specific insurgencies or the societies from which they emerge. 
The “strategic-level bibliography” of Operation Iraqi Freedom provided by the US Army War College’s 
Strategic Studies Insitute is similarly skewed heavily toward self analysis at the expense of close study of 
Iraq itself: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/of-interest-11.pdf/. Lastly, the very titles 
of the more popular “first-hand” accounts of events on the ground betray their focus. See, for example: L. 
Paul Bremer III and Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Colby Buzzell, My War: Killing Time in Iraq, (London: Penguin, 2005); 
Rajiv Chandraseskaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone, (New York: Knopf, 
2006); Peter Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq, (New Haven: Yale UP, 
2008); Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of 
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the localized dynamics of violence (instead, more commonly dismissing the viability of such 
exploration by presenting Iraq as hopelessly divided and impenetrably complex), the country and 
its people have received only token attention from authors whose central focus has lain 
elsewhere. 
 
This phenomenon can be attributed to a variety of forces. Most immediately, the preponderance 
of “first hand” accounts of post-Saddam Iraq that center on the actions and experiences of a 
particular author can be attributed to the overriding interests of the authors in question – as well 
as their understanding of their readers’ appetites, which favour stories of deployments abroad and 
critiques of American policy over examinations of the nuances of Iraqi society. The contemporary 
prose of counterinsurgency thus may be understood, in significant measure, as a manifestation of 
our collective disinterest in Iraq, and our overriding preoccupation with ourselves.  
 
Nonetheless, the prevailing focus on America and its allies in accounts of post-Saddam Iraq also 
reflects dominant intellectual trends in academia, the press, and the defence establishment. On the 
one hand, the notion that external powers have made the critical decisions of the post-Saddam 
era, and that the Iraqis have been mere pawns in the games of others, sits neatly within a broader 
narrative that is widely held among professional observers of the Middle East.44 If America and 
its allies have, in fact, been “in the driver’s seat of history” throughout the course of the post-
Saddam era, it is only natural that accounts of the period should focus on the actions of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Iraq, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008); Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 
(London: Penguin Press, 2006); Rory Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes and other Occupational Hazards 
of a Year in Iraq, (Orlando: Harcourt, 2006). Munson’s work stands out as one of the only truly Iraq-
focused books to be produced by an active participant in the conflict.  
44 For a polemical attack on prevailing trends in academia to treat the Middle East as a recipient of modern 
history (along with allegations regarding the shortcomings of the academic establishment in engaging the 
practicalities of defence- and foreign policy-related debates), see: Martin Kramer, “Ivory Towers on Sand: 
The Failure of Middle East Studies in America”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001. 
Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), p.39 notes that this perspective is 
broadly held among residents of the region as well, as in their own minds, “Arabs remain the objects of 
history”.  
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occupiers.45 Furthermore, in adopting an occupier-centric framework of analysis, authors are 
following the lead of journalists and policy experts, who have written far more about the 
implications of the war in Iraq on American interests and objectives than about Iraq itself.46 With 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq occupying a central position in American politics from late 
2002 until 2008, those with ground-level experience have been called upon far more to make 
sense of America and its allies’ involvement in Iraq than to expound on the specifics of the 
country itself. 
 
Lastly, a further, more mundane concern merits consideration: namely, the practical reality of 
occupation, and the limited range of experiences it has offered. Those who have deployed to Iraq 
have, as a rule, not experienced an extended immersion in Iraqi society, nor been offered 
extensive opportunities to interact substantively with Iraqis. On the contrary, deployment 
experiences have been profoundly isolating, amounting to intensive and prolonged immersions 
among one’s own kind on insular military installations. Even for those spending significant 
amounts of time “outside the wire”, the barriers of language, culture, armour, and mutual 
suspicion have dictated that Iraq and the Iraqis often remained largely inaccessible and 
incomprehensible. The lessons learned and insights gathered by many of those deployed have 
thus been, above all else, of the self, leading to a body of literature that is understandably 
introspective. 
 
                                                
45 In reference to debates over the reasons for improved conditions in Baghdad in 2007 and 2008, Ward, 
“Countering the Military’s Latest Fad”, attacks the “mythology” of the Surge. “The prevailing 
interpretations of the surge narrative — even competing ones, which tend to differ mostly over claims of 
paternity – put Americans in the driver’s seat of history”, Ward notes skeptically, such that “the assumption 
seems to be that the United States, its leaders and the tactics it employed are primarily responsible for the 
events on the ground.” 
46 Emphasized in Munson’s critique cited above. David Hendrickson and Robert Tucker, “Revisions in 
Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War”, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2005, pp.3-4 
offer a useful counterbalance to occupier-centric interpretations of the post-Saddam era, emphasizing how 
the fundamental qualities of Iraq itself shaped events; while Ollivant, “Countering the New Orthodoxy”, 
p.2 also cites the weaknesses of what he terms “military-centric” analysis. 
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Nonetheless, however innovative the resulting “canon of counterinsurgency” may be with respect 
to its own objectives, and however strong the merits of individual works, dominant trends toward 
introspection and self-critique have created severe distortions. Viewed collectively, the sheer 
volume of military-centric prose – examining the efficacy of the tools in the counterinsurgent’s 
arsenal, for example, with emphasis on metrics, methods, and “lessons-learned” from particular 
operations – has swelled to the point that insurgency itself has fallen from view.47 As self-critique 
becomes self-absorption, the influence (for good or for ill, depending on one’s particular world-
view) of counterinsurgent forces becomes fundamentally overstated; corrupting analysts’ ability 
to understand events, and to evaluate the efficacy and wisdom of particular actions. 
 
With the Surge, however, and the accompanying shift in the posture of American forces on the 
streets of Baghdad, opportunities to directly engage the city – and to explore its features, and 
those if its residents – proliferated. Numerous barriers remained, and interactions between 
Americans and Iraqis were still fraught with opportunities for distortion and misunderstanding, 
yet the change was nonetheless profound.  
 
Having benefited enormously from that shift, this dissertation has two primary objectives. First 
and foremost, it is a study of the Mehdi Army’s campaign in the Tisa Nissan political district of 
Baghdad, which is intended to illuminate the internal dynamics that shaped the militia’s fortunes 
and, by extension, offer insights into the condition of Iraqi society. In that capacity, it is both a 
study of war in the neighbourhoods of Baghdad, as well as a study of Baghdad’s neighbourhoods 
                                                
47 Practitioners of the discipline thus treat counterinsurgency as a thing in and of itself, which can be 
discussed and debated without reference to any particular insurgency. There are, therefore, “best practices” 
that can be adhered to, and solutions that can be applied, irrespective of the specific circumstances they are 
meant to address. Indeed, even critiques of the most flagrantly troubled examples of this trend such as 
Joshua Rovner and Tim Hoyt, “There is No Checklist for Counterinsurgency”, Foreign Policy – The AfPak 
Channel, November 18, 2010 (levied in response to Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke and Beth Grill, 
“Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency”, RAND Corporation, 2010) 
are more inclined to attack the manner in which counterinsurgency is studied and presented, rather than the 
underlying counterinsurgent-centric paradigm. 
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at war, which might contribute to the literatures of both modern Iraq and insurgency. Second, this 
thesis is offered as a primary source for students and practitioners of counterinsurgency, in the 
hope that it might draw attention to problematic imbalances in the literature of the field, and 
prompt much needed discussion (and investigation) of how the Iraqi people have shaped the post-
Saddam era.  
 
Finally, in light of the concerns raised above, this thesis is not an account of the author’s personal 
experiences working with the US Army as part of a Human Terrain Team. Nor is it an 
examination of the contributions of Human Terrain Teams to the execution of counterinsurgency 
operations, or an exposition on the conduct of academic research in a conflict environment.48 
Contextual and methodological considerations relevant to the fieldwork upon which this 
dissertation draws are detailed in Appendix A, while the footnotes of Chapters Four through 
Seven provide details of how particular insights were gathered (and commentary on the context in 
which certain issues were investigated). This is intended to allow the dissertation to remain 
focused – as exclusively as possible throughout – on Baghdad and its people.  
 
                                                
48 Furthermore, as this work mobilizes the resources of history, anthropology, sociology, urban studies, and 
other academic disciplines, it does not attempt to exhaust the potential contributions of each, or to engage 
fully the various methodological or theoretical debates therein. Instead, an explicitly utilitarian approach 
has been adopted, whereby this work moves among (and attempts to blend) all available academic 
resources with the overriding objective of illuminating the subject in focus. The intent is thus neither to use 
the experience of the Mehdi Army in Tisa Nissan to validate a particular academic paradigm, nor to explore 
the Mehdi Army’s fortunes through the prism of a particular theoretical approach, but rather to leverage all 
available resources and approaches in the investigation of its fate.  
Chapter 1  
 






i. The Continuity of Change in Baghdad 
Baghdad is a city in flux. Subject to pressures from within and without, its physical landscape 
and social fabric have both been altered dramatically since the American-led invasion of 2003. 
Much of the city has been cleansed along sectarian lines, leaving shi’a and sunni families in 
segregated cantons, while violence has taken the lives of tens of thousands, ruptured families, 
and provoked the flight abroad of vulnerable minorities and many of the best educated remnants 
of a once vibrant middle class.1 Public infrastructure has deteriorated badly as well, 
compounding the damage done by episodic bombardment and the withering of state services 
under international sanctions during the 1990s.2 Baghdad, as a result, has been stressed to the 
point of systemic collapse, and its residents brutalized to the point of despair.  
 
This is neither the first nor the most catastrophic incidence of tumultuous reconfiguration in the 
city’s long history. Change, often sudden and deadly in nature, has been a recurring feature in 
the life of the City of Peace. Labeled a “deathtrap”, and a “devourer” of men by one of Iraq’s 
most distinguished historians, Baghdad has been repeatedly ravaged and reshaped by floods, 
plagues, and foreign invasion.3  In 1831, the cumulative effect of all three in rapid succession 
(only a generation after plague had wiped out “most of the people of Iraq”) reduced the city’s 
population from 80,000 to a mere 27,000 over the course of four months, bringing down the 
ruling regime in the process.4  
                                                
1 Exact casualty figures for Baghdad are unavailable, but the death toll across Iraq from 2003 through 
2011 has been estimated at 162,000. Study by the anti-war organization Iraq Body Count, which is 
discussed in Dan Murphy, “The Iraq War Death Toll? At least 162,000 and Counting”, Christian Science 
Monitor, January 2, 2012, and available online: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/.  
2 See: Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.258-259; Makiya, Cruelty and Silence, pp.202-203; Pollack, 
The Threatening Storm, p.60; and Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade, p.45 for discussion of the 
effects of American-led bombing of Baghdad during 1991.  
3 Quotations from Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.15, alongside a chart on plagues, famines, and 
invasions that have ravaged Baghdad.  
4 See: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.235-236 for discussion of the 1831 plague outbreak in Baghdad 





The annals of the city reveal further notable instances of destruction, with the arrival of Hulagu 
and the Mongols in 1258 and of Tamerlane in 1401 bringing utter devastation and ruin. 
Estimates of the death toll from the Mongol expedition range into the hundreds of thousands 
(during which the waters of the Tigris were said to have turned black from the ink of Baghdad’s 
libraries and red from the blood of the dead), and the city’s destruction prompted the fall of the 
Abbasid Caliphate and the collapse of an entire civilization.5 Tamerlane’s arrival a century and a 
half later was likewise a civilization-destroying event, as he is infamously recalled to have 
slaughtered the entirety of Baghdad’s population, leaving behind towering pyramids of human 
heads.6  
 
This chapter addresses a further instance of radical, transformative change in Baghdad’s history. 
Yet, in contrast to the tragedies cited above, this particular episode did not feature the 
destruction of the city or the decimation of its people. On the contrary, it was the direct result of 
the explosive growth of both, and the efforts of an increasingly wealthy – and increasingly 
ambitious – central government to manage and direct that growth.  
 
At the start of the twentieth century, Baghdad was a remote, parochial outpost of the Ottoman 
Empire, home to a mere 180,000 residents.7 A century later, however, on the eve of the 
                                                                                                                                          
in a single night). The Ottoman army arrived shortly thereafter to capitalize on the chaos, overthrowing 
the Mamluk government.  
5 For an account of the Mongol campaign of Hulagu situated in reference to the events of the post-Saddam 
era, see: Ian Frazier, “Invaders: Destroying Baghdad”, The New Yorker, April 25, 2005. The Mongol 
campaigns are discussed further in Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern 
World, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004). Wilfred Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs, (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1964), pp.92-93 notes that the devastation of the Mongol expedition created systemic socio-
political instability in Mesopotamia, which was remedied by the adoption of the Bedouin Arab tribal 
system (which, he argues, had previously been alien to the region).   
6 For a comparative discussion of the Mongol campaign and that of Tamerlane, see: Michael Hancock, 
“Scourges of God: A General Comparison of Tamerlane and Hulagu in the History of Baghdad”, available 
online at www.academia.edu. 
7 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, (London: Hurst & 





American-led invasion, it was a sprawling metropolis, home to more than 6 million Iraqis.8 This 
massive and deeply destabilizing growth fundamentally transformed the city. While advances in 
public health and the development of modern infrastructure contributed to population increases 
across Iraq during the middle decades of the twentieth century, Baghdad’s grossly 
disproportionate expansion was not the byproduct of prosperity, continuity, or other such 
benefits of “modernity” writ large.9 It was instead fueled, above all else, by radical social 
upheaval and grinding rural poverty that, beginning in the 1930s and continuing well into the 
rule of the Ba’th regime during the 1970s, drove a series of sweeping population movements 
that collapsed the poorest elements of Iraq’s periphery onto the slums of its capital city. 
 
These migrations, originating along the lower reaches of the Tigris River in Iraq’s “Deep 
South”, saw hundreds of thousands of destitute shi’a men, women, and children of the 
traditional tribal underclass abandon their homes and relocate to Baghdad.10 Not only did this 
fundamentally alter the demographic composition of the city (precise records are unavailable, 
but it is thought that Baghdad was a sunni-majority city until the 1950s), but the stresses 
                                                                                                                                          
was a posting to which the Ottoman government exiled its most troublesome (and, often, its most inept) 
bureaucrats. Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.243 cites census figures from 1905 for Baghdad’s population.  
8 For comparison, New York City had a population of nearly 3.5 million in 1900, which rose to 
approximately 8 million by century’s end. London grew from nearly 6 million in 1900 to approximately 7 
million a century later. Cairo’s experience was far closer to that of Baghdad, growing from 600,000 in 
1897 to 10 million in 2000.  
9 Saad Ibrahim, “Over-urbanization and Under-urbanism: The Case of the Arab World”, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1975, p.31 argues for urbanization in Iraq as having 
been a force against modernization. Observing the plight of the rural poor who took part in similar 
contemporary migrations across the Middle East, Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the 
Middle East and North Africa, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963), p.86 notes that “for the great majority of 
peasants, the benefits of the modern age can be summed up by saying that it has become harder to die… 
more Middle Eastern peasants are probably kept alive to suffer misery than ever before in history”.  
10 The term “Deep South”, which is used throughout this work in reference to modern-day Maysan and 
Wasit Provinces, was coined by Dr. Nana Yaw Boaitey in the course of his ethnographic research in 
Baghdad during 2008. It has particular resonance among American audiences, as many of the prejudices 





generated by uncontrolled mass migration delineated fault lines in the urban landscape that 
persist to the present day.11  
 
Furthermore, in addition to the changes arising from migration flows themselves, the manner in 
which Iraq’s ruling regimes attempted to manage this phenomenon yielded profound and 
pervasive effects. An understanding of these migrations and their consequences is, therefore, 
essential to interpreting the events of the post-Saddam era in Baghdad – particularly with respect 
to discussion of the rise of the city’s now-enormous shi’a underclass, the significance of the 
city’s physical layout to localized patterns of violence, and the mechanics of the Mehdi Army’s 
urban campaign.  
 
I. A Countryside in Chaos 
The mass migrations that overwhelmed Baghdad during the middle of the twentieth century 
traced their origins to a social engineering experiment initiated decades before Iraq’s creation. 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had claimed sovereignty over 
what was then known as Mesopotamia for over three hundred years. Imperial power had long 
been concentrated in Baghdad and Basra, however, leaving much of the rugged and sparsely 
populated terrain between the two cities as the domain of nomadic sunni Arab tribes.12 These 
tribes were organized into a complex and ever-fluctuating system of confederations, the 
strongest of which operated as portable “states” in their own right, enabling prominent sheikhs 
                                                
11 Batatu, “Iraq’s Shi’a, their Political Role, and the Process of their Integration into Society”, p.209 states 
that shi’ism reached majority status in Baghdad for the first time in the city’s history around the time of 
the 1958 coup that toppled the monarchy. Noted also in Suglett and Farouk-Sluglett, “Some Reflections 
on the Sunni/Shi’i Question”, p.80. 
12 Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, in Tribes and Power; and Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.8-19, survey 





to engage Ottoman bureaucrats more as peers than as subjects.13 Regional politics was thus 
characterized by a web of intrigue and double-dealing as rival Arab factions attempted to 
leverage imperial favour against their indigenous rivals, while Ottoman administrators sought to 
maintain overall control by manipulating these same local divisions to the empire’s advantage. 
During the latter decades of the nineteenth century, in the context of a broader, empire-wide 
campaign toward administrative rejuvenation and the restoration of fading prestige, Ottoman 
officials took action to alter this dynamic.14 No longer willing to countenance the existence of 
powerful, independent tribal groups within the boundaries of the empire, the Ottomans set out to 
shatter their confederations and assert a more complete imperial control. This was not to be 
achieved through force of arms, however, but instead through the manipulation of land. Taking 
advantage of the empire’s ownership of the land across much of the region (and the growing 
financial allure of commercial agriculture), Ottoman administrators alternately induced, 
compelled, and coerced Arab tribes to abandon their nomadic ways and become farmers.15 Their 
objective in doing so was twofold: not only would the ensuing intra-Arab competition over land 
and water rights sow localized dissent and preclude collective resistance to the Ottomans’ rising 
                                                
13 Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, pp.73-74 notes that “each strong tribe was a miniature mobile state”. 
Robert Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority Among the el Shabana of Southern 
Iraq, (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1970), p.25 argues that “except for sporadic attempts at tax collection and 
pacification, the southern Mesopotamian countryside was for nearly seven centuries the home of largely 
self-governing tribal groups”.  
14 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.13 traces Ottoman efforts toward the “reconquest” of Mesopotamia to the 
early nineteenth century, though notes that progress accelerated dramatically under the watch of Midhat 
Pasha from 1869. For detailed discussion of the land reform schemes enacted during the tanzimat, see: 
Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, “The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure”; Haj, The 
Making of Iraq, pp.24-39; Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes 
under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”; and David Pool, “From Elite to Class: The 
Transformation of Iraqi Political Leadership”, in Abbas Kelidar (ed), The Integration of Modern Iraq, 
(London: Croom Helm, 1979) pp.75-84.  
15 The tribes of southern Mesopotamia had been gradually settling along the Tigris and Euphrates through 
the duration of the nineteenth century, but this process was accelerated dramatically by the Ottoman land 
scheme. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly facilitated the export of Middle Eastern 
commodities to international markets as well, while the introduction of steamships to Mesopotamia’s 
rivers further drove commercial activity. The Ottoman settlement scheme thus occurred in the context of 





power, but southern Mesopotamia would also become a commercial engine that would help to 
power the empire’s global revival.  
 
While the scheme was implemented unevenly across southern Mesopotamia (and provoked such 
unrest as to warrant its eventual suspension), a chain reaction was catalyzed that brought about 
the near-universal settling of the tribes, the shattering of their warfighting coalitions, and an 
extraordinary agricultural boom along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.16 It also wrought a host of 
unintended and unanticipated consequences, which would exert powerful influences over the 
subsequent course of Iraqi history. These included the fragmentation and corruption of the 
regional tribal system as a whole, mass conversions among the newly settled Arab farmers to the 
shi’a sect of Islam and, finally, an exodus from the Deep South that saw the region’s poorest and 
most vulnerable flee to Baghdad. 
 
i. The Degradation of the Tribal System & the Rise of Shi’ism 
Irrespective of the turbulence generated by the Ottoman land scheme, the chaotic manner in 
which it progressed, and the fact that the Ottomans were driven from Mesopotamia by the 
British while the tribes’ settlement was still underway, the transition from nomadism to 
sedentary agriculture gained irreversible momentum.17 A fundamental transformation of modes 
of subsistence and patterns of life thus ensued across southern Mesopotamia around the turn of 
                                                
16 The inconsistent nature of the scheme’s implementation reflected both the varied strength and 
competency of Ottoman administrators across southern Mesopotamia, as well as differing local conditions 
with respect to both land usage and inter-tribal relations. See: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, Chapter 5; 
Fahim Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958); and 
Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi, pp.12-13 for commentary on the variances of land ownership in the South 
and the resulting differences in settlement patterns and agricultural practices from the lower-Tigris to the 
middle-Euphrates. 
17 While idealized conceptions of Arab tribes often reference an innate hostility to the encroachment of 
government authority, the financial allure of agriculture appears to have been a paramount driver of 
sedentarization – and the tribal revolts that occurred during the process were overwhelmingly not protests 
against the end of nomadism or the advance of Ottoman power. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, “Some 
Reflections on the Sunni/Shi’i Question”, p.82 observe that revolts were instead launched principally in 
response to perceived slights or injustices in the allocation of land rights and the manner in which 





the twentieth century, as nomads became villagers, warriors became farmers, and sheikhs 
became landlords – causing shocks to the regional tribal order that went well beyond the 
structural fragmentation desired by the Ottoman government.18 Not only did tribal 
confederations splinter, but qualitative changes occurred as well to the ethos that had 
underpinned tribalism as a system of social relations.  
 
First, despite the widespread fragmentation of tribal structures, the caste-like socio-cultural 
hierarchy of the traditional tribal system was intensified.19 Certain areas saw the upper echelons 
of the traditional social order become powerful landowners (leaving their underclass 
subordinates as a landless peasantry), while others witnessed fierce competition between relative 
equals over land and water rights. The net effect was the exacerbation of social prejudices and 
the intensification of identity-based rivalry.20 Second, and perhaps more insidiously, dramatic 
changes also occurred to relations within tribes. As sheikhs took on roles that entailed both 
authority and responsibilities tied to the regional political economy, their position vis-à-vis their 
tribesmen was altered. They transitioned, in effect, from serving as their tribesmen’s protector 
and advocate to that of their master and administrator.21 The incentives and pressures of 
                                                
18 Jabar, in Tribes & Power, pp.75-76 notes that the rise of the market economy “triggered processes 
which changed the tribe beyond recognition”, and emphasizes the dislocations that ensued as “warrior 
chieftains were turned into tax farmers”. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, p.86 also cites the social 
changes that ensued as “warrior tribesmen” became “subservient sharecroppers”.  
19 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.16, 68-69 and Jabar, “Shaykhs and Ideologues”, p.28 detail the 
divisions that existed among tribal castes, which were largely based on modes of subsistence and patterns 
of life. Haj, The Making of Iraq, pp.32-39 analyses the social implications of sedentarization, whereby 
“new class relations evolved, with the dominant tribes emerging as the triumphant landed class”. 
20 Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p.76 notes how despite the fact that sedentarization unraveled the 
tribes structurally, it nonetheless made the social prejudices associated with the former tribal system more 
rigid and contentious. Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, pp.46-48 also addresses the accentuation of divisions 
among tribal strata as nomadism was abandoned, and how tribal genealogy (whether real or imagined) 
became increasingly important as actual structures unraveled. Per the phenomenon of social bias 
intensifying despite the collapse of the very structures that underpinned those biases, there is an 
observation to be made regarding basic human nature and the proclivity of those seeking to preserve 
“tradition” in the face of change by clinging to its less tangible vestiges.  
21 See: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.63, 73-78, 83-84 for discussion of how the sheikhs’ transition 





commercial agriculture thus had a commoditizing effect on sheikh-tribesman relations and, 
while the balance of power between sheikhs and their tribesmen varied from place-to-place and 
tribe-to-tribe, the relationship became an increasingly antagonistic one. 
 
Social unrest permeated southern Mesopotamia as a result of the tribal system’s structural 
fragmentation and ethical corruption, prompting a search for a new schema to order the lives of 
the southern farmers. This search played out haphazardly and informally in the midst of the 
tribes’ sedentarization, and its progression was largely obscured by the political unrest that 
consumed the region at that time (due not only to the turmoil generated by the Ottomans’ 
initiative, but also the British invasion in the context of the First World War). It progressed 
nonetheless, and in doing so it affected a sweeping demographic change that would have 
extraordinary consequences for the future of Iraq. This was the mass conversion of newly-settled 
Arab farmers to shi’ism, which occurred on such a scale as to elevate it to the majority faith in 
Mesopotamia.22  
 
Aided by proximate factors as dramatic as the raids of viciously sectarian wahabbis from the 
Arabian Peninsula (which motivated the small and heavily Persian shi’a communities of Najaf 
                                                                                                                                          
economically-derived power, and how the sheikhs of the Deep South came increasingly to rely on private 
militias to assert authority over “their” tribesmen. Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, p.27 
observes that the tribes were “undergoing disintegration”, and that relations between sheikhs and their 
tribesmen were increasingly commoditized, while Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs, p.203 laments that “the old 
relationship between the sheikh and his tribesmen had disappeared and both were poorer in consequence.”  
22 For discussion of conversions to shi’ism, see: Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq; Nakash, “The Conversion of 
Iraq’s Tribes To Shiism”; and Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement. The settlement of the tribes is widely cited in 
academic literature as the essential precondition for the mass conversions that followed. Nakash, “The 
Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes To Shiism”, p,457 posits that “an identity crisis among the settled tribesmen” 
was the critical driver of the process. He further notes on p.448 that all of the tribes that remained nomadic 
have likewise remained sunni to the present day. With the recent nature of these conversions in mind, the 
oft-referenced “primordial” division between shi’a and sunni in Iraq, and the similarly popular notion of a 
timeless legacy of shi’a persecution at the hands of sunnis in Iraq (and Mesopotamia before it) are thus, in 
fundamental respects, nonsense. Nakash, “The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes To Shiism”, p.443 notes that 
“there is no evidence that would suggest that the Shi’is were ever close to forming a majority of Iraq’s 
population before the nineteenth or even twentieth century.” On the scale of the conversion process, 
Nakash notes (p.455) that upon driving the Ottomans from Mesopotamia during World War I, British 





and Kerbala to forge alliances with their Arab neighbours), and as mundane as completion of the 
Hindiyya Canal in 1803 (which made the stretch of the Euphrates River in the immediate 
vicinity of shi’ism’s holy cities particularly attractive farmland), the emissaries of the shi’a faith 
met with extraordinary success as they proselytized across the region. Connecting classic shi’a 
narratives of injustice and oppression at the hands of illegitimate leadership to the farmers’ 
recent experiences with both the Ottomans and their own sheikhs (and, moreover, encouraged at 
times by Ottoman administrators intent on undermining the tribal system), the shi’a men of 
religion who canvassed the growing settlements of southern Mesopotamia offered an appealing 
new source of leadership and identity to the beleaguered peasant farmers.23  
 
ii. Fight or Flight in the Deep South 
Nowhere were the dislocations arising from the transition to sedentary farming and the 
degradation of the tribal order more pronounced than along the lower reaches of the Tigris River 
in Iraq’s Deep South. There, where Ottoman power had been at its weakest, a narrow cadre of 
tribal elites established themselves as the guarantors of regional stability.24 By positioning 
themselves as the indispensable proxies of the distant central government (a role they would 
maintain via astute political manoeuvering well into the second-half of the twentieth century), 
                                                
23 Nakash notes the practice of Ottoman officials to use religious figures to undercut tribal loyalties in The 
Shi’is of Iraq, p.39 and “The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes To Shiism”, p.452.  
24 For discussion of regional dynamics in the Deep South, see: Mohammed Tarbush, The Role of the 
Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941, (London: Keegan Paul, 1982), pp.19-30; and Haj, The 
Making of Iraq. Batatu and Dodge, the former in The Old Social Classes, p.99 and “The Old Social 
Classes Revisited”; the latter in “The Social Ontology of Late Colonialism: Tribes and the Mandated State 
in Iraq”, in Tribes and Power, and Inventing Iraq, Chapter 5, note how the rising power of southern 
sheikhs marked a significant break from the past, and how the decision of British administrators to 
empower them as local proxies (due in part, according to both authors, to their romanticized, essentialist 
views of Arab tribalism) affected a major shift in regional dynamics. Dodge is particularly critical of the 
British in this regard, while Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.88 observes that “what may have begun as 
an administrative expedient ended as a political necessity”, as there were no practical alternatives to the 





they secured control over some of the largest estates in the Middle East.25 They also assumed 
tyrannical, feudal-style powers over their vast holdings, while the traditional tribal underclass 
was relegated to serf status and forced to work under horrendous conditions. 
 
Further compounding the plight of these warriors-turned-serfs, the reach of religious emissaries 
faded and the palliative influence of shi’ism appears to have waned significantly as the distance 
increased from Najaf and Kerbala. To the distant southeast of the holy cities, where the new 
agricultural order was at its most brutal, shi’ism made its weakest inroads. A 1947 survey of 
present-day Maysan and Wasit provinces, for example, failed to find a single mosque – and thus 
while the farmers of the Deep South nominally adopted the shi’a faith en masse, the spread of 
shi’ism failed to provide a structure of social relations that could adequately replace the tribe.26  
 
The faith of the Deep South, spread by self-proclaimed holy men of dubious provenance, instead 
developed as a rough overlay of traditional tribal norms.27 Couched in the local vernacular and 
laden with superstitions, magical rites, and the cults of saints, the peasant farmers’ faith became 
a matter of contempt among their higher-class coreligionists elsewhere – adding a further layer 
to their marginal, underclass status in the new regional order. 
 
                                                
25 Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, “The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure”, p.497 
note that the estates of the Deep South became among “the largest private estates in the whole of the 
Middle East”, and that their owners paid negligible taxes. 
26 Batatu, “Iraq’s Shi’a, their Political Role, and the Process of their Integration into Society”, p.205 notes 
that as of 1947 there was not a single mosque or husseiniyah in modern-day Maysan and Wasit Provinces. 
Prevailing styles of architecture partially account for this, but the irreligiousity and outright impiety of the 
farmers in the region was legendary. Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs, p.20 observes of the Deep South around 
the middle of the twentieth century that “few people in these parts bothered to pray at all, and those that 
did were mostly old men”.  
27 Batatu is particularly cynical regarding the mechanics of the conversion process, noting in “Shi’i 
Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin”, p.186 that the mu’mins and sayyids that 
spread the shi’a faith among the rural poor “specialized in superstition or even quackery and lived off the 
peasant tribesmen”. On the extent to which shi’ism displaced or otherwise altered traditional tribal values, 
Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, p.6 argues that the “Arab tribal system was encapsulated by Shi’i religion, not 





Irrespective of the comforts provided by their new faith, conditions on the agricultural estates of 
the Deep South proved unbearable. The sheikhly elite codified their powers and privileges under 
the laws of the nascent Iraqi state (in which the tribal domain was left outside of federal 
jurisdiction, leaving the Southern sheikhs quite literally a law unto themselves), and they further 
became a powerful constituency in parliament during the 1930s and 1940s. Attempts to 
challenge their position occurred sporadically into the 1950s – featuring the legislative 
initiatives of reform-minded politicians as well as militant action by revolutionary communists – 
yet substantive challenges were consistently thwarted.28 Conditions, therefore, continued to 
deteriorate, and life expectancy for the farmers (who were infamously described as “living 
pathological specimen” by a visiting British doctor) was measured only in the upper-thirties.29  
 
The dislocations arising from the fragmentation of the tribal system, the farmers’ appalling 
quality of life, and the seeming impossibility of material or social improvement created an 
atmosphere of despair that, from the 1930s onwards, prompted an exodus from the Deep South 
(and from modern-day Maysan Province in particular). Initial movements were modest enough 
to be absorbed by Iraq’s various urban areas as families, extended families, and “tribal 
fragments” boarded trucks and buses for passage to a new start in Baghdad, Basra, and other 
smaller cities throughout the South; yet by the mid-1940s, it was apparent that a mass migration 
of extraordinary proportions was underway.30 Migration levels would accelerate continuously 
                                                
28 On peasant uprisings during the 1950s, see: Haj, The Making of Iraq, pp.36-38; and al-Arif, Iraq 
Reborn, p.24. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp.60-61 discusses the communists’ contribution to revolts in 
present-day Maysan and Wasit Provinces. 
29 Quotation from the 1955 account of Dr. Michael Critchley in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine, 
cited in Warriner, Land Reform and Development, p.115. Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, 
p.29 notes the life expectancy of southern farmers ranged from 35 to 39 years between 1921 and 1958.  
30 Hilmi, Internal Migration, p265 notes that until the late-1930s, Iraq’s cities were able to absorb much of 
this migration “in the existing urban fabric”, but that peripheral slum developments were notable in 
eastern Baghdad by the early 1940s. Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-
Mujahidin”, p.188 notes that migration progressed from the 1930s “in great waves, sometimes emptying 
whole villages”. Warriner, Land Reform and Development, p.153 observed “ten lorry loads a day” leaving 
modern-day Maysan Province for Baghdad in the 1950s. The term “tribal fragments” comes from 





through the decades that followed (with the Iraqi capital emerging as the destination of choice), 
and as a result, not only would shi’ism rise to majority status in Baghdad shortly after mid-
century for the first time in the city’s long history, but the countryside would be depopulated to 
point of jeopardizing Iraq’s agricultural productivity.31  
 
II. Mahallahs, Migration & Baghdad’s Evolving Landscape 
While the southern countryside’s destabilizing transformation progressed through the first half 
of the twentieth century, Baghdad was also changing. Ottoman Baghdad had long been home to 
a kaleidoscope of distinct and discordant communities that were delineated variously along the 
lines of family, religion, profession, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and sect.32 Aspects of one’s 
communal identity dictated sharp social, economic, and political distinctions, and urban society 
thus shared important structural commonalities with its rural, tribal counterpart.33  
 
Moreover, just as the tribes of southern Mesopotamia laid claim to physical terrain, the social 
and cultural forces that segmented Baghdad were manifested spatially on the urban landscape in 
the form of the mahallah, or city quarter.34 The mahallahs served as the basic structure of urban 
                                                                                                                                          
notes that “in Iraq, migration had always been a family affair from the outset, implying a determination 
never to return no matter what conditions were found at the other end of the journey”. 
31 Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs, p.203 notes the concerns of southern sheikhs (to whom Thesiger was 
generally sympathetic) regarding their dwindling labour supply. Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi, p.23, writing 
in the 1960s, noted that if migration flows were not reversed “the muwaddafin (government 
administrators) will soon have to one to serve but each other” in the rural South.  
32 See: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.8-10, 16-22 for a discussion of the rigidity of social divisions in 
both urban and rural spaces, whereby “Iraq consisted to no little extent of distinct, self-absorbed, feebly 
interconnected societies”, where a “strong spirit of localism” prevailed. 
33 The similarities between rural and urban social organization in Ottoman Mesopotamia are discussed by 
Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.8-10, and also by the famous Iraqi sociologist Ali al-Wardi in “A 
Study of The Society of Iraq”. Noted in Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, p.251, who also compares 
the martial aspects of the tribe with the urban gangs that often formed along mahallah-based lines.  
34 The dira is the land to which a tribe lays claim. It can have both fixed properties (such as the particular 
plot of farmland that a semi-nomadic tribe regularly cultivates) as well as transient, spatial qualities (i.e., 
the ever-moving buffer zone that a nomadic tribe lays claim to as it moves across the desert). Like their 
rural counterparts, urban social units were also in constant competition for prized territory. Gulick, 
“Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, p.251, traces the movement of identity-based communities in Baghdad 





social organization, and their residents existed “as a rule… in a world of their own… and seldom 
if ever took thought of the community at large or of its interests, or had even any real 
understanding of such a community”.35 Particular kinship groups, religious sects, and 
professional guilds thus occupied independent sectors of the city that, often surrounded by 
formidable walls and gates, demarcated the boundaries of their lives.36 As such, despite being 
“diverse” in statistical terms, the identity-based fault lines of Ottoman Baghdad – and the 
powerful prejudices that upheld them – inhibited intercommunal blending and precluded the 
development of a shared identity. 
 
By the 1930s and 1940s, however, when migration to Baghdad was intensifying, the boundaries 
of the mahallahs were blurring.37 The rise of Arab nationalism around the time of the First 
World War and the development thereafter of an Iraq-specific conception of identity (which was 
promulgated aggressively by the Iraqi monarchy following independence in 1932) had powerful 
influences on the city.38 Furthermore, in addition to the rise of Iraqi nationalism, intellectual 
currents of liberalism and radical strands of communism and fascism spread among Baghdad’s 
educated classes.39 The city was thus in the midst of a transformative period of its own, wherein 
                                                
35 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.19.  
36 Charles Issawi, in Middle Eastern Cities, pp.107-8, notes the prevalence of walls and barriers among 
communities in what he refers to as “Muslim cities” like Baghdad. This schema of institutionalized 
division was further reinforced by the Ottomans’ millat system, which allowed minority communities 
such as Christians and Jews to administer their own neighbourhoods and maintain independent education 
systems.  
37 Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, p.246 notes that the mahallah framework was dominant in 
Baghdad at the turn of the century and that, while its barriers were blurring, the traditional names of these 
enclaves were still in use during the 1957 census.  
38 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.22-23 notes the rise of nationalism and the weakening of the city’s 
kaleidoscopic divisions in response to an array of factors including British occupation; and Tripp, A 
History of Iraq, pp.26-27 addresses the rise of Arab nationalist thought (itself an outgrowth of Turkish 
nationalism in key respects, as well as the influences of the First World War). See: Makiya, Republic of 
Fear, pp.152-160 and William Cleveland, The Making of An Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism 
in the Life and Thought of Sati’ al-Husri, (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1971), on the work of Sati al-Husri in 
furthering Arab nationalism via public education.  
39 Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, p.48; Haj, The Making of Iraq, pp.82-98; Marr, The 
Modern History of Iraq, p.45; Israel Gershoni, “Rethinking the Formation of Arab Nationalism in the 





Baghdadis were attempting to transcend traditional divisions (the categories and values of the 
traditional past became the object of extraordinary scorn among the budding intelligentsia), 
while the identity-based clusters at the city’s increasingly cosmopolitan core, and the “mahallah 
mentality” that accompanied them, were giving way to a more inclusive urban environment.40 
 
i. Arrival in “The Capital”  
The intellectual dynamism evident at the heart of the Iraqi capital did not translate into 
widespread support for the migrants’ plight, however, or into receptiveness to their arrival. On 
the contrary, the influx of impoverished and illiterate peasants (who were derisively referred to 
as shurughis, or “easterners”) was perceived as both a physical and cultural threat. To the elites 
of the city, and to growing legions of increasingly better-educated Baghdadis with aspirations to 
elitism, the migrants were crude, ignorant, and dangerously belligerent – anachronistic 
manifestations of Iraq’s backward past – and their appearance in the city prompted responses 













                                                                                                                                          
Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, (New York: Columbia UP, 1997), pp.18-19; and Dann, 
Iraq Under Qassem, pp.12-16 survey the development of increasingly radical political movements from 
the 1930s to the 1950s (which, in the account of the latter, is emphasized as having been confined to a 
narrow stratum of elites). Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.391 notes of the 1920s and 1930s that 
“political extremism progressively gained force… and moderation became anathema.” 
40 The “mahallah mentality” is Batatu’s phrase, The Old Social Classes, p.19. Batatu also comments on 
pervasive urban disdain for rural, tribal society, while p.426 notes how the “corrosion” of traditional 
values among the educated was key to the rise of new, modern ideologies.  
41 The “migrants as plague” metaphor would become reality, with outbreaks of smallpox in the city’s 
migrant slums prompting panic in the winter of 1956-1957. Noted in Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban 





Figure 1.1 – Baghdad in 1944 
42 
The migrants’ initial attempts to erect their distinctive palm-frond and mud-brick huts on open 
plots of land within the city prompted a backlash.43 Known as sarifas, these simple, portable 
structures were begrudged as a blight on the cityscape, due not only to their incongruous 
appearance, but also to the attempts of their inhabitants to tap into the city’s already sub-
standard infrastructure. Established residents would thus summon the police to disperse migrant 
settlement clusters, and the majority of new arrivals were barred from the city centre.44 Instead, 
                                                
42Map of Baghdad in 1944 from the University of Texas’ online catalogue of maps: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/baghdad_1944.jpg  
43 Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.276 notes the propensity of Baghdad’s residents to summon the authorities 
to eradicate migrant settlements. Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs, p.205 observes “many… left their villages 
to escape the tyranny of the sheikhs. But in Baghdad or Basra they encountered the police”. Gulick, 
“Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, p.252 further argues that the migrants were “feared and resented” by 
established residents.  
44 Hilmi, Internal Migration pp.271-277 observes that not all migrants were excluded from the city, 
however, and that some (predominantly on the west side of Baghdad) managed to maintain a foothold on 





they were largely relegated to the city’s vacant periphery, where sprawling tangles of sarifas 
rapidly accumulated to accommodate what were widely viewed as “growing and rather 
menacing hordes” of shurughis.45 
 
The largest and most notorious concentration of sarifas developed on the eastern edge of 
Baghdad. There, on the open terrain just beyond the earthen wall known as the “bund” that 
protected the city from the devastating floodwaters of the Tigris River, a satellite city grew 
alongside Baghdad.46 Despite the fact that this area was prone to catastrophic flooding (and 
furthermore served as the principal garbage dump for Baghdad proper), the migrants made it 
their home, incorporating assorted debris into the construction of their sarifas. This sprawling 
slum was given the nickname al-asima, “the capital”. By the time of its demolition in 1963 it 
would stretch for ten kilometers (through what is now the heart of eastern Baghdad, from Rusafa 
Political District southeastward toward Baghdad al-Jadeeda) and house over 25 percent of the 
city’s population.47  
 
ii. Community Beyond the Bund 
Visitors to al-asima, and to the smaller settlement clusters like it that could be found around 
Baghdad’s margins at mid-century, were struck by the intensity of local destitution.48 These 
                                                
45 Warriner, Land Reform and Development, pp.172-173. Her comment was made in reference to the 
accumulation of similar slum encampments on the outskirts of cities and towns across the South, but the 
sentiment was equally applicable (if not more so) to conditions in Baghdad. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, 
p.5 notes of the final years of the monarchy: “an uprooted, unassimilated human flotsam accumulated on 
the outskirts of every sizable town, consisting of declassed, unskilled peasants”.  
46 The creation of the bund, and its vital role in the growth of Baghdad on the eastern bank of the Tigris 
River, is discussed in Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.265-266 and Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, 
p.249. 
47 Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.269-271 estimates that at the time of al-asima’s destruction it contained 
20,000 sarifas. Population percentage estimate from al-Madfai, “Baghdad”, p.59, who was the Director 
General of Planning and Design for the Ministry of Municipalities. He observes that sarifas came to 
constitute 44.6 percent of Baghdad’s housing supply by the time of Qassim’s coup, housing some 250,000 
people. 
48 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.49 notes the “somber wretchedness” of the slums, while Hilmi, 





areas were wholly unplanned and unserviced, lacking plumbing, proper roads, electricity, or any 
other sort of public amenity. A survey of al-asima conducted in 1957 found that only 7 percent 
had access to even a stand-alone outhouse toilet, and there were no bathing facilities whatsoever 
for the slum’s 184,000 residents.49 Multiple families could thus be found crammed into squalid 
three- to five-room houses (with an average of 5.2 people to a room by one count), which were 
periodically swept away by floodwaters.50 Further adding to public health concerns, buffalo 
herders from the southern marshlands had joined the migration to al-asima, and while they made 
up only a small fraction of the population, their large herds produced voluminous amounts of 
waste.51 The large pits from which mud was exhumed for brick-making thus filled rapidly to 
overflow with a potent mixture of human and animal excrement (as well as the refuse that 
continued to be hauled to the area from the city proper), which spilled over onto the paths that 
weaved haphazardly throughout the dismal, cholera-ridden wasteland.  
 
Apart from its physical characteristics, the social environment of al-asima further contributed to 
its distinctness from the city centre.52 While the migrants’ exodus to Baghdad had been driven 
by the degradation of the tribal system, the dynamics of migration and subsequent patterns of 
settlement enabled them to preserve (and, to a certain extent, reconstitute) aspects thereof. 
Having fled the Deep South in kinship clusters and then found themselves largely unable to 
                                                
49 Survey detailed in Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration”, p.417, who noted of the toilets “the object is 
clearly privacy rather than sanitation”. Population figures from Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.266. The 
population of the migrant slums in 1957 was thus greater than the entire population of Baghdad a half-
century earlier. 
50 Figures cited in Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.277. Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration”, p420 references 
the devastating flood of 1954. The flooding of the Tigris was welcomed by city administrators, as not only 
did it sweep away the accumulated waste in al-asima, but it was also hoped to act as a deterrent to the 
slum’s continued growth.  
51 Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.278-285 notes the unique contribution of the Marsh Arabs to the squalor 
of al-asima. 
52 Ismael al-Arif, Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After, (New York: 
Vantage Press, 1982), p.21 observes of the migrants that “they brought with them to the large towns and 
cities their traditional customs and their tribal solidarity, which kept them aliens in an industrial society. 
They remained villagers in urban surroundings.” Fuad Baali, “Social Factors in Iraqi Rural-Urban 
Migration”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 25, No. 4, October 1966, p361 further 





penetrate urban society, migrants formed settlements on the open terrain of al-asima that 
mimicked the structure of the mahallah.53 Building from tribal ties, familial connections, and 
common geographic origins, these communal encampments became beacons that attracted 
subsequent arrivals possessing shared kinship markers; serving, in a limited capacity, as 
incubators for traditional bonds.  
 
Yet, while the migrants’ efforts to preserve elements of their tribal past appears to have eased 
their adjustment to life in al-asima (and the slum developed striking physical and cultural 
similarities to the villages of the Deep South), an array of forces undermined efforts to recreate a 
quasi-traditional civil society. It was, after all, to escape the tyranny and predations of their 
sheikhs that many migrants had fled to Baghdad in the first place, making the large-scale 
recreation of tribal networks deeply problematic. Furthermore, inescapable dislocations of long-
range migration and the realities of urban slum life pulled communal groups apart.54 Aspiring 
communal leaders, detached from traditional sources of economic and social power, thus 
struggled to remain influential in the lives of their kinsmen; while the search for often scarce and 
                                                
53 Bassam Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the 
Modern Middle East”, in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the 
Middle East, (Berkeley: U California Press, 1990), p.142 notes a broader trend in rural-to-urban migration 
across the Middle East wherein “Those who… cannot be absorbed [into the heart of urban life] rely on 
their ethnic-tribal kin groups as reference groups; they can survive only through maintaining the network 
of prenational tribal loyalties and ties.” Hosham Dawood, “The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the 
Tribalization of the State: the Case of Iraq”, in Tribes and Power, p.117 notes how urban migration “threw 
tribal members on the connections of their hamoula and their house”. T.H. Greenshields, “‘Quarters’ and 
Ethnicity”, in G.H. Blake and R.I. Lawless, The Changing Middle Eastern City, (London: Croom Helm, 
1980), p.133 notes how “anchor” communities formed in Baghdad’s slums, which subsequently drew in 
additional migrant kin. Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.500-504 observes how migrant communities 
developed around bonds of common kinship and geographic origin in the Deep South. Hilmi also notes 
the doctoral research of Aziz on p.317, who alleged that tribal leaders had reconstituted their power 
somewhat during the mid 1960s due to the dynamics of migration and settlement – though Hilmi 
questions the veracity of this claim, noting his own research in 1975 “point[ed] out clearly the 
deterioration of the position of tribal chiefs”.  
54 The 1940s and 1950s were a time of price shocks and rampant economic insecurity for many in 
Baghdad and, with the massive influx of migrants having flooded the labour market, wages were 
depressed and job security meagre. On the labour-market and financial prospects of the migrants, see: al-
Madfai, “Baghdad”, p.60; Atheel al-Jomard, “Internal Migration in Iraq”, in The Integration of Modern 
Iraq, p.117; Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p.34; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.136-
138; Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration”, p.414. Furthermore, al-Madfai, “Baghdad”, p.58 notes how the 





insecure wage labour (or improved material conditions elsewhere in the city) gradually split the 
slums’ mahallah-like clusters apart.  
 
The shurughis cemented a reputation as the “urban nomads” of Baghdad’s slums: illiterate, 
unskilled outcasts that inhabited a diseased wasteland of open sewers and decrepit huts on the 
city’s margins.55 While continuing to adhere to the norms and mannerisms of their tribal roots, 
they were increasingly detached from the kinship networks that had provided a degree of 
stability in the past.56 Their shi’a faith, on the other hand, appears to have afforded little succor. 
The migrants retained their reputation for irreligiosity (with only one in ten responding that they 
regularly attended mosque in a 1957 survey), and accounts of the era are silent regarding any 
actions by the shi’a religious establishment toward the improvement of their condition.57 The 
combination of economic hardship and social decay instead fueled rising crime rates in al-
asima, and the slum established a reputation as Baghdad’s most dangerous and depraved place – 
reinforcing popular prejudices against the shurughis and the allegedly regressive, violent nature 
of their traditional values.58 
 
                                                
55 Halpern, The Politics of Social Change, p.85 coins the term “urban nomad”, calling him “uprooted, 
displaced, and superfluous, with no fixed place in society”.  
56 See the work of Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under 
Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p.78, on how “tribal ethos or culture, rather than tribal 
organization, persists in [urban] spaces and keeps [migrants] bound together”. Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban 
Migration”, pp.420-421 notes “the breaking of family and tribal ties by their different employment and 
higher money incomes”, but that “they maintain many of their folkways”. Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a 
City”, pp.251-252 cites the work of al-Wardi on the difficulties encountered by migrants as they attempted 
to preserve traditional ties.  
57 Statistics from Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.454. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p.193 
and Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin”, pp.184-186 discuss 
the religiosity of the migrants. The shi’a faith was in a period of steep decline across Iraq at mid-century, 
and the religious elites of Najaf and Kerbala were focused primarily on reinvigorating their seminaries and 
reviving popular religiosity among the elite. Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah 
and al-Mujahidin”, p.188 observes that it was not until the 1960s that the shi’a elite paid notable attention 
to the urban poor. 
58 Baali, “Social Factors”, p.362 notes the prevalence of criminality in the slums at mid-century, which he 
attributes to “the low level of living and the ignorance prevalent among the dwellers”. Gulick, “Baghdad: 
Portrait of a City”, p.251 cites al-Wardi’s observations of how “undesirable elements” eroded communal 





III. Social Justice through Civil Engineering 
Migration flows were not the only source of turbulence in Baghdad at mid-century. Stoked by 
political factions hostile to the monarchy (including communists, pan-Arabists, and fascists), the 
1940s and 1950s witnessed a barrage of strikes, protests, and deadly riots on the city’s streets.59 
Capitalizing on mass unrest arising from issues such as the economic shocks that accompanied 
World War Two, rising economic inequality, and the monarchy’s continued close relations with 
much-despised Great Britain, opposition groups mobilized enormous, volatile crowds. The 
violence was such that the monarchy imposed martial law for years at a time, and a consensus 
emerged among contemporary observers that the Iraqi capital was a cauldron of accumulated 
grievances and unmet expectations that threatened to boil over into revolution.60 
 
Nonetheless, an array of forces prevented the migrants from proactively engaging in politics. 
These included the social and physical barriers that separated them from the city proper; their 
inability to mobilize effectively due to an absence of unifying social structures; near-universal 
illiteracy that rendered them politically inarticulate; the fact that many were legally classified as 
fugitives for having fled the Deep South in violation of debt laws; and, lastly, the simple fact 
that surveys found the migrants to be generally positive about their lives in Baghdad.61 However 
appalling outside observers may have found conditions in al-asima, they marked a significant 
                                                
59 Haj, The Making of Iraq, pp.82-98 examines the development of political parties from 1940-1958 and 
the ways that economic hardship fueled popular unrest, with a focus on the economic dislocations of 
World War II. See: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, Chapter 17 for discussion of economic hardship as 
fuel for political unrest in the 1940s and 1950s, and Chapter 22 on the wathbah riots of 1948 that left 
hundreds dead. 
60 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.61 notes that the “last decade of the old regime was a study in 
contrast”, and argues that material conditions played a key role in driving political disturbances. Qubain, 
The Reconstruction of Iraq, p.30 observes that economic hardship and the concurrent rise of extreme 
leftist political movements hostile to both the monarchy and its British patron led to “a race between 
reform and revolution”. Wm. Roger Louis, “The British and the Origins of the Iraqi Revolution”, in The 
Iraqi Revolution of 1958, p.45 likewise states that among British observers “it was an article of faith… 
that a race was taking place between development and revolution” between 1956 and 1958. Haj, The 
Making of Iraq, p.79 notes that martial law was imposed between 1948 and 1952. 
61 Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration”, pp.418-419 summarizes the findings of her fieldwork. She 
emphasizes the migrants’ general satisfaction with their significantly improved material conditions in al-





improvement upon life in the Deep South. Thus, while the contrast between the slums and the 
concentrations of wealth that developed in other parts of the city sparked resentment among the 
less fortunate, the migrants were not the latent revolutionary force that some have idealized them 
as having been.62 
 
Despite the shurughis’ general silence, their squalid condition was politicized by opposition 
groups like the Iraqi Communist Party as evidence of the injustice of the status quo. While the 
communists drew their cadre strength principally from the middle classes and labourers of 
higher socio-economic strata than the shurughis, they proved able to summon enormous crowds 
of migrants in support of their often-violent rallies.63 The advocacy of the communists also 
helped to drive public opinion toward a more sympathetic posture vis-à-vis the migrants, and by 
the mid-1950s, elements of the liberal intelligentsia and professional classes had joined their 
calls to redress the injustices of the Deep South and improve conditions in Baghdad’s slums.  
 
The monarchy was alternately unable and unwilling to take on the southern sheikhs, however, as 
they retained their status as irreplaceable guarantors of regional order. Moreover, the 
government deliberately refrained from making substantive improvements to al-asima out of 
                                                
62 Tareq Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 
p.313 alleges the creation of a “proletarianized peasantry” prior to the 1958 coup. This appears 
fundamentally untrue, yet the ability of the ICP to mobilize large crowds of impoverished shi’a after the 
1958 coup, when the party would briefly establish itself as an informal arm of the revolutionary regime, 
seems to have prompted ICP admirers to exaggerate its achievements in later years. Hilmi, Internal 
Migration, p.281 offers a more reasoned assessment of the migrants’ economic condition and its 
implications for the politics of the era. Also, see: Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, for 
reference to how the anti-British themes of the ICP were pivotal in the party’s ability to rouse the shi’a 
underclass (as opposed to the popularity of Marxism, or any genuine adherence to communism among the 
overwhelmingly illiterate underclass). 
63 The Iraqi Communist Party has received extensive academic scrutiny, driven both by strong leftist 
currents among Iraq specialists and by Cold War era concerns. See: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, for 
the most comprehensive (and largely sympathetic) treatment of the ICP. Gabbay, Communism and 
Agrarian Reform offers a useful counterbalance that presents the ICP as a fairly narrowly based, elitist 





fear that such efforts would encourage additional, undesired, migration flows.64 The slum was 
thus intentionally left to fester as a deterrent to those contemplating flight from southern Iraq, 
while the monarchy instead sought to make use of Baghdad’s growing social tensions – to wit 
significant numbers of shurughis were recruited into the security services, where their 
willingness to fire upon crowds of middle class protestors was a valued asset.65  
 
i. The Revolution of 1958 & Qassim’s Reforms 
On July 14, 1958, a bloody coup d’état was launched by members of the Iraqi Army that toppled 
the monarchy, bringing sweeping changes to Iraq.66 Colonel Abd al-Karim Qassim’s 
revolutionary regime was equally outspoken and determined in its pursuit of a more egalitarian, 
progressive Iraq, and “social justice” comprised a central plank of its platform.67 In recognition 
of the appalling conditions in al-asima, (and, moreover, of the widespread support shown by the 
urban poor during and after Qassim’s seizure of power), eastern Baghdad was chosen as a 
primary focal point of the government’s reform agenda.68  
 
                                                
64 Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration”, p.420 notes official government concerns, which would be 
proven justified in subsequent years.  
65 See: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.134-138 on the divisions between the migrants and their 
economic betters, and the former’s incorporation into the security services. Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban 
Migration”, p.420 notes that basic steps were taken to create roads in al-asima after the 1956-7 smallpox 
outbreak, but that nothing substantive was achieved.  
66 Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958, (London: 
Oxford UP, 1969), p.51 and Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.804-805 discuss the mutilation and public 
desecration of Crown Prince Abdullah and Nuri al-Said, and the celebratory riots by mobs of migrants that 
accompanied Qassim’s coup (in which the residents of the slums descended upon the city centre in a 
looting rampage that necessitated the imposition of martial law). Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian 
Reform, p.121 also cites brutal violence in the Deep South, featuring “unprecedented acts of terror and 
destruction” by the peasant farmers against their socio-economic betters. 
67 See: Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp.63-64 for discussion of Qassim’s genuine commitment to “social 
justice”, and the observation that he was “haunted” by the poverty of his countrymen. In reference to 
Qassim’s legacy, Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp.154-5 notes the near-mythical status of Qassim among 
Baghdad’s urban poor.  
68 Nicholas Thatcher, “Reflection on US Foreign Policy towards Iraq in the 1950s”, in The Iraqi 





To improve the migrants’ condition, Qassim initiated the wholesale demolition of the decrepit, 
disease-ridden sarifas, and leveled the bund that divided al-asima from Baghdad proper. The 
bund was replaced by a canal that would control the flooding of the Tigris River (thereby 
allowing for development on either side, and enabling a dramatic eastward expansion of the 
city), while the sarifas of al-asima were replaced by a grid of modern housing. This new district 
of the city was triumphantly named medinat ath-thawra, or “Revolution City”, and along with 
its sister development called Shula on the western side of Baghdad, it was intended as a 
towering symbol of revolutionary Iraq’s commitment to its most downtrodden citizens.   








                                                






Figure 1.3 – Baghdad City Transit Map, 1961 
70 
Development efforts progressed through Qassim’s rule, laying the structural groundwork for 
modern-day Baghdad. The Army Canal was completed in 1961 and the initial grid of Revolution 
City was established a year later, while further parcels of land were distributed to professional 
and social groups favoured by the new regime.71 The demolition of the sarifas also continued 
steadily through the early 1960s (with their residents being funneled into the new development 
zones), while the erection of new sarifas was prohibited in an attempt to bring migration flows 
under control.72 Furthermore, efforts were undertaken to address the root causes of migration, 
                                                
70 Map of Baghdad’s public transport system from the University of Texas online map collection: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/baghdad_bus_1961.jpg, which illustrates the beginnings of the 
city’s sprawling expansion from its original core in present-day Rusafa Political district.  
71 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p.149 discusses Qassim’s use of land as a tool to secure the support of 
influential elements of the military and government bureaucracy, which had been established practice 
under the monarchy. al-Arif, Iraq Reborn, p.23 and Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.50 note the monarchy’s use 
of land as, in the words of the latter, “a way of purchasing social order”.  
72 Continued migration flows were recognized as a major problem in Baghdad during the early 1960s. Not 





principally through a land reform scheme designed to break up the feudal estates of the Deep 
South.73  
 
From the outset, however, Qassim’s urban and rural programmes each met with significant 
problems. Revolution City was intended to contain 16,000 housing units constructed by the 
government and Shula an additional 4,000, but administrative shortcomings dictated that, after 
erecting only 1,000 units in Revolution City alone, construction halted.74 The rest of the land 
was instead parceled out vacant (albeit free of charge) to those who applied through the Ministry 
of Housing. Furthermore, both the homes that were constructed by the government and the plots 
of land allocated for future building were far too small for the large migrant households.75 
Conditions of dramatic overcrowding swiftly ensued, as the former sarifa-dwellers poured into 
the housing projects and overwhelmed available resources.  
 
The flood of impoverished shi’a families into Revolution City was made all the more rapid and 
destabilizing by the catastrophic failure of Qassim’s efforts in the South. Not only did the 
Agrarian Reform Act fail to improve the lives of the peasant farmers, it provoked a full-scale 
agricultural implosion that has been compared to the exploits of Robert Mugabe’s regime in 
Zimbabwe.76 However sincere Qassim’s intentions (and however enthusiastically they were 
                                                                                                                                          
and the extent to which Qassim’s regime wanted to demonstrate its achievements, it was made illegal to 
even photograph them. Discussed in Baali, “Social Factors”, pp.363-364. 
73 Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, pp.109-117 and Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.836-
837, discuss Qassim’s land reform scheme, which was based upon Egyptian efforts to achieve similar 
ends in 1952. Contrary to suggestions that Qassim was a radical (or, indeed, a communist) Gabbay argues 
compellingly that his reforms had modest aims and “the dominant approach… was one of tolerance rather 
than incitement”. 
74 Details in Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.293, who notes that demand was such that all the land was 
claimed “within a few weeks”.  
75 Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.407-411 discusses overcrowding, observing that average household size 
among the residents of Revolution City in 1975 was 7.7 people, and that the homes built averaged 3.3 
people per room. 
76 Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.115, 473, 517 notes that farmers in the Deep South continued to face 





celebrated by the recipients of state support), agricultural production collapsed. The resulting 
economic downturn and general atmosphere of chaos was such that, when paired with the 
growing allure of Baghdad after the regime’s highly publicized construction of modern, 
subsidized housing, migration levels surged ever higher.77 Escalating migration flows during the 
1960s and 1970s would cause Baghdad’s population to explode from 793,000 in 1957 to 
3,054,000 by 1975, at which time Revolution City and Shula would contain nearly a third of the 
city’s total population.78 
 
ii. Revolution City After Qassim 
The decidedly mixed results achieved by Qassim’s reforms during his time in power cast doubt 
on whether he or a like-minded successor could have effectively remedied either the root causes 
of migration or the social and logistical problems it caused in Baghdad. His pursuit of “social 
justice” appears to have been as sincere as it was celebrated, but irrespective of the wisdom of 
his reforms, the Iraqi state lacked both the funds and the administrative capacity to successfully 
execute initiatives of such magnitude.79 In any event, he was denied the opportunity to follow 
through on his initiatives or to remedy their shortcomings. The horrific street violence and 
                                                                                                                                          
Classes, p.955 discusses the failures of the scheme, and Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.99 compares 
its effects to Zimbabwe. 
77 Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, p.116 notes that the government sought to force those 
farmers that had been given land grants to remain in the South, and that residents of Baghdad’s slums 
were offered parcels of land outside of the capital to induce them to return to the countryside. Clawson, 
“Iraq’s Economy and International Sanctions”, p.70 notes that Qassim’s rule marked the beginning of a 
phase in Iraq’s history where economic policy was dictated by ideological objectives as opposed to 
economic ones, wryly observing that “Iraq was a food exporter for 3,000 years, until after the 1958 land 
reforms and the subsequent Ba’th actions to reinforce state control over the economy.” 
78 Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.243 charts Baghdad’s growth.  
79 However much the ideological outlook of the Iraqi government changed after the monarchy was 
overthrown, the administrative institutions of the government remained largely intact. Warren Adams, 
“Reflections on Recent Land Reform Experience in Iraq”, Land Economics, Vol. 39, No. 2, May 1963, 
p.200 (who taught at the Iraqi College of Agriculture), argues for continuity between the regimes, noting 
that the executors of policy “faced many of the same problems, tried similar solutions and very likely 
shared much of the same administrative machinery” in their efforts to combat Iraq’s most pressing 
challenges. Iraq had been suffering from administrative sclerosis for decades, and the body tasked with 
spending Iraq’s oil revenue had long been unable to spend the money allocated to it. Hilmi, Internal 
Migration, pp.101-102 also comments on the severe institutional and administrative problems encountered 





intense political rivalry that had persisted through the course of his reign eventually consumed 
him, and he was executed in the course of a 1963 coup that was launched by the Iraqi Ba’th 
Party and its allies in the military.80  
 
Qassim’s killing had far-reaching consequences for Baghdad’s swelling shi’a underclass. Their 
affection for the fallen prime minister was legendary, and was violently reemphasized during the 
coup by the vast crowds that swept inward from the city’s margins in his defense. The clashes 
that occurred between the shurughis and the perpetrators of the coup have been counted among 
“the bloodiest street battles in the history of the country”, and they raged on even after Qassim’s 
death became public knowledge.81 Furthermore, connections between the shi’a underclass and 
the Iraqi Communist Party (and the prominent role of communist leaders in rallying the crowds 
that emerged from Revolution City and Shula to defend Qassim) worsened the migrants’ 
position in the newly established order, as the Ba’th were archenemies of the communists. Thus, 
while the Iraqi Communist Party was subjected to a retaliatory slaughter, Baghdad’s shi’a 
underclass was regarded as a threat to be contained rather than a target for state assistance, 
leaving them marginalized yet again in Iraqi politics.82 
 
                                                
80 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, catalogue the violence that persisted 
through Qassim’s rule. Qassim had survived an earlier assassination attempt in October 1959, in which a 
young Saddam Hussein played a central role. 
81 Makiya, Republic of Fear, pp.58-59 references the fighting, noting that stories circulated that Qassim 
was not dead, but would instead soon return from occultation like the mehdi of the shi’a faith. Continued 
resistance prompted the architects of the coup to display Qassim’s corpse on television as definitive proof 
of his demise. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.978 references the battles fought between the shi’a 
underclass (led, he notes, by members of the Iraqi Communist Party) and the coup’s supporters in the 
Ba’th Party and the Iraqi military.  
82 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.897 discusses the scope of popular support for the communists in the 
early months of Qassim’s rule, but derisively notes that the vast majority were “July 14th Communists” – 
implying they were fair weather fans of the party due to its perceived position of prominence in the new 
order and its ties to the much beloved Qassim. Nonetheless, as the Ba’th subjected the ICP to an 
“unending year of horror” in 1963, “the districts that had risen against them were treated as enemy 





In an ironic distortion of Qassim’s vision, Revolution City and Shula thereafter did come to 
stand as monuments to the central government’s relationship with Baghdad’s shi’a poor. Rather 
than testaments to an official commitment to justice and equality, however, the two districts 
became sprawling, festering reminders of promises unfulfilled, persisting social prejudices, and 
the continued inability of the state to manage the implications of mass migration. As southern 
Iraq emptied itself into Baghdad at a continually-accelerating pace, conditions in Revolution 
City (which had been designed to house only 300,000 people, but by the late 1970s housed an 
estimated 1,500,000) deteriorated to the point that it was deemed “ready for the bulldozer”.83  
Instead of marking a definitive break from the squalid past of al-asima, it inherited al-asima’s 
reputation as the city’s poorest, most squalid, and most dangerous place.  
 
IV. The State & Civil Society in Revolutionary Iraq 
As Revolution City and Shula swelled uncontrollably through the 1960s and 1970s, Iraq’s 
development as a nation (including both physical, infrastructural growth, and the formation of a 
coherent Iraqi identity) was progressing rapidly as well. Trends in internal migration caused 
explosive urban growth, technological advancements and industrialization were transforming 
traditional patterns of life, and an assortment of political ideologies were simultaneously 
interweaving with, and displacing, the identity-based distinctions of the past.84 These processes 
                                                
83 Quotation from Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.411. Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.141 observes that “the 
modern era of 1957-1975 showed a continuous rise of the rural-urban migration volumes to an alarming 
scale of unprecedented dimensions”. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p.248, estimates that 
the slums of Baghdad absorbed 990,000 new arrivals between 1968 and 1977. W. Thom Workman, The 
Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War, (London: Lynn & Rienner Publishing, 1994), p.79 notes the 
discrepancy between Revolution City’s intended capacity and its actual population by the mid-1970s. 
84 For an example of the complex interweaving of past and present in Iraqi society at mid-century, see: 
Batatu The Old Social Classes, pp.403-424, 481-482, who notes how family ties, as well as the lingering 
bonds of the mahallahs, shaped the formation of modern ideologies. In reference to the city’s growth and 
infrastructural development from the mid-1940s onwards, Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.35 presents 
census data that shows Baghdad’s population nearly quadrupled between 1922 and 1957. Qubain, The 
Reconstruction of Iraq, p.30 notes that the scope of associated development prior to the boom of the 
revolutionary era “has had no parallel in the history of the country since the golden age of the Abbasid 
Caliphate.” Warriner, Land Reform and Development, p.181 notes the “chaos” of urban development and 





were evolving inconsistently and, indeed, at times chaotically, but they had nonetheless acquired 
a collective energy that brought dramatic changes to Iraq.  
 
Nowhere were these changes (or their inconsistent, schizophrenic nature) more evident than in 
Baghdad. The city itself was evolving due to sprawling peripheral growth and transformative 
internal renovations, the overarching objectives of which were the demolition of the past and the 
creation of a modern cityscape.85 Infrastructural tumult was mirrored in the social sphere as well, 
where the city’s residents were in the midst of varied, often contradictory campaigns to define 
Iraq’s future. The intellectual movements that had coalesced during the latter years of the 
monarchy, the communists and Pan-Arabists foremost among them, continued to inspire a 
frenzy of radical ideological activity, while traditionally-defined categories of identity lost 
ground to the encroachment of modernity.86     
 
Yet, from the era of Qassim’s rule, a change occurred to the dynamics of Iraq’s modernization 
process. Inspired by radical and extraordinarily ambitious political ideologies (and made 
possible by surging oil revenues), the Iraqi state attempted to take control of national 
                                                                                                                                          
process, Warriner, Land Reform and Development, p.175 laments the absurd phenomenon of “sheikhs in 
Cadillacs” and their “tribesmen in buses”. 
85 On the infrastructural condition of Baghdad in the 1950s, see: Warriner, Land Reform and 
Development, pp.121-125, and pp.181, 175 for a sharp critique of the incongruities of “development”, and 
“change without direction or purpose”; while Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, p.253 observes the 
city centre was modernizing at the expense of traditional social structures. Al-Madfai, “Baghdad”, p62 
details the shortcomings of urban planning in Baghdad.  
86 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp.65-66 further notes how the cycle of political violence and 
repression under the late-monarchy fostered rising radicalism, and that “centrist” moderates remained 
marginalized from popular discourse. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.426 notes how the “corrosion” of 
traditional values among the newly educated was central to the rise of modern ideological movements. 
Warriner, Land Reform and Development, pp.182-183 critiques the attitudes prevalent among the 
educated elite at mid-century, noting that the “young bureaucrat just back from California with a degree in 
economics has apparently learnt nothing but contempt for his fellow countrymen”. Dann, Iraq Under 
Qassem, pp.5-6 likewise writes derisively of the new intelligentsia as being “cut off from or contemptuous 
of the traditions of their forefathers, often presenting a façade of Western culture which they had not 
really absorbed”. See Abdul-Salam Yousif, “The Struggle for Cultural Hegemony during the Iraqi 
Revolution”, in The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, for a more sympathetic analysis, and observations on how 
the toppling of the monarchy ushered in an era of broadened political activity and a “democratization of 
culture” – while specifically noting (p.189) that new intellectual currents “cut across mahallahs… and 





development and actively direct its progression. Growing rapidly in size and strength, the 
government emerged as a pro-active agent of change that would use its wealth and power to 
transcend the past and realize the future. Qassim’s bold attempts to restructure both Baghdad 
and the political economy of southern Iraq thus marked early steps in a move toward 
interventionist governance that, enjoying overwhelming popular support among the Iraqi people, 
would see the Iraqi state encroach further and further into all sectors of Iraqi society.87  
 
Despite the popularity of statist efforts at civil and social engineering, however, the rising profile 
of the government held deeply subversive implications for Iraqi society. Beginning with the 
much-lauded reform efforts of Qassim, and moving on to the aggressive totalitarianism of the 
Ba’th regime of the late 1960s and 1970s, civil society fell under siege. In the end, not only 
would the Iraqi people be rendered dependent upon the state as never before, but the state itself 
would either consume or destroy independent social organization almost entirely. 
 
i. Social Erosion in Revolution City 
While the administrative problems that inhibited Qassim’s urban reform programme and the 
chaos that arose from his efforts at rural land reform were immediately apparent, there were less 
obvious – yet no less insidious – consequences to his intrusion into Iraqi society. For Baghdad’s 
shi’a underclass, including those resident in the city’s sarifa slums at the time of the coup as 
well as subsequent migrants to the Iraqi capital, these came in the form of changes to patterns of 
                                                
87 On the prevalence of strong popular support for transformative governance across the Middle East, see: 
John Waterbury, “The Growth of Public Sector Enterprise in the Middle East” in Haleh Esfandiari and 
A.L. Udovitch (eds), The Economic Dimensions of Middle Eastern History: Essays in Honor of Charles 
Issawi, (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1990) pp.255-256. Mohsen, “Cultural Totalitarianism”, p.7 
observes how Iraqi regimes after the 1958 coup embraced the “mass culture” ideology of eastern Europe, 
wherein “the masses were seen as an object whose consciousness could and should be manipulated by the 
state”. Gareth Stansfield, Iraq: People, History, Politics, (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp.92-98 traces the 





migration and urban settlement that exacerbated the degradation of traditional social bonds and 
accelerated the degradation of civil society.  
First, the massive surge of migration that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s witnessed major 
changes to the patterns of movement. Whereas in 1957, a full 98 percent of al-asima’s residents 
hailed from the Deep South (of whom 87 percent were from present-day Maysan Province), the 
years that followed brought increases in both the number of migrants and their diversity of 
origin.88 Although the Deep South continued to provide the majority of new arrivals, the 
growing allure of Baghdad’s housing projects created a powerful draw that, when combined 
with the collapse of southern agriculture, prompted migration from all across the South. The 
growing geographical diversity of those surging into Revolution City, Shula, and the city’s 
smaller peripheral slums thus diluted the homogeneity that had facilitated the establishment of 
communal clusters – while the dramatic increase in the scale of migration flows further 
contributed to social disarray.89 
 
Second, the rise of the government as an increasingly generous provider of largesse (however 
badly needed, and however gratefully welcomed) further eroded the social capital reserves of 
civil society.90 With the state using its oil wealth to offer housing, employment, food, and other 
essentials to its neediest subjects, the influence of localized communal leadership waned. Tribal 
sheikhs and other low-level civil society figures had no means to compete with the resources of 
the government, and as the state took an increasingly active role in the daily lives of the 
populace, they saw their functional utility disappear.  
                                                
88 In 1957, Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration”, p.413 found that 87 percent of al-asima’s residents came 
from present-day Maysan Province and 11 percent from Wasit Province. Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.336, 
381  notes that the percentage of migrants from Maysan Province fell to 53.5 percent by 1975, and that 
non-migrant families moved into Revolution City and Shula as well, reflecting the fact that the squalor of 
Baghdad was not limited to the former sarifa settlements and, as such, the new development zones were 
initially attractive to many. 
89 Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.401 notes that by 1975, new arrivals to Revolution City were motivated 
increasingly by financial incentives and significantly less by the desire to join kin.  
90 Himi, Internal Migration, p.552 observes how the government’s provision of goods and services 





Third, the demolition of the sarifa encampments meant the destruction of the mahallah-cum-
tribal enclaves that had been established in al-asima and elsewhere.91 Their residents’ relocation 
to densely packed grids of tenement houses physically unraveled the communities that had been 
established in the formerly sprawling slums, thereby undermining the continuity of social bonds. 
However much Revolution City and Shula marked a structural and sanitary improvement from 
the sarifas of the past, they became vast, overcrowded ghettoes where fragments of southern 
Iraq’s dissolving tribal order were collapsed upon one another. Traditional modes of dress, 
patterns of speech, and social customs persisted, but the structures of traditional society 
deteriorated apace with their physical surroundings.92 
 
ii. Ba’th Party Rule – Reshaping Iraq from Above 
Despite the decidedly mixed results of Qassim’s reform initiatives, the regimes that followed 
him embraced the role of transformative social engineer with increasing ambition. After a 
tumultuous decade of coups and countercoups following Qassim’s toppling of the monarchy, the 
Ba’thists seized power for a second time in 1968.93 Building from an eclectic ideology that fused 
elements of the extreme-right and extreme-left, they sought to impose a totalitarian stability on 
Iraq.94 Aided in their efforts by an extraordinary boom in oil revenues (which rose tenfold from 
                                                
91 Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.565 observes that the two main results of Revolution City and Shula’s 
creation were the acceleration of migration to the city and the alteration of settlement patters away from 
mahallah-style kinship clusters. Gulick, “Village and City: Cultural Continuities in Twentieth Century 
Middle Eastern Cultures”, p.149, raised concerns at the time over the implications of the migrants’ forced 
relocation, expressing doubts over the survival of migrant communities. 
92 Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p.78 notes that the numerical grid that was originally created to 
delineate Revolution City was replaced by the hamoula-level names that reflected local residents’ tribal 
heritage. Rather than marking the continuity of substantive tribal bonds or the perseverance (or 
reconstitution) of a broader tribal order in the district, however, it appears this was driven by nostalgia and 
affinity to traditional identities, which the author terms as “cultural tribalism”. 
93 On the political instability of Iraq at mid-century, Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.22 observes that 
“between 1958 and 1968 there were more than ten coups and attempted coups, two armed rebellions, and 
a semi continuous civil war against the Kurds”. 
94 See Makiya, Republic of Fear, for a detailed exposition on, and deconstruction of, Ba’thist ideology. 
Rooted in the writing of chief ideologue Michel Aflaq, Ba’thism was a romantic, mystical ideology that 





US$575 million in 1972 to US$5.7 billion in 1974, leaping further to US$26.5 billion by 1980), 
they would dramatically expand both the size of the state and the scope of its role in society.95  
 
In an endeavour that marked a dramatic change in the intensity of state intervention in society 
(but which also must be acknowledged as having been in keeping with prevailing attitudes 
toward the writ of the state over society itself), the Ba’th Party sought to resolve, once and for 
all, the problem of identity- and ideology-based division within Iraq. Rather than using the 
resources of the state to blend Iraq’s disparate array of communal subgroups or to harmonize its 
competing strands of political thought, however, the Ba’thist programme called for civil and 
political society to be annihilated in their entirety – and their atomized remnants then drawn into 
the embrace of the state.96  
 
Thus, while the predatory aspects of Ba’th Party rule have attracted the lion’s share of attention 
in accounts of Iraqi history, Ba’thist Iraq was much more than a police state.97 Its immense 
security apparatus did not exist merely to stifle political dissent or to eradicate potential threats 
to the regime. Far more ambitiously, its mandate was to aid in the fundamental restructuring of 
                                                                                                                                          
Ideology and Practice”, in Iraq Since the Gulf War, p.34 further examines its ideological heritage in 
German romanticism.  
95 Oil revenues listed in Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p.172 and Workman, The Social 
Origins of the Iran-Iraq War, p.104. 
96 Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.141 notes succinctly “their programme is not to win over the masses, but to 
change them”. Makiya’s account of Ba’thist Iraq remains the most illuminating and thought provoking of 
the resources available on the era, particularly with regard to its implications for Iraqi society. See: 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1973), Chapter 11 on how 
social atomization renders a populace all the more susceptible to the inducements of totalitarian 
governance. The dislocations of Iraq’s chaotic transition to “modernity” (from mass migration, to 
industrialization, to ideological turmoil) may thus be seen to have paved the way for the rise of totalitarian 
governance – which, in turn, furthered that same atomization. Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.203 and 
Stansfield, Iraq, p.79 both emphasize the relevance of Arendt to the study of Iraq, with the former arguing 
of the Ba’th that “they appealed largely to atomized and disrupted individuals, or to those who felt 
threatened by the rootlessness brought on by population growth, urbanization, modernization, and the 
assault of large-scale demographics changes on a traditional way of life”.  
97 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp.115-122 provides an overview of the various overlapping security 





the social environment from which such dissent or threats might emerge.98 The extensive 
capability that the regime developed to surveil, control, and eliminate its citizenry was, 
therefore, not an end in itself, but rather an element of a broader strategy that, paired with a 
powerful propaganda machine and the financial resources of seemingly unlimited petro-wealth, 
would achieve a complete and final transformation of Iraqi society. 
 
For the ever-swelling shi’a underclass of Baghdad, Ba’thist governance and oil-fueled 
prosperity brought both benefits and perils. The shi’a poor (alongside the rest of their fellow 
Baghdadis) benefited from the state’s growing riches via near-full employment in ballooning 
government bureaucracies, improved medical care, subsidies on a variety of goods and services, 
price controls that mitigated against inflation, and an array of welfare benefits.99 Oil wealth thus 
enabled the state to feed, clothe, heal, and house the Iraqi people; and as a result, increasing 
numbers of Iraqis could claim “middle class” status thanks to the Ba’th.100 The regime’s much-
touted pursuit of Iraq’s modernization (and militarization) likewise evoked widespread popular 
enthusiasm, and the 1970s have been called a “golden age” in which the country prospered 
materially while ascending to the pinnacle of the Middle Eastern political order.101  
                                                
98 The growth of the security services and the resulting complicity of the general population in the 
enforcement of Ba’thist rule was an important objective of the Ba’th. Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.32 
notes that by 1980 “one-fifth of the economically active Iraqi labour force (about 3.4 million people) were 
institutionally charged during peacetime with one form or another of violence”. Makiya, Republic of Fear, 
p.66 notes that the most brutal excesses of the Ba’th occurred after the regime had eliminated its principal 
political rivals and firmly established its dominance over Iraq. Violence was thus not perpetrated simply 
to establish the party’s control, but rather to transform the citizenry. See: Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, p.422 for a discussion of totalitarianism and the proclivity of state terror to reach its apex 
after the opposition has been decisively defeated. 
99 Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements”, p.4 notes that the daily minimum wage for unskilled 
labour grew substantially from 1973, while price controls checked inflation, yet conditions remained 
difficult for the urban poor. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p.248 estimate that some 
265,000 of the 990,000 migrants that came to Baghdad between 1968 and 1977 wound up employees of 
the state – overwhelmingly in superfluous, “non-productive” roles created to absorb surplus labour.  
100 Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed Etatist Nationalism”, p.126 argues that by 1980 
the “middle classes” would account for half of Iraq’s urban population, due directly to the distribution of 
oil revenues.  
101 See Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p.121 for the observation that Saddam “knew all too well that 





Nonetheless, even the most celebrated aspects of Ba’thist prosperity possessed a darker side. 
The expansion of state bureaucracies, for example, eased the shocks that would otherwise have 
arisen as nearly one million new migrants poured into Baghdad’s slums between 1968 and 1977 
(driven by both the allure of growing state generosity and the fallout of yet another ill-conceived 
attempt at land reform in the South), yet it also furthered the regime’s transformative agenda.102 
Taking advantage of popular enthusiasm for government intervention in the economy, the 
architects of Ba’thist economic policy implemented a programme under the guise of “socialism” 
that was designed to subvert civil society through the creation of endemic dependency.103 The 
provision of generous welfare services, employment, and various public amenities was thus not 
                                                                                                                                          
time… the Iraqi people had do be made to love and adore him… He was to become Iraq.” Shadid, Night 
Draws Near, pp.24-25, further observes that the 1970s were a time when Iraq’s “newfound wealth 
radiated Iraqi culture, influence and power across the region”. Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: Politics 
of Revenge, (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), p.160 likewise observes in an otherwise critical biography of 
the Iraqi President that all Iraqis enjoyed significant improvements to their material lives through the 
1970s. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp.231-239 chart economic growth during the 
1970s, featuring a dramatic rise in GDP and a surge in wages for both skilled and unskilled labour.  For 
contrary views, see Isam al-Khafaji, “The Parasitic Base of the Ba’thist Regime”, in CARDRI, Saddam’s 
Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? (London: Zed Books, 1989), pp.82-84, who attacks the idea that the Ba’th 
presided over an economic boom in the 1970s, noting that huge disparities of income developed and that 
inflation surged in keeping with state spending; Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, p.97, who comments 
that “labor shortages, stagnant agriculture, rising urban population, persistent inflation, rising dependence 
on foreign consumer goods (especially foodstuffs), and rising dependence on oil” characterized the era. 
Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p.91 note that “inefficiency, waste, mismanagement and corruption” 
poisoned efforts to spend Iraq’s oil revenues effectively.  
102 The Ba’th Party’s land reform programme was enacted in May 1969 in an effort to further undermine 
the position of rural sheikhs, leading to a major drop in production and revolts in modern-day Maysan 
Province. Detailed in Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.3.  
103 The irrelevance of economic theory to Ba’thist conceptions of socialism was captured by chief Party 
ideologue Michel Aflaq: “when I am asked to give a definition of socialism, I can say that it is not to be 
found in the works of Marx and Lenin. I say: socialism is the religion of life and of its victory over death.” 
Recorded in Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, p.59. Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p.90 note 
similarly how “socialism was not a coherent body of ideas” to the Ba’th, “but rather a catchword to win 
the support of the masses”. Critically, Ba’thist socialism was not concerned in any meaningful way with 
the redistribution of wealth to create economic equality. Its goal was, instead, the large-scale distribution 
of oil revenues – which would make the state the ultimate patron of the populace, and prevent individuals 
or groups external to the state from exerting socio-economic influence. See: Batatu, The Old Social 
Classes, p.1116-1120 for contemporary observations on how “social power” was a deliberate target of 
Ba’thist economic policy in the 1970s, and how the government was becoming ever more able “to 





pursued simply for the betterment of the Iraqi people, but instead with the deliberate intent of 
eradicating independent social and economic capital.104  
 
Simultaneously, tribal sheikhs and other traditional leadership figures came under intense, 
multifaceted pressure. With the welfare state catering to the needs of the populace, the police 
state aggressively eradicating sources of influence separate from the government, re-ruralization 
initiatives sending indoctrinated former migrants back into the countryside to “civilize” their 
peers, land reforms undermining their position in the countryside, and state-run schools and 
media outlets relentlessly denigrating tribalism as regressive and backwards, the onslaught 
proved overwhelming.105  
 
Furthermore, the Ba’thist offensive against traditional civil society was not limited to the public, 
communal spheres, but extended into the heart of the family. Saddam Hussein’s promotion of 
women’s rights was thus, above all else, a ploy to subvert traditional patriarchal authority, while 
children were recruited by teachers and Party officials to inform on their parents.106 Public and 
                                                
104 Makiya, Republic of Fear, pp.41, 44 observes how “Party, state, and even civil society were merging 
into a single, great, formless mass”, and that “the Ba’th developed a novel approach to the problem of 
hostility and alienation from the state: they turned the people into its employees”. Mohsen, “Cultural 
Totalitariansim”, p.9-10 observes similarly that the Ba’th Party maintained lists of “financially 
independent and politically non-aligned intellectuals” who were silenced or brought into the service of the 
state. 
105 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, pp.1-2 notes that the Ba’th were explicitly anti-traditional in their 
ideology, particularly as party ideologues were urbanites with strong biases against the rural tribal system. 
Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.577-581 discusses the re-ruralization initiatives of the Ba’th that sought to 
return indoctrinated migrants to the countryside where they would serve as “a nucleus for socialism” and 
facilitate “the elimination of tribal tradition and [the] dominance of backward norms and convictions”. 
106 Makiya, Republic of Fear, pp.77-78 quotes a Saddam Hussein speech given to the Ministry of 
Education: “To prevent the father and mother from dominating the household with backwardness, we 
must make the small one radiate internally to expel it. Some fathers have slipped away from us for various 
reasons, but the small boy is still in our hands and we must transform him.” Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam 
Hussein, p.93 argue that the promulgation of women’s rights was a ploy to undermine families and insert 
the state – and by extension the regime – in the position of the family as the ultimate locus of loyalty. 
Karsh notes (pp.176-177) that the state deliberately sough to make the Ba’th Party the parent figures of 
Iraqi children. “You must encircle the adults through their sons”, Saddam Hussein is quoted as declaring, 
“you must place in every corner a son of the revolution, with a trustworthy eye and a firm mind who 





private spaces alike were thus filled with the eyes and ears of the regime, to the point that it was 
widely believed that the government monitored families through their television sets. 
 
iii. The Ba’th, the Shi’a Opposition & Revolution City 
Despite its wealth and power, the Iraqi government remained unable to check migration flows 
and struggled to manage their implications in the capital.107 Baghdad’s shi’a slums thus 
continued to swell, deteriorating further through the peak years of Iraq’s oil boom. Employment-
related concerns were effectively mitigated through the continued expansion of state 
bureaucracies, and as in generations past, popular discontent was tempered by the slums’ 
material superiority to life across much of the South, yet the regime nonetheless remained 
vigilant for signs of unrest.  
 
As such, the efforts of shi’a militant groups during the 1970s to rally support in Baghdad’s 
slums prompted swift and forceful action.108 The powers of the government had grown to the 
point that mass agitation of the sort instigated by the communists in previous decades was 
inconceivable (forcing radical shi’a opposition networks like the Da’wa to operate in small, 
clandestine cells), and the security services were thus able to isolate and ruthlessly persecute 
those who attempted to agitate against the regime. However, the recruitment initiatives of radical 
shi’a factions met with limited success among Baghdad’s shi’a underclass for local reasons as 
well. The religious devotion of Baghdad’s shi’a underclass remained questionable (despite the 
Da’wa’s reference to Revolution City as its “stronghold of heroes”, mosque attendance had 
                                                
107 Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.904-905 notes that into the mid-1970s, the Ba’thist apparatus was not 
robust enough to keep migrants from leaving the South, or to prevent their incursion into Baghdad. 
Discussions of the comprehensiveness of Ba’thist totalitarianism thus must be qualified by an assessment 
of the administrative capabilities of the Iraqi state. Put crudely, shortfalls in administrative competency 
dictated that irrespective of its aspirations, Ba’thist Iraq could never reach the level of, for example, Nazi 
Germany – and the Iraqi government would also remain unable to muster the institutional capacity to 
spend its surging oil revenues well into the 1980s. Noted in Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, p.81. 
108 Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements”; and Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement offer detailed 





fallen to a mere 5.7 percent by 1975) and the shi’a underclass had a distant, contentious 
relationship with Najaf’s religious establishment – making the shurughis an unlikely base of 
support for elitist militants seeking Islamic revolution.109  
 
At the end of the 1970s, therefore, the Ba’th regime appeared well on its way to the fulfillment 
of its ideological vision. Its wealth seemed inexhaustible, domestic opposition had been 
effectively eradicated, and the Iraqi people were tied more closely to the central government 
than at any time in the nation’s history.110 Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, had taken control of the 
government in June 1979 after several years of directing events from behind the scenes, and was 
dispensing a calculated balance of tarhib wa targhib, “punishment and reward”, to reinforce his 
domestic preeminence.111  
 
It was at this time of ascendant power, however, that Saddam Hussein made the first of a series 
of strategic blunders. In response to the advent of the Iranian Revolution, which brought to 
                                                
109 The fact that the Da’wa was an offshoot of elitist currents in the shi’a establishment that harboured 
extensive social prejudices against the shurughis (examined in Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, p.75), 
suggests strongly the Da’wa’s appellation for Revolution City was far more an expression of intent (or, 
more likely still, a public relations slogan) than an reflection of reality. Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a 
Movements”, and Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin”, offer 
further detail. Mosque attendance figures from the survey of Hilmi, Internal Migration, p.454. The 
religiosity of the urban poor (and, equally importantly, their attitude toward Islamist movements such as 
the Da’wa) remains controversial. The shi’a religious establishment was held in low regard among the 
shurughis (a sentiment that was returned in kind), as a result of generations of neglect and the actively 
hostile stance of the clerical establishment toward underclass interests. Clerical elites had been outspoken 
opponents of both the Iraqi Communist Party and Qassim’s southern land reform scheme, for example, 
while social prejudices persisted. Nonetheless, as noted by Batatu; Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, p.132; and 
Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p.xxi, radical shi’a groups did make notable headway in 
their recruiting efforts, and observers widely attribute this to the same social dislocations and material 
hardships that had prompted affinity to communism in previous generations.  
110 Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.265 notes that “by the late 1970s the Ba’thi state was wealthier and 
stronger than any state has ever been in the modern history of Iraq”. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, 
p.1116-1120 observed the rise of the Ba’thist state during the 1970s, noting how by 1977 “the social 
power of private large-scale property [had been] uprooted”, while “side by side with this, the government 
has grown enormously in the life of the people”.  
111 Terms discussed in Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin”, 
p.195. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.206-226 and Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.85-87 detail 






power a millenarian shi’a regime intent on spreading Islamic revolution into Iraq only months 
before his formal ascension to power, Saddam launched a large-scale ground invasion of his 
neighbour. His particular reasoning remains uncertain, as a case can be made for the invasion as 
pre-emptive self-defence against the threat posed by revolutionary Iran, or alternatively, as an 
aggressive effort to assert Iraq’s power while the Iranians were still in the midst of revolutionary 
disarray.112 Irrespective of his motives, the campaign proved catastrophic. What was intended to 
be a lightning strike by the Iraqi military became the longest conventional war of the twentieth 
century, exacting an extraordinary human and material toll on both sides.113  
 
Saddam Hussein would attempt to sustain the full edifice of the totalitarian state, and to isolate 
the Iraqi people from the costs of the war, but this ultimately proved impossible.114 The balance 
between terror and reward thus shifted toward the former as the state’s resources declined, and 
Baghdad’s shi’a underclass saw the welfare state contract at a time when the predations of the 
police – ever vigilant throughout the war for signs of domestic unrest among its shi’a subjects – 
                                                
112 The enthusiastic response of the remnants of Iraq’s shi’a opposition to the Iranian Revolution, and the 
popular resonance of their subsequently emboldened statements and actions against the Ba’th regime, 
gave Saddam Hussein legitimate cause for concern. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s seizure of power in 
Tehran was met with outspoken praise by shi’a elites in Iraq and by a renewed Da’wa terrorist campaign 
as well – which, as noted in Efraim Karsh, Essential Histories: The Iran Iraq War, 1980-1988, (London: 
Osprey Publishing, 2002), p.13, killed some twenty Ba’thist officials and nearly took the life of Vice 
President Tariq Aziz. See: Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp.256-7 for Grand Ayatollah 
Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr’s attitude (and overtures) toward Khomeini. The domestic crackdown that 
ensued was paired with lavish expenditures on mosques and shrines for the shi’a, the open distribution of 
money to the poor in Revolution City, and overtures that won the support of high-ranking shi’a clerics. 
The crackdown not only devastated the Da’wa and drove its remnants into Iranian exile, but also saw the 
execution of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr (the intellectual inspiration of the Da’wa and the 
most likely figure to have assumed a Khomeini-esque role in Iraq). Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, p.234 
notes that “this was the first execution of a Grand Ayatollah in the modern history of the Middle East”. 
Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.53 notes that after the execution in April 1980, “Saddam appeared to have 
won a total victory over the Shia radicals in Iraq” – meaning that the invasion of Iran was launched after 
domestic threats had been contained. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp.256-257, like 
Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.270 and Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.223, argue that Saddam approached the 
conflict from a position of confidence and strength. Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, Chapter Six, 
argue that Saddam entered the conflict reluctantly in response to a significant, growing threat from Iran.  
113 For a concise overview of the conflict, see: Karsh, Essential Histories. 
114 Sluglett, Farouk-Sluglett and Stork, “Note Quite Armageddon”, pp.27-28 discuss Saddam Hussein’s 





remained fearsome.115 Although Revolution City was renamed “Saddam City” in October 1982 
(at which time basic infrastructural improvements were made, and cash was distributed to soothe 
popular discontent), Baghdad’s shi’a underclass saw its fortunes decline further.116 Confined to 
increasingly cramped and decrepit tenements on the outskirts of the city, social unrest would 
simmer through the 1980s – turning the previously apolitical shurughis into a growing concern 
of the regime. 
                                                
115 See Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.153-156 for discussion of domestic expenditures as being 
driven by concerns over public support for the war, and that Iraq had already suffered nearly 100,000 dead 
by the time the Army was driven from Iran in 1982; Frederick Axelgard, A New Iraq? The Gulf War and 
Implications for US Policy, (New York: Praeger, 1988), p.28 discusses the terrible performance of Iraqi 
shi’a troops during the initial offensive into Iran; and Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of 
Failed Etatist Nationalism”, p.127 likewise notes the prevalence of “deliberate capitulation” by frontline 
Iraqi soldiers. Isam al-Khafaji, “Iraq's Seventh Year: Saddam's Quart d'Heure?”, Middle East Report, 
No.151, March-April 1988, p.35 attacks the notion of high morale within the Iraqi Army, citing the 
actions of the Punishment Corps charged with executing poorly performing commanders and enforcing 
loyalty; while Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p.155 also note morale issues within the Iraqi Army.  
116 Sluglett, Farouk-Sluglett and Stork, “Not Quite Armageddon”, p.24 notes that the name change took 
place in October 1982 – in recognition, perhaps, of Saddam Hussein’s growing discomfort with the word 
thawra, “revolution”, being spoken among the shi’a masses at a time when Iranian forces were advancing 
into Iraq.  Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin”, p.198 asserts 
that the Ba’th paved streets and installed plumbing in areas of Saddam City to mitigate the growth of 
Islamic radicalism and Da’wa support. See: Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah 
and al-Mujahidin”, p.184 on the neglect of Revolution City under Ba’thist rule, and the theory that the 
district’s streets had long remained unpaved due to speculation that large oil deposits lay beneath.  
Chapter 2 
 





i. An Attempted Return to Normalcy 
Saddam Hussein and his regime endured the extraordinary costs of war with Iran. At the 
conflict’s end in August 1988, the Iraqi president faced significant challenges – notable among 
them the need to revitalize a stagnant economy; create jobs to absorb demobilizing soldiers; 
address the enormous debts incurred during the prosecution of the war; overcome significant 
battlefield attrition of Ba’th Party loyalists; and rehabilitate a badly damaged oil sector. The 
situation, however, did not pose an existential crisis for the government.1 Nor did it prompt 
Saddam Hussein to alter the core tenets of his methods or ambitions. On the contrary, while the 
Iraqi regime had been forced to scale back aspects of its domestic totalitarianism during the 
latter stages of the conflict, the Iraqi president emerged at its conclusion determined to quickly 
reassert his preeminence both at home and across the Middle East.  
 
Despite having incurred an estimated 600,000 casualties and accrued debts of US$80 billion, 
Saddam Hussein had cause for optimism as he worked to reconstitute and reenergize the 
totalitarian state.2 Iraq’s debt burden compared favourably to that of many in the Third World, 
the country retained vast oil reserves that augured well for its medium- to long-term economic 
                                                
1 Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.xii, notes “The system that had reached perfection on the eve of the Iraq-
Iran war remained intact all throughout it… At no point… was the Iraqi president’s authority inside Iraq 
and among Iraqis (excluding the Kurds) threatened during the 1980s.” Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq 
Since 1958, p.280 observe that Iraq’s economic position was “certainly bad… but not desperate”. Kiren 
Aziz Chaudhry, “Consuming Interests: Market Failure and the Social Foundations of Iraqi Etatisme”, in 
Kamil Mahdi (ed), Iraq’s Economic Predicament (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2002), p.245 further notes that 
the “Ba’thist state upheld its populist pact with consumers during the war with Iran, while systematically 
undercutting all independent forms of social organization.” al-Jabbar, “Why the Intifada Failed”, p.100 
takes a more alarmist stance regarding the position of the regime, but points out nonetheless that although 
the “regime was in crisis, so was the opposition”. 
2 Amatzia Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Baghdad”, in Iraq’s Road to War, 
p.6 notes that Iraq suffered an estimated 200,000 killed and 400,000 wounded, while some 70,000 
remained captive in Iran as prisoners of war. Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.202-203 cites Iraq’s 
debt burden, while Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p.272 estimate the total cost of the war 
to Iraq at nearly US$453 billion. For reference, Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, p.100 calculates that 
Iraq’s total oil revenues from 1931 to 1988 totaled only US$179.3 billion, making the bill for the war 
some 254 percent of Iraq’s cumulative historic oil rents. Per the year-to-year funding of the war, 
Alnasrawi further notes that annual GDP in Iraq averaged US$48.1 billion, while the annual cost of the 





prospects, and his position at the apex of state and society remained secure.3 Indeed, by the mid-
1980s, the cult of personality surrounding Saddam Hussein had grown to eclipse Ba’thist 
ideology as the centerpiece of Iraqi society, making Saddam Hussein himself the new object of 
state-mandated devotion.4  
 
Yet, while Saddam Hussein’s position remained secure and his aspirations grandiose, Iraq faced 
short-term economic problems that required careful and considered care. Iraq’s economic model, 
and the broader governance strategy of which it was a part, relied upon the regime’s distribution 
of the nation’s previously inexhaustible oil wealth. With massive outstanding debts, a booming 
population, and annual revenues of only US$14.5 billion in 1989, however, the government’s 
resources were insufficient to allow an immediate return to the “normalcy” of the 1970s.5 
Saddam Hussein was thus faced with a dilemma. Desiring to reinvigorate the Iraqi economy 
without jeopardizing the government’s dominance thereof, he would have to radically transform 
the regime’s fiscal position.6  
 
                                                
3 Clawson, “Iraq’s Economy and International Sanctions”, p.72 notes that Iraq’s debt burden was less 
formidable than that of Turkey, Egypt, Argentina, or Brazil.  
4 See: Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.76-79, 202-203 on the increased personalization of Saddam 
Hussein’s rule during the course of the war; and Baram, “The Ruling Political Elite”, pp.460-461 on the 
marginalization of party figures and their replacement by kinsmen and trusted associates of Saddam. 
Baram also notes the declining academic credentials of government functionaries, moving away from 
M.D.s and Ph.D.s toward “those of a much more plebian birth” as Saddam installed his personal allies in 
key positions. International Crisis Group, “What Lies Beneath”, pp.6-7 further comments on the decline of 
Ba’thist ideology during the course of the war, arguing that Party ideology had lost its relevance by the 
mid-1980s.  
5 Alnasrawi, “Economic Devastation, Underdevelopment and Outlook”, p.78 notes that Iraq’s population 
grew by a staggering 34 percent between 1980 and 1989. This represented the continuation of ongoing 
growth trends, as well as the results of a regime-sponsored fertility campaign during the war. Sluglett and 
Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp.280-281 notes that by the war’s end the Iraqis were thoroughly 
dependent upon the state for their material wellbeing, making population growth a looming liability. 
6 Noting this dynamic, Peter Sluglett, “The International Context of Iraq from 1980 to the Present”, in 
Emma Nicholson and Peter Clark (eds) The Iraqi Marshlands: A Human and Environmental Study, 
(London: Politicos Publishing, 2002), p.246 observes that “the ‘desperateness’ of Iraq’s financial position 





Saddam Hussein’s efforts toward that end proved disastrous. Initial attempts at modest austerity 
through the suspension of an array of subsidies were followed by experiments in privatization 
and deregulation, all of which precipitated chaos.7 Inflation soared, shortages of formerly 
ubiquitous staple goods fueled popular discontent, “entrepreneurs” with ties to the regime 
accumulated vast and conspicuous fortunes, and a black market economy surged to further 
distort the marketplace.8  
 
Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein’s programme for Iraq’s revival remained centered on the 
government’s continued dominance of the economy.9 Ambitious and expensive infrastructure 
projects were thus initiated (ranging from dam building to the construction of an underground 
metro system in Baghdad), which badly strained the government’s finances while failing to 
rejuvenate economic activity.10 Furthermore, efforts to solicit external aid proved unsuccessful. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Iraq of one of its most reliable benefactors, while 
Iraq’s wealthy Arab neighbours were not only unwilling to forgive the loans they had extended 
to finance the war against their common Iranian enemy, but were also insensitive to Iraqi 
requests through OPEC to collude in raising the price of oil to Iraq’s advantage.11 
 
                                                
7 The failures of the government’s economic policies in the late-1980s are detailed in Karsh and Rautsi, 
Saddam Hussein, pp.202-207; Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Baghdad”, p.8; 
Chaudhry, “Consuming Interests: Market Failure and the Social Foundations of Iraqi Etatisme”; Kiren 
Aziz Chaudhry, “Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State”, Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, October 1994, p.15.  
8 The growth of the informal economy is discussed in Alnasrawi, “Economic Devastation, 
Underdevelopment and Outlook”, p.81; International Crisis Group, “Iraq Backgrounder”, p.10. 
9 The dominance of the regime over the new “capitalist” private sector is noted by al-Khafaji, “A Few 
Days After: State and Society in a post-Saddam Iraq”, p.80; and Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p.92, 
who argue that economic liberalization was essentially a political strategy as opposed to an economic one, 
with the objective of creating a “national bourgeoisie” dependent upon the regime. Hanna Batatu, “State 
and Capitalism in Iraq: A Comment”, MERIP Middle East Report, No. 142, September-October 1986, 
p.12 finds no evidence that the ostensibly private economic actors who emerged during this time 
(principally as government contractors) possessed “any genuine autonomous social power”.  
10 Discussed in Clawson, “Iraq’s Economy and International Sanctions”, p.72 who notes that major 
infrastructure projects consumed US$30 to US$50 billion of the state budget in 1989-1990.  





By the close of the 1980s, conditions in Iraq were not yet desperate. The government had seen fit 
to allocate twice the amount for rearmament as it did for reconstruction in the post-war years, for 
example, and 1990 saw Iraq repay a better-than-expected US$3.4 billion of its debts – but 
problems were mounting.12 Inflation had surged dramatically, the economy was stagnant, and 
simmering unrest within the armed forces prompted a wave of executions.13  
 
In response, Saddam Hussein chose to embark on what would prove to be his most disastrous 
venture to date. Having failed in his efforts to lead Iraq back to prosperity, and unwilling to scale 
back his ambitions to match his resources, the Iraqi president ordered the invasion of Kuwait.14 
Iraq’s neighbour to the south possessed abundant quantities of gold and hard currency that could 
supply a much-needed stimulus, and also significant oil reserves that would serve as a valuable 
                                                
12 Sluglett, “The International Context of Iraq from 1980 to the Present”, p.246 states that from 1988 to 
1989 the regime’s rearmament expenditures were double that of reconstruction efforts (including the 
construction of celebratory monuments and palaces). Clawson, “Iraq’s Economy and International 
Sanctions”, p.71 discusses Iraq’s debt repayments, noting that oil revenues were rising again at the close 
of the 1980s. Stansfield, Iraq, p.122 emphasizes the role of Iraq’s prioritization of military expenditure in 
its deteriorating fiscal position.  
13 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, “On the Way to Market: Economic Liberalization and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait”, 
Middle East Report No. 170, May-June 1991, p.14 observes that the economic chaos led to unrest of the 
sort that “not even the experienced repressive apparatus of the Ba’th Party could guarantee political 
stability”. See: Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.207-208; Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: 
Decision-making in Baghdad”, p.8; and al-Jabbar, “ Why the Intifadah Failed”, pp.102-103 on purges of 
the officer corps, which had grown increasingly independent from the institutions of the regime during the 
final years of the war (something Saddam Hussein had allowed in the name of improving performance on 
the battlefield).  
14 Iraq’s dubious historical claim to its southern neighbour notwithstanding, Kuwait had attracted 
significant Iraqi ire for perceived transgressions beyond its refusal to either forgive Iraq’s war debts or 
cooperate in affecting a rise in oil prices. Kuwait had been deliberately exceeding OPEC-mandated 
production quotas and thereby suppressing the price of oil (a policy that cost Iraq billions in lost revenue), 
and was also accused of “slant-drilling” to steal from oil fields within Iraq. For discussion over the 
motives behind Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, see: Clawson, “Iraq’s Economy and International Sanctions”, 
pp.71-73 (who attacks the notion that the invasion was in response to sudden economic desperation, 
instead suggesting it was a considered, deliberate act); Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.207-208 
(who emphasize Saddam’s domestic vulnerability at the time); Long, Saddam’s War of Words, Chapter 2 
(who provides a broad overview of contributing factors); Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p.33l and 
Chaudhry, “On the Way to Market”, p.14 (who emphasize systemic economic concerns). Jabar, “The War 
Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed Etatist Nationalism”, p.131 notes the opinion of exiled Iraqi officers 






medium- to long-term revenue source.15 Its conquest would remedy the regime’s problems in a 
single, decisive strike.  
 
Instead, the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait brought a succession of catastrophes upon Iraq. 
The invasion itself achieved the remarkable feat of uniting nearly the entirety of the international 
community against Saddam’s regime, while the rout subsequently suffered at the hands of an 
American-led coalition exacted a devastating toll on both the Iraqi military and national 
infrastructure.16 The war’s aftermath then witnessed simultaneous uprisings in the shi’a South 
and Kurdish North, the suppression of which took tens of thousands of lives and forced the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands more – leaving Iraq’s national unity, and the regime’s 
claim to command the loyalty of its subjects, in tatters.17 Finally, a further blow was struck by 
the United Nations, via the imposition of a set of economic sanctions that was unprecedented in 
scope (and ultimately in duration as well), which would devastate the Iraqi economy and plunge 
the vast bulk of the populace into poverty.18 
 
The damages inflicted on Iraq by Saddam Hussein between 1988 and 1992, which compounded 
the enormous costs of the eight-year war with Iran, catalyzed dramatic changes to both state and 
society. To the former, the utopian transformative vision of the 1970s (when a seemingly 
                                                
15 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.242 argues that the conquest of Kuwait was intended as a first step toward a 
broader exercise of Iraqi power over the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, which would assert Iraqi 
dominance in the region and further assist in its economic revitalization.  
16 Baghdad in particular suffered severe damage (notably to the electricity grid and water treatment 
facilities), which surpassed the cumulative effects of the entire Iran war. See: Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam 
Hussein, pp.258-259 on the damage inflicted by the six-week air campaign.  
17 For detailed accounts of the 1991 uprising in southern Iraq, as well as its suppression (and the way in 
which both badly inflamed sectarian tensions), see Human Rights Watch, “Endless Torment: The 1991 
Uprising in Iraq and its Aftermath”, June 1992, Chapter 3; Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, pp.269-270; and 
al-Jabbar, “Why the Intifadah Failed”, pp.106-108. 
18 David Cortright and George Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, 
(Boulder: Lynne Riener, 2000), p.8, 40-41 note that Iraq was “in a class by itself as the longest, most 
comprehensive, and most severe multilateral sanctions regime ever imposed”, and offer a list of the 
various UN Resolutions passed with respect to Iraq. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p.55 observes that 
the architects of the sanctions regime expected Saddam Hussein to fall quickly from power, and that they 





limitless budget had fueled the ambitions of radical ideologues) was replaced by cold 
pragmatism and the desire to preserve power.19 Weakened by the consequences of over a decade 
of disastrous policy decisions, the Ba’th regime as led by Saddam Hussein would no longer seek 
to transform Iraqi society, but instead to maintain control via the manipulation of its existing 
features. To the latter, the gradual contraction of the totalitarian state and the concurrent 
intensification of material and psychological hardship would combine to catalyze changes in 
Iraqi society. Battered and abused to the point of total annihilation, civil society would find 
space to regenerate. 
 
Yet, while the Iraqi regime was weakened, it remained ruthless and resourceful. Nascent trends 
in Iraqi society would not be allowed to develop unchecked in ways that might threaten Saddam 
Hussein’s position, but would instead be co-opted to ensure that their manifestations supported 
the regime’s agenda. With state resources shrinking, Saddam and his associates thus surveyed 
the domestic landscape for suitable allies to whom they could delegate responsibilities and social 
forces to manipulate in their favour – and the processes of governmental and societal change 
thereby became inextricably intertwined. The religious movements, tribal groups, and localized 
power-brokers that emerged during the following years to fill the space ceded by the previously 
“omnipotent and omnipresent” state would become defining features of Iraqi society, and 
bearing the distinct markings of their interactions with the regime, they would exert powerful 
influences through the final years of Saddam Hussein’s rule and beyond.20 
                                                
19 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.107 observes that, as a result of war damage and sanctions, Iraq’s annual 
oil revenue fell to US$400 million in 1992 – leading to the regime’s “inability to buy off dissent”. 
Revenues would not rise significantly until the 1995 “Oil for Food” scheme enabled Iraq to sell US$1 
billion of oil every ninety days to fund humanitarian needs. Detailed in Agustin Velloso De Santisteban, 
“Sanctions, War, Occupation, and the De-development of Education in Iraq”, International Review of 
Education, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2005, p.60.  
20 Phrase from Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under 
Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p.89. Nicholas Haussler, “Third Generation Gangs 
Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency”, M.A. Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, 2005, p.41 details how the 
social changes of the 1990s were instrumental in shaping the networks at the heart of post-2003 violence, 





I. The “Resurgence” of Tribes & Islam: A Triumph of Tradition? 
Saddam Hussein’s decision to empower subordinates external to the regime to lessen its 
administrative burden was a radical yet necessary departure from the methods of totalitarian rule 
employed during the 1970s and early 1980s. His choices of tribalism and Islam as the principal 
frameworks for its implementation made this decision all the more drastic. The social structures 
and ethical norms of the tribal system had atrophied significantly through the middle decades of 
the twentieth century, while the prestige of religious leaders and levels of popular religiosity had 
suffered precipitous declines as well. Tribalism and sectarianism, long-identified as obstacles 
impeding Iraq’s pursuit of modernity, unity, and power, had been attacked and undermined for 
decades. The sudden rise to national prominence of tribal sheikhs and austere men of religion 
from the late-1980s into the 1990s was thus a dramatic and unexpected development – the roots 
and implications of which remain deeply controversial.21 
 
One school of thought on the rise of Islam and tribalism in modern Iraq contends that while the 
Ba’th regime had achieved near-total success in either destroying or consuming all the modern 
manifestations of civil society (including labour unions, student groups, political parties, and 
professional and social organizations), it was never able to eradicate fully traditional markers of 
identity. When the regime’s position weakened, the essentialist argument goes, primordial social 
forces reemerged from the subsoil of Iraqi society to provide order, direction, and comfort to a 
                                                                                                                                          
Society in a post-Saddam Iraq”, pp.78-80 for the prediction that the war to oust Saddam Hussein would be 
far simpler than the task of managing the various “interest groups” that had emerged and staked out claims 
to various geographic areas and sectors of the economy during the 1990s. 
21 For detailed treatment of Saddam Hussein’s shifting attitudes toward tribalism, see Baram, “Neo-
Tribalism in Iraq”, and Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes 
under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”. International Crisis Group, “Iraq Backgrounder”, 
pp.20-21 offers a concise, though strongly essentialist overview of the rise of tribalism in modern Iraq. In 
regard to Saddam’s embrace of Islam, Long, Saddam’s War of Words; Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word: 
Political Discourse in Iraq, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), especially Chapters 13 and 14; and Jabar, 
“Clerics, Tribes, Ideologies and Urban Dwellers in the South of Iraq: the Potential for Rebellion”, offer 
detailed accounts. Sami Zubaida, “The Rise and Fall of Civil Society in Iraq”, Open Democracy, February 
5, 2003 provides a useful overview of the evolution of civil society in modern Iraqi history, charting the 





battered populace. The rise of tribalism and religiosity is thus viewed as the triumph of tradition, 
and evidence of the persisting power and enduring allure of deeply rooted cultural and historical 
forces. 
 
Alternatively, far more immediate and tangible causes may be offered in explanation. The 
“rebirths” of tribalism and of popular religiosity may instead be interpreted not as the revival of 
previously dormant or suppressed forces somehow innate to the Iraqi people, but rather as 
distinctly modern phenomena: driven by a combination of the regime’s deliberate exploitation of 
the forms and categories of the past, and the mutation of Iraqi society in response to 
extraordinary economic, psychological, and physical stresses.22  
 
In Baghdad, from the city’s bourgeois core to its poorer, peripheral districts such as Saddam 
City, the latter explanation appears far more compelling.23 For, while the tribal and religious 
movements that would sweep the Iraqi capital during the 1990s began as grassroots trends in 
Iraqi society, were couched in the language of the traditional past, and would not have flourished 
as they did were it not for popular recognition of their historical roots in Iraqi culture, their 
modern manifestations on Baghdad’s urban landscape represented a break from the city’s past 
far more than to a return to it.  
 
                                                
22 The work of Jabar explores both sides of this argument and details the processes through which 
tribalism came to re-take a central place in Iraqi society in the 1980s and 1990s “as Ba’th party 
organization weakened” Jabar notes, “primordial networks were reinvigorated to fill a social void”. Jabar, 
“Clerics, Tribes, Ideologies and Urban Dwellers in the South of Iraq: the Potential for Rebellion”, p.172. 
Nonetheless, Jabar, p.101 notes “there is no clear concept of what a tribe is in late twentieth-century Iraq 
after almost a century and a half of continuous decomposition”.  
23 For a contrasting view from the canon of counterinsurgency, see M.W. Shervington, “Small Wars and 
Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Lessons From Iraq”, M.A. Thesis, Cranfield University Dept. of Defence 
Management and Security Analysis, 2005, pp.67, 99 for the assertion that “at the turn of the millennium, 
Iraq’s society had changed little from its heady days of 1920”, and that “the tribe is the one common 
denominator that links the vast majority of Iraqis together regardless of political or religious persuasion”. 
Essentialist arguments are also advanced, albeit with nuance, in the unfortunately titled: David Ronfeldt, 






With respect to rising religiosity, the growing popularity among sunnis of aggressively radical 
and explicitly sectarian strains of Islam was unequivocally not a reversion to the beliefs and 
practices of previous generations. Similarly, the extraordinary fervour with which the 
notoriously irreligious shi’a underclass embraced Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr could 
in no way be construed as a “revival” of Iraqi shi’ism. The “tribes” that would soon proliferate 
through the Iraqi capital, on the other hand, would grow not by virtue of a widespread 
rediscovery of latent traditional bonds or the revitalization of authentic kinship structures among 
Baghdadis, but rather in the remarkable absence of both. 
 
i. The Roots of Iraq’s Tribal Revival 
The process through which tribal sheikhs, networks, and ethics became prominent features of 
modern Iraqi society began on the country’s rural periphery during the war with Iran. Whereas 
Ba’thist ideology was uncompromising in its condemnation of tribalism, and had defined itself 
in no small measure through its disavowal of Iraq’s traditional past, Party administrators had 
long been pragmatic in their dealings with tribal groups. Thus, while Party ideologues (like the 
vast majority of their counterparts in educated urban society) viewed sheikhs as “the epitome of 
backwardness”, and tribal loyalties were rhetorically castigated as divisive hindrances to 
national unity, the offensive against both tribes and tribalism had, even during the peak years of 
Ba’thist totalitarianism, been only as strong as the localized position of the government.24  
 
In urban areas such as Baghdad, where the state was at its strongest and the tribes generally at 
their weakest, the regime had diligently eradicated independent tribal leadership. In the more 
remote areas of the countryside, on the other hand, particularly in areas of the South and West 
where the apparatus of the government was less robust and where tribal structures had endured 
                                                
24 Quotation from Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.1, who further notes the regime’s “flexible” 





to varying degrees, the Ba’th adopted a policy of empowering the lower echelons of the 
traditional tribal order at the expense of their social, political, and economic betters.25 The 
regime had thereby staved off potential threats from more powerful or respected tribal groups by 
manipulating enduring traditional divisions; all the while, working to strengthen its powers in a 
process intended to culminate in the tribes’ eventual destruction.26  
 
The unanticipated costs of the Iran war halted the planned expansion of the totalitarian state, 
however, forcing its contraction from areas of Iraq’s periphery and thus altering tribe-state 
relations. First, whilst continuing to empower the weak to subvert the strong, the Iraqi 
government grew increasingly reliant upon tribal proxies to fill important roles in the 
countryside. Unable to sustain, much less enhance, the full institutional array of the state, the 
government granted localized powers to trusted tribal clients during the late-1980s. Second, the 
propaganda apparatus of the regime abandoned core tenets of Ba’thist dogma and began to tout 
the virtues of Iraq’s tribal past in support of the war effort.27 Thus, despite the fact that official 
anti-tribal policy enjoyed broad support within the Ba’thist establishment and among the 
educated urban classes, tribal sheikhs enjoyed a surge of rhetorical support. Third, and equally 
                                                
25 Detailed in Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, observing (pp.3-4) that the policy of manipulating tribal 
rivalries was used most notably in present-day Anbar province, where the tribal order was said to be 
particularly vibrant and where dominant families and tribal groups had retained their traditional positions. 
Prominent tribes such as the Jabbur and the Shammar Jarba thus saw their lands confiscated and 
distributed to weaker rivals. Jabar, “Shaykhs and Ideologues”, p.31 notes how this approach was followed 
in southern Iraq as well, where the lower echelons of the tribal order (the Marsh Arabs, for example) were 
made proxies of the state to undermine their traditional superiors.  
26 Both Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq” and Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement and in “Clerics, Tribes, 
Ideologies and Urban Dwellers in the South of Iraq: the Potential for Rebellion”, argue that the 
empowerment of tribal subordinates during the course of the war with Iran was viewed as a temporary 
measure only, and that the regime’s objective remained the wholesale atomization of the populace. 
27 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.1 observes that with his tribal policies of the 1990s, “Saddam 
Hussein altered the Ba’th Party’s most central tenets of faith”. Baram traces the changing posture of the 
Ba’th vis-à-vis Iraq’s tribes as progressing from outright hostility and the pursuit of tribal destruction 
during the 1970s, to the desire to co-opt and manipulate sheikhs as necessary allies during the 1980s, to 
the use of tribal proxies as “legitimate partners for power-sharing” in the 1990s. See: Jabar, “Sheikhs and 
Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-
1998”, p.90 for a discussion of how government rhetoric about Iraqis’ common tribal heritage was used to 





important, the weakening position of the state during the late 1980s catalyzed grassroots changes 
in areas affected by the state’s contraction. Having spent the duration of its rule devouring Iraqi 
society and cultivating mass dependency, the government’s retreat left a vacuum that tribes and 
tribalism – with the blessing and encouragement of the state – began to fill.28  
 
The extent to which “tradition” played a determining role in shaping the tribal order that 
developed thereafter is dubious.29 While many of the principal sheikhly families of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries continued to occupy their traditional domains, none of 
Iraq’s tribes had been preserved in stasis through the intervening decades. Even the most distant, 
rural reaches of the country had been affected by Iraq’s transformative and destabilizing pursuit 
of modernity, and a large-scale essentialist revival was thus inconceivable. Among Iraq’s shi’a 
underclass in particular, tribal structures had been corrupted and fragmented by the broad array 
of forces detailed in the previous chapter, while individual leaders had been relentlessly 
persecuted and marginalized. 
 
Yet, with the welfare state in decline and the government empowering its chosen proxies with 
both official influence and financial resources, traditional authenticity was of secondary concern 
to the Iraqi people. In an environment of pressing material need, access to patronage and support 
                                                
28 Per the independent authenticity of the tribal structures that emerged, one must question how and why 
this could have occurred. Essentialist arguments aside, tribal structures and their leaders would have had 
to have either avoided or resisted the numerous fragmentary pressures of the twentieth century – and also 
either avoided or reached an arrangement (and the latter is far more likely) with the Ba’th. Hence, it would 
seem that the prospects for pure, independent sheikhly authenticity were slim, save for extremely low-
level bonds among groups able to remain off Ba’thist radar. 
29 Dawood, “The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: the Case of Iraq”, p.119 
observes continuity among tribal networks in the “Sunni Triangle in northwestern Iraq”; while Baram, 
“Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.4 states that the “old cores” of the tribal system endured in the countryside. 
Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, pp.76-77 notes how the spread of public education undermined 
traditional structures, however, even in rural areas. On the changing structures (and norms) of the tribal 
system, Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.22 notes the flexible, fluid nature of tribalism – though 
observes that such “flexibility” can only extend so far before the underlying validity of the entire 





was vital. When further buttressed by the praises of the official media (and, indeed, by the 
visible behaviour of the regime itself, which took on an increasingly tribal character as Saddam 
Hussein installed trusted kin in top positions), Iraq’s tribal movement became an increasingly 
prominent feature of the domestic landscape.30 
 
ii. The Drivers of a “Resurgent” Islam 
The surge in popular religiosity that would ultimately transform Iraq’s social and political 
discourse during the 1990s (among both sunnis and shi’as alike) can be traced to the efforts of 
shi’a clerics and laymen to incubate popular religiosity and to incite armed revolt against the 
government. Having faded to a point of near-irrelevance in the lives of a great many Iraqi shi’a 
(and, moreover, having witnessed the anti-religious and anti-elitist Iraqi Communist Party amass 
an enormous shi’a following), the elites of the shi’a establishment began working assiduously 
from the late 1950s to revitalize their faith.31 Still, while modest strides were made through the 
1960s, most notably in subverting the position of the Iraqi Communist Party, religion 
nonetheless remained marginal to public life in Iraq.32  
 
                                                
30 On the tribalization of Saddam Hussein’s regime, both Baram and Jabar discuss how the Iraqi president 
embedded his familial and tribal kin within the institutions of the state to strengthen his personal position. 
Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p.71 describes this practice as “etatist tribalism”, which was used “to 
enhance the political power of a certain fragile and vulnerable state elite”. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 
Iraq Since 1958, pp.93-94 trace this phenomenon to President Arif’s creation of the Republican Guard in 
the mid 1960s, which was placed under the control of his tribal kin. See: Charles Tripp, “After Saddam”, 
Survival, Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2002-03, pp.25-26 for discussion of the ahl al-thiqa, “people of trust”, 
whom Saddam Hussien embedded in key positions in the government and economy.  
31 Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp.195-199 discuss the formation of the Association of 
Najaf Ulema in 1958 and the later emergence of the Da’wa as part of a campaign to counter endemic 
“atheism” in Iraqi society. Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements”, pp.5-6 notes of the formation 
of shi’a revivalist movements: “they were moved by a growing sense that the old faith was receding... that 
the belief of even the urban Shi’a masses was not as firm... and that the ulama were losing ground and 
declining in prestige and material influence”. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.999-1000 notes the 
phenomenon of young men from elite clerical families joining the Iraqi Communist party. 





The ascent to power of the Ba’th regime in 1968 then brought unprecedented waves of 
persecution to the shi’a religious establishment. Clerics were arrested, murdered, or deported, 
while agents of the regime penetrated Najaf’s seminaries to monitor teachers and students 
alike.33 Efforts to engage the masses thus gave way, out of necessity, to clandestine activity – 
with the Da’wa emerging at the forefront of an assortment of militant networks seeking Islamic 
revolution and a revival of the faith in Iraq.  
 
The battle between the devoutly secular Ba’th regime and its shi’a opposition escalated through 
the 1970s, with the former in firm control. The latter years of the 1970s witnessed sporadic anti-
regime protests during religious festivals, yet the prowess of the totalitarian state dictated that 
the general public remained largely passive.34 Moreover, the extent of popular religious fervour 
should not be overestimated, as fallout from crippling drought and other economic concerns 
played vital roles in motivating popular participation in anti-regime activity.35  
 
Nonetheless, as noted in the previous chapter, the government felt compelled to redouble its 
dispensation of terror and reward to its shi’a subjects during the late 1970s. The security services 
culled the clerical establishment, while funds were distributed to the shi’a poor. An additional 
step was also taken, however, which marked a dramatic break from past practices. Faced with 
religiously-defined opposition, and sensitive to the fact that its religious message was resonating 
to some effect, the formerly secular Iraqi regime began to adopt the mantle of religion.36  
                                                
33 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.195 notes the Ba’th regime’s early persecution of the shi’a establishment, 
and of the Hakim family in particular. 
34 Popular unrest and anti-regime agitation led by shi’a factions, or otherwise defined in explicitly shi’a 
terms (along with the response of the government, which included the execution of opposition figures and 
noted clerics, mass deportation of Iraqi shi’a to Iran, and also major expenditures on religious 
infrastructure and public welfare for the shi’a masses) are detailed by Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: 
al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin”; and Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement.  
35 Discussed in Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, pp.209, 228-233. 
36 On the extent to which the regime’s embrace marked a break from past practices, see: Tripp, A History 





Saddam Hussein, ever the pragmatist in his pursuit of self-preservation, began to define himself 
and his rule in Islamic terms.37 The regime dedicated funds to the construction of mosques and 
the refurbishment of shi’a shrines and seminaries (while their occupants came under heightened 
scrutiny), and official rhetoric took an increasingly Islamic bent. The advent of the Iranian 
Revolution and the ensuing eight years of war, during which time Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
continued to decry the fundamental illegitimacy of Iraq’s “godless” regime, then prompted 
further, dramatic amplification of Saddam Hussein’s Islamic persona, as the Iraqi leader sought 
to outflank his religiously-defined opposition at home and abroad.38  
 
At a grassroots level, the costs of the war also fueled rising religiosity among the Iraqi people. 
As battlefield casualties mounted, the Iranians pushed into Iraqi territory, and the welfare state 
contracted, Iraq began to change from the bottom-up. A spontaneous, popular surge in piety thus 
intermixed with the increasingly militant Islamic rhetoric of the state to create a push-pull effect, 
taking Iraq ever further from the secularism of previous decades. The economic shocks that 
followed the war then added further impetus to both grassroots and government-directed trends 
toward religiosity, such that by the time of the Kuwait invasion Islam had become “the rhetorical 
coin of the realm” and Iraqi society was more religious than it had ever been before.39 
 
                                                                                                                                          
from shi’a factions, wherein “the government abandoned its earlier pretense of respect for Islamic values”, 
removing Islamic education from the national curriculum and attacking its foes in word and deed.  
37 Detailed in Long, Saddam’s War of Words, pp.62-69, who surveys how the rhetoric of the Iraqi state, 
and of Saddam Hussein in particular, changed over time in response to rising shi’a religiosity. Long 
argues for Saddam’s “instrumental” use of Ba’thist ideology, noting that he was willing to deviate from 
the Party line whenever necessary.  
38 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.144-145 discusses Saddam’s reaction to the advent of the 
Iranian Revolution. Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements”, p.7 notes that the regime spent 
24,000,000 Iraqi Dinars on shrines, mosques, and other religious causes in 1979. Long, Saddam’s War of 
Words, pp.65,70 notes that Islamic rhetoric escalated in response to the Iranian revolution, and then 
surged further after battlefield setbacks like the loss of the Faw Peninsula to the Iranians in 1986 (with 
Saddam Hussein making the hajj to Mecca at the end of that year and Iraqi military units, operations, and 
weapons systems being given Islamic names).  
39 Quotation from Long, Saddam’s War of Words, p.82, who notes that it was at this time that allahu 
akhbar, “God is Great” was emblazoned on the Iraqi flag. Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: 





II. The Transformation of State & Society During the 1990s 
The events that followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait: crushing military defeat, popular uprisings 
by both shi’a and Kurdish civilians, and the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations, 
inflicted extensive damage upon the mechanisms through which the state controlled Iraqi 
society. First, the failure of the Kuwait invasion and the imposition of sanctions rendered the 
long-cultivated dependency of the populace a dangerous liability. Iraq’s currency reserves were 
exhausted and oil revenues were minimal, leaving the regime without means to meet the needs 
of a rapidly expanding population. Second, after the vicious sectarianism and brutal atrocities of 
the 1991 revolts, even the powerful propaganda apparatus of the state could no longer sustain the 
notion that Saddam Hussein was the beloved leader of all Iraqis.40 Iraqi nationalism, having been 
recast and refocused on the person of Saddam Hussein, was badly damaged. Third, while the 
security services endured as a fearsome and powerful tool, the regime had struggled to manage 
the 1991 uprisings. Indeed, although trusted units of the military and intelligence services were 
responsible for the vast bulk of the killing during the government’s counteroffensive in the 
South, for example, it fell to the regime’s tribal clients (who were, of course, themselves shi’a) 
to play a decisive role in containing the violence.41  
                                                
40 Atrocities were not solely the work of counterinsurgent forces during 1991. Marr, The Modern History 
of Iraq, p.242, observes that the rebels were “unruly, unorganized, and at points almost as brutal as the 
regime”. Detailed in Human Rights Watch, “Endless Torment”; al-Khafaji, “State Terror and the 
Degradation of Politics”, pp.16-17; and emphasized by Makiya, Cruelty and Silence, p.90.  
41 Whereas Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam, 
(London: IB Tauris, 2005), p.180 posits that “probably a majority of shi’ites joined the ranks of the 
opposition in the fateful spring of 1991”, it appears certain that the assessment of Pollack, The 
Threatening Storm, p.49 (that “probably fewer than 100,000” took part) is far closer to the truth. Baram, 
“Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, pp.8-9 and Dodge, Inventing Iraq, p.162 note that many southern sheikhs viewed 
the revolt with caution, attempting to position themselves, above all else, on the winning side (prompting 
“resentment and exasperation” among opposition leaders, in the words of Baram). Baram, “Neo-Tribalism 
in Iraq”, p.7 notes the Ba’th Party apparatus “proved a near-total failure” in the suppression of the shi’a 
revolt, while al-Khafaji, “State Terror and the Degradation of Politics”, p.17 states that the regime’s 
cultivation of proxies and informants from among the lower echelons of the southern tribal order – who, in 
turn, owed their material and social position entirely to the state – paid off handsomely during 
counterinsurgency operations. Makiya, Cruelty and Silence, p.100 describes how the government’s 
retaking of Samawah, the last southern town to fall after the uprising, came only “after local tribal leaders 





Faced with a suffocating sanctions regime, an overwhelmingly hostile international community, 
fundamentally compromised national unity, rising poverty, a public health crisis that would take 
the lives of hundreds of thousands, and a significantly weakened state apparatus, the top-down 
and bottom-up forces that had encouraged the rise of tribalism and religiosity intensified 
dramatically. The populace turned increasingly to Islam for psychological comfort and to tribes 
for material assistance. The government, on the other hand, came to rely more and more on its 
tribal proxies to compensate for its withdrawal from society, and Saddam Hussein tightened his 
embrace of Islam to align himself with public opinion and reestablish a measure of credibility.42 
 
i. The Flying Sheikhs from Taiwan 
One of Saddam Hussein’s first high-profile policy decisions following the 1991 revolts was to 
bring tribalism firmly into the heart of the public order. His tribal clients had proven reliable 
during the Iran war and, as noted above, shi’a tribes in particular had been invaluable in the 
containment of the 1991 uprisings. In recognition of their evident utility, the Iraqi president 
embraced and empowered them. Saddam Hussein convened a much-publicized gathering of his 
sheikhly clients in Baghdad, and casting himself in the role of “sheikh of all sheikhs” and the 
Ba’th Party as the “tribe of all tribes”, he presided over ceremonies in which his proxies danced 
tribal dances, swore loyalty oaths to the regime, and recited traditional poems extolling his 
virtues.43 Saddam Hussein also took the additional steps of returning lands that had been 
confiscated during the reform initiatives of prior decades, and amending Iraqi law to restore 
                                                                                                                                          
From Resentment to Revolt”, in Iraq’s Road to War, p.61 likewise describes how Saddam Hussein 
purchased the loyalty of key southern sheikhs to cut the momentum of the shi’a uprising.  
42 Munson, “What Lies Beneath”, p.9 notes “as the power of the state weakened due to war and sanctions, 
Saddam increasingly relied on ruthless and personally-profiting security officials, powerful tribes, 
organized criminals, and religious leaders to ensure stability and loyalty in key areas.” Marr, The Modern 
History of Iraq, p.297 notes that the regime’s official “faith campaign” began in 1994.  





sheikhs’ traditional rights as patriarchs (most prominently, and controversially, to include their 
right to kill adulterous female family members).44 
 
The surging political prominence of sheikhs provoked significant disdain and dismay, however, 
to the extent that even the state-run press published critical editorials.45 Popular stereotypes of 
sheikhs as backward, ignorant anachronisms persisted, and were famously reinforced by the 
newly empowered sheikhs’ propensity to spend hours riding the elevators of the Rashid Hotel in 
Baghdad, captivated by modern technology.46 Yet, irrespective of the widespread scorn among 
Baghdadis toward the “flying sheikhs”, as they became mockingly known, their influence 
continued to grow. For, in addition to providing a valuable service to the regime, the contraction 
of the welfare state and the overall decline of the public sector created a popular need for their 
services. The sheikhs’ position as middlemen between an increasingly weakened regime and an 
increasingly destitute populace enhanced their status greatly, imparting critical momentum to 
Iraq’s tribal “revival”.  
 
The regime’s reliance upon tribal proxies to administer Iraq’s periphery intensified through the 
1990s, despite clear warning signs in the South and West that the strategy held significant 
dangers. In 1992, for example, a major armed confrontation occurred between competing tribal 
groups in the vicinity of Kut that left hundreds dead, while by the mid-1990s, the rural margins 
of modern-day Anbar Province had become the domain of tribally-defined networks involved in 
                                                
44 Discussed in Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.20, who observes that the new regime-tribe relationship 
amounted, in important respects, to a return to pre-1958 conditions with Iraq’s rural, tribal domain under 
its own legal regime. Also noted by Jabar, Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and 
Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p.93. Karsh and Rautsi, 
Saddam Hussein, p.94, observe that Saddam’s reputation as a “liberator of women” was voided as a result.  
45 Noted in Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.17.  
46 Stories detailed in Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.122. The educated elite had long been contemptuous 
of rural tribal sheikhs, as alluded to by Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.115, who refers to them as “an 





smuggling and organized crime.47 Nonetheless, the Iraqi regime was either unwilling or unable 
to exert the power necessary to rein in its unruly clients, and through the course of the decade 
many established regional fiefdoms and came to control sectors of Iraq’s vibrant black market 
economy. Furthermore, by 1995, 60 percent of National Assemblymen in the Iraqi government 
were identifying themselves with tribal names, and the regime established a separate High 
Council of Tribal Chiefs a year later, granting sheikhs diplomatic passports, land rights, and 
weaponry.48 
 
Tribalism thus permeated the official and unofficial structures that came to dominate Iraq 
through the course of the 1990s, and what began as a rural, peripheral phenomenon spread into 
the core of the nation’s capital. Yet, while the sheikh-as-proxy strategy appears to have operated 
with some measure of authenticity on Iraq’s periphery, its manifestation in Baghdad was deeply 
troubled.49 In the heart of the city, both the structures and the norms of tribalism had been under 
near-constant attack for generations. The traditional communal clusters of the mahallah that had 
                                                
47 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, pp.17-18 describes the Kut engagement, which featured artillery and 
other military-grade weapons and left 266 dead and 422 wounded. Jabar, Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: 
Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p.97 
comments on the quasi-tribal raiding parties that made the road from Baghdad to Amman (via Anbar 
Province) exceptionally treacherous. Whereas the shi’a tribes of southern Iraq appear to have focused 
primarily on competition with one another for regional power, sunni tribes (which were deeply embedded 
in the upper echelons of the Iraqi military and security services) were more active in anti-regime intrigue. 
Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p.68, 75 notes an assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein by 
Ubaidi tribesmen in December 1993, and discusses the May 1995 revolt in Ramadi launched by Dulaimi 
tribesmen. 
48 Percentage from Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.263. Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: 
Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, 
pp.95-96 details the benefits that came with membership in the tribal council. Keiko Sakai, “Tribalization 
as a Tool of State Control in Iraq: Observations on the Army, the Cabinets and the National Assembly” in 
Tribes and Power, pp.148-151 notes that candidates in the 1989 National Assembly elections had begun to 
run in remarkable numbers on their tribal credentials – a practice that had been banned during the 1970s in 
an effort to downplay tribal loyalties. He notes, however, that this had been limited to sunni candidates 
and that southern shi’a did not adopt the practice at that time. 
49 Noted in Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.263; and Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.15, who 
expresses contemporary surprise at the emergence of tribes in central Baghdad. Jabar, “Sheikhs and 
Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-
1998”, p.94 observes the difficulty encountered by Saddam Hussein in his search for suitable tribal 
proxies in urban areas, where “the disintegration of actual tribes and clans has reached such a point that 





ordered the city’s core had been unwound and diluted, while the dislocations of long-range 
migration and life in urban slums had fragmented tribal bonds among the capital’s new arrivals. 
The city’s peripheral zones thus maintained certain cultural affectations of the traditional past, 
but the city was not home to latent tribal networks that could naturally revive themselves. On the 
contrary, Baghdad had been subjected to the full force and fury of Ba’thist anti-tribal 
persecution, whereby not only had the legitimacy of the tribe been badly denigrated but, perhaps 
more importantly, those individuals who stood out as prospective tribal leaders had been co-
opted or eliminated.  
 
Baghdad’s tribalization evolved instead with strong elements of necessity-driven functionalism 
and cynical opportunism.50 As the statist economy and the value of the dinar collapsed in 
tandem, and the government’s retreat from society was extended to include the cessation of 
policing of areas of the capital (leading to sharp increases in crime and violence), Baghdadis 
were compelled to either resuscitate long-discarded tribal identities or fabricate them entirely.51 
The tribes that emerged in the Iraqi capital during the course of the 1990s were thus not the 
outgrowth of a sudden resurgence of previously suppressed or obscured kinship bonds, but 
rather attempts by desperate urbanites to find a measure of security and stability in an 
increasingly volatile urban environment. “Tribes” thus came to exist in areas of the city where 
tribalism had long been anathema, and “sheikhs” of dubious authenticity proliferated – often by 
decree of a regime content to create them when no suitable proxies could be found.52  
                                                
50 Distilled by al-Khafaji, “A Few Days After: State and Society in a post-Saddam Iraq”, pp.80-81 who 
notes “the chiefs and their supposed tribe-members use [the rise of state support for tribalism] in a very 
pragmatic way – one which does not signify a genuine sense of solidarity”. “Kinship relations have been 
used to solidify interest groups”, Khafaji observes, but these groups “do not express more generalized 
social relations… kinship is a means to cement interest groups… but it is not the basis of those groups”. 
51 Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.xv notes that through the 1990s “law and order were collapsing in 
Baghdad”. Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under 
Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, pp.97-99 likewise addresses surging criminality across 
Iraq – for which tribal groups were in large measure responsible. 
52 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p..122 observes “where there were no sheikhs to cultivate, or where they 





These men, to whom the regime funneled money and granted localized power, and in turn to 
whom Baghdadis looked for handouts, employment, and protection, were found in increasing 
numbers as the 1990s wore on. They came to be known collectively as “taiwani” sheikhs, an 
epithet that drew equivalence between their fraudulent pedigrees and the origins of the pirated 
goods from the Far East that came to dominate Baghdad’s markets under sanctions.53 Yet, 
despite the patent illegitimacy of many urban sheikhs, and the transparent utilitarianism of their 
tribesmen’s newfound allegiances, Baghdad’s tribes became indispensable vehicles for localized 
protection and conduits for state patronage.  
 
Their influence remained controversial, however, and resented by many, for two main reasons. 
First, many tribes bore a striking resemblance to mafia-style networks, and their sheikhs to 
distinctly modern urban warlords.54 Whereas Iraq’s resurgent “tribes” were valued for the 
protection they offered, they were also directly responsible for much of the violence that 
proliferated. Second, the broader tribal phenomenon of the 1990s saw a debased caricature of the 
traditional conceptions of honour and vengeance come to Iraq, whereby blood feuds and honour 
killings became intermeshed with economically- and politically-motivated turf wars.55 Baghdad 
thus grew rougher and more violent, with the pseudo-traditional ethics of sanctions-era tribalism 
reshaping urban culture.56 
 
 
                                                
53 Term noted in Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under 
Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998”, p94 and Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.122. The taiwanii 
designation was still used widely by Baghdadis as of 2008, to designate what American personnel referred 
to simply as “fake sheikhs”.  
54 Jabar, “Shaykhs and Ideologues”, p.48 laments the rise of “tribal gangsterism”. 
55 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.14 notes the resurgence of mutated tribal conceptions of justice, to 
include honour killings, as well as the rising use of inter-tribal mediation in place of the increasingly 
inoperative state judicial system.  
56 See: Shadid, Night Draws Near, p.26 on the rise of reef, or “country”, ethics during the sanctions era, 
and observations on the ruralization (and, in the eyes of those who cherished Baghdad’s dynamic urban 
heritage, the debasement) of Baghdad’s urban culture. Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, p.21 further notes 





ii. In Search of an Office Cleric 
Saddam Hussein’s embrace of Islam, and his efforts to co-opt and thereby manage rising 
religiosity, intensified dramatically in the aftermath of the 1991 uprisings. Rising religiosity had 
been a notable response to the hardships of years past, and with deprivation and destitution 
looming on the horizon, the regime attempted to position itself at its vanguard. The regime thus 
asserted its piety before the populace, via measures such as the prohibition of alcohol in 
Baghdad’s once-vibrant restaurants and bars and the construction of elabourate mosques across 
the city.57 The regime’s ongoing feud with the United Nations and its Western enemies was also 
recast in the language of jihad, with Saddam Hussein in the role of holy warrior fighting for 
Islam.58  
 
As the government strove to re-invent itself as a beacon of righteous piety, the Iraqi people were 
turning, of their own volition, to religion and religious institutions.59 Among sunnis, growing 
enthusiasm for Islam was both satisfied and stoked by the religious organizations that flocked to 
Iraq to mitigate the much-publicized suffering of the sanctions era. These groups, hailing 
principally from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, brought not only material comfort, however, but also 
radical, foreign strands of Islam.60 Wahabbi mosques were thus found in increasing numbers in 
Iraq, while salafi movements took root in Baghdad, Mosul, and areas of Anbar Province – most 
                                                
57 Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, pp.271-272 discusses the regime’s rising religiosity during the early 
1990s. 
58 Long, Saddam’s War of Words, Chapter Five offers extensive textual analysis of the speeches of 
Saddam Hussein and other Ba’thist officials, tracing the rise of religious rhetoric.  
59 Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, pp.271-272 also notes the rise of popular religiosity after the disasters of 
1991. “Fear, dislocation, uncertainty, and social ills drove masses into the warmth of religious charities 
and fraternities”, in a process further fueled by simultaneous surges in crime and prostitution. Hashim, 
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, pp.110-111 discusses the revival of Islam during the sanctions era. 
60 Munson, “What Lies Beneath”, p.45 notes the radical nature of the networks that came to operate in 
Iraq. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p.182 points to the growth of Saudi-financed wahhabism as having 





notably the city of Falluja.61 It is unclear to what extent the government maintained control over 
the increasingly radical religious movements that grew thereafter – it has been argued that the 
rise of militant extremism occurred more in the absence of state supervision than in response to 
active state encouragement – yet, irrespective of their genesis, they spread widely among Iraq’s 
sunni Arabs.62  
 
Among Iraqi shi’a, however, rising religiosity posed a far more complicated challenge. It 
threatened not only to exacerbate popular sectarian hostility in a manner that could provoke 
unacceptable levels of destabilizing violence, but also to empower figures within the clerical 
establishment with ties to opposition movements such as the Da’wa and the Supreme Council 
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI – which would become the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council 
in the post-Saddam era). The former had been pursuing a clandestine war against the Iraqi state 
since the 1970s, while the latter had deployed its Badr Brigade militia of Iraqi shi’a to fight 
under Iranian command against the Iraqi Army during the 1980s.  
 
Furthermore, the government’s relationship with its shi’a subjects was at an all time low in the 
aftermath of the 1991 uprising, wherein mobs of shi’a youths and their government opponents 
had traded savage atrocities.63 The prospect of a popular religious movement taking root among 
                                                
61 Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, p.25 notes the rise of salafism in Falluja during the 1990s, 
arguing that the intensity of religious radicalism occurred in tandem with the decreasing power of state 
surveillance.  
62 Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, p.26 argues that the development of these radical groups 
fostered unrest and levels of sectarianism that were contrary to the interests of the regime, and that their 
proliferation was an undesired consequence of the sanctions era rather than a deliberate initiative. For a 
differing view, see: Makiya, Republic of Fear, pp.xxx-xxxi on Saddam’s deliberate cultivation of sectarian 
tensions as a divide and rule strategy. The encouragement of sectarian tensions was a double-edged sword, 
however, which the Iraqi government appears to have used with caution as its resources weakened. 
Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”, pp.18-20 notes that Saddam Hussein’s emphasis on Arab tribalism as a 
core tenet of Iraqi identity was, at least in part, an effort to bridge sectarian divisions in the wake of the 
1991 uprisings. 
63 Human Rights Watch, “Endless Torment”; and Makiya, Cruelty and Silence, pp.91-92 discuss the chaos 





the battered and embittered shi’a was thus a serious threat, which compelled Saddam Hussein to 
pursue a course of action that yielded remarkable short- to medium-term success; but which 
brought with it extraordinarily destabilizing long-term consequences.  
 
Taking advantage of the fearsome internal rivalries that had divided the elites of the shi’a 
establishment for centuries (and continuing the regime’s established practice of purchasing the 
loyalty of high ranking shi’a clerics, who would thereafter be scornfully referred to by their 
peers as ulema al-hafiz, or “office clerics”), Saddam Hussein installed a man he hoped would be 
a pliable proxy at the pinnacle of Iraqi shi’ism.64  
 
III. Sadr and Saddam: A Match Made in Najaf 
Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, the father of Muqtada al-Sadr and the founder of the 
Sadrist movement, is one of the most polarizing figures in Iraq’s history.65 Born in Iraq in 1943 
to a respected shi’a Arab family with ancestral roots in Lebanon, he embarked on a career as a 
religious scholar within the seminaries of Najaf at a time when the tattered remnants of Iraq’s 
clerical establishment were attempting to revive their much-diminished position.66 He studied 
under the luminaries of modern shi’ism that congregated in Najaf during the 1960s and 1970s, 
including the Grand Ayatollahs Muhsin al-Hakim, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, and Abu al-Qasim 
                                                                                                                                          
joining the uprising. The looting, he obsevers, “was on a scale that is impossible to exaggerate” – 
something attributed to the collapse of “public morality”.  
64 The term ulema hafiz is discussed by Batatu, “Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wa al-Islamiyah and al-
Mujahidin”, pp.196-197, and Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements”, p.7. Batatu traces the term 
to the British occupation of Iraq during the First World War, noting that it was standard practice of Iraqi 
regimes (which were typically sunni) to procure the support of shi’a clerics. Ajami, The Foreigner’s Gift, 
p.98 references the term marja’ al-sulta, or “jurist of the regime”. Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, pp.171-
179 discusses the marja’ system as one of institutionalized instability, rivalry, and division, which created 
ample opportunity for outsiders to manipulate its members. Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, p.261 also 
discusses the divisions and rivalries that have long dominated the seminaries of Najaf. 
65 For purposes of clarity and brevity, Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr will hereafter be referred to 
simply as “Sadr”, while his son Muqtada al-Sadr will be referred to as “Muqtada”. This has the added 
benefit, moreover, of reemphasizing that the former was the founder of the Sadrist movement and the man 
after whom Sadr City is named. 
66 Biographical details on Sadr’s life drawn from Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr; Ajami, The Foreigner’s 





al-Khoei; and among notable contemporaries such as Ali al-Sistani, Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, 
and Iranian exile Ruhollah Khomeini.  
 
While his name does not appear in English-language accounts of the shi’a opposition 
movements of the 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s, and his clerical career appears to have progressed in 
relative obscurity, his experience was typical of those who came of age under Ba’thist rule: he 
was twice arrested during the mid-1970s, allegedly tortured, and then subsequently compelled to 
maintain a low profile as the Iraqi government turned Najaf into a veritable prison from the late-
1970s onwards.67 His return to prison in 1991 was similarly unremarkable, as shi’a clerics were 
rounded up by the hundreds during the course of the government’s suppression of the southern 
uprisings.68  
 
In sharp contrast to the fate of numerous peers, however, he was released from prison several 
months later – after which his career underwent a meteoric ascent. Two narratives compete to 
account for the events that ensued, each with legions of fiercely devoted adherents. Critics of 
Sadr allege that he struck a bargain with the regime, where in exchange for government support, 
he would channel the discontent of the shi’a masses away from the regime while also attacking 
its foes in the clerical establishment. Sadr, the story goes, became an agent of the government in 
order to further his own career at the expense of his more qualified and better-established 
clerical rivals. His supporters, on the other hand, counter with the assertion that Sadr was never a 
willing agent of the regime. Instead, they maintain, he took advantage of a weakened Iraqi 
government and manipulated it into enabling him to care for the shi’a underclass at a time of 
                                                
67 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.3 states that Sadr was “largely unknown” before 
he was elevated to the rank of Grand Ayatollah and granted control of Najaf’s seminaries by the Ba’th 
regime.  
68 See: Human Rights Watch, “Endless Torment”, for details of the government’s campaign against 
clerics, which featured both the targeting of individuals and the physical destruction of Najaf, Kerbala, 





extraordinary need – something, his followers emphasize, that the elites of the clerical 
establishment had neglected to do throughout the entirety of Iraq’s history.69  
 
The details of who was using whom, and to precisely what end, remain hotly contested. What is 
beyond dispute, however, is that Sadr was released from prison at a time when many of his peers 
were disappearing into custody, and following the death of the aged Grand Ayatollah Abu al-
Qassim al-Khoei the following summer, the Iraqi government orchestrated his elevation to the 
clerical rank of Grand Ayatollah and installed him at the apex of the clerical establishment.70  
 
i. The Roots of a Controversial Relationship 
Irrespective of what transpired between cleric and regime, Sadr held opinions and ambitions 
that, from the perspective of the government, made him an ideal candidate to assume leadership 
among Iraqi shi’a. Foremost among these was his profound personal hostility to prominent elites 
within the shi’a establishment. Sadr was very much a part of the intense rivalries that permeated 
Najaf’s clerical establishment, called the hawza, and although the ferocity of its divisions had 
abated from the heights of the Mesopotamian past (when competing clerics would align 
themselves with Najaf’s mahallah-based gangs and rival tribes from the surrounding 
countryside, engaging in open warfare for control of the city), division, rivalry, and instability 
                                                
69 Discussed in Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, Chapter Seven; Ajami, The Foreigner’s Gift, pp.93-98: 
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, pp.3-4. Cockburn takes the line that Sadr took 
advantage of the regime, and was not a willing agent thereof. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp.54-61 is 
similarly generous regarding Sadr’s relationship with the regime, though he does concede that the regime 
“gave him control over the Najaf seminaries”. Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, 
p.9 takes a harsher line; while Jabar, “Clerics, Tribes, Ideologies and Urban Dwellers in the South of Iraq: 
the Potential for Rebellion”, p.171 notes that Sadr was “a handpicked government appointee”. 
70 Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei had been the marja’ mutlaq, or supreme object of emulation among Iraqi 
shi’a. His death left a vacancy at the apex of the shi’a establishment, which the regime was able to fill by 
using its physical strength and financial resources to install a chosen successor at the head of Najaf’s 
seminaries. This manoeuver was aided by the fact that, as Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.97-98 notes, 





remained its defining internal characteristics.71 Sadr’s deep personal animosity toward men such 
as Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and Ali al-Sistani (the former tied to the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the latter marked by the regime as an undesirable pillar of shi’a 
leadership) was thus likely central to the regime’s orchestration of his rise. 
 
Beyond his personal rivalries with opponents of the regime, Sadr possessed views on social and 
religious issues that would have further endeared him to Saddam Hussein. Prominent among 
these was his attitude toward the virtues of Iraq’s tribal past. In sharp contrast to prevailing 
attitudes among the clerical elite (where tribalism was generally regarded a regressive social 
force), Sadr celebrated the norms and values of tribalism. His most famous literary work was a 
highly controversial effort to reconcile shariah law with tribal laws and customs, which reflected 
his view that the tribal, Arab heritage of Iraqi shi’a was a core component of their national and 
religious identities (a stance which implied, none too subtly, that clerics of non-Arab heritage 
such as Ali al-Sistani were not true Iraqis – and thus unfit to lead Iraqi shi’a).72 Sadr’s attitude 
toward tribalism thus served the aims of the regime twice over, as it lent credibility to the 
government’s programme of tribal empowerment, while also reinforcing the Arab roots of Iraqi 
shi’a identity in ways that undercut Iranian influence. 
 
Furthermore, Sadr was fiercely critical of the clerical establishment’s relationship with the shi’a 
underclass. His activist stance on the need to pro-actively engage the poor marked a two-tiered 
                                                
71 See: Juan Cole and Moojan Momen, “Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman 
Karbala 1824-1823”, Past and Present, No. 112, August 1986; Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq; and Peter 
Heine, “Zghurt and Shmurt: Aspects of Traditional Shi’i Society”, in Faleh Abdul Jabar (ed), Ayatollahs, 
Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq (London: Saqi, 2002), pp.37-38 on 
the dynamics of politics in pre-Iraqi Najaf and Kerbala. Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.101, 123 
compares the intrigue of Najaf’s religious seminaries to the novels of Trollope. Shadid, Night Draws Near, 
pp.228-229 also emphasizes Sadr’s rivalry with Sistani, with the former mocking the latter’s Persian 
accent; while International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, pp.3-4 discusses Sadr’s tenuous 
relationship with his establishment peers. 
72 Sadr’s Fiqh al-Asha’ir is discussed in Mahan Abedin, “The Sadrist Movement,” Middle East 





shift from the practices of the elite. First, Iraq’s leading shi’a clerics had long taken a cautious 
approach when engaging the public sphere in any capacity. This stemmed, in part, from a strong 
theological current within shi’ism known as “quietism”, which advocates that clerics distance 
themselves from the mundane concerns of daily life and focus on the spiritual realm.73 It was 
also a reflection of more practical concerns, however, as the predations of the Ba’th had made 
such reticence essential. Second, the religious leaders of Iraq’s holy cities had developed a 
reputation for aloofness and elitism in their stance toward the shi’a underclass. The shurughis, 
with their rough, tribal mannerisms and their occasionally-blasphemous brand of folk religion, 
were widely regarded by the hawza with much the same disdain as was shown by the urbane 
middle and uppper classes of Baghdad. 
 
Having ascended to a position of power, Sadr preached an aggressive, populist line. His views 
on the necessity of concerted activism, like his allegations regarding the establishment’s 
abdication of its responsibilities vis-à-vis the poor, were uncompromising. He cast the 
distinction as one not merely between “activist” and “quietist” but, utilizing the vocabulary of 
warfare, between militancy and passivity.74 He accused the leading lights of the shi’a 
establishment, past and present, not only of having made themselves irrelevant to the lives of 
                                                
73 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Shiites Under Occupation”, Middle East Briefing, September 9, 
2003, provides a concise overview of the quietist/activist issue. In questions over to the place of religious 
leadership in the public sphere, distinction between the “activist” and “quietist” traditions among shi’a 
clerics, and the practice of taqiyya, “concealment”, are core issues. The former concerns the extent to 
which clerics involve themselves in the political and material concerns of their followers, while the latter 
is the notion that one’s opinions or identity can be concealed in the prudent pursuit of survival. Decades of 
state-persecution in Iraq rendered the practice of taqiyya essential among those working in opposition to 
the government – particularly during the Ba’thist era – while quietism emerged as the dominant trend 
among shi’a clerics in Iraq in response to both similar political pressures and the evolution of theological 
scholarship as well. 
74 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.2 observes Sadrist references to “field-based” 





Iraq’s beleaguered shi’a through their inaction and timidity but, moreover, of indifference to the 
suffering of the poor due to class- and identity-based prejudices.75  
 
Sadr’s populist appeals to the poor, combined with his pro-tribal stance, created powerful 
synergies with the regime’s strategy to empower the lower echelons of the tribal order and 
undercut the leading figures of the shi’a elite. His uncompromising stance on activism, on the 
other hand, meant that not only would he assume responsibility for tending to the shi’a poor 
during the sanctions era (something the regime was administratively ill-equipped and 
prejudicially disinclined to do), but that he would also launch scathing personal and theological 
attacks on the regime’s establishment enemies.76  
 
Lastly, Sadr was also a xenophobic Iraqi nationalist. He was fierce in his criticism of Iran, 
outspoken in attacking Iraq’s Israeli and Western enemies, and an ardent proponent of pan-
sectarian solidarity among Iraqi Arabs. Each of these positions complemented the regime’s 
official line, which depicted Iran (and its agents within Iraq, members of the Da’wa and clerics 
of Iranian ancestry prominent among them) as a looming threat, blamed America and its allies 
for the suffering of the Iraqi people under sanctions, and called for national unity in the face of 
foreign conspiracies.77  
 
                                                
75 On the rivalry that developed between Sadr and his establishment peers, International Crisis Group, 
“Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.5 states that “the tribal world was split in two” along lines of class and 
regional affinity by the Sadr-Sistani rivalry, with the wealthier and better respected tribal groups in the 
vicinity of Najaf and Kerbala along the Euphrates giving their allegiance to Sistani, and the poorer, less 
prestigious groups of the Deep South and the region’s urban slums aligning with Sadr. Cockburn, 
Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.112-113 notes that the followers of Sistani would prevent Sadr’s emissaries from 
using mosques to network and deliver sermons. 
76 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.1 discusses the ferocity of Sadr’s personal 
attacks, and the manner in which he actively sought to instill mass disrespect of his establishment foes.  
77 His virulent anti-Americanism was of particular note in this regard, as it reflected prevailing sentiments 
among Iraqi shi’a stemming from America’s betrayal during the 1991 uprisings. Discussed in 
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”; International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics in Iraq”; 





ii. Building a Mass Movement 
Taking advantage of the regime’s support, Sadr (who became known as the White Lion in 
honour of his flowing white beard) created a mass movement of immense proportions. Speaking 
in the vernacular of the southern underclass as opposed to the classical Arabic favoured by his 
establishment peers, and employing men of humble birth as his emissaries in contrast to the 
common use of sayyids and the kin of the elite, Sadr engaged with the daily struggles of the 
poor.78 He was, therefore, the first public figure since Qassim to truly embrace the shi’a 
underclass and work toward the betterment of its condition, and his efforts were all the more 
vital due to the hardships of the era. From the urban slums of Baghdad and Basra to the smaller 
cities and rural spaces of southern Iraq, the charitable operations of the Sadrists were often the 
only source of material and spiritual comfort in a time of endemic poverty, hunger, and 
disease.79  
 
Touting the virtue and authenticity of the shi’a underclass, which was rooted in their tribal, Arab 
heritage and their long history of suffering, and declaring that the time had come for the 
shurughis to take their rightful place in Iraqi society, Sadr cultivated a massive popular 
following in places like Saddam City and the Deep South.80 His ability to tap into deeply rooted 
social and economic concerns explained, in large part, how he was able to build such a 
formidable following among a demographic renowned for its irreligiosity. For, while the 
absence of a history of religious sentiment in no way precludes its development – particularly 
when subjected to stimuli as powerful as those experienced by the shi’a poor during the 1990s – 
                                                
78 Sadr’s efforts to connect with the shi’a underclass are discussed in Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.112-
114; and Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp.57-58. 
79 On the scope of material suffering in the Iraqi capital, Pierre-Jean Luizard and Joe Stork, “The Iraq 
Question from the Inside”, Middle East Report No. 193, March-April 1995, p.21 notes food riots in 
Baghdad’s shi’a slums.   
80 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.5 notes how social connectivity between 





Sadr’s movement was not merely religious.81 At its core was a socio-economic message, and one 
that drew upon grievances that had been building for generations.  
 
As such, Sadr’s militant populism lent a distinct current of class warfare to the movement that 
formed around him. His assertions of identity-based prejudice and quietist impotence on the part 
of the clerical elite resonated among the destitute shi’a of Iraq (who had found little help 
forthcoming from the hawza over previous decades), and his attacks on the inauthenticity of his 
allegedly Persian rivals met with approval among Iraqi shi’a (who retained hatred for Iran 
following the war of the 1980s, in which they comprised the core of the Iraqi Army’s enlisted 
ranks).82  
 
Sadr’s rhetorical assault on the shi’a elite prompted ardent counterattacks, however, which 
featured allegations about his relationship with the regime and accusations of flagrant hypocrisy. 
While there was undeniable substance to Sadr’s critique of the shi’a establishment as being 
contemptuous of the underclass and ineffectual in aiding the poor, the fact that he made these 
charges whilst operating with the blessing of the regime was not lost upon his critics.83 Whatever 
prejudices were harboured within the upper echelons of the shi’a establishment, and however 
disinclined the scholarly elites of Najaf may have been to administer to the underclass, any 
substantive outreach had long been impossible due to the prowess of the Ba’thist police. The 
Hakim family, for example, suffered more that eighty killed during the government assaults of 
                                                
81 See Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements”, for discussion of the circumstances surrounding 
the rise of shi’ism (and of militant activism) among the urban poor from the 1970s onwards. Also, see: 
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.3 for anecdotal evidence of continued 
irreligiousity in the Deep South until the rise of Sadr, who, in many respects, appears to have introduced 
local shi’a to the core tenets of their faith.  
82 See Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi’a Movements”, p.8 for popular historical affinity among Iraqi 
shi’a toward Arab clerics as opposed to their Persian counterparts – a phenomenon that was intensified by 
the war with Iran.  
83 His allegation that the late Grand Ayatollah Abd al-Qassim al-Khoei had been a regime collaborator, 
noted in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.3, was thus particularly provocative. 
Moreover, in contrast to the freedom with which Sadr was able to operate across Iraq, Tripp, A History of 





the early 1980s, and by 1992 its surviving members (along with countless other members of the 
elite) had been driven into exile.84 Sadr’s condemnation of the timidity and inaction of his 
establishment peers were thus met with fury, as the targets of his vitriol knew full well that Sadr 
had seen the government’s repressive powers first-hand during his many years in Najaf.85 
 
Furthermore, in addition to rousing the ire of his establishment peers, the populist militancy of 
Sadr and his followers provoked resentment among middle and upper class shi’a. For, although 
the hardships of the 1990s destroyed the economic position of the middle class, the economic 
parity that came with near-universal impoverishment did not foster a spirit of solidarity. On the 
contrary, as the “middle class” ceased to exist in any meaningful financial sense, its members 
clung all the more fiercely to its social and cultural underpinnings.86 The systemic economic 
collapse that forced teachers, doctors, and other trained professionals to labour as builders or cab 
drivers (at a time when rough, uneducated sheikhs-cum-gangsters rose to positions of social and 
economic power) prompted extraordinary frustration.87 The concurrent rise of a militant populist 
movement of the shi’a underclass masses, which proclaimed its explicit intent to surmount them 
in Iraqi society, thus caused long-simmering prejudices against the shurughis to boil over. 
 
                                                
84 International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics in Iraq”, p.3 for statistics on Hakim casualties. 
85 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.3 discusses the strength of his rhetorical attack 
on his peers and predecessors. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp.58-59 notes the accusations leveled by 
the Hakim family and those affiliated with the shi’a establishment concerning Sadr’s ties to the regime.  
86 Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed Etatist Nationalism”, p.135 notes “with the 
collapse of oil rentierism, the salaried middle strata lost its middle-class status, but not the longing for it”, 
and thereafter were left “impoverished and humiliated”. Chaudhry, “Consuming Interests: Market Failure 
and the Social Foundations of Iraqi Etatisme”, pp.233-234 observes “since 1990, the Iraqi middle class 
has been wiped out… functions of the state have been relegated to recreated ‘tribal’ hierarchies; and large 
segments of the bourgeoisie holding dinars have been reduced to penury”. This created exceptional 
resentment, alluded to in Munson, “What Lies Beneath”, pp.37-38 who observes the rise of uneducated 
strong-men on the streets of Baghdad during the 1990s, who held sway over the eviscerated, yet far better 
educated, former middle class. 
87 Munson, Iraq in Transition, p.40 states that sanctions “forced up to 63 percent of professionals to find 
employment as labourers”, while many families were displaced from their middle class neighbourhoods 





Problematically for the clerical establishment and its middle class followers, however, both the 
favour of the government and prevailing demographic trends were working against them. 
Beneath the surface of Iraq’s boom in oil wealth and the resulting spread of middle class 
prosperity to many, the shi’a underclass had remained a distinct and ever-growing entity. Thus, 
while the economic position of the shurughis improved due to the benefits of state-provided 
employment and an array of public welfare services, they nonetheless remained an identifiable 
bloc in Baghdad, and in the cities and towns of southern Iraq. Furthermore, as the underclass 
continued to swell, the middle class shrank significantly as the pressures of sanctions prompted 
educated Iraqis to flee abroad in growing numbers.88  
 
iii. A Monster of its Own Creation 
As Sadr’s movement continued to grow through the mid-1990s, the pitfalls of the regime’s new 
governance strategy were becoming ever more apparent. In the tribal sphere, the groups that had 
carved out fiefdoms across the country were proving difficult to manage. Localized disputes 
raged over control of Iraq’s thriving black market, “tribal” networks sought to exert supremacy 
over the government, while the encroachment of kinship groups into the institutions of the state 
spread instability through the armed forces that led to violent clashes and assassination attempts 
against Saddam Hussein.89  
 
                                                
88 Al-Khafaji, “State Terror and the Degradation of Politics”, p.21 notes the exodus of educated 
professionals that began in 1991, with Jordan the top destination.  
89 Discussed by Sakai, “Tribalization as a Tool of State Control in Iraq”, pp.156-158. The major uprisings 
against the state were pursued by sunni factions based in present-day Anbar Province, marking the fallout 
of the regime’s attempt to integrate tribal networks into the military and security services. The most 
threatening of these was a revolt by Dulaimi tribesmen in Ramadi during May of 1995 that saw the 
government briefly lose control of the city. See: Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq”; and Jabar, “Sheikhs and 
Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-
1998”, for further insight. Graham-Brown, “Sanctioning Iraq”, p.11 notes how the rise of tribal factions 
active in the black market stoked inter-communal rivalry, and how the failure of the government to 





Sadr, like his increasingly ambitious tribal counterparts, also began to assert his independence. 
He was well aware that the security services had penetrated his movement and that, as the 
dominant figure among shi’a clerics, he attracted constant regime attention. Nonetheless, he took 
an increasingly confrontational stance. Tensions escalated through the second-half of the 1990s, 
as Sadr issued a decree that reestablished Friday prayers (an act that held explicitly political 
connotations, implying a claim to political authority on his own part), and issued statements that 
included critiques of, and challenges to, the government.90  
 
Sadr’s shift against the regime, and his refusal to comply with Saddam Hussein’s subsequent 
demands for compliance and public support, came at a time of uncertainty for the Iraqi president. 
Efforts to thwart the work of the United Nations weapons inspectors monitoring Iraq’s military 
programmes provoked air strikes in December 1998, which not only exacted a significant toll on 
the regime’s security apparatus, but also sparked a surge in domestic unrest.91 Unnerved, the 
Iraqi president ordered a wave of arrests and a spate of executions that included two Grand 
Ayatollahs – and he demanded that Sadr cease holding Friday prayers, and desist from 
challenging the regime’s authority.92  
 
                                                
90 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.4 explains the political implications of Friday 
prayers, and how Sadr’s move not only represented a challenge to the Iraqi regime, but to the clerical 
leadership of the Iranian government as well. See: Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.124-125, for the 
argument that relations between Sadr and the regime soured from 1996 onwards. 
91 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp.89-93 discusses the period in question, arguing that Saddam 
“panicked” in the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 (which, moreover, came on the 
heels of the September 1998 passage of the Iraq Liberation Act by the US Congress that explicitly called 
for regime change). Also worrying to the regime, the state largesse that had mitigated popular discontent 
among the shi’a underclass had largely dried up – leaving the shi’a poor not only better organized and 
more unified than at any time previous (due to Sadr’s efforts), but increasingly aggrieved at their material 
condition.  
92 In keeping with the accusatory, acrimonious spirit of the hawza, Sadr’s critics asserted that he played a 
role in the regime’s execution of Grand Ayatollahs Ali al-Gharawi and Murtada Burujurdi. Noted in 
Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p.59. Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.129-130 recounts an attempted 
uprising in and around Nasiriyah, in southern Iraq, launched by Sadrist supporters in response to the 





Sadr refused, however, and in February of the following year, he and his two eldest sons were 
murdered as they drove through the streets of Najaf. His death sparked riots in Saddam City, and 
ill-fated efforts toward a coordinated uprising in various regions of the South that came to be 
known as the al-Sadr intifadah.93 The riots in Baghdad saw the largest spasm of violence on the 
city’s streets since the toppling of Prime Minister Qassim. But in contrast to the events of 1963 
when the shurughis had descended upon the city center to defend their champion, violence was 
contained within the slums. Thousands took to the streets of Saddam City as news spread of the 
White Lion’s martrydom, and several days of military action were required to pacify the district. 
Efforts in the South, on the other hand, faltered due to poor coordination – devolving into a 
series of ineffectual raids by Marsh Arab factions that were party to a long-running feud with the 
state. 
 
Whereas the retaliatory violence of Sadr’s mourners proved ineffectual, the scale of public 
support that followed his murder showcased both the depth of his admiration within the 
underclass as well as the breadth of the rift between his supporters and their establishment 
opponents. Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a long-time enemy of Sadr (and, moreover, blamed by 
some as complicit in the failure of the intifadah for having allegedly withdrawn the promised 
support of the Badr Brigade), was forced to beat an undignified retreat from funeral services 
held in Qom, Iran – where he was confronted, accosted, and attacked by members of the 
crowd.94 The fact that Hakim had attempted to attend the service was significant in itself, and 
emblematic of a broader “unseemly scramble” that ensued among Sadr’s former critics when 
                                                
93 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.5 notes that major police action was required to 
suppress the riots in Saddam City. Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.133-134 recounts the events of the al-
Sadr intifadah. A former Iraqi Army officer (interviewed in March 2008 at Joint Security Station SUJ on 
the northeastern corner of what was by then known as Sadr City) related the story of how the district was 
encircled by the military, and Sadrist leaders were summoned to a meeting where its complete destruction 
was threatened unless unrest ceased. 





they saw the outpouring of popular grief upon his death.95 Establishment clerics sought to 
reposition themselves as the martyred cleric’s admirers, and his rivals attempted to suppress 
publications in which they had attacked him as a regime collaborator. Whatever the 
circumstances of Sadr’s rise and the nature of his relationship with Saddam Hussein’s 
government, his martyrdom left his legacy immune to criticism in the eyes of his followers – 
who constituted an enormous force in Iraq’s shi’a community.  
 
iv. Iraq on the Eve of Invasion 
From the time of Sadr’s murder until the 2003 invasion, material and social conditions in Iraq 
decayed further. Vital public infrastructure, the maintenance of which had been neglected during 
the 1980s and which had suffered serious damage in 1991, was on the verge of total collapse.96 
Problems with the electrical grid, sewage treatment facilities, and water purification systems not 
only degraded Iraqis’ quality of life, but when taken in concert with shortages in medical 
supplies and equipment, they also precipitated a public health crisis the extent of which, and 
ultimate responsibility for, remain controversial.  
 
UNICEF, in an estimate echoed by Denis Halliday (who served briefly as the head of the United 
Nations’ humanitarian mission in Iraq before resigning in protest of what he famously labeled as 
“genocide”), alleges that 1,000,000 Iraqi children died as a result of sanctions.97 Alternatively, a 
study conducted by Columbia University estimates that between 106,000 and 227,000 children 
                                                
95 Quotation from Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.119.  
96 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.258-259 and Graham-Brown, “Sanctioning Iraq”, p.9 on the 
deterioration of public infrastructure in Baghdad. Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed 
Etatist Nationalism”, p.133 notes that the Gulf War had a far greater effect: “the extensive nature of the 
first war was surpassed by the intensive nature of the second”.  
97 See Graham-Brown, “Sanctioning Iraq”; Cortright and Lopez, The Sanctions Decade; Pollack, The 
Threatening Storm; and Voices in the Wilderness, “Myths and Realities Regarding Iraq and Sanctions”, in 
Anthony Arnove (ed), Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, (London: Pluto Press, 
2000), for the controversy surrounding the human costs of the sanctions regime and debate over the 
apportioning of blame. Mohammed Ali, John Blacker and Gareth Jones, “Annual Mortality Rates and 
Excess Deaths of Children under-Five in Iraq, 1991-1998”, Population Studies, Vol. 57, No. 2, July 2003, 





under the age of five died as a result of the 1991 war, the uprisings that followed, and the 
subsequent hardships of the sanctions era.98 Arguments also continue over the reasons why such 
horrific human suffering ensued, with defenders of sanctions asserting that Saddam Hussein 
deliberately exacerbated the plight of his subjects for political purposes; arguing that the Iraqi 
president was willing to sacrifice the Iraqi people (and the shi’a poor in particular) to further the 
appearance of persecution at the hands of international conspiracies.99 
 
Nonetheless, despite the enormous damage inflicted on Iraqi society, sanctions failed to break 
the hold of the regime. On the contrary, despite its limited resources and fundamentally 
compromised legitimacy, popular dependence on the government and its proxies increased 
significantly during the 1990s.100 With the economy paralyzed by sanctions and the dinar 
virtually worthless, official patronage became essential for survival.  
 
Furthermore, in concert with material degradation, Iraqi society also underwent a qualitative 
shift during the 1990s that statistics on plunging literacy rates and surges in violent crime cannot 
fully convey. The extraordinary stresses of the era are widely acknowledged to have left Iraq a 
                                                
98 Cited in Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp.137-138.  
99 Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p.74 asserts that the Iraqi government “had the funds to address these 
humanitarian problems”, and that the consensus in the American intelligence community was that Saddam 
Hussein deliberately exacerbated the impact of sanctions. See p.86 for the observation that medical 
supplies and infant formula were smuggled out of Iraq to be sold in Jordan and the Gulf states, and that the 
regime’s priority was its financial position (and its ability to purchase the loyalty of its proxies) rather than 
public health. See also: Amatzia Baram, “The Effect of Iraqi Sanctions: Statistical Pitfalls and 
Responsibility”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 54. No. 2, Spring 2000 for further critique of the regime’s role 
in exacerbating (and exaggerating) the popular effects of sanctions. Christopher Foote, William Block, 
Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq”, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
Public Policy Discussion Paper 04-1, May 4, 2004, p.9 cites the estimate of the US General Accounting 
Office that US$4.4 billion was misappropriated or stolen from the Oil for Food programme.  
100 The intensification of popular dependency on the government – despite its badly diminished resources 
– is discussed in Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp.280-281 Pollack, The Threatening 
Storm, p.135 notes how ration cards became a tool of social control for the regime. International Crisis 
Group, “Iraq Backgrounder”, p.10; and Haris Gazder and Ather Hussein, “Crisis and Response: A Study 
of the Impact of Economic Sanctions in Iraq”, in Iraq’s Economic Predicament, pp.49-50 likewise discuss 
the criticality of handouts to survive the era and the resulting need to cultivate official favour. Allawi, The 





rougher, angrier, and more volatile place. Civil society, already convulsed by the shocks of 
modernity and ravaged by decades of totalitarian governance, was debased and degraded to the 
point that the Iraqi exiles returning to their home country in 2003 would find it scarcely 
recognizable.101 Not only had the education system and the economy effectively collapsed, but 
so too had their intrinsic value in the eyes of rising generations.102 A new generation came of 
age, therefore, in an environment where destitution, idleness, and want were rampant – and 
where theft, prostitution, and violence were rife.103 Corruption, previously confined to the upper 
echelons of the Ba’th Party and the ruling elite, became both endemic and unremarkable 
throughout much of society, while “violence and social apathy” emerged as the defining 
qualities of the decade.104  
 
Among the shi’a underclass, Saddam City emerged as the epicentre of Iraq’s misery during the 
1990s. “While all of Baghdad suffered during the decade-long era of sanctions,” an observer 
would note after the invasion, “Saddam City suffered the most. Its families are falling apart, its 
children are malnourished, stunted and ignorant”.105 With the remnants of Sadr’s network forced 
                                                
101 Discussed in Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p.127. 
102 See International Crisis Group, “Iraq Backgrounder”, p.10; and Munson, “What Lies Beneath”, p.36 
for shifting attitudes toward education. De Sanstisteban, “Sanctions, War, Occupation”, pp.64-65 notes a 
drop in female literacy from 87 percent in 1987 to 45 percent by 1995 and an overall drop in literacy from 
80 percent in to 58 percent.   
103 See: Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p.132; Munson, “What Lies Beneath”, pp.36-37; Makiya, 
Cruelty and Silence, pp.204-206; Graham-Brown, “Sanctioning Iraq”, p.10; and Hussein al-Shaharistani, 
“The Suppression and Survival of Iraqi Shi’is” in Iraq Since the Gulf War, pp.137-138 for discussion of 
the social climate of the 1990s. De Sanstisteban, “Sanctions, War, Occupation”, p.66 cites a 1999 UNSC 
panel report on social collapse within Iraq.  
104 Quotation from Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed Etatist Nationalism”, p.134 who 
further observes, “the rates of violent crime were doubling by seasons, rather than years”. Ayad Rahim, 
“Attitudes to the West, Arabs and Fellow Iraqis”, p.190 notes of the Iraqis during the 1990s “vengeance 
lurks in people’s hearts, waiting for an opportunity to explode”. Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.109 writes 
of “a generation filled with hate”.  
105 Quotation from Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, p.253. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, 
p192 argues (citing the work of Baram) that the shi’a poor suffered disproportionately because they were 





underground after his murder, the district was left to fester.106 Throughout the rest of the country, 
on the other hand, the tribal, religious, and criminal groups that had risen to local and regional 
prominence worked to consolidate further their powers and pursue their ambitions. They, along 
with the remnants of the White Lion’s movement, would emerge among the dominant actors on 
the political landscape of post-Saddam Iraq, and their rivalries would shape much of the violence 
in the wake of the American-led invasion. 
 
                                                
106 Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, p.11 traces continuity between the upper 








i. Opportunity Amidst Chaos 
As the Americans arrived in Baghdad at the start of March 2003, the city descended into chaos. 
Crowds surged into the streets to celebrate the fall of the regime, to destroy its most potent 
symbols, and to take revenge on those who had sustained it. Murals of Saddam Hussein were 
defaced, his iconic statue in Firdos Square was pulled down, and Ba’th Party functionaries were 
hunted by their former charges. Looters, meanwhile, ransacked government ministries, 
museums, businesses, and private homes alike. The heart of the Iraqi capital was thus consumed 
by a frenzied, destructive burst of activity that, with a mixture of elation, relief, opportunism, 
and cruelty, brought about the total collapse of public order.  
 
However, the appearance of anarchy created by the wave of thefts, kidnappings, and murders 
that swept the city obscured the deliberate, directed actions of more coherent forces. Beneath the 
cover of chaos, numerous groups were manoeuvering into position to pursue their own particular 
agendas on the uncertain terrain of post-Saddam Baghdad.1 
 
As the city centre burned, one such group emerged unexpectedly on its periphery.2 In Saddam 
City, the capital’s largest and most notorious ghetto, former associates and devotees of the White 
Lion took to the streets to provide mundane services such as trash collection, traffic control, and 
food distribution. “The Sadrists”, as they became known, networked through the religious 
institutions scattered among the district’s estimated two million residents and, within a few short 
                                                
1 Apparent chaos concealed numerous, coordinated operations. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp.144-
145 notes emergence of “death squads” during the summer of 2003 to pursue teachers, journalists, 
politicians, and other former regime elements. al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, p.9 further 
observe the efforts of the Badr militia to murder sunni military officers and academics (allegedly at the 
behest of Iran). Hendrickson and Tucker, “Revisions in Need of Revising”, pp.11-14 suggest that 
Coalition Forces would not have been able to stop the looting, even if they had attempted to do so.  
2 Due to the closed nature of Iraqi society during the sanctions era, the rise of the Sadrist movement was 
poorly appreciated outside of the country. The rise of the Sadrists in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s 
removal, therefore, not only took outside observers by surprise, but much of the country’s exiled elite as 




weeks, had revived elements of the late cleric’s organization and begun the process of rekindling 
his mass movement.3 Capitalizing on the still-potent force of the White Lion’s legacy among the 
city’s shi’a underclass and the power vacuum created by the sudden and complete disintegration 
of the government, the Sadrists claimed the capital’s shi’a slums as their own. Saddam City was 
thus renamed “Sadr City” in the White Lion’s honor, and the Sadrists, following the model of 
Lebanese Hizballah, assumed responsibility for the management of schools, medical facilities, 
and welfare services, as well as the provision of security.  
 
Their ambitions were not limited to the peripheral, impoverished spaces of the capital, however. 
On the contrary, the Sadrists aspired to reclaim their martyred namesake’s position of 
preeminence within Iraqi shi’ism, and to ensure that Iraq’s long-neglected and much-maligned 
shi’a underclass would see its grievances addressed and its ambitions fulfilled in the post-
Saddam order. Early attempts to revive the White Lion’s grassroots following and to reconnect 
his former associates in Baghdad were thus matched by similar efforts in the cities and towns of 
southern Iraq; as the Sadrists laid the groundwork for what would be a national campaign in 
pursuit of political power, religious prestige, and social validation.4 
 
Yet, while the instability of the invasion’s early days enabled the Sadrists to gather themselves 
and generate a vital measure of initial momentum, their rise proved as unwelcome as it had been 
unexpected. Core elements of the Sadrists’ agenda (and, also, of the manner in which they would 
pursue that agenda) resulted in an inevitably cold reception by the dominant players of the 
nascent post-Saddam order. First, their outspoken and uncompromising belligerence toward the 
                                                
3 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.146 notes that the Sadrists controlled 90 percent of the district’s mosques 
after only a few months. Per population figures in Sadr City, estimates vary widely in the absence of 
reliable census data, ranging from 1 million to 2.5 million. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p.267 
estimates the population of the district at 2.5 million, noting that Saddam City would be the second-largest 
city in Iraq if it were counted separately from Baghdad. He further observes that some one-third of all 
Baghdadis lived in the slum (based on an estimate of the city’s population slightly above six million). 
4 Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy, (Ithaca: Cornell 
UP, 2006), p.14 note that in the wake of the US-led invasion, Sadrist militants quickly established 




American-led Coalition (a stance that reflected both the ideological heritage of the White Lion, 
as well as prevailing sentiments within key elements of the movement’s base) won the Sadrists 
the enduring enmity of the dominant armed force in Iraq. Second, the legacy of Mohammed 
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr’s virulent hostility toward the leading figures, families, and factions 
of the shi’a establishment – key elements of which, owing to their cooperation with the invading 
Coalition, rapidly secured central positions in the emerging political order – ensured the 
Sadrists’ ostracism from the corridors of power. Third, the Sadrists would have to navigate the 
divisions and prejudices of Iraqi society. Their rise as a movement of the downtrodden shi’a 
underclass, with ambitions not only to empower their demographic base but also to exact 
vengeance upon those who had oppressed, neglected, and humiliated them in decades past, 
meant that they would be viewed with hostility and suspicion by many – not least by their 
“betters” within Iraq’s shi’a community. 
 
Nonetheless, with the White Lion’s son Muqtada at the resurgent Sadrist movement’s helm, and 
the Mehdi Army militia as its principal organizational body, the Sadrists would become a 
pivotally influential force in Iraq. For, although they faced an array of formidable obstacles from 
the outset of their campaign (and they would thereafter acquire additional, powerful foes – Iraqi 
al-Qaeda foremost among them), the Sadrists possessed a rare and valuable commodity that 
would fuel their ascent: the ideological bond that had been forged among the masses of Iraq’s 
shi’a underclass by Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr.5 On a national landscape where the 
populace had been systematically atomized and depoliticized over a period of decades, and 
where the Ba’th regime had orchestrated the state’s effective consumption of society, the 
Sadrists’ ability to build from the framework of a genuine, grassroots mass-base was an 
                                                
5 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.7 references the early successes of the Sadrists, 
but also emphasizes the chaos that surrounded their attempts to revive the White Lion’s movement. 
Indeed, there was not a latent, mass-based “Sadrist movement” to be revived, but instead a broadly shared 
set of ideas and sympathies among the martyred cleric’s former devotees. There was, therefore, much 




extraordinary asset. Indeed, the scope of popular enthusiasm for the White Lion’s memory was 
unrivaled by any of the various factions and individuals that sought power in the post-Saddam 
era, and the Sadrists’ ability to mobilize the shi’a underclass masses would thus prove decisive 
in shaping the movement’s fortunes. 
 
I. The Sadrists’ Faltering First Steps 
The Sadrists’ first forays of the post-Saddam era were inauspicious. In their initial effort to 
reclaim the White Lion’s position at the pinnacle of Iraqi shi’ism, they became embroiled in a 
controversial murder that cast their enterprise as lawless and prone to savage violence. The 
provocative manner in which Muqtada then sought to establish his public profile and rally 
popular support not only reinforced class-based prejudices against the shi’a underclass, but 
alienated broad segments of his father’s flock as well. Furthermore, while the Sadrists’ 
outspoken belligerence against the Coalition and its Iraqi allies earned them significant 
international acclaim, even this, their greatest early achievement, came with significant caveats. 
In immediate, practical terms, it led the Sadrists to a series of devastating defeats on the 
battlefield and intensified domestic isolation. Less vividly, but no less influentially, it also 
further exacerbated their reputation for recklessness and strategic myopia.6 
 
It became evident from the outset, therefore, that the rekindled Sadrist movement would be more 
radical and more controversial than its predecessor – and that this extremism posed a serious 
liability to the Sadrists’ enterprise. Muqtada’s rhetorical ferocity and the Mehdi Army’s resolute 
commitment to “resistance” enabled the Sadrists to rally a sizable contingent of followers, but 
these same qualities also threatened to undermine the full-scale revival of the White Lion’s mass 
movement. In short, the most prominent representatives of the Sadrist movement shaped its 
character in such a way as to pull it toward the radical extreme of the political spectrum, where it 
                                                




evolved into a potent, yet exceptionally polarizing entity. Extremism would bring advantages to 
the Sadrists, principally via the zeal of their rank and file, but it would also limit their appeal and 
diminish their potential among the shi’a underclass at large. As such, after a turbulent year and a 
half, Muqtada and his colleagues would be compelled to reevaluate their strategies and seek to 
refashion their image. They would struggle, however, to alter the distinct persona that had 
developed around the new iteration of the Sadrist movement.    
 
i. A Rivalry Resumed 
The brutal murder of Abd al-Majid al-Khoei was the first high-profile act of the resurgent 
Sadrist movement. Coming on April 10, 2003 (only a day after the fall of Baghdad), it 
announced the Sadrists’ violent resumption of the anti-establishment campaign that the White 
Lion had pursued rhetorically during the 1990s. Khoei, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Abd 
al-Qassim al-Khoei (whose death had opened the door for Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-
Sadr’s ascent in 1992), was the scion of a powerful and respected shi’a family and a 
consummate insider in Iraq’s clerical elite.7 Having been compelled to flee abroad in response to 
the persecution of the shi’a establishment after the 1991 uprisings, Khoei had also become a 
noted member of Iraq’s exiled opposition, earning acclaim as a respected moderate while 
managing his family’s international charitable operations. 
 
From his base in London, Khoei became involved in efforts to prepare for the 2003 invasion. 
Thereafter, he was among the many exiles who returned to Iraq in concert with Coalition Forces. 
Arriving in Basra in the early days of the war, Khoei traveled onward to his home city of Najaf. 
His arrival in Najaf was a contentions issue, however, and emblematic of broader concerns that 
                                                
7 The details of Abd al-Majid al-Khoei’s life and death are drawn from the al-Khoei Foundation website: 
www.al-khoei.org; Michael Wood, “Abdul Majid al-Khoei” The Guardian, April 12, 2003; “Abdul Majid 
al-Khoei”, The Economist, April 17, 2003; Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, pp.23-24; and Cockburn, 




arose surrounding the return of Iraq’s exiled elite.8 In general terms, the exiles’ return in 
collusion with a foreign invasion force, after years abroad in relative comfort, provoked 
resentment and accusations of inauthenticity from those who had endured the full duration of 
Saddam Hussein’s rule. More specifically, the aspirations of exiled clerics such as Khoei to 
resume their traditional dominance within Iraqi shi’ism posed a serious threat to the Sadrists’ 
ambitions.9 The arrival in Najaf of Khoei (who was only a few years older than Muqtada, and far 
more accomplished and respected) was a direct challenge to the Sadrist movement.  
 
Shortly after Khoei’s arrival in Najaf, while visiting the shrine to Imam Ali, he and a group of 
fellow exiles were confronted by an armed crowd of Sadrist supporters. It remains contested 
whether what followed was part of a planned attack, or whether events unfolded spontaneously: 
one account alleges that Khoei and his companions were consumed by a mob that had assembled 
to take revenge on the facility’s Ba’th Party-affiliated caretaker, while another asserts that 
Muqtada ordered Khoei’s death personally.10 Regardless, the killing was instrumental in shaping 
initial perceptions of the Sadrists’ character. In the dominant narrative that coalesced around the 
event, the savage murder of a distinguished religious scholar – seized from within one of 
shi’ism’s holiest sites to be murdered, butchered, and dragged in pieces through the streets of 
Najaf – was precisely the sort of act to which Muqtada and his ilk were constitutionally inclined. 
Impressions of the Sadrists as reckless instigators were then reinforced in the days that followed, 
when a Sadrist mob besieged the Najaf home of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Sadrist 
                                                
8 For further discussion of the tensions surrounding the return of the clerical elite, see: International Crisis 
Group, “Shiite Politics in Iraq”; and Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, p.13. 
These tensions were broadly applicable in the case of more secular politicians as well, as Iraqis were 
sceptical of the authenticity and intentions of those who had endured the hardships of the 1990s.  
9 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.21 notes Sadrist aspirations vis-à-vis Najaf’s old 
city, and that the establishment of a strong presence there was an “ultimate objective” of the movement. 
10 The controversy surrounding Khoei’s murder is referenced in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil 
War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.9; Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.149-158; Munson, Iraq in 




supporters launched a barrage of attacks against returning exiles from the Hakim family as well, 
marking the initial skirmishes in what would be a protracted war for the seat of Iraqi shi’ism.11 
 
ii. The Penance of the Finalists 
Parallel to the rise of tensions in Najaf, pressure mounted on the Sadrists in relation to the 
looting that had devastated Baghdad. The inaction of the Americans in the midst of the chaos 
drew widespread criticism, yet resentment grew as well regarding the “order” that was 
established on the city’s periphery. Fairly or not, the shi’a underclass was held responsible for a 
disproportionate share of the looting, and the anger of many Baghdadis intensified as the 
Sadrists were perceived to be maintaining control over their home turf while allowing their 
supporters free rein to pillage the city’s core.12 As the invasion’s aftermath proved far more 
destructive than the fighting accompanying the regime’s fall, frustrations were captured in the 
coining of the derisive term al-hawasim, meaning “the finalists”, in reference to the looters.13 
The epithet was a sarcastic allusion to Saddam Hussein’s claim that the defence of Iraq would be 
umm al-hawasim, “the mother of all finales” – and it was applied scornfully to the opportunists 
who ravaged the city for material gain.  
 
                                                
11 The siege of Sistani’s home, and its relief by the intervention of his tribal allies from the surrounding 
countryside, is described in Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, p.13. Popular 
suspicion regarding the Sadrists’ actions in Najaf was such that many blamed them for the assassination of 
Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in a car bombing in August 2003 – despite the fact that the attack was 
officially attributed to sunni militants. Discussed, along with general commentary on hostilities against the 
Hakim family in Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp.171-173.  
12 Conflicting accounts have been offered on the looting of Baghdad. The shi’a poor are likely 
scapegoated at the exclusion of others in the popular imagination, yet they do appear to have been notably 
active. See International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.9 for discussion of popular attitudes 
toward the role of Sadr City residents in the looting. Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.146, 162 mentions 
the crowds that emerged from the slum to loot the city centre, though the author’s source asserts that the 
Sadrists themselves disapproved of the looting. Shadid, Night Draws Near, p.26 notes the anarchy that 
followed the fall of the government was expected by Baghdadis, who had watched the rise of rural, tribal 
ethics and the debasement of civil society during the 1990s. Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement, p.23 cites the 
role of Ba’thist officials intent on destroying evidence of their crimes.  
13 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.163 discuss the roots of the term. Hawasim is also translated as 
“decisive”, with the implication that the battle between Saddam’s forces and the US-led Coalition would 




Because of the shi’a underclass’ prominent position within the ranks of the hawasim, the 
eventual issuance of a public appeal that religious leaders assist in the restoration of order and 
the return of stolen goods cast a spotlight squarely on Muqtada al-Sadr. Yet, the young cleric 
chose not to endear himself to those at the heart of the emerging political order or assist in the 
reestablishment of stability. In one of Muqtada’s first public statements, he issued what became 
known as the hawasim fatwa. Asserting the fundamental illegitimacy of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, he declared that any claims to ownership of goods or property were invalid – and that 
looters were entitled to the fruits of their plunder so long as they paid khums, a 20 percent 
religious tax on its value, to Sadrist officials.14  
 
The most notable result of the hawasim fatwa was to confirm popular suspicion as to who had 
been the principal culprits in the looting, reinforcing prejudices against the city’s shi’a poor. 
Furthermore, within the backlash that ensued, it became apparent that popular anger transcended 
socio-economic lines. In an early sign of a generational divide that would exert a strong 
influence over the development of the rekindled Sadrist movement, many of the older former 
followers and colleagues of the White Lion were repulsed by his son’s actions.15 Those who had 
come of age during the 1990s, however, when material deprivation, official corruption, and 
physical suffering had debased Iraqi society, embraced Muqtada passionately and rallied to his 
call for radical, aggressive action.  
 
                                                
14 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.8 discusses the “famous” edict and its polarizing 
effects, as does Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.163.  
15 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.8, addresses the generational divide among 
supporters of Muqtada, observing that he often pitted fathers against their sons. Cockburn, Muqtada al-
Sadr, p.147 notes the uncouth, anti-intellectual qualities of the rekindled Sadrist movement, declaring that 
“Muqtada was more reliant than his father on the impoverished urban masses, people whom his opponents 




From the outset, therefore, the so-called “sanctions generation” entrenched itself at the heart of 
the resurgent Sadrist movement.16 It would be these young men in their twenties and thirties, 
both clerics and laymen alike, who would be its most active members, and who would fill the 
ranks of the Mehdi Army militia. Their characteristics, many of which could be observed in 
Muqtada himself, would define the rekindled Sadrist movement and mark it as something 
distinct from the White Lion’s original initiative.17 While Muqtada would draw upon his father’s 
reputation among the shi’a underclass, build from the remnants of his father’s network, and 
deploy many of the same rhetorical attacks against his father’s former enemies, the rekindled 
Sadrist movement became unique in and of itself: reflecting both the personal attributes of its 
leadership, and the changes that had occurred in Iraqi society during the 1990s. 
 
iii. Defeat in Najaf 
The Sadrists cemented a reputation as belligerent outsiders during the first year of the post-
Saddam era. In the political sphere, their relentless opposition to Coalition Forces, and to the 
parties of the shi’a establishment that were cooperating with the occupation, assured their 
official marginalization. Likewise, their provocation of instability rendered them widely 
unpopular among the general population.18 Rather than softening their stance, however, the 
Sadrists embraced their opposition status – forming their own shadow government and growing 
increasingly militant in word and deed. Thus, while they remained a marginal force in Iraqi 
politics as the first anniversary of regime change approached (and their Mehdi Army militia was, 
as yet, similarly unimposing), the Sadrists had staked an outspoken claim as the vanguard of 
                                                
16 The size of this “generation” merits consideration as well, in light of the explosive population growth 
detailed in the previous chapters. Munson, “What Lies Beneath”, pp.32-33 cites World Bank figures 
stating that Iraq’s population grew from 13 million in 1980 to 23.3 million in 2000.  
17 See: International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, pp.8-9, 18 on Sadr as the archetype of his 
followers, discussion of his attraction of the lowest social stratum that had followed his father, and the 
ignorance and fanaticism of his followers (some of whom revered Muqtada as the actual Mehdi, creating a 
quasi-divine personality cult around the young cleric). 
18 See International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.10 for commentary on the Sadrists’ early 




shi’a opposition to the emerging political order, fusing their anti-occupation and anti-shi’a 
establishment views.  
 
Despite the Sadrists’ limited popularity, their determined agitation attracted the attention of 
Coalition Forces. With frustration mounting throughout Iraq at the unsatisfactory pace of 
economic and political reconstruction, and a potent insurgency having developed among sunni 
Arabs that had thrown key areas of Anbar Province and Baghdad into turmoil, concern spread 
over the potential implications of Sadrist incitement. Wary of a Mehdi Army-led “shi’a 
insurgency” alongside the so-called “sunni insurgency”, debates raged over the wisdom of either 
confronting or compromising with Muqtada and the Sadrists.19  
 
Such discussions were overtaken by events, as tensions erupted into armed confrontation at the 
end of March 2004.20 The immediate spark of the conflagration was a sermon of Muqtada’s that 
proclaimed the September 11th attacks on the United States “a miracle and a blessing from God”, 
prompting the Coalition to take a series of steps against him and his associates. The Sadrists’ 
main newspaper was shuttered for publishing the text, Sadrist political leader Mustapha al-
Yacoubi was arrested for his alleged role in the murder of Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, and Muqtada 
was also named as wanted in connection with the incident.21  
 
The Mehdi Army responded with a surge of attacks in and around its operational hub of Sadr 
City, while Sadrist supporters instigated an uprising across southern Iraq that overwhelmed the 
                                                
19 For further discussion of this period, see: Bremer, My Year in Iraq, which is referenced critically in 
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.11. 
20 See International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p11; and Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, 
pp.270-272 for discussion of the events leading up to the spring confrontation in Najaf.  
21 The management of the Khoei murder became a highly politicized affair, as the threat of prosecution of 
Muqtada and his closest associates would be wielded for years as a political weapon designed to punish or 




contingent of Coalition Forces responsible for the region.22 Muqtada, meanwhile, fled south to 
his father’s former stronghold in Kufa and then onward to nearby Najaf, where he summoned a 
sizable contingent of militiamen from Baghdad to prepare for a major confrontation.23 
 
The Mehdi Army was routed decisively in the counteroffensive that followed, which saw 
Coalition Forces inflict heavy casualties on it in Najaf (where, in a sign of the continued potency 
of intra-shi’a divisions, the Coalition was aided by the tribal allies of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani), while also suppressing the Sadrist insurrection that had destabilized southern Iraq.24 A 
decision was made to halt operations in Najaf prior to the full destruction of the Mehdi Army, 
however, and to allow Muqtada and the remnants of the militia to escape. This course of action 
averted further destruction of Najaf’s religious infrastructure and bought Coalition Forces a 
measure of badly-desired stability in southern Iraq at a time when they faced mounting problems 
with sunni insurgents in the western city of Falluja. Yet subsequent events enabled the Sadrists 
to gain significant strategic momentum from their tactical defeat.  
 
                                                
22 Shadid, Night Draws Near, pp.442-443 quotes Major General Martin Dempsey, who cited the fighting 
in the capital as “the biggest gunfight since the fall of Baghdad”. Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in 
Fragments, p.28 count 800 killed by Coalition Forces in nine weeks of fighting in and around Sadr City. 
See George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq, (London: Faber and Faber, 2006), pp.322-323 
for observations on the performance of the “paper army” of European forces stationed across the South, 
where the weakness of Coalition Forces played a significant role in the uprising’s initial success.  
23 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.5 states that many of the militants that fought in Najaf were from Sadr 
City. On p.153, however, he notes that the Sadrists did draw in local recruits from among Najaf’s urban 
poor (indeed, the Sadrists’ local base had been evident since their participation in Khoei’s murder). For 
further background, see: Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.752 on the long legacy of “oppressive wealth 
and dire poverty” in Najaf and associated class-based tensions – which had enabled the Iraqi Communist 
Party to build a formidable local following in the 1950s and 1960s, and which were central to the eventual 
local rise of the Sadrist movement. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, p.262 observes how the 
unfamiliarity of militiamen from Sadr City with the urban terrain of Najaf undermined their effectiveness 
in the fighting.   
24 The contribution of Sistani’s tribal allies is noted in Packer, Assassins’ Gate, p.324. As had been made 
evident during the initial siege of his home during the April 2003 invasion, the rivalry between Sistani and 
the White Lion that had polarized the tribal domain of southern Iraq was revived with the rise of the 
rekindled Sadrist movement. International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.17 notes that the 
lower echelons of the tribal order that had been recruited into Saddam Hussein’s paramilitary forces and 




At issue was a precipitous drop in the already declining popularity of the US-led occupation 
during April 2004. Major clashes between the Coalition and Iraqi opponents in both Najaf and 
Falluja (the latter of which was temporarily besieged by US forces in response to the killing and 
desecration of civilian security contractors) saw Americans killing Iraqis in large numbers, 
causing a hardening of public opinion against occupation. The exposure of the Abu Ghraib 
prisoner abuse scandal immediately thereafter provoked overwhelming outrage, souring Iraqis 
on the intentions and character of their “liberators”. As such, the Sadrists’ impeccable record of 
rejectionism skyrocketed in value.25 The ability of the Mehdi Army to have survived the 
confrontation in Najaf became a victory in its own right that, paired with symbolic gestures such 
as the Sadrists’ delivery of aid to sunni insurgents in Falluja, transformed Muqtada and his 
militia into icons of resistance.  
 
The Sadrists thus enjoyed a surge of popularity during the summer of 2004, while that of the 
Coalition declined steeply. Tensions between the two sides re-escalated accordingly, 
culminating in a second round of heavy fighting in late August. Once again the focal point was 
Najaf, and once again, the Mehdi Army suffered a decisive, bloody defeat. In contrast to the 
events of the spring, however, there were few positives for the Sadrists to take way from the 
August clash. Indeed, while the fighting ended with Muqtada and his surviving companions yet 
again being granted safe passage from Najaf, this was due only to the intervention of Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.26 The ceasefire brokered by the White Lion’s former archenemy 
allowed Muqtada and his confederates to escape with their lives, but its terms barred the Sadrists 
                                                
25 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.11, cites poll data from May 2004 showing that 
81 percent of Iraqis had a “better” or “much better” opinion of Muqtada than they had three months 
earlier.  
26 The rising threat of sunni sectarianism and attacks on shi’a civilians appears to have been a central 
motivator in the decision of Sistani and the shi’a elite to spare Muqtada and avert the destruction of the 
Mehdi Army in Najaf, as it was recognized that the militia would be a useful ally in the sectarian war that 
was then gathering momentum. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p.325 argues that the primary concern 
among the shi’a elite, and the reason for the preservation of the Mehdi Army, was out of concern over the 
growing power of then-Prime Minster Iyad Allawi, whom the author alleges was attempting to create a 




from the coveted terrain of Najaf’s old city, cemented Sistani’s dominance over Muqtada, and 
left the Sadrists’ aspirations to clerical preeminence in tatters. 
 
iv. An Attempted Course Correction 
In the aftermath of the fighting in Najaf, additional setbacks compounded the Sadrists’ woes. 
First, the Mehdi Army’s decision to take refuge in and launch attacks upon Coalition and Iraqi 
units from some of the shi’a faith’s holiest sites provoked popular fury, as significant damage 
was incurred.27 Second, with nationwide elections scheduled for January 2005, the Sadrists’ 
continued incitement of Coalition ire at a time when shi’a parties were well positioned to 
achieve victory bred frustration. The occupation remained deeply unpopular, but to many shi’a, 
“resistance” appeared increasingly counterproductive when electoral triumph was in reach.28 
Third, the Mehdi Army’s recklessness prompted Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri (who had been 
designated as the official heir to Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr’s flock upon his death, 
and who had been channeling funds to Muqtada from his base in Iran) to sever his relations with 
Muqtada. This deprived the Sadrists of both a valuable revenue source as well as a claim to 
clerical respectability, further weakening their position.29  
 
The cumulative toll of these setbacks was sufficient to prompt a shift by Muqtada. Looking 
ahead to the upcoming elections, he withdrew the Mehdi Army from the front lines of resistance 
                                                
27 The wadi al-salam, or “Valley of Peace”, cemetery on the western edge of Najaf was a major venue of 
fighting that sustained particularly heavy damage. Furthermore, the inexperience of Mehdi Army fighters 
was evident in their difficulty handling munitions – leading to a number of destructive explosions in the 
religious sites they used as caches and firing positions.  
28 In the run-up to the January elections, leading shi’a politicians and members of the clerical 
establishment made frequent reference to the circumstances surrounding Iraq’s formation under British 
occupation in the aftermath of World War I. As the British were preparing to leave Mesopotamia and 
transfer authority to the Arabs, prominent shi’a clerics and shi’a tribes of southern Mesopotamia 
instigated a brief, though costly uprising against the British. Historiography of the period attributes the 
ensuing ostracism of the shi’a clerical establishment and the broader marginalization of shi’a Arabs from 
the nascent Iraqi government to this ill-advised revolt – and it was thus viewed as a mistake that shi’a 
leaders sought to avoid repeating, particularly as the rejectionism of the sunni insurgency opened the door 
for wholesale shi’a dominance of the government.   




and moderated his rhetoric.30 The decision to avoid further confrontation enabled the Mehdi 
Army to regroup, and the Sadrists’ subdued rhetoric calmed intra-shi’a tensions significantly. 
Muqtada’s turn toward the political mainstream, however, and his simultaneous effort to reform 
the Mehdi Army, exposed internal problems that would plague the Sadrists in the years to come.  
 
On the one hand, elements of the Mehdi Army rejected Muqtada’s pragmatic shift, however 
incremental, toward moderation. The closing months of 2004 thus saw an internal splintering of 
factions from the militia’s core, which reflected a structural incoherence that extended to its 
highest levels.31 On the other, the young cleric’s attempt to impose discipline upon the militia’s 
rank and file revealed the staggering scope of the challenge. For, although the Sadrists’ ability to 
channel legions of able-bodied young men into the Mehdi Army had been, and would remain, 
central to the movement’s advances, the radicalism and violence of their most ardent followers 
vexed efforts at reform. 
 
Furthermore, the internal concerns illuminated by Muqtada’s strategic shift were inextricably 
linked to two emerging trends that would shape the militia’s development. The first was the 
growing scope of Iranian activity in Iraq, and the decision of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to 
provide training, funding, and weapons to shi’a militants with whom they shared common 
objectives.32 While the Mehdi Army would benefit from Iranian patronage and technical 
assistance as it sought to improve its capabilities in the wake of 2004’s defeats, the militia’s 
organizational integrity would, in the long run, be badly undermined by Iranian intrigue. The 
Iranian policy of working directly with sub-networks of fighters within the Mehdi Army 
                                                
30 Discussed in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, pp.10-16.  
31 Qais al-Khazali, a former associate of Muqtada’s father, was among the most prominent defectors at this 
time. For discussion of Khazali’s career, see Cochrane, “Special Groups”, pp.3-4; and Kagan, The Surge, 
pp.167-168. 
32 For discussion of Iranian involvement in Iraq with respect to both the development of the Mehdi Army, 
see: Kagan, The Surge; Cochrane, “Special Groups”; Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist 




compromised its chain-of-command, complicating Muqtada’s efforts to direct patterns of 
violence in keeping with his political aims (and confusing efforts of observers to interpret the 
political significance of shi’a militancy).33  
 
The second force that exerted powerful influence over the militia’s development was the rise of 
sectarian violence within the sunni insurgency. With radical, aggressively sectarian militant 
groups like Iraqi al-Qaeda taking an increasingly prominent role in the sunni insurgency, what 
began principally as a reaction by elements and clients of the fallen regime to their sudden loss 
of position transformed into jihad; not only against Coalition Forces and their Iraqi allies, but 
against Iraq’s shi’a populace at large.34 The venomous sectarianism of men like the Jordanian, 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who rose to fame as the leader of Iraq’s al-Qaeda franchise, thus 
interwove with the radical strands of sunni Islam that had developed in Iraq during the sanctions 
era, giving rise to a devastating, divisive new trend in violence. 
 
The recurrence of spectacular suicide attacks against shi’a civilians through the course of 2004, 
and the accompanying, incendiary rhetoric of sunni militants regarding the elemental 
illegitimacy of the shi’a faith, generated a wave of fear, suspicion, and hatred. This surge of 
intra-Iraqi violence, which was concentrated in Baghdad, also sparked a period of booming 
                                                
33 Popular hostility among Sadrists toward Iran is noted in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-
Sadr”, p.16. As alluded to in Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.209-210, the particular dynamics of the 
relationship between the Iranians and Muqtada al-Sadr remains controversial. Cockburn’s source 
(presumably a Sadrist seeking to dissociate the movement from Iran) asserts that Muqtada opposed Iranian 
involvement in the Mehdi Army, but that the disorganized nature of the militia and the desire of its 
fighters to gain access to funds (and, as time progressed, to increasingly advanced weaponry) enabled the 
Iranians to subvert his authority. Kagan, The Surge, pp.167-168 engages this issue further in reference to 
the uncertainty over the relationship between Muqtada and Qais al-Khazali, a Sadrist militant who worked 
closely with Iran, as does Goodman, “Informal Networks and Insurgency in Iraq”, pp.9-10.  
34 For discussion of the sunni insurgency and its roots in the developments that occurred within Iraqi 
society during the sanctions era, see: Munson, Iraq in Transition, Chapters Five and Six. See: Goodman, 
“Informal Networks and Insurgency in Iraq”, pp.2-6 on the Islamicization of the sunni insurgency and the 
relationships between Ba’thists and radical Islamic movements in Iraq that trace back to the 1990s. 





growth for the Mehdi Army.35 The inability of either the Iraqi government or Coalition Forces to 
secure the capital created desperate demands for protection, and the Mehdi Army grew 
massively as it emerged as the preeminent defender of shi’a Baghdadis.  
 
The militia’s position in the capital was greatly improved as a result, yet both the scope of this 
growth and the psychological environment in which it took place created problems. On the one 
hand, rapid expansion exacerbated already severe command and control issues. Thus, while 
Muqtada was attempting to impose order upon the Mehdi Army at the close of 2004, the 
militia’s surging growth was directly undermining his endeavour. On the other, the Mehdi 
Army’s prominent role in counterattacks against sunnis overwhelmed attempts to redress its 
reputation for divisiveness and brutality. Instead, the militia’s increasingly aggressive role in 
sectarian violence added a polarizing new element to its already unenviable reputation for 
viciousness, making it all the more controversial. 
 
II. The Ascent of the Sadrists 
As Muqtada sought to reform the Sadrist movement and rein in the Mehdi Army during the 
latter months of 2004, the Sadrists’ prospects remained uncertain. They had made notable 
progress in a number of areas, but pressing concerns accompanied their successes. First, while 
the Sadrists had forced their way, uninvited and unwelcome, onto the field of post-Saddam 
politics, they had been decisively bested in their confrontations with Coalition Forces and 
banished from Najaf by their establishment rivals. Second, although the Mehdi Army had seized 
control over large sections of Baghdad’s impoverished periphery (as well as areas of Basra and 
the Deep South), defining characteristics of the militia – most prominently the radicalism of its 
                                                
35 Shadid, Night Draws Near, p.308 and Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, pp.170, 179 cite the March 2004 
ashura bombings by Iraqi al-Qaeda, which killed 270 and wounded a further 570, as a major early 
recruiting boost for the Mehdi Army. Vali Nasr, The Shi’a Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will 
Shape the Future, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007) p.262 notes how “Shia militias… were often the only 




core membership and its disjointed, unwieldy structure – undermined efforts to consolidate its 
gains. The Mehdi Army was thus a powerful street-level force, but its preeminence was not 
paired with the kind of cohesive popular enthusiasm previously enjoyed by the White Lion. 
Third, while the Sadrists had asserted themselves at the forefront of resistance against a deeply 
unpopular occupation, the value of that achievement was depreciating. With nationwide 
elections scheduled for January 2005, the main axis of conflict in Iraq was shifting away from 
resistance against the Coalition and toward violent, intra-Iraqi competition over the country’s 
future – rendering the Sadrists’ rejection of, and ostracism from, the emerging political order a 
potential liability. 
 
Despite their troubles, however, the Sadrists were in fact on the verge of a remarkable ascent, the 
angle and velocity of which would prove greater than Muqtada and his associates could 
reasonably have anticipated. Thought the reforms and adjustments of Sadrist leadership were 
instrumental in the successes that ensued, and the assets that they had thus far developed (the 
Mehdi Army foremost among them) proved invaluable, the Sadrists’ rise would be sparked, 
ultimately, by forces beyond their control. Indeed, at the root of the Sadrists’ rise was the 
aforementioned shift in the underlying paradigm of conflict in Iraq, whereby fighting between 
shi’a and sunni militants subsumed anti-Coalition resistance as the dominant framework of 
violence.  
 
This transition was initially problematic for the Sadrists, as they had defined themselves largely 
through their opposition to the occupation (and, moreover, Sadrist dogma was explicitly non-
sectarian). Nonetheless, as sectarian violence intensified, the Sadrists were presented with an 
array of opportunities for advancement. Capitalizing upon these opportunities, Sadrist politicians 
would rise from shunned outsiders to powerful insiders in the Iraqi government, the Mehdi 




would undergo a sweeping demographic transformation that suggested the permanence of the 
Sadrists’ gains. 
 
i. The Opportunities of the Sectarian War 
Sectarian violence – which began as an undercurrent within the sunni insurgency, gained 
momentum during the spring and summer of 2004, and then intensified dramatically in the 
context of the January 2005 elections – altered Iraq’s strategic landscape in several ways to the 
direct benefit of the Sadrists. Most critically, the rise of Iraqi al-Qaeda and the ferocious 
sectarianism of sunni jihadis compelled the shi’a elite to put aside their feud with the Sadrists 
and reach out, however warily, in the name of sectarian solidarity.36 In the run-up to the January 
2005 elections, the Sadrists were thus welcomed as junior partners into the United Iraqi Alliance 
– a coalition of religiously-defined shi’a factions overseen by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.  
 
Elections then strengthened the Sadrists’ position, as the ballot box enabled them to capitalize on 
the latent mass base that they had, until that point, rallied with decidedly uneven results.37 
However controversial the Mehdi Army’s reputation may have been, the shi’a underclass masses 
of Baghdad, Basra, and the smaller cities and rural reaches of southern Iraq overwhelmingly 
backed Sadrists candidates. With the UIA emerging from the elections as Iraq’s dominant 
political grouping (and the Sadrists comprising a sizable electoral bloc in the alliance), the 
                                                
36 Intra-shi’a rapprochement is discussed in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, pp.12-
15. Muqtada’s turn toward moderation in the wake of the Mehdi Army’s defeat in Najaf (and, likewise, 
the establishment’s perception that he had been chastened in the process) was an important precondition of 
the pan-shi’a alliance, but it was by no means sufficient to precipitate it.  
37 Irrespective of their early missteps and their polarizing radicalism, the Sadrists remained the dominant 
political vehicle for Iraq’s shi’a underclass. In a testament not only to the enduring legacy of the White 
Lion, but also to the persistence of social prejudices within the Iraqi elite and the extent to which Iraqi 
society had been ravaged to the point that it was largely incapable of giving rise to new, original political 
currents, the rekindled Sadrist movement was effectively unchallenged in its claim to represent this sizable 
constituency. The only notable challenges to the Sadrists’ position as the political face of the shi’a 
underclass came from offshoots of the White Lion’s former movement that rejected Muqtada’s claim to 
leadership (such as the Fadhila Party, whose influence was confined largely to Basra and its environs), and 




Sadrists’ position was thereafter all the more prominent; enabling them to influence the writing 
of Iraq’s constitution, and granting the movement an important measure of respectability.38 
 
The intensification of sectarian killing that accompanied the January elections also enabled the 
Mehdi Army to recast its image and improve its position in Baghdad. For, while the conduct of 
Iraq’s first nationwide elections since Saddam Hussein’s removal marked a notable symbolic 
achievement, they badly exacerbated sectarian tensions.39 In protest of what prominent sunni 
leaders cited as their unfair persecution by Coalition Forces and their marginalization from the 
emerging order, Iraq’s sunni Arabs boycotted the elections en masse.40 Their boycott, combined 
with the decisive victory of the UIA (which was dominated by radical shi’a religious parties like 
the Da’wa and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council that possessed strong historical ties to Iran, 
and also prominently featured the Sadrists, whose Mehdi Army was already infamous for its 
attacks on sunnis), had the effect of broadening and deepening Iraq’s growing sectarian rift.41 
 
Sunni militants responded to the UIA’s electoral triumph with a withering offensive in and 
around the Iraqi capital, featuring beheadings and a wave of suicide bombings that targeted shi’a 
religious processions, mosques, and marketplaces.42 With Coalition Forces deliberately 
                                                
38 As noted in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.15, the exigencies of elite-level 
realpolitik brought further advancement to the Sadrists, as Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari and his 
colleagues in the well connected, yet exceptionally narrowly based Da’wa Party cultivated ties with the 
Sadrists in order to balance the growing clout of their establishment peers in the Supreme Iraqi Islamic 
Council.  
39 The ways in which Iraq’s transition to democracy served to exacerbate identity-based division is 
emphasized throughout Munson, Iraq in Transition. See also: Ucko, “Militias, Tribes and Insurgents”, 
pp.352-354; and Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments, pp.142, 150-155. 
40 On sunni perceptions of marginalization during late 2004 and early 2005, Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in 
Fragments, p.36, note the contrast between Coalition Forces’ “effective truce” with the Mehdi Army after 
the August clash in Najaf and their annihilation of Falluja in November, giving sunnis the impression that 
they were being singled out for persecution. 
41 Goodman, “Informal Networks and Insurgency in Iraq”, pp.11-12 alleges continued strong ties between 
the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and Iran.  
42 Detailed in International Crisis Group, “The Next Iraqi War?”, which notes (p.i) “2005 will be 
remembered as the year Iraq’s latent sectarianism took wings, permeating the political discourse and 
precipitating incidents of appalling violence and sectarian ‘cleansing’.” Casualty figures for 2005 are 




withdrawn from day-to-day policing functions on the streets of the city (as part of a strategy that 
sought to mitigate popular displeasure with occupation by limiting the presence of foreign 
soldiers in the daily lives of Iraqis), and Iraqi Security Forces as yet unable to secure the city, the 
Mehdi Army was presented with an extraordinary opportunity.43 Its ability to mobilize throngs 
of armed men – however volatile or predatory – enabled it to set up checkpoints around shi’a 
neighbourhoods and defend vulnerable public spaces. Furthermore, its notoriety for the 
persecution of sunnis helped the Mehdi Army assert itself as a leading exactor of retribution at a 
time when calls for vengeance were mounting. The same qualities that had previously rendered 
the militia so controversial were thus found to have a grim, but undeniable utility in countering 
the onslaught of sunni fanatics; and the Mehdi Army attracted waves of new recruits as it 
refashioned itself as shi’a Baghdadis’ indispensable bulwark against the sunni jihad.  
 
The escalation of sectarian violence by sunni militants also granted the Mehdi Army a valuable 
reprieve from its conflict with Coalition Forces. Most immediately, with Zarqawi and Iraqi al-
Qaeda entrenched at the top of Coalition Forces’ threat assessments (and the Mehdi Army 
continuing to check its anti-Coalition activity), the attentions of the militia’s most capable 
adversary were increasingly directed elsewhere. Furthermore, the Sadrists’ inclusion within the 
Iraqi government and their growing importance to shi’a efforts in the sectarian war conferred 
additional measures of protection. The Mehdi Army’s fighters were shielded from arrest or 
                                                                                                                                           
Institution’s Iraq Index: http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx; and in Cordesman, “Iraq: 
Creating a Strategic Partnership”, pp.12-18. 
43 Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments, pp.38-41 discusses Coalition Forces’ emphasis on behind-
the-scenes training for Iraqi Security Forces and quick-impact raids during 2005, when the prevailing 
wisdom was that foreign forces should minimize contact with the Iraqis as to avoid stoking resentment. 
Further worsening the plight of ordinary Baghdadis and inflaming sectarian enmity, shi’a elements of the 
Iraqi Security Forces embarked on a campaign of intimidation, kidnapping, and murder that targeted sunni 
militants and civilians. Members of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council’s Badr militia were well integrated 
into the Ministry of the Interior, and they transformed the police, in particular, into a decidedly partisan 
force. See: Kagan, The Surge, p.6 for discussion of SIIC’s Bayan Jabr, who took over the Ministry of the 





prosecution by Iraqi officials and their strongholds were declared off-limits to Coalition Forces, 
enabling the militia to evolve with greatly diminished interference from the American military.44 
 
ii. Victory in the Battle for Baghdad 
The Sadrists’ rise continued apace with the escalation of sectarian violence through 2005 and 
into 2006. On the streets of Baghdad, the Mehdi Army grew ever stronger.45 The steady barrage 
of sunni attacks, which were punctuated by spectacular mass casualty events like the 
Khadimiyah bridge stampede of August 2005 (which saw some one thousand shi’a perish when 
rumors of an impending suicide attack spread panic through a vast crowd of religious pilgrims), 
enabled the militia both to strengthen its core and expand its membership.46 The Mehdi Army’s 
lead role in defence of underclass shi’a strongholds like Sadr City and Shula (which, by virtue of 
their demographic makeup and their status as the heartland of the militia, became priority targets 
for sunni attack) enabled it to attract additional recruits; while the militia’s monopoly on service 
provision and the maintenance of order in Baghdad’s shi’a slums enabled it to cultivate localized 
popular support.47  
 
The Sadrists’ rising stature was reinforced by success in the December 2005 elections, in which 
the movement’s political representatives and affiliated candidates secured a formidable thirty-
two-seat bloc in parliament. As increasingly powerful members of the again-victorious United 
                                                
44 In exchange for the Sadrists’ support for the government, Sadr City was declared off limits to Coalition 
Forces during 2006 and 2007. Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 1, p.345 notes Prime Minister Maliki’s 
condemnation of a US-led raid into Sadr City in August 2006 
45 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.15 notes that Iraqi government and Badr 
officials conceded that the Mehdi Army was the dominant force on the streets of Baghdad by the end of 
2005. 
46 As noted in Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 1, p.191, Zarqawi’s declaration of “total war” against 
Iraq’s shi’a community in the immediate aftermath of the stampede was a further, significant driver of 
sectarian fear and a recruiting boon to the Mehdi Army.  
47 The continued inability of the government to control the city and administer its poorer neighbourhoods 
meant that the power vacuum that had initially opened the door for the Sadrists’ rise persisted through the 
years that followed. Irrespective of the Sadrists’ relationship with the central government, their local-level 
representatives remained effectively uncontested as service providers and neighbourhood-level 




Iraqi Alliance, Sadrist politicians wielded considerable clout in the protracted post-election 
wrangling over who would secure the position of prime minister.48 Indeed, their support for Nuri 
al-Maliki’s candidacy was critical to his eventual success in the contest, and the Sadrists were 
rewarded with ministerial portfolios that conferred both prestige and valuable patronage 
opportunities.49  
 
As had been the case in the January elections, Iraq’s political process also served, yet again, to 
exacerbate sectarian division to the advantage of the Sadrists. The UIA’s victory, which marked 
the apparent consolidation of political power by shi’a religious factions, touched off a further 
escalation of sectarian violence. Beginning with the infamous Samarra mosque bombing in late-
February 2006, and escalating dramatically through the spring and summer to claim tens of 
thousands of lives and displace over 1,500,000 Iraqis from their homes, the scope and intensity 
of violence rose to previously unseen heights.50  
 
While the scale of the killing and the resulting social polarization grew to such levels that 
observers labeled the conflict a “civil war”, the mechanics of violence continued largely 
unchanged. Rather than a grassroots, popular clash between the city’s shi’a and sunni residents 
                                                
48 Discussed in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.14. Sadrist influence was a subject 
of much media discussion at the time, with Muqtada al-Sadr commonly referred to as a “kingmaker” in 
recognition of his influence in mediating disputes within the government.  
49 In keeping with their attempt to retain “outsider” credibility and avoid active cooperation with Coalition 
Forces, the Sadrists eschewed high-profile posts in the ministries of defence and interior – instead 
focusing on social service oriented positions that enabled them to buttress their grassroots support. 
Discussed in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.14, 
50 Iraq Body Count: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/year-four/ noted at the time that by 
“every available indicator the year just ended (March 2006 – March 2007) [was] by far the worst year for 
violence against civilians in Iraq since the invasion.” Contrary to common assertions that the February 
bombing of the Samarra mosque was an atrocity that “sparked” the sectarian war, however, Kagan, The 
Surge, pp.8-9 notes that rates of civilian casualties rose only 3 percent from March to April. There was 
thus a spasm of spontaneous retributive violence against sunnis in the immediate wake of the bombing 
but, as noted by Kagan, the conflict did not reach its peak until several months later (in response to an 
array of political events, notable among them the formation of the Maliki government in May, the 
reorganization of Iranian-sponsored shi’a militant cells shortly thereafter, and the killing of Zarqawi in 
June). Bigio and Scott, “Internal Displacement in Iraq”, p.9 state that 1.6 million Iraqis were displaced in 




that featured neighbours taking up arms against one another in a manifestation of long-
simmering sectarian divisions, the killing and forced displacement that ravaged Baghdad 
remained, for the most part, the work of politically-motivated militant networks such as Iraqi al-
Qaeda and the Mehdi Army.51  
 
In a sign of the structure that underpinned the sectarian war in Baghdad, the conflict became a 
contest for territory.52 The violence of 2006 was thus characterized by systematic sectarian 
cleansing in the name of urban conquest. The Mehdi Army, like its fellow shi’a in the Badr 
militia and their mutual sunni foes, seized control of neighbourhoods within the capital by 
positioning themselves as the benefactors of their local sectarian kin and eliminating civilians of 
the opposing sect. With its formidable street-level presence, the Mehdi Army achieved great 
successes in the bloodshed that ensued. Capitalizing on the near impunity with which they could 
operate owing to the protection of the government, the Mehdi Army led an offensive that pushed 
Baghdad’s sunni population back into fortified enclaves, claiming broad sections of the capital.53  
                                                
51 See: al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, p.9 for the observation that the “violence is neither 
spontaneous nor popular” and that opinion among Iraqis was that there was not a civil war in progress “as 
long as neighbours are not killing their neighbours”. Kagan, The Surge, p.3 asserts that “violence in 
Baghdad in 2006 did not emerge from the antipathy between Sunni and Shia neighbours, or from a 
cataclysmic terrorist attack, but rather from an armed political competition between extremist groups”. 
Goodman, “Informal Networks and Insurgency in Iraq”, p.1 likewise observes that the violence of the 
sectarian war was not driven by popular antipathy between the sects. “Rather, sectarianism has been a 
weapon used to further [political] groups’ strategic and policy interests. In that sense, sectarianism has 
served primarily as a weapon of asymmetric warfare in Iraqi politics.” For a contrasting view, see: 
Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p.122 who argues “the killing was a mass social phenomenon, driven 
from the bottom up rather than from the top down”.  
52 Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 1, p.265 notes that forced displacement of shi’a was a key strategy 
of sunni militants. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p.447 traces the forced displacement phenomenon to 
late 2004, when sunni militants expelled shi’a from areas of western Baghdad in order to make room for 
families fleeing the US-led offensive on Falluja.  
53 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, pp.2-4, examines the 
Sadrists’ “classic civil war strategy” and the manner in which they seized territory across the city. While 
units within the Iraqi Security Forces were active in the persecution of sunnis, a subtle shift took place. 
The personnel of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council’s Badr militia (who were well entrenched in the 
officer corps of the security services, and who had been prominent in the extra-judicial targeting of sunni 
militants as well as the persecution of sunni civilians during 2005) distanced themselves from the 
uniformed offensive. On the decision of Badr and the main shi’a parties to abstain from the worst of the 
sectarian war’s atrocities (allegedly in the name of maintaining good relations with Coalition Forces), see 
Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp.449-450. Both the Mehdi Army and Badr were complicit in the 




iii. The Transformation of the Iraqi Capital 
As mass killing and systematic forced displacement continued into the latter months of 2006, the 
demographic landscape of Baghdad was radically altered. The city, which had formerly been 
dominated by the middle class, mixed-sect neighbourhoods that developed at its core during the 
course of the twentieth century, was subjected to a rapid, bloody sectarian segregation.54 By the 
close of 2006, the vast majority of eastern Baghdad was exclusively shi’a (with the exception of 
the sunni enclave of Adhimiyyah, and remaining mixed-sect neighbourhoods in the very heart of 
Rusafa political district). On the western bank of the Tigris River, on the other hand, sunnis were 
being squeezed into a band of neighbourhoods along the terminus of the highway connecting 
Baghdad to Anbar Province. 




                                                                                                                                           
Kagan, The Surge, pp.18-21 notes how Coalition Forces’ reliance on the ISF to “hold” areas after 
clearance operations during 2006 enabled shi’a militants to further their sectarian objectives and, likewise, 
drove sunni civilians closer to radical militants. 
54 Bigio and Scott, “Internal Displacement in Iraq”, pp.1, 13 estimate that 2.6 million Iraqis were displaced 
internally by mid-2009, with a further 2 million overseas, and note that 83 percent of those displaced from 
a home in Baghdad relocated to another area of the city. 
55 Maps downloaded from Columbia University’s “Gulf 2000” project, led by Dr. Michael Izady, which 




Figure 3.2 – Baghdad’s Demographic Layout, 2008 
 
 
The Mehdi Army, having played a leading role in city’s segregation, controlled much of its shi’a 
terrain. In its original strongholds of Sadr City and Shula, and in the formerly mixed-sect, poor 
to working class neighbourhoods around the city’s sprawling margins, the militia was firmly 
entrenched. Its fighters dominated the streets, while Sadrist officials formed a de facto 
government. Closer to the city centre, the militia had also taken possession of a number of 
formerly mixed-sect, middle class neighbourhoods. The militia’s position in these areas was 
contested, as the Badr militia sought to monopolize power in the city centre (and Baghdad’s 
middle class shi’a were broadly hostile to the Sadrist movement), yet the Mehdi Army’s gains 
appeared more durable that might otherwise have been expected.  
 
This was due, in significant measure, to the fact that local demography had been altered in ways 
that went beyond sectarian realignment. Through the course of the post-Saddam era, rising 
insecurity and declining living standards had combined to generate outflows of middle class and 




decades.56 From the earliest weeks after the 2003 invasion, for example, educated professionals 
such as doctors and teachers had been targeted aggressively by both kidnappers and politically-
minded militants (the latter of whom sought to eliminate the social capital of demographic 
groups hostile to their particular agendas). Baghdad’s Christians, likewise, had found themselves 
victims of attacks by Muslim militants of both sects, and poorly positioned to defend 
themselves.57  
 
Owing to the layout of Baghdad, the ensuing population outflows caused a gradual hollowing 
out of the city centre, leaving the communities that remained behind all the more vulnerable to 
the predations of their enemies and the incursions of outsiders. Critical to the Sadrists’ advances, 
meanwhile, an inward surge of poor shi’a families was emanating from the city’s peripheral 
slums. The initial years of the post-Saddam era thus saw a small-scale reenactment of the 
shurughi migrations of the 1940s and 1950s, as clusters of poor shi’a families from districts like 
Sadr City and Shula (joined by others from the hinterlands of the capital, and also from southern 
Iraq where the collapse of the much-relied-upon central government prompted movement to 
Baghdad) pressed in upon Baghdad’s core. Laying claim to the abandoned property of the fallen 
regime; installing themselves in the homes of the displaced and those who had fled abroad; and 
erecting ramshackle, modern-day sarifas of cinder-blocs, concrete, and scrap metal on open 
pieces of land; they further transformed the city.58   
 
                                                
56 See Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 2, pp.663-666; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp.288, 309 and 
Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp.376-378 on the targeting of educated professionals and the resulting 
“brain drain” in Baghdad. Surging criminality in Baghdad was a major factor in the exodus that occurred, 
and Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 1, pp.118-123 cites statistics from the Baghdad morgue that 
showed 60 percent of the killings in the city during 2004 were “gunshot wounds… unrelated to the 
insurgency”.  
57 See Cordseman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 1, p.333 on the flight of middle class and Christian families in 
2006. The Camp Sarah neighbourhood, for example, which was a generations-old Christian enclave at the 
base of the Karradah Peninsula, appeared largely vacant by 2008. 
58 Imagery of the Tisa Nissan district on Google maps (which is utilized in the chapters that follow) was 
updated in the spring of 2012. The contrast between the new imagery (which appears to date to some time 
in late 2011) and that which it replaced (which dated to May 2004) shows the enormous scale of 




While the scope of these movements was initially modest, the resentment that developed toward 
these migrants’ perceived opportunism was sufficient enough for the pejorative hawasim, coined 
originally in reference to looters, to be scornfully applied to the squatters-cum-settlers. On the 
one hand, their efforts to rig connections to already compromised water, sewer, and electricity 
systems further strained critical infrastructure, generating enormous frustration within adjacent 
communities. On the other, the rising tide of poor shi’a, particularly in the mixed-sect 
neighbourhoods near Baghdad’s peripheral slums, fostered an environment of identity-based 
animosity that recalled the 1940s and 1950s.59 Established residents thus came to view surges in 
violence and criminality, the accelerating collapse of public infrastructure, and the encroachment 
of the shi’a underclass as elements of a single phenomenon – the roots of which could be traced, 
in the narrative of the besieged middle class, to slums like Sadr City.60 
 
As the sectarian war intensified and the Mehdi Army continued its campaign of territorial 
conquest, the geographic spread of the shi’a underclass became increasingly politicized. The 
early flight of middle class and minority families out of Baghdad and the initial flow of hawasim 
into areas adjacent to the capital’s slums had progressed with a large measure of spontaneity, but 
the systematic manipulation of demographics emerged as a key weapon in the Mehdi Army’s 
                                                
59 The legacy of the hawasim fatwa further tied the rekindled Sadrist movement to the destabilizing 
changes that swept Baghdad, particularly in the minds of the movement’s middle class and minority 
opponents. This class-based tension transcended sectarian lines, as it brought middle class Baghdadis of 
various sects and faiths into conflict with the shi’a poor. Furthermore, while this dynamic was notably 
powerful in areas adjacent to shi’a underclass strongholds (such as the hayys of Beladiyat and Obeidy), 
migrations reached further afield to areas such as central Zafaraniyyah in Baghdad’s southeastern corner, 
and onward as far away as Najaf.  
60 This was a recurring theme in conversations with middle class Baghdadis during fieldwork in 2008. The 
Mehdi Army’s conquest of middle class areas of the city drew upon long-running themes of class-based 
tension, as well as the motif of underclass triumphalism embedded at the core of the White Lion’s 
movement. As poor shi’a families pressed inwards upon the centre of the Iraqi capital, a symbiotic 
relationship thus developed between the Mehdi Army and the hawasim whereby each built from the 
advances of the other. As such, while the Mehdi Army enjoyed a period of massive growth in Baghdad in 
response to the escalation of sectarian violence, the militia did not become a cohesive, grassroots force 





arsenal.61 Pressing outwards from districts like Sadr City and Shula, the militia utilized a 
combination of targeted killing, forced displacement, and intimidation to eliminate or subdue 
unsympathetic elements of adjoining areas. Supportive members of the shi’a underclass were 
thereafter ushered into the area (where they were often joined by displaced shi’a families of 
varied socio-economic backgrounds that had been driven from sunni-conquered areas of 
Baghdad), establishing themselves on open land or moving into homes confiscated from the 
forcibly displaced.62 The Mehdi Army not only thus cleansed broad areas of Baghdad of sunnis, 
but aided in the spread of the Sadrist movement’s demographic base as well.   
 
III. Betrayal, Exile, and Defeat 
By late 2006, the Sadrists were a towering force in Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr was an influential 
national figure, Sadrist politicians formed a central component of the Iraqi government, and the 
movement was the near-exclusive political vehicle for Iraq’s burgeoning shi’a underclass. The 
Mehdi Army, meanwhile, was larger and more powerful than ever before. The militia had 
absorbed legions of new recruits, it controlled vast tracts of the Iraqi capital, and its fighters 
could claim the lion’s share of the credit for having turned the tide of the sectarian war. 
Furthermore, the demographic changes that had swept Baghdad augured well for the Sadrists’ 
future. Not only was the Iraqi capital more heavily shi’a than at any time in the city’s long 
history, but the movement’s underclass supporters had grown as a percentage of that shi’a 
                                                
61 While the role of forced evictions and depopulation is broadly acknowledged as having been central to 
the Mehdi Army’s expansion across Baghdad, the complementary role of population transfers into the 
areas seized by the militia has attracted less attention. The dynamics of this process in Tisa Nissan are 
detailed in the chapters that follow. Al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, p.29 note the 
phenomenon of “fake” displacement, whereby the influx of underclass shi’a into contested areas was 
orchestrated to improve the local position of the Mehdi Army. 
62 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”, p.20, cites Sadrist officials stating that the 
resettlement of displaced shi’a was a central focus of the movement’s non-military wing. Cockburn, 
Muqtada al-Sadr, p.220 cites anecdotal evidence of Sadrist “realty” offices in the business of placing shi’a 





majority, and expanded geographically as well.63 From the Sadrists’ perspective, therefore, there 
seemed ample reason to celebrate, and to expect that further successes would follow – and their 
rising swagger was infamously evident during the December execution of Saddam Hussein, 
where leaked footage showed the condemned man being taunted with Sadrist slogans as he was 
led to the gallows. 
 
However, despite the Sadrists’ remarkable advances, they faced significant and growing 
problems.64 First, while the Sadrists’ rise to power (both in government and on the streets of 
Baghdad) had conferred a broad array of benefits, with power came increased responsibilities, 
heightened expectations, and intensified public scrutiny. Their successes thus brought added 
burdens that they struggled to manage. Second, the Mehdi Army’s ascendancy in Baghdad had 
been matched by both the intensification of its notoriety, as well as the exacerbation of its 
organizational problems. The militia had grown massively, but it had become all the more 
controversial and structurally incoherent. Third, impending shi’a victory in the sectarian war 
meant that, in the eyes of the dominant players of the shi’a establishment, the Sadrists had 
served their purpose. The diminishing threat of Iraqi al-Qaeda and the sunni insurgency (which 
owed much to the sunnis’ evident defeat in the sectarian war, as well as the associated rise of the 
Awakening movement that witnessed former insurgents turn on al-Qaeda and seek reconciliation 
with the government) meant the dissolution of the principal force that had bound the rival shi’a 
factions together in the first place. 
 
                                                
63 As discussed in the Conclusion, census data is unavailable for post-Saddam Baghdad. Nonetheless, with 
the flight of middle class and minority families, and the devastation of the city’s sunni population during 
the sectarian war, it is a certainty that the shi’a underclass has risen as a percentage of the city’s 
population since 2003 (at which time they had likely comprised at approximately half of the city’s 6 
million residents).  
64 Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, pp.23-41 provides an overview of the Mehdi 
Army’s “remarkable reversal of fortunes” in the context of the Surge, which “stemmed from internal 
divides that were exacerbated by external pressures.” International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The 
Sadrists and the Surge”, page p.i argues that the Sadrists were “victims of their own success”, and that 




Beset, therefore, by a host of internal problems, and confronted by an array of external 
challenges, the Sadrist movement would experience a precipitous drop in its fortunes. Unable to 
consolidate effectively their hard-fought gains, the Sadrists found themselves betrayed by their 
shi’a establishment rivals and exposed to a devastating American-led offensive. Muqtada would 
thus be driven into exile, Sadrist politicians would find themselves outsiders once again, and the 
Mehdi Army would be routed to the point that Muqtada would be compelled to dissolve it 
entirely.  
 
i. The Perils of Success 
From the start of their campaign, the Sadrists had positioned themselves as outsiders. This had 
denied them the prestige of official authority and access to the wealth of the state, but it had 
dissociated them from the shortcomings of the Iraqi government and the occupation. Not only 
were the Sadrists free of blame for the government’s inability to restore basic services, establish 
the rule of law, or revitalize Iraq’s economy, but they were able to cultivate popular support by 
filling the resulting governance vacuum. Upon their entry into the United Iraqi Alliance, 
however, the Sadrists became answerable for the performance of the state. The key role of 
Sadrist officials in the badly underperforming ministries of Health and Electricity (the former 
known as the “Ministry of Horrors” among American personnel, in recognition of both the poor 
standard of care as well as the proclivity of the Mehdi Army to prey upon sunni patients) thus 
exposed the Sadrists to mounting criticism.65 Furthermore, in addition to issues of performance 
and competency, Sadrist officials proved as prone to corruption as the rest of their colleagues in 
                                                
65 Sunni interviewees displaced from Beladiyat and Mashtal (interviewed in April 2008 on Forward 
Operating Base Loyalty) made numerous references to the educational and managerial shortcomings of 
Sadrist “technocrats” in both ministries, blaming underperformance on the ineptitude of those in charge. 
who were alleged to possess only high school diplomas. International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The 





the Iraqi government.66 The militant populism and religious austerity of Sadrist rhetoric was, 
therefore, compromised by evident hypocrisy, tarnishing the movement’s image.    
 
The Mehdi Army likewise struggled to handle the responsibilities that came with the successes 
of 2005 and 2006. Having seized vast tracts of the Iraqi capital, the militia presided over 
millions of Baghdadis who looked to it not only for protection, but governance as well. This 
would have been a daunting task for a well organized and well resourced organization (by way 
of comparison, it was a feat that neither the Iraqi government nor the Coalition had 
accomplished to any meaningful level of popular satisfaction since the 2003 invasion), yet for 
the Mehdi Army it proved overwhelming. The militia’s decentralized structure had facilitated its 
growth and aided in the prosecution of the sectarian war, but in the aftermath of the fighting it 
badly undermined efforts to administer its conquests. Furthermore, by 2007 the militia’s ranks 
were dominated by young men in their teens, twenties, and thirties, who were ill-equipped for, 
and little-inclined toward, the mundane and technical tasks of governance.67 Lastly, the 
abatement of sectarian violence and the cessation of large-scale population transfers deprived the 
militia of its most important revenue source. While the Mehdi Army had funded itself in part 
through its control over the informal economy (most notably via the control of petrol stations, 
the distribution of cooking oil, and the sale of electricity from small generators), the assets 
seized from its victims were an essential funding stream.68   
 
                                                
66 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, pp.2, 7 discuss the reputation 
of Sadrist officials for corruption, and the Sadrists’ struggles to perform effectively in the political realm. 
Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments, pp.130-132 discusses broader issues of corruption in the post-
Saddam state.  
67 For discussion of the rising prominence of ever-younger militants due to the battlefield attrition of more 
seasoned Mehdi Army commanders, see al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, p.10; and 
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.9, which catalogues growing 
resentment among Iraqi shi’a in response to the abuses suffered at the hands of the militia. 
68 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, pp.6-7 discusses the 
prominent role of plunder in financing the Mehdi Army, and further observes how sectarian cleansing 
became a major financial operation that drew in the unemployed and those desirous of quick riches. 
Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 2, p.373 cites UN statistics that 45,000 were being displaced each 




The Mehdi Army was faced, therefore, with an extraordinary challenge for which it was neither 
suited nor equipped. As such, despite the efforts of Muqtada al-Sadr to implement reforms and 
issue guidance, the militia, as a whole, descended into disorder and predation.69 The waning 
months of the sectarian war thus witnessed a redirection, rather than a cessation, of the militia’s 
martial energies, with militiamen turning their weapons on the shi’a civilians over whom they 
presided. Life for many in Mehdi Army-held territory thereafter required running gauntlets of 
checkpoints staffed by armed youths (who became infamous for narcotics-fueled violence), and 
paying protection money to local strongmen.70  
 
ii. The Metastasizing Problems of the Mehdi Army  
Far and away the highest-profile element of the rekindled Sadrist movement, the militia was 
decisively influential in shaping popular opinion toward Muqtada and his associates. As the 
Sadrists’ principle organizational body, the militia was also their most important operational 
asset. Its reputation and effectiveness were thus paramount concerns, yet efforts to resolve these 
woes (which began in earnest after the militia’s defeats in Najaf in 2004, and remained a top 
priority through the years that followed), achieved only the most modest of results.71  
 
At issue was the inescapable fact that the Mehdi Army’s behaviour was an authentic 
manifestation of its membership, and its incoherence a direct byproduct of the manner in which 
it had spread across Baghdad. Having developed from a core of sanctions-generation males and 
                                                
69 The day-to-day realities of life under the Mehdi Army’s “protection” had long provoked significant 
levels of dissatisfaction, featuring the domineering presence of religious radicals and a strong undercurrent 
of criminal activity such as extortion and theft. Shadid, Night Draws Near, pp.214-215 notes early worries 
over life under Sadrist rule. Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 2, p.411 comments on the largely 
unsuccessful efforts of Muqtada to establish order within the militia during the latter months of 2006.  
70 Drug abuse among militiamen is noted in al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, p.11, and was 
still widely alleged by Iraqi Security Force personnel and residents of Tisa Nissan during fieldwork.  
71 For discussion of attempts to reform the Mehdi Army, see International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, 
The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.8; Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, pp.16, 25-26. 
Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 2, p.411 traces Muqtada’s renewed efforts to regain control of the 
movement and the Mehdi Army to the autumn of 2006, by which time it was widely evident that the 




radical junior clerics, and expanded further by enlisting legions of young men (who, in time, 
were joined by the even more hardened and volatile youths that came of age during the post-
Saddam era), the Mehdi Army, as an institution, took on their particular attributes. The extreme 
nature of their rhetoric, the brutality with which they pursued their objectives, and the austere 
brand of Islamic rule imposed in their wake (often complete with “morality police” in the image 
of Iran or Saudi Arabia) exerted a formative influence on the militia’s identity. 
 
That identity had, in turn, exerted a profound influence over the manner in which Muqtada was 
able to translate popular affinity for the White Lion’s legacy into active support for his agenda. 
From the initial, polarizing controversy that surrounded the hawasim fatwa and the murder of 
Abd al-Majid al-Khoei to the gruesome atrocities of the militia’s sectarian campaign, a self-
perpetuating cycle had developed that repelled more moderate elements of the shi’a underclass 
while attracting additional like-minded recruits. Efforts, therefore, to rein in the militia’s most 
extreme elements and refashion its reputation ran directly against the central current of its 
development.  
 
The Mehdi Army’s growth in Baghdad occurred through the absorption of pre-existing local 
networks. Taking advantage of the latent base of popular support bequeathed by the White Lion, 
and drawing further upon the affinity of shi’a youths for Muqtada and his message, the Mehdi 
Army mobilized thousands of footsoldiers. In keeping with the best practices of insurgent 
warfare, the militia “went local” – recruiting not only agents and informants, but entire 
operational networks from the neighbourhoods that it sought to draw into its domain.72 Either 
working out of mosques (which, frequently, were former sunni mosques that had been seized by 
                                                
72 The particular and varied implications of this approach are examined in detail in the chapters that 




the militia) or from Sadrist offices, representatives of the Mehdi Army would recruit from the 
surrounding area, establishing what amounted to local “franchises”.73 
 
In doing so, the militia was able to spread quickly across the city and, in the process, acquire 
troves of valuable intelligence. The increasingly localized and decentralized structure of the 
militia came at a cost, however, as the priorities and loyalties of its myriad subcomponents grew 
increasingly localized as well. The effects of this dynamic were not uniformly negative – indeed, 
the decentralized nature of the Mehdi Army’s expansion allowed for the development of pockets 
in the city where the Mehdi Army’s representatives were tied closely to the local community and 
enjoyed significant popularity – yet the overall result was deeply detrimental to its strategic 
coherence.74 
 
iii. Mounting External Pressures 
In the final weeks of 2006, dramatic changes to Iraq’s political landscape brought enormous 
pressure to bear on the Sadrists and their militia. With Iraqi al-Qaeda in check and shi’a victory 
in the sectarian war secured, the rationale for the establishment’s alliance with the Sadrists was 
rapidly collapsing.75 Furthermore, with the Sadrists appearing potentially vulnerable due to the 
weaknesses discussed above, and American forces preparing to recommit themselves to Iraq via 
                                                
73 Al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, p.12 discusses the common use of mosques as nodes of 
violence in the sectarian conflict. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p.449 also notes the Mehdi Army’s 
“franchise”-driven growth. 
74 Such localism, and the resulting variation in character of the Mehdi Army, was evident during the 
course of 2008 when subcomponents of the militia were assessed and engaged individually by American 
forces, who attempted to differentiate between “good” and “bad” elements of the militia. Noted 
throughout the course of fieldwork in 2008 (when American commanders emphasized the need to work 
cooperatively with what they referred to as “good JAM”), and referenced in Bing West, The Strongest 
Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq, (New York: Random House, 2008), p.353.  
75 Sectarian violence continued nonetheless, and Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p.125 notes that 
December 2006 was the peak month for sectarian killing with an average of 125 dead each night (50 
percent of whom were in Baghdad). Nonetheless, shi’a forces had claimed a decisive strategic victory by 





the Surge, the timing was ideal for Prime Minister Maliki to break with Muqtada, the Sadrists, 
and the Mehdi Army.76  
 
The dynamics of violence in Iraq thus reverted back to that of 2003 and 2004, pitting the 
Sadrists and their militia against the joint forces of the Coalition, the Iraqi government, and the 
Badr militia as well.77 From January of 2007 onward, as Prime Minster Maliki strengthened his 
association with Coalition Forces, American personnel spread out through the capital in the 
context of the Surge and initiated a major offensive against the Mehdi Army.78 The Sadrists’ 
betrayal by their establishment rivals meant that militiamen were no longer able to rely on the 
protection of the government, and their strongholds were no longer off limits to Coalition 
Forces.79 The forces arrayed against the Mehdi Army were such that Muqtada was compelled to 
order his militia not to counter the offensive, while the young cleric fled to exile in Iran.80 
 
                                                
76 See Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, p.22 for a discussion of Prime Minster 
Maliki’s calculations. The survival of the pan-shi’a alliance was made all the more unlikely by Maliki and 
his establishment peers’ ties with the US-led Coalition. The closing months of 2006 witnessed American 
officials applying heavy pressure to the Maliki administration to break with the Sadrists and confront the 
Mehdi Army (while Muqtada and his associates replied in kind with public demands for the Coalition’s 
withdrawal from Iraq). Noted in Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 2, pp.380-381. Cordesman, Iraq’s 
Insurgency, Vol. 2, pp.409-411 also notes that by mid-2006 the American military regarded the Mehdi 
Army as a greater threat than al-Qaeda to its interests and to stability in Iraq.  
77 Tensions between the Sadrists and the shi’a establishment had remained evident throughout the course 
of the sectarian war: the Mehdi Army and the Badr militia had clashed over competing claims newly-
cleansed “shi’a” areas near Baghdad’s middle class core, battled for influence in the cities and towns of 
southern Iraq, and jockeyed for influence within the ranks of the Iraqi Security Forces as well. The 
escalation of their antagonism, which occurred in a rough correlation to the abatement of sectarian 
violence, was a strong indicator that the pan-shi’a coalition would dissolve as the overriding threat of 
sunni militants faded. Cochrane, “Special Groups”, p.12 notes the rise of intra-shi’a violence across 
southern Iraq during 2007. 
78 As noted in Cochrane, “Special Groups”, p.4, the initial phase of the Surge was focused principally on 
the defeat of Iraqi al-Qaeda in an effort to capitalize on the momentum generated by the Awakening. 
Operations against the Mehdi Army nonetheless progressed in shi’a areas of the city, becoming a central 
focus by late 2007. 
79 Noted in Tina Susman, “Security Crackdown Widens to Shiite Slum”, Los Angeles Times, March 5, 
2007. 
80 The reaction of Muqtada and the Mehdi Army to Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, also referred to as the 
Baghdad Security Plan, is detailed in Kagan, The Surge, pp.54-59. For a discussion of Muqtada’s 
motivations in fleeing Iraq, see: Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist movement”, p.25, who 
emphasizes both Muqtada’s fears of capture by Coalition Forces and of threats from within the Mehdi 
Army. Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.238, offers an assortment of alternative theories, including 




As the pressure increased on the Mehdi Army during the spring and summer of 2007, the 
militia’s strengths and weaknesses were clearly defined. In Baghdad, the Mehdi Army was 
driven from many of the formerly mixed-sect, middle class neighbourhoods most distant from its 
principal strongholds, while the refocused attention of Coalition Forces compelled numerous 
high-ranking militiamen to seek refuge in the Deep South and Iran.81 Nonetheless, while the 
militia’s penetration of the city’s core proved short-lived, it remained dominant around much of 
Baghdad’s periphery. Indeed, a full year into the Surge, the Sadrists’ home turf would still be 
regarded as impenetrable by the most astute of observers, and the prospect of the Mehdi Army’s 
head-on defeat was widely agreed to be “fanciful”.82  
 
Yet, however well entrenched the Mehdi Army appeared in areas of the capital (and across 
zones of southern Iraq as well), the intensification of external pressure badly exacerbated its 
organizational troubles. With Muqtada absent in Iran and unable to quell the dissent that festered 
in response to his order that the militia not aggressively combat the encroachment of the Surge, 
the various sub-networks within the Mehdi Army splintered apart.83 Muqtada’s stated strategy of 
non-confrontation was thus badly compromised at a vital time, as elements of the militia came 
into sporadically heavy confrontation with Coalition Forces and the Iraqi government.  
 
The most prominent instigators of violence were the so-called “Special Groups”, which took 
advantage of Iranian technical expertise, financial resources, and advanced weaponry to launch a 
                                                
81 Cochrane, “Special Groups”, p.18 notes that Maysan Province was a point of refuge for Mehdi Army 
and Special Group fighters fleeing Coalition offensives in Baghdad and Basra. International Crisis Group, 
“Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.22 notes how the flight of wealthy militants to areas of 
the Deep South generated a localized surge in real estate prices.  
82 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, pp.i-ii. 
83 Efforts to mount a coherent response to the Surge featured the creation of the “Golden Brigade” of the 
Mehdi Army, a unit of cadre loyalists tasked with forcibly disciplining rogue militiamen. Discussed in 
Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, pp25-26. Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 2, 
pp.598-603 and Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement”, pp.25-27, offer detailed 




formidable counteroffensive.84 The close ties of Special Group leaders with the Mehdi Army, 
and the consequently indeterminate political motives of their operations, opened the door for a 
broad policy of retributive targeting by Coalition Forces. Furthermore, the numerous local 
franchises that had been absorbed into the Mehdi Army during its expansion were unable to 
mount a coherent response to the advance of the Surge either. The sustained, street-level 
counterinsurgency operations of the Surge brought the militia’s affiliates into direct, daily 
contact with American and Iraqi units. Faced with the advance of powerful enemies, and lacking 
an effective organizational hierarchy upon which to call, elements of the militia pursued 
independent courses of action. Some sought reconciliation with the Iraqi government and 
worked in concert with local officials to enhance stability and security, others went to ground or 
fled their neighbourhoods, while still others offered violent resistance.  
 
iv. The End of the Mehdi Army? 
In August 2007, the Mehdi Army’s fortunes took a further downward turn. The militia was 
engaged in a long-running battle with the Badr militia for supremacy in southern Iraq, and the 
spring and summer of 2007 brought an escalation of skirmishes and assassinations.85 These 
clashes culminated in a major confrontation during the shabaniyyah festival in Karbala, where 
Mehdi Army fighters traded mortar and machine-gun fire with Badr loyalists (who were 
uniformed members of the Iraqi Security Forces).86 With some fifty civilians killed and hundreds 
more wounded, and public opinion placing blame squarely on the shoulders of the Mehdi Army, 
                                                
84 For an overview of the Special Groups, see: Cochrane, “Special Groups”. Cochrane, Fragmentation, 
p.27 discusses documents captured by Coalition Forces during the capture of Qais al-Khazali revealing 
that the Iranians (via the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force) were supplying Special Group cells with 
US$750,000 to US$3,000,000 per month. 
85 International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics in Iraq”, p.20 notes the numerous assassinations of SIIC 
representatives and Sistani-affiliated clerics during the summer of 2007. Intra-shi’a tensions are also 
addressed in Munson, Iraq in Transition, pp.219-220. International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The 
Sadrists and the Surge”, p.12 discusses the intensity of the Mehdi Army’s rivalry with Badr. 
86 The Kerbala clash was instructive as to the broader dynamics of the Mehdi Army – Badr rivalry. Badr 
personnel embedded in the Iraqi Security Forces were charged with protecting the Imam Ali shrine, and 
they came into conflict with Mehdi Army militiamen who sought to assert control over the venue. The 
clash thus possessed political, economic, and religious connotations. The battle and its implications are 




Muqtada al-Sadr was compelled to take drastic action. On the day after the fighting, he imposed 
a unilateral ceasefire on his militia for a period of six months – during which time the Sadrist 
leadership would attempt, yet again, to enforce internal discipline and rehabilitate the militia’s 
image. 
 
The Mehdi Army’s ceasefire, which Muqtada would renew in February of 2008, led to a 
significant drop in violence and a tense stalemate in the Iraqi capital.87 On one side, Sadrist 
leaders spent these months attempting to reform and reconstitute the Mehdi Army. Muqtada, still 
in Iran, continued his religious studies in an effort to elevate his clerical credentials and burnish 
his credibility. The Sadrist strategy thus focused on the consolidation of its base and the pursuit 
of long-term goals, while avoiding direct confrontation.88 Citing the continued hostilities of 
Special Group cells and elements of the Mehdi Army as immediate justification, however, and 
remaining intent on the defeat of their outspoken, long-term enemy, American forces continued 
to pursue an aggressive offensive against the Mehdi Army, pushing further into the militia’s 
domain. As a result, Muqtada’s ceasefire grew increasingly unpopular within the ranks of the 
militia, and a major confrontation loomed as 2007 drew to a close.89  
 
However, 2008 did not feature a large-scale eruption of violence. Instead, with the exception of 
March Madness’ fleeting turmoil and sporadic clashes in Basra, Baghdad, and elsewhere, the 
militia suffered a string of crushing defeats. Not only was it driven from the territory that it had 
                                                
87 The extent to which the Mehdi Army, however disorganized it was, adhered to the truce imposed by 
Muqtada surprised many. Noted in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the 
Surge”, p.17. 
88 Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.259 argues that “the movement’s reputation among Shia had benefited 
from the long ceasefire during which the Mehdi Army had been effectively purged… In Shia areas, 
particularly in Baghdad, it was losing its reputation as an umbrella group for every local warlord or 
racketeer.” Observations in Tisa Nissan during 2008 (detailed in the chapters that follow) run 
overwhelmingly contrary to this assertion. 
89 Following remarkable successes against the sunni insurgency during 2006 and 2007, the Mehdi Army 
and associated shi’a militant groups became the primary target of the Surge. Heightened violence was thus 
widely anticipated during 2008 by American military personnel, as the limited time horizon of the Surge 




captured during the sectarian war, but it was also forced to cede control over the heartland of the 
Sadrist movement. The scope of its defeats in Baghdad and the Deep South were such that 
Muqtada ordered the wholesale dissolution of the once-fearsome militia in June, leaving the 
future of the rekindled Sadrist movement in doubt.90  
  
 
                                                
90 The dissolution of the Mehdi Army and the efforts of Muqtada to channel elements of his base into 
social service oriented organizations is detailed in Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist 
Movement”, p.37, along with commentary on the ways in which the military, religious, and political 
elements of the rekindled Sadrist movement fell into dispute and disarray during the latter phase of the 
Surge. On the militia’s collapsing strategic position during the fall of 2008, see: Sabrina Tavernise, “A 
Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees its Power Wane,” The New York Times, July 27, 2008; and Bill Roggio, 
“Madhi Army Decimated During Recent Fighting”, Long War Journal, June 26, 2008. 
Chapter 4 
 




i. Area Study Overview 
The area study that follows examines six of the ten hayys, or administrative sub-districts, of 
Baghdad’s Tisa Nissan political district. These hayys: Amin, Beladiyat, Fedaliyah, Kamaliyah, 
Mashtal, and Shawra wa Umm Jidr, are known collectively, along with the hayy of Obeidy, as the 
area of Tisa Nissan “beyond the Army Canal”.1  
Figure 4.1 – The Hayys of Tisa Nissan & Surrounding Areas 
2 
In Arabic, Tisa Nissan means “April 9th”, and the name is a play on words that juxtapose the 
present with the past. In present terms, the district’s name commemorates the day that Saddam 
Hussein’s iconic statue was pulled down in Firdos Square in the early days of the 2003 invasion, 
signifying the fall of the Ba’th regime. In reference to the past, the name also evokes Sa’ba 
                                                
1 Obeidy has not been included in the area study, as various constraints precluded the conduct of fieldwork 
in the hayy. Collective reference to this area of Tisa Nissan as “beyond the Army Canal” was common 
practice in Baghdad, as the canal is a prominent feature on the urban landscape and the neighbourhoods 
beyond it share a broad set of common characteristics. 




Nissan, “April 7th”, which was the name that the Ba’th regime had bestowed upon one of the 
district’s neighbourhoods in a tribute to the date of the Ba’th Party’s first congress in 1947.3   
 
I. The Landscape of Eastern Baghdad 
The foundation of present-day Tisa Nissan, like that of nearby Sadr City, was laid during Abd al-
Karim Qassim’s urban development initiative of the early 1960s. As discussed in Chapter One, at 
the time of the coup that brought Qassim to power, the eastern half of the Iraqi capital had long 
been contained almost entirely within a small area of the modern-day Rusafa political district. 
Confined largely to the eastern bank of the Tigris River (stretching from Adhimiyyah in the north 
to the base of Karrada Peninsula in the south), and limited from eastward expansion by the 
earthen flood-protection wall known as the bund, the city was a small fraction of its present size.4  
Figure 4.2 – Hilmi’s Sketch of Baghdad, 1953 
5 
                                                
3 The Ba’th Party’s first congress was held in Syria, on April 7, 1947. The Sa’ba Nissan neighbourhood 
was established for low-level Ba’th Party functionaries in the hayy of Beladiyat, and is discussed further 
below and in Chapter Five. 
4 As evident in maps of Baghdad dating prior to the twentieth century, Adhimiyyah was originally an 
independent city, but was eventually absorbed into Baghdad during its massive twentieth century 
expansion. 




The replacement of the bund with the Army Canal, however, and the relocation to Revolution 
City of the hundreds of thousands of underclass shi’a slum dwellers that had erected their sarifas 
just beyond it, opened a broad expanse of land to urban development. Having swelled 
numerically in preceding decades, quadrupling from 200,000 residents in 1922 to approximately 
800,000 at the time of the 1958 coup, Baghdad would now grow geographically as well.6 What 
was formerly a cramped, antiquated city began its physical transformation into the sprawling, 
concrete metropolis of some 6,000,000 that it was at the time of the 2003 invasion.  
 
i. The Fundamentals of Planned Development 
Whereas initial waves of migration from Iraq’s Deep South progressed effectively unregulated 
through the 1940s and 1950s, with migrant groups establishing settlement clusters on the city’s 
ungoverned margins, Qassim’s reforms ushered in a new era of government-directed 
development. In an effort to bring order to Baghdad’s expansion, civil and social engineers 
sought to pro-actively manage growth and give structure to the city’s modernization. To that end, 
a schema was developed that blended traditional modes of urban social organization with modern 
political imperatives, creating what amounted to a reinterpretation of the traditional mahallah. 
The city’s growth would thereafter be delineated through the creation of new, identity-based 
settlement clusters; yet, in a break from the traditional past, the tribal and religious distinctions 
that had defined the inward-looking enclaves of Ottoman Baghdad were largely replaced by 
professional associations and other modern client-groups of the state.7  
 
The manner in which the mahallah framework was adapted reflected both the self-consciously 
progressive, transformative ideals dominant within the upper echelons of Iraqi society, as well as 
                                                
6 Population figures from Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.35.  
7 Profession was the dominant organizational framework of the new mahallahs, though class-based 
distinctions remained (and, indeed, were inextricably tied to an occupation-based system). The system thus 
shared much in common with the traditional mahallah, which had also featured professional and guild-




the growing ambitions of the Iraqi state. To the former, prevailing intellectual currents within 
educated society during the middle decades of the twentieth century espoused the urgent 
necessity of transforming Iraqi society from its antiquated, divided past into a modern, cohesive 
future.8 The Ba’th Party’s rhetoric, for example, concerning the need to create a “new Iraqi man” 
who could transcend the parochial, regressive forces of tribe and sect, was wholly in keeping with 
the thinking of the era.9 The use of an occupation-based framework of social organization to 
structure Baghdad’s growth was thus a way to further the unification of Iraqi society and facilitate 
the development of a modern Iraqi identity.  
 
With respect to the agenda of the state, the reinterpreted mahallah advanced official interests in a 
more practical way as well. Beginning with Prime Minister Qassim, and continuing through the 
rule of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi state sought to radically expand its control over Iraqi society. 
The state, the size and strength of which grew enormously as oil revenues surged, positioned 
itself as architect and engineer of social change. Concurrently, the regimes that ruled Iraq after 
the toppling of the monarchy also grew increasingly totalitarian, culminating in the reign of the 
Ba’th. With the state thus attempting to dominate society as well as refashion it, government 
resources were deployed not merely to modernize Baghdad, but to do so in a manner that 
reinforced the power of the ruling regime. The distribution (and, conversely, the confiscation) of 
land within the capital was thus a way for a regime to consolidate its power, as the loyalty of 
particular client groups could be cultivated in a manner that simultaneously reaffirmed their 
dependency. 
 
                                                
8 Ajami, The Arab Predicament, p.44 offers a broader discussion of prevailing notions in the Middle East 
during the second half of the twentieth century regarding region-wide efforts at “the destruction of tradition 
and the creation of the future”.  
9 The Ba’th Party’s embrace of the “New Iraqi Man” as an ideological concept is discussed in Karsh and 




As such, through the 1960s and 1970s, eastern Baghdad’s development progressed via 
government-directed construction that featured the allocation of land to favoured groups. Present-
day Tisa Nissan, like similar spaces elsewhere on the city’s expanding periphery, was divided and 
allocated to groups of soldiers, teachers, engineers, municipal workers, doctors, labourers, and 
factory workers, whereupon residential neighbourhoods were founded that blended Baghdadis of 
various sects, religions, and ethnicities.  
Figure 4.3 – Gulick’s Sketch of Baghdad’s Development, 1965 
10 
In the area between where the bund had been situated and where the Army Canal was dug to 
replace it, the city’s middle class core was expanded outward to the canal’s inner edge.11 Zones of 
residential and commercial development thus extended Rusafa further eastward, and to the 
                                                
10 Sketch of Baghdad showing its expansion by 1965, from Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, p.247. 
11 The former path of the bund remains visible in satellite imagery of the city, as a major urban artery now 
runs where it once stood (the Mohammed al-Qassim Expressway on Iraqi maps, which was known as 




southeast, middle class neighbourhoods such as Officer City were established. The commercial 
hub of Baghdad al-Jadeeda, meaning “New Baghdad”, was also erected near the far southeastern 
corner of the city. New Baghdad was to be the area’s primary economic engine, containing a 
mixture of commerce, light industry, and sizable grids of housing for middle to working class 
families. 
 
In addition to the extension of Baghdad’s core, there was also a major initiative to expand the city 
beyond the Army Canal.12 Revolution City was the largest and most ambitious element of this 
campaign (and one that eschewed the progressive-minded framework that sought to break down 
the divisions of the past, preferring instead to ghettoize the bulk of the shi’a underclass), but 
territory between its southeastern boundary and the Diyala River was targeted for urbanization of 
a more affluent, integrated variety. Amin, for example, was established during the 1960s as an 
extension of the working class housing developments and commercial districts of New Baghdad. 
Moving up the socio-economic scale, Mashtal was also founded as an enclave for middle class 
families of both sects. Further development along the Army Canal’s outer edge then saw the 
space between Amin and Revolution City (which would become the hayy of Beladiyat) allocated 
to professional groups from the Baghdad city government and various state ministries. By the 
early 1970s, therefore, the area was progressing toward the sort of integrated, cosmopolitan space 
that had been envisaged by its creators. Salaried, middle to working class Muslim families of both 
sects lived side-by-side in southeastern Baghdad’s new mahallahs, while the area’s promising 
early development attracted a sizable Christian community as well.  
 
 
                                                
12 The history of Tisa Nissan’s development, which is explored in greater detail on a neighbourhood-by-
neighbourhood basis in the chapters that follow, is drawn from conversations with long-time local residents 
and members of the Iraqi Security Forces held between February and November 2008 at various venues 
across the district. The particulars of the fieldwork process are further detailed in Appendix A, while 




ii. The Shifting Terrain of Southeastern Baghdad 
Despite efforts to pro-actively manage Baghdad’s expansion during the second half of the 
twentieth century, numerous forces worked to influence development in ways both unanticipated 
and undesired by the government. In southeastern Baghdad, the most important of these was the 
continued escalation of mass migration by impoverished shi’a families. Although the rapidly 
swelling ghetto of Revolution City became the epicentre of migrant settlement, migration flows 
were by no means confined therein. On the one hand, new arrivals from the Deep South 
continued to erect sarifas on open terrain across eastern Baghdad through the 1960s despite the 
government’s ban on their construction.13 On the other, migrant families poured into 
neighbourhoods such as Kamaliyah on the city’s expanding margins, tilting the demographic 
composition of poorer, working class neighbourhoods and giving them an expanding shurughi 
profile.  
 
As the neighbourhoods of eastern Baghdad developed further through the 1970s, and underclass 
shi’a migration flows surged yet again, tensions developed between the residents of middle class, 
mixed-sect neighbourhoods within Beladiyat and Mashtal and the rising tide of impoverished 
shi’a on their borders.14 On one side of the dispute, the residents of eastern Baghdad’s planned 
neighbourhoods considered themselves an integral part of the capital’s dynamic and growing 
urban core. The continued influx of underclass shi’a migrants into their immediate environs was 
thus resented as a negative influence on local development. On the other side, resentment grew in 
kind among the migrants, over their inferior quality of life and the scorn that was heaped upon 
them. Those resident in the poorer areas of Kamaliyah, like those who settled in growing numbers 
                                                
13 Noted by Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a City”, p.252. “In 1965,” he observed, “there were still 
numerous [sarifas] outside the Bund, and there were quite a number of infiltrators in the built-up portions 
of the section called New Baghdad”.  
14 Class-based social divisions between members of the shi’a underclass and their fellow Baghdadis were 
evident throughout the course of fieldwork in Tisa Nissan. Chapter Five details the localized tensions in 
Beladiyat and Mashtal, where the dividing line fell, in effect, between the edges of the city’s middle class 




in areas of Amin and Obeidy, became keenly aware of their poverty in comparison with nearby 
middle class Baghdadis, and also fully conscious of the prejudices harboured against them. 
 
At the root of simmering tensions in eastern Baghdad was the continued inability of the Iraqi 
government, even at the peak of its oil-fueled powers during the late-1970s, to muster the 
necessary combination of focused attention and administrative capacity to see through the 
development process and manage the repercussions of rural-to-urban migration effectively.15 The 
main neighbourhoods within Mashtal, Beladiyat, and Amin, like those of Baghdad al-Jadeeda on 
the inner bank of the Army Canal, had been intended to facilitate an eastward extension of the 
city’s core. However, vital public infrastructure – including the power grid, paved roads, sewers, 
marketplaces, medical facilities, and schools – was never sufficiently developed to accommodate 
the growth that ensued.16 Thus, while the nuclei of these hayys enjoyed fairly reliable 
infrastructure and essential services, spaces in their immediate outskirts frequently did not. 
Furthermore, surges of migration undermined the efforts of social and civil engineers to 
perpetuate forward-looking middle and working class development in the hayys beyond the Army 
Canal. As impoverished, unskilled shi’a migrants continued to surge into eastern Baghdad, the 
canal instead came to replace the bund, serving as the dividing line where the core of Baghdad 
ended, and its underserviced, shurughi-dominated periphery began.  
 
An array of grievances thus accumulated beyond the Army Canal, which intensified as the 
resources of the state declined sharply from the mid-1980s onwards. With electricity supplies 
                                                
15 Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.904-905 observes that during the mid-1970s the government lacked the 
administrative capacity in Baghdad and in southern Iraq to control migration. The police were unable to 
control the flow of families, for example, while the administrative apparatus was insufficiently robust to 
deter movement via the restriction of work permits or other such means. 
16 The contrast between the quality of home construction and critical infrastructure in those neighbourhoods 
that had been established for middle to working class growth and those that became dominated by the shi’a 
poor was clear during the course of fieldwork, despite the area in its entirety having atrophied severely. 
Nonetheless, even the relatively affluent enclaves of Beladiyat and Mashtal – like their counterparts across 





growing increasingly unreliable, schools and medical centres decaying, and crime rates surging as 
well, a general consensus developed that the attentions of the government (excluding the ever 
present security services) dropped sharply as one crossed the canal.17 To residents of more 
affluent neighbourhoods within Beladiyat and Mashtal, this was understood, with significant 
bitterness, to be the result of the area having become home to high levels of poor shi’a. As the 
government was forced to prioritize the recipients of its largesse, the shurughi profile of eastern 
Baghdad left it low on the regime’s list.18  
 
To the area’s shi’a poor, who by the 1980s appear to have constituted a solid majority in Tisa 
Nissan beyond the Army Canal, eastern Baghdad’s neglect was likewise understood to stem from 
its strong shurughi profile.19 Yet, while the migrants and their descendants had come to the same 
diagnosis as their more affluent counterparts regarding the root cause of their unsatisfactory 
material situation, a quite separate set of emotions followed. For the shi’a underclass, eastern 
Baghdad’s decay marked yet another chapter in their long-running ill treatment at the hands of 
the government, and the persistence of social prejudices in Iraqi society. The atrocious condition 
of essential services in areas of Kamaliyah, for example, was easily assimilated into the broader 
narrative of suffering and neglect that encompassed their experience in Baghdad to date. 
 
                                                
17 The decrepit state of critical infrastructure prior to the 2003 invasion and the area’s long-running neglect 
was a recurring theme during discussions throughout Tisa Nissan, to include the more affluent and centrally 
urban hayy of Baghdad al-Jadeeda. Crime levels were a more localized phenomenon, as detailed in the 
chapters that follow.  
18 Thus, to the middle class clusters of the area, the very same phenomenon that had been at the root of the 
area’s decline during previous decades was now blamed for the government’s neglect in a time of particular 
need, fueling class-based tensions. These frustrations were made explicit in conversations with residents of 
Beladiyat and Baghdad al-Jadeeda during the spring and summer of 2008. They attributed the 
unsatisfactory quality of local schools and medical facilities to the high concentrations of underclass shi’a 
in the district – and the government’s corresponding neglect. 
19 Reliable census-style data is unavailable, but the accounts of long-time residents of Beladiyat and 
Mashtal made common, corroborating reference to the rising tide of underclass shi’a in the area and a 




Economic and infrastructural collapse during the sanctions era further exacerbated social 
divisions. It also made the rise of Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr all the more 
polarizing.20 Sadr’s fiery rhetoric of class warfare and underclass empowerment was met with 
extraordinary enthusiasm among the hundreds of thousands of poor shi’a who inhabited areas 
such as Kamaliyah, Amin, Obeidy, and Fedaliyah, while middle class shi’a loyal to Ali al-Sistani 
were left feeling besieged. The opponents of the White Lion viewed his militant populism, his 
embrace of rough tribal ethics, his promulgation of low, folk religion, and his celebration of the 
inherent virtues of Iraqi society’s lowest rungs not merely as a symptom of the broader societal 
collapse underway during the 1990s, but as a driver thereof. Sadr’s alleged debasement of shi’ism 
was thus neatly situated in the context of the implosion of the economy, the fall of the middle 
class, the rise of pseudo-tribal violence, and the degeneration of Baghdad itself.  
 
II. The Fall of Saddam & the Rise of the Mehdi Army 
By the time of the 2003 invasion, southeastern Baghdad was structurally decrepit and socially 
volatile. The legacy of centrally planned growth in the spirit of the mahallah remained evident, as 
the area was home to a collection of distinct development clusters, yet it was not the landscape 
envisioned by its original architects. Neighbourhoods adjacent to the Army Canal offered 
reminders of the middle class, blended society that the Iraqi state had aspired to create, housing 
families of educated professionals of both sects and a sizable Christian community.21 Their 
residents’ financial position had been degraded to the point that their claim to middle class status 
was more cultural than economic, however, while the less affluent neighbourhoods further toward 
                                                
20 As discussed in Chapter Two, rather than uniting Baghdadis in commonly-shared suffering, the rapid 
impoverishment of middle class families through hyperinflation and the contraction of government 
bureaucracies fueled heightened social tensions. The fault lines between the core neighbourhoods of 
Beladiyat and Mashtal and the underclass areas further beyond the Army Canal were thus broadened and 
deepened as the 1990s progressed, with socio-cultural distinctions rising in prominence as economic 
distinctions faded.  
21 The Christians of the area were found mostly within clusters that echoed traditional mahallah, yet many 




the city’s periphery dominated the terrain. The further reaches of modern-day Tisa Nissan were 
home to tens of thousands of mostly poor to working class families, a majority of whom were 
shi’a that traced their roots in the capital to the migrations of previous decades, and material 
conditions were, on the whole, deplorable.22 
 
The turmoil that followed the 2003 invasion brought waves of violent, destabilizing change that 
caused a sweeping demographic shift. Multiple, overlapping trends in violence (beginning with 
the persecution of former Ba’thists, followed by the growth of a booming kidnapping-for-ransom 
trade, and ultimately the rise of the Mehdi Army), carried the daily threat of violence into the 
heart of Tisa Nissan’s various neighbourhoods. The resulting insecurity, combined with the 
accelerated infrastructural collapse that followed the city government’s dissolution, generated an 
array of responses.23  
 
i. Demographic Change & the Advance of the Mehdi Army 
In established middle class and minority neighbourhoods in hayys like Beladiyat and Mashtal, 
residents attempted to close ranks and isolate themselves from the rising tide of violence. 
Nonetheless, rising instability and the precipitous decline in overall quality of life prompted 
population outflows. Those with the financial means and requisite connections to escape Iraq thus 
fled abroad in growing numbers, causing a gradual hollowing-out of the neighbourhoods they left 
behind. 
 
                                                
22 Absent reliable census figures, population estimates are given in rough terms. Nonetheless, Tisa Nissan 
was widely acknowledged to possess a shi’a majority at the time of the 2003 invasion, with a total 
population estimated by Coalition Forces to be in the vicinity of 1,500,000.  
23 The story of the Mehdi Army’s rise in Tisa Nissan, which is detailed in the chapters that follow, is drawn 
from conversations with long-time local residents and members of the Iraqi Security Forces held at various 
locations across the district between February and November 2008. Key sources included sunnis exiled 
from Mashtal, interviewed by the author on FOB Loyalty in April 2008; political and civil society leaders 
from Beladiyat, interviewed by A. Roosendaal on FOB Loyalty in April and May 2008; and ordinary 
residents of Amin, Kamaliyah, and Fedaliyah, interviewed in their homes and places of business by the 




The contraction and flight of middle class and minority groups was accompanied by population 
inflows, which saw Baghdad’s periphery encroach with growing force. Taking advantage of the 
collapse of law and order, families of poor shi’a moved out of nearby Sadr City into areas of 
Beladiyat and Obeidy, laying claim to open or abandoned real estate.24 Similarly, vacant terrain 
within Shawra wa Umm Jidr and Kamaliyah was claimed by new arrivals from Diyala Province, 
Sadr City, and other areas further afield, leading to a major boom in unlicensed and unregulated 
home construction. As the great majority of migrants to the area were shi’a of modest means, the 
hayys beyond the Army Canal thus saw their demographic profile tilt further toward the core 
constituency of the Sadrist movement, facilitating the Mehdi Army’s growth and expansion 
through the area. 
Figure 4.4 – Tisa Nissan, 2004 
25 
                                                
24 As detailed in Chapter Five, underclass shi’a “squatters” were joined by more affluent shi’a 
“prospectors”, who seized valuable land along the Army Canal in Beladiyat and erected sizable homes on 
what had formerly been vacant, government-owned land.  





Figure 4.5 – Areas of Post-Saddam Settlement in Tisa Nissan 
26 
Figure 4.6 – Hotspots of Sectarian Violence in Tisa Nissan 
27 
                                                




The transformation of Tisa Nissan broadened in scope and accelerated in speed with the 
escalation of sectarian violence. As the Mehdi Army spread outwards from Sadr City and 
expanded across eastern Baghdad from late-2004 onwards, the militia capitalized on the 
demographic strength of the shi’a underclass to make strong inroads into the district.28 In poorer 
areas with large shi’a contingents, the militia recruited local allies and thereby embedded itself at 
street-level. By 2005, the Mehdi Army had thus firmly established its position across much of 
Tisa Nissan beyond the Army Canal, where it went about eliminating resident sunnis, 
intimidating shi’a opponents within the area’s few middle class neighbourhoods, and furthering 
the district’s demographic realignment. 
 
In areas closer to the Army Canal, where the shi’a underclass’ demographic position was weaker, 
the Mehdi Army’s expansion met with heightened resistance from both sunni militants and 
resident middle class communities. Amin, for example, which was home to a strong working 
class sunni population, became a flashpoint of sectarian violence. The Mehdi Army thus engaged 
in a protracted, brutal struggle with sunni militants that persisted into 2007 (which, in keeping 
with the dynamics of the sectarian war, saw the two sides inflict devastating punishment upon 
local civilians). Areas of Beladiyat and Mashtal also offered resistance to the Mehdi Army’s 
advances, as their core neighbourhoods of middle class and minority families were broadly 
opposed to the Sadrist agenda. By capitalizing on the steadily weakening position of their local 
foes, however, as well as the encroachment of underclass shi’a families from Sadr City (a process 
in which the militia played an active role), the Mehdi Army was ultimately able to assert control 
over the two hayys as well. Sunni families were expelled en masse, minority groups were 
compelled to flee abroad or retreat into fortified enclaves, while the remnants of the local shi’a 
                                                                                                                                            
27 Google maps imagery from May 2004, adapted by the author. 
28 The particular mechanics of the Mehdi Army’s conquest of individual neighbourhoods are examined 




middle class continued, with limited success, to attempt to isolate themselves from the rising tide 
of violence. 
 
Small pockets of middle class shi’a and minority settlement thus endured beyond the Army Canal 
but, by the close of the sectarian war, the area had been broadly cleansed of its sunni population 
and reshaped as the domain of the shi’a underclass. The Sadrist movement was the political party 
of choice, while the Mehdi Army was the dominant street-level force. Tisa Nissan, previously a 
diverse, multi-religious area of Baghdad, now appeared relatively homogenous – and sat firmly 
under militia control.  
 
Instability persisted, however, as sweeping population transfers and associated violence had left 
much of the area in disarray. Not only had thousands of former residents been killed, forcibly 
displaced, or compelled to flee, but thousands of new shi’a families had arrived as well. In 
addition to the voluntary inflows of shi’a families from Sadr City, Diyala Province, and 
elsewhere, thousands more had been forcibly displaced from their homes in sunni-conquered 
areas of western Baghdad and thereafter sought refuge in Mehdi Army-held Tisa Nissan.29 The 
battered remnants of the district’s pre-2003 communities thus existed in and among a mixture of 
opportunistic migrants and forcibly displaced families, and the resulting chaos was manifested in 
the disastrous state of critical infrastructure. Electricity was only sporadically available (despite 
the presence of one of Baghdad’s largest power installations along the Diyala River in Amin), 
water and sewage systems had collapsed to the point that cholera became a serious concern, and 
the city government exercised a negligible influence over broad swathes of the district.30 
 
                                                
29 Many of the shi’a families who sought refuge in Tisa Nissan were of decidedly middle class background. 
With the city centre offering little open land, however, and with Tisa Nissan emerging as a “safe zone” 
under militia control, shi’a with limited sympathy for Sadrist causes moved into the area. 




ii. Tisa Nissan & the Surge 
At the start of the Surge in early 2007, the hayys of Tisa Nissan beyond the Army Canal 
presented a formidable challenge. The Mehdi Army’s local affiliates were the dominant street-
level force from one neighbourhood to the next, the militia maintained a strong network of 
operational nodes (to include particularly important facilities in the Sa’ba Nissan neighbourhood 
of Beladiyat and in the hayy of Fedaliyah), and local politicians were thought to be tied closely to 
the Sadrist movement and the Mehdi Army.31 Furthermore, in addition to facing an organized, 
armed opposition, Coalition Forces were confronted by a civilian population that ranged, for the 
most part, from passively sceptical to actively hostile. For, while the area’s remaining middle 
class and minority enclaves welcomed the expulsion of the militia and the restoration of law and 
order, the underclass shi’a majority was overwhelmingly Sadrist in its sympathies.  
 
As such, while much of Baghdad experienced a remarkable turnaround during 2007, with levels 
of violence plummeting and a sense of normalcy beginning to return the city’s streets, Tisa 
Nissan stagnated.32 In central areas of Beladiyat and Mashtal, where key elements of the populace 
cautiously welcomed the American-led offensive, the militia was dislodged and momentum was 
generated toward the restoration of order. Nearer to the city’s periphery, however, in areas 
populated by underclass shi’a and dominated by the Mehdi Army, the Surge’s first year met with 
sustained resistance. American and Iraqi units succeeded in pushing the militia’s rank and file off 
                                                
31 This assessment of Tisa Nissan in the context of the Surge is drawn from the introductory briefings 
provided to the author and his HTT colleagues in February 2008 by American military personnel from the 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) led by the 4th Brigade of the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division, which 
oversaw the district at that time. Practical aspects of these briefings, and of the district-wide survey 
conducted immediately thereafter by the HTT, are presented in Appendix A. The District Council of Tisa 
Nissan had a citywide reputation for corruption and inefficiency, to the point that, as discussed in Chapter 
Six, American commanders largely disengaged from the district’s official leadership during the second half 
of 2008. This decision was particularly remarkable in light of Coalition Forces’ broader emphasis on 
“mentoring” and “partnering” to build up the Iraqi government in preparation for the Surge’s conclusion – 
but was widely agreed by commanders on the ground to be wholly appropriate in light of local conditions. 
32 For an account of American operations in Tisa Nissan during 2007, see: Finkel, The Good Soldiers. The 
work chronicles the fifteen-month deployment of 2-16 infantry battalion to the eastern half of Tisa Nissan 




the streets and onto the defensive in many neighbourhoods, yet the terrain remained fiercely 
contested. Indeed, as the Surge’s second year began, the Mehdi Army still appeared well 
entrenched beyond the Army Canal, the civilian populace remained distant from American forces, 
and efforts toward the improvement of governance and economic activity had met with minimal 
results – giving the hayys beyond the canal a citywide reputation for intractability and lethal 
dysfunction. The district’s troubles were understood by American forces to come from the 
confluence of numerous factors, including:  
Security Development Governance 
 
- The organized efforts of Mehdi 
Army fighters to resist the 
advances of the Surge 
 
- The attacks of Special Group cells 
on American and Iraqi units 
 
- The localized, neighbourhood-
level influence of strongmen and 
gang-style networks affiliated with 
the Mehdi Army 
 
- Negative attitudes toward 
Coalition Forces among local 
civilians, complicating efforts to 




- The decrepit state of critical 
infrastructure 
 
- “Brain drain”, and the flight of the 
educated middle class 
 
- The threat of violence against 
those engaged in Coalition-
sponsored development initiatives 
 
- A strong legacy of government 
control over economic activity, 
and resulting systemic paralysis 
following the government’s 
collapse in 200333  
 
- The Sadrist sympathies of 
prominent local politicians, and 
their opposition to the political 
objectives of the Surge 
 
- Widespread practice of localism 
and patronage among elected 
leaders, and an absence of 
district-wide cooperation toward 
a “common good” 
 
- The Baghdad municipality’s lack 
of administrative capacity in the 
district, and its low prioritization 
of Tisa Nissan 
 
Three distinct yet interconnected groups were held responsible for the majority of violence 
against American and Iraqi forces. The first was the Mehdi Army, which continued, despite 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s August 2007 ceasefire, to launch sporadic attacks against American and Iraqi 
units in Tisa Nissan.34 The militia’s leadership was detailed in link-analysis charts, and 
                                                
33 American personnel met with sustained frustration in efforts to stimulate economic growth, and a 
perceived lack of initiative on the part of ordinary Baghdadis attracted significant comment by American 
personnel. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, p.154 offers a representative opinion, lamenting Iraq as “the 
ultimate entitlement-driven society”, and observing that efforts to wean Iraqis off of government handouts 
“was like forcing them to kick a drug habit”. Packer, Assassins’ Gate, p.144 offers further anecdotes. 
Steven Metz, in the Foreword to Munson, Iraq in Transition, px, similarly notes the “pervasive lack of 
initiative” encountered by American forces in Iraq. Munson, Iraq in Transition, p.2, introduces his work by 
describing the Iraqi people as having been “atomized and cowed into inaction”. 
34 Finkel, The Good Soldiers, p.139 reinforces the observations shared by BCT staff in February 2008, 




understood by intelligence officers to be an organized and regimented hierarchy with a relatively 
coherent chain of command that connected key figures in the district (some of whom were 
identified as long-time residents, others imports from Sadr City or the South) to senior leadership 
elsewhere. A mixed strategy was being pursued to manage this group, ranging from efforts to 
capture or kill prominent militants to overtures to those deemed potentially reconcilable. 
Simultaneously, attempts were being made to undermine popular support for the Mehdi Army by 
demonstrating the ability of Coalition Forces (and, by extension, the Iraqi government) to meet 
the day-to-day needs of the populace. Programmes to spur economic development, reestablish the 
rule of law, revive civil society, and build the capacity of District- and Neighbourhood-level 
institutions of governance were thus part of a broader, non-violent offensive to subvert the 
militia’s position. 
 
The second major threat came from small cells of shi’a militants who were armed, trained, and 
funded by the Iranian government. These groups were thought to operate independently of the 
Mehdi Army’s leadership structure, yet their members were commonly known to have either past 
affiliations with, or continuing ties to, the militia. They were understood not to have substantive 
local connections in the neighbourhoods of Tisa Nissan, however, but rather to operate locally as 
a result of several favourable aspects of the terrain.35 Referred to collectively as “the Special 
Groups”, their ability to execute mortar and rocket attacks on American bases, and to strike 
American and Iraqi convoys with Explosively Formed Projectiles (a type of roadside bomb that 
                                                
35 Because of the manner in which American units were dispersed throughout Baghdad (and their limited 
presence in Sadr City in particular), Tisa Nissan was an attractive targeting environment for shi’a militants. 
Benefiting from a network of local facilitators within the district’s neighbourhoods (which provided both 
safe houses and low-level operatives), convenient access to Sadr City, and ingress/egress routes to the north 
and east (most importantly, to Iran), Tisa Nissan was an ideal venue for militants to launch IED, rocket, and 
mortar attacks against American forces. Mid-ranking officers of the 4-1 Iraqi National Police Brigade 
(interviewed by the author at the INP headquarters co-located at the District Council facility in September 
2008) reinforced this understanding of violence in Tisa Nissan, alleging that much of the violence levied 
against the Surge came from shi’a militants foreign to the area, who had been trained in Iran or in southern 
Iraq before coming to the district (where they would be given an area familiarization and basic logistical 




utilized shaped-charge technology to penetrate armour plating) made them the most lethal threat 
in Tisa Nissan.36 The threat to American and Iraqi units posed by the Special Groups was 
addressed militarily, through the efforts of locally stationed American units that patrolled the 
district on a daily basis, and by independent Special Operations Forces that were specifically 
dedicated to their pursuit.37  
 
The third source of violence came from armed groups of varying types that were local to the 
neighbourhoods of Tisa Nissan. From the tribes of Fedaliyah, to the mafia-style criminal 
networks of Kamaliyah, to the gangs of young men in their teens and twenties found on the 
streets of Amin, locally-rooted groups with motivations having little to do with national-level 
politics were instrumental in shaping conditions.38 Many of these groups maintained both affinity 
for the ideals of the Sadrist movement and operational affiliation with the Mehdi Army, however, 
which complicated efforts to disaggregate “political” violence from “local” violence. American 
and Iraqi forces were pursuing a mixed strategy to manage these groups similar to that deployed 
against the Mehdi Army’s cadre, combining the targeting of notorious militants with attempts to 
induce those deemed potentially reconcilable to mitigate their disruptive actions.  
 
                                                
36 Explosively Formed Projectiles, or “EFPs”, were introduced to Iraqi shi’a militants by the Iranian 
military. They utilize technology similar to that of rocket propelled grenades, whereby projectiles of molten 
copper are fired directionally through their armoured targets. Weapons caches discovered by American and 
Iraqi forces from early 2005 onwards found large numbers of EFPs with Iranian markings, though cruder 
versions were also fabricated within Iraq.  Discussed in Cochrane, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist 
Movement”, pp.19-20.  
37 Separate from the Brigade Combat Teams that were charged with the management of day-to-day 
counterinsurgency operations in particular areas of Baghdad, Special Operations Forces were organized 
into Task Forces dedicated to the pursuit of particular high value targets (the leadership of Iraqi al-Qaeda, 
for example, or that of Special Group networks such as Asaib ahl al-Haq). Ollivant, “Countering the New 
Orthodoxy”, p.6 notes the divergence between so-called “landowning” BCTs and the Special Operations 
units that were exclusively dedicated to targeting militants. 
38 See Haussler, “Third Generation Gangs”; and Max Manwaring, “Street Gangs: The New Urban 
Insurgency”, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2005, on commonalities between urban insurgency and the 




While important progress had been made on each of these fronts during the course of the Surge’s 
first year, Tisa Nissan remained unstable and deeply frustrating to American personnel. The 
Mehdi Army had been forced to cede its claims to core areas of Beladiyat and Mashtal, and it was 
no longer able to operate with the impunity it had previously enjoyed across the area further 
toward the city’s periphery, yet Coalition Forces were struggling to build on their initial 
advances. Relations with the district’s elected leadership, for example, were deeply troubled. 
American commanders regarded prominent political leaders with skepticism and suspicion 
(sentiments that were returned in kind), as their corruption, Sadrist sympathies, and suspected 
militia ties engendered widespread pessimism over the utility of political engagement.39  
 
Attempts to engage civil society and rally popular support from the district’s residents, on the 
other hand, had achieved only the most modest of results. Encouragingly, it was evident that Tisa 
Nissan’s resident population was not coherently united behind the militia, and that the district, as 
a whole, was not an “insurgent stronghold”. Indeed, it was broadly understood among locally 
stationed American and Iraqi personnel that the militia’s past abuses had generated significant 
popular displeasure, and that the restoration of order and economic development were widely 
desired.40 Nonetheless, efforts to capitalize upon popular discontent languished, and American 
personnel made frequent, exasperated reference to what they saw as a crippling lack of initiative 
and an absence of public trust. 
 
                                                
39 The fact, for example, that the District Council representative who headed the security committee for 
Tisa Nissan made much of his being an uncle to Muqtada al-Sadr was indicative of the general atmosphere 
in official circles. Enmity toward Tisa Nissan’s political establishment was by no means limited to 
American personnel, as fieldwork would highlight widespread dissatisfaction among Iraqi sources 
(including politicians themselves, members of the security forces, and ordinary civilians alike).  
40 Interviews conducted by the author and R. Kent during February and March 2008 with the junior officers 
and enlisted personnel who undertook the vast bulk of day-to-day operations in Tisa Nissan, some of whom 
had over a year of experience in the district, found remarkably nuanced views of the local civilian 
population. Interviews were conducted on Forward Operating Bases Loyalty and Rustamiyah, and at the 
various patrol bases that had been established throughout the hayys of Tisa Nissan. Details of the interview 




vii. March Madness – Challenges & Opportunities 
As discussed in the Introduction, the final days of March 2008 witnessed an explosion of violence 
in areas of eastern Baghdad beyond the Army Canal. Not only were rockets launched across the 
Tigris River toward the Green Zone, but the two Forward Operating Bases in Tisa Nissan and the 
network of smaller patrol bases that had been established throughout the district came under 
heavy fire as well.41  
 
As violence subsided, however, conditions in Tisa Nissan changed dramatically yet again. First, 
the fighting forced local political leaders and members of the Iraqi Security Forces to display 
their loyalties.42 The early successes of shi’a militants, including the televised surrender of Iraqi 
Security Forces in Sadr City, the overrunning and abandonment of checkpoints across Tisa 
Nissan, and the kidnapping of the chief Iraqi spokesman for security efforts in Baghdad, 
encouraged many to betray their pro-militia sympathies. In the aftermath of the revolt’s collapse, 
therefore, American personnel had a clarified understanding of the district’s leadership. 
Furthermore, the Iraqi Security Forces were purged of militia loyalists, and the Iraqi National 
Police, in particular, emerged as a far more effective and reliable force.  
 
Second, the successful offensive launched by American and Iraqi forces prompted the flight of 
prominent militants. The subsequent absence of these individuals badly degraded the offensive 
                                                
41 See Finkel, The Good Soldiers, Chapter 12 for an account of March Madness in the eastern half of Tisa 
Nissan.  
42 This was noted with significant satisfaction by senior leaders in 2-16 infantry battalion, who anticipated 
that the spasm of violence (which occurred during the final days of their deployment) would have a 
valuable clarifying effect. Discussions with battalion command elements, FOB Rustamiyah, March 2008. 
Finkel, The Good Soldiers, p.248, notes rampant defections by members of the Iraqi National Police 
battalion responsible for eastern Tisa Nissan during March Madness, while associated aspects of the 
revolt’s aftermath vis-à-vis the purge of Iraqi Security Forces are noted in Michael Gisik, “Troops Arrest 
Eight Iraqi Police Officers”, Stars and Stripes, May 17, 2008. Discussion of “corruption” and “disloyalty” 
within the ranks of the Iraqi National Police must be qualified by an understanding of the threats levied 
against its members, however. As the 4-1 National Police Brigade drew many of its personnel from shi’a 
areas of Baghdad, militants met with considerable success in intimidating or coercing policemen to desert 
during March Madness (an occurrence that reached high into the INP’s hierarchy, as a Battalion 




capabilities of the shi’a insurgency. Sporadic and occasionally intense violence would continue 
through the course of 2008, associated most prominently with ongoing operations in nearby Sadr 
City and the counteroffensives of Special Group cells such as the Hizballah Brigades and Asaib 
Ahl al-Haqq. Yet overall levels of violence fell significantly.  
 
Third, the aftermath of the Mehdi Army’s failed offensive witnessed a recalculation of interests 
by influential actors in Tisa Nissan. The declining fortunes of the Mehdi Army and the rising 
profile of the Iraqi government during the spring and summer of 2008 prompted individuals and 
groups that had previously aligned themselves with the militia to change course, making areas 
that had previously been extremely hostile far less so – in some cases, seemingly overnight.  
 
Lastly, beyond changes within the district itself, the operational posture of locally stationed 
American forces shifted in important ways. In an effort to capitalize on the Mehdi Army’s 
collapsing position, the spring and summer of 2008 saw major district-wide initiatives to 
confiscate weapons, restore the presence of the Iraqi government, and reestablish law and order 
that brought American personnel and their Iraqi counterparts into daily contact with local 
residents. This was part of a coordinated national campaign against the Mehdi Army and 
associated shi’a militants that involved methodical pushes into the Sadrist movement’s last 
remaining sanctuaries, and it granted near-daily access to the neighbourhoods of Tisa Nissan and 
previously unavailable chances to speak with its residents in an increasingly peaceful 
environment. As such, the remainder of the spring and summer of 2008 offered unprecedented 
opportunities to examine the hayys of one of Baghdad’s most troubled areas at ground level, 
enabling investigation of the localized issues beneath the Mehdi Army’s changing fortunes in the 






iv. Area Study: Structural Overview 
Each of the following three chapters examines a pair of hayys from Tisa Nissan beyond the Army 
Canal. The chapters begin with observations on conditions within the hayys and how they were 
perceived by American forces on the eve of March Madness, along with commentary on the key 
local issues at that time. Discussion follows of the changes that occurred in each hayy as a result 
of March Madness, with an emphasis on how these changes generated insights into the dynamics 
of the militia’s campaign. The core of each chapter then traces the overall trajectory of the Mehdi 
Army’s rise and fall, detailing the localized social forces that shaped its successes and failures.  
Chapter 5  
 
Beladiyat & Mashtal – Communities Under Siege 
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i. Beladiyat & Mashtal: A Year into the Surge 
Figure 5.1 – Hayy Boundaries of Beladiyat & Mashtal 
1 
In the early months of 2008, core areas of Beladiyat and Mashtal were in the midst of a fragile yet 
marked trend toward improved levels of security and stability.2 Central neighbourhoods of both 
appeared to have moved beyond the worst of the violence of previous years and were viewed, by 
Americans and Iraqis alike, as the areas in Tisa Nissan beyond the Army Canal where the Surge 
had yielded its greatest gains: the local institutions of the Iraqi government were functioning with 
relative coherence in comparison to neighbouring hayys to the north and east, attacks against 
                                                
1 Google maps imagery from May 2004, adapted by the author. 
2 An initial assessment of Beladiyat was carried out during early March by the author and A. Roosendaal in 
conjunction with American military personnel from 2-30 infantry battalion. A similar survey of Mashtal 
was conducted in mid-March by the author and R. Kent in conjunction with American military personnel 
from 2-16 infantry battalion.   
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Americans and their counterparts in the Iraqi Security Forces were less common than elsewhere 
beyond the canal, the Mehdi Army had been driven from the streets, and core segments of the 
resident population appeared cautiously supportive of, and encouraged by, the progress that had 
been made. Thus, while Beladiyat and Mashtal continued to face an array of problems and the 
margins of both hayys remained dangerous, they stood out as success stories, in an area of 
Baghdad where success had proven difficult to achieve.3 
 
Aspects of the hayys’ histories, and of local demographics, had been instrumental in the progress 
made by American and Iraqi forces. The main neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and Mashtal had 
been established as the domain of Baghdad’s middle class, housing educated professionals of 
both Muslim sects, a sizable Christian minority, and also Baghdad’s largest concentration of 
Palestinians. As such, the Mehdi Army had found limited local support, and its advance across 
the hayys had proceeded largely by forcible conquest that featured the methodical eradication of 
its opponents and sweeping population inflows into Beladiyat in particular.   
 
As such, while the militia claimed the entirety of both hayys within its sphere of influence at the 
start of the Surge, pockets of localized opposition had remained. When American and Iraqi forces 
pushed into Beladiyat and Mashtal, offering to reestablish the rule of law, elements of the 
populace provided support. The militia, facing the redoubled efforts of American and Iraqi forces, 
and unable to call upon the support of the two hayys’ core communities, had been driven back to 
the margins of Beladiyat and Mashtal. Their main neighbourhoods, which had been among the 
last areas of southeastern Baghdad seized by the militia, were thus among the first that it lost 
during 2007. 
                                                
3 By early 2008, core areas of the two hayys shared more in common vis-à-vis security and stability with 
middle class areas below the Army Canal such as Muthana and those of the Rusafa political district than 
the other neighbourhoods beyond the Army Canal. While problem areas remained within the hayys, 
particularly in western areas of Beladiyat adjacent to Sadr City, the core neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and 
Mashtal were cited by American commanders as bright spots within an otherwise deeply troubled district. 
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Nonetheless, although significant progress had been achieved during the Surge’s initial year and a 
sense of calm was returning to the hayys’ main neighbourhoods, it was apparent that Mashtal and 
Beladiyat had been deeply affected by the turbulence and bloodshed of the post-Saddam era. The 
killing or expulsion of those with ties to the fallen regime, the sectarian cleansing of the vast 
majority of both hayys’ sunni Iraqi populations, the persecution of Christian and Palestinian 
minorities, the influx of thousands of new shi’a residents (the majority of whom were of the 
much-maligned underclass), and the violent rise of the Mehdi Army had combined to transform 
the terrain. The neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and Mashtal, which had been created with a view to 
forging a cosmopolitan, forward-looking Iraqi identity, had been Balkanized along lines of faith 
and class. Furthermore, the physical integrity of both hayys had also been badly degraded, as 
violence, administrative collapse, and a surge of unregulated construction had pushed already-
brittle water, electricity, and sewerage systems beyond the breaking point.  
 
The core neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and Mashtal, which had struggled for decades to maintain 
their middle class identities, had been broken apart and overrun to the point that, even after the 
threat of the Mehdi Army appeared to have been checked, their recovery remained uncertain. The 
initial year of the Surge saw a major reduction in violence and encouraging progress toward the 
revitalization of governance and economic activity, but an array of localized tensions persisted – 
the most notable of which was between the remnants of pre-invasion middle class and minority 
communities and the underclass shi’a families that had moved into the area.4 With the former 
viewing the latter as having been intimately complicit in the violence, instability, and 
infrastructural collapse that had devastated the area, and further hoping to reverse the area’s 
                                                
4 The fragility of the progress achieved by early 2008 was a central point of emphasis among American 
military personnel at the Company level, who had extensive first-hand experience in the hayys. The 
comparative nature of the “successes” gained in both hayys thus requires emphasis, as does the fact that 
senior personnel on BCT staff (who took a broader, comparative view of Tisa Nissan in its entirety, and of 
eastern Baghdad as a whole) were generally more enthusiastic regarding conditions in Beladiyat and 
Mashtal.  
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demographic drift into eastern Baghdad’s underclass shi’a periphery, class-based tensions 
simmered.5 Although the militia had lost significant ground in the two hayys, class rivalry – 
which had deep roots in the city’s history and was enshrined at the heart of Sadrist ideology – 
threatened not only to hinder the consolidation of progress, but also, potentially, to enable the 
militia to revive its campaign in the future.  
 
ii. Key Issues in Beladiyat & Mashtal 
The post-Saddam era had brought a series of sweeping, transformative changes to the two hayys, 
the most influential and controversial of which had been the influx of hawasim and the violent 
rise of the Mehdi Army. Yet, while it was an article of faith among the hayys’ middle class and 
minority communities that the encroachment of the hawasim and the rise of the militia had 
progressed hand-in-hand, the precise nature of the relationship between the Mehdi Army and the 
hayys’ new arrivals remained unclear.6 
 
To what extent had Beladiyat and Mashtal been venues of popular class warfare? Had the hayys’ 
demographic transformation been orchestrated as part of a deliberate campaign of urban 
conquest, in which the Mehdi Army had mobilized the Sadrist underclass to envelop the most 
prominent outposts of middle class development beyond the Army Canal? Alternatively, had 
population flows progressed spontaneously into the two hayys, whereupon the new settlements of 
Sadrist shi’a had served as a fifth column of sorts, facilitating the militia’s inward incursion? 
                                                
5 As noted below, members of the hayys’ middle class and minority communities were adamant in their 
accounts of the interconnectedness between the rise of the Mehdi Army and the encroachment of the 
hawasim, and prominent local leaders were intent on rolling back the advances of the hawasim after the 
militia’s expulsion.  
6 A critical indicator that cast doubt on the militia having led a mass-based invasion of Beladiyat or Mashtal 
was the relative weakness of the Mehdi Army’s anti-Coalition insurgent campaign in the two hayys. Areas 
of new settlement that were home to large numbers of Sadrist shi’a were more dangerous to American and 
Iraqi forces than the hayys’ core neighbourhoods but, as discussed in greater detail below, there was little 
evidence of a coherent civil-military campaign by the Mehdi Army in either hayy. On the contrary, while 
certain specific areas were notably lethal, Beladiyat and Mashtal were, on the whole, palpably less hostile 
than militia-dominated areas further beyond the Army Canal.  
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Either way, with an eye to the future, might the continued presence of class tensions enable the 
Mehdi Army to revive its position in Beladiyat and Mashtal? 
 
iii. March Madness in Beladiyat & Mashtal 
March Madness witnessed a fleeting surge of violence in Beladiyat and Mashtal. Both hayys were 
home to hotspots of activity, as western areas of Beladiyat were used as launch sites for rocket 
attacks on the Green Zone and as hideouts for militants, while eastern Mashtal witnessed violence 
spill northwards from nearby Amin. Nonetheless, patterns of violence tracked well with 
American forces’ understanding of the two hayys and the position of shi’a militants therein. As 
such, following the restoration of local order after the revolt’s collapse, the attentions of both 
counterinsurgent forces, as well as those of the hayys’ resident populations, reverted back to the 
localized, inter-communal concerns discussed above. 
 
The momentum generated by American and Iraqi forces brought important changes to Beladiyat 
and Mashtal, however. American units consolidated their gains by engaging local leadership and 
establishing a strong street-level presence, and both Iraqi Security Forces and the local elements 
of the Iraqi government emerged from the clashes with rejuvenated vigour. Improved security and 
renewed economic activity facilitated interaction between American personnel and local 
residents, and the diminished threat of retributive violence by militants also made such 
interactions increasingly safe. Opportunities for Americans to interact with local leaders and 
ordinary residents proliferated, leading to an array of insights into local conditions.7  
                                                
7 Fieldwork in Beladiyat was led by A. Roosendaal in conjunction with personnel from 2-30 Infantry 
battalion and with the support of J. Hubbard between April and July 2008. Fieldwork in Mashtal was led by 
the author in conjunction with personnel from 1-66 armor battalion with the support of A. Roosendaal and 
J. Makeur, initially during April and again between August and October 2008. The primary means by 
which Beladiyat and Mashtal were investigated was through sit-down meetings held under controlled 
conditions, called “Key Leader Engagements” in the parlance of the American military. With a contingent 
of local communal leaders and elected officials meeting regularly with American personnel, HTT personnel 
were able to speak repeatedly with prominent individuals and cultivate personal relationships. Sources 
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I. The Subsoil of Conflict in Beladiyat & Mashtal 
The social tensions that underpinned conflict in Beladiyat and Mashtal during the post-Saddam 
era had deep historical roots. Waves of migration had been crashing upon eastern Baghdad since 
the 1940s, causing an array of social, economic, and cultural stresses. Despite ambitious urban 
development initiatives, however, and enormous state expenditures on an array of welfare 
services and subsidies, the capital’s eastern periphery had been overwhelmed. The Army Canal 
had thus come to replace the bund as a dividing line between centre and periphery on the urban 
landscape, and an array of class-based grievances emerged that recalled the social frictions of the 
1940s and 1950s.  
 
This social divide pitted the city’s self-consciously cosmopolitan core against its underclass shi’a 
margins, as the denizens of middle class neighbourhoods like those in Beladiyat and Mashtal 
looked on apprehensively at the “growing and rather menacing hordes” of urban poor on their 
borders.8 While these tensions were notably lopsided at the outset, with the umbrage of the 
middle classes outweighing that of their poorer counterparts (who, as noted earlier, found the 
conditions on Baghdad’s margins to be far better than life in the villages and towns they had 
                                                                                                                                            
engaged in these meetings included elected representatives from the Neighbourhood Council system, self-
identified local “tribal” leaders, officers from the Iraqi Security Forces, as well as sunni politicians and civil 
society leaders who had been forcibly exiled from the two hayys. Interviews and informal discussions were 
conducted at local government facilities, at patrol bases jointly manned by Iraqi and American personnel, 
and at FOBs Loyalty and Rustamiyah, covering topics such as the historical development of the two hayys, 
personal narratives on life during the Saddam era, perspectives on the violence that had affected the area 
since 2003, and the dynamics of relations among the hayys’ various communities. To balance the 
perspectives of the local elite with the views of ordinary residents, and also to engage segments of the 
population that were under- or unrepresented in venues where American personnel conducted sit-down 
business, interviews were supplemented with fieldwork in the neighbourhoods of both hayys. HTT 
personnel accompanied joint American-Iraqi operations that were conducted throughout Beladiyat and 
Mashtal, and through conversations with residents in their homes, on the streets, and in places of business 
(and also through interactions with Iraqi Security Force personnel), elicited new perspectives and examined 
the hayys first-hand. By combining the top-down perspectives of local leaders with the bottom-up views 
collected during street-level interactions and observations – which were further supplemented by the 
insights and opinions of interviewees from other areas of Tisa Nissan – a comprehensive picture of the 
hayys was developed. 
8 Phrase quoted from Warriner, Land Reform and Development, pp.172-173. 
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fled), this dynamic shifted in time.9 With broad segments of Baghdad’s periphery becoming 
underclass slums, and with socio-cultural prejudices against the shurughis persisting through the 
latter decades of the twentieth century, a reciprocal enmity coalesced among Baghdad’s shi’a 
poor that was ultimately enshrined at the heart of the Sadrist ideology. 
 
i. The Foundation of Beladiyat and Mashtal 
The position of Beladiyat and Mashtal on the dividing line between Baghdad’s middle class core 
and its impoverished periphery, and the hayys’ status as focal points for associated class-based 
tensions, have been discussed in broad terms. However, an understanding of the dynamics, and 
the effects, of the Mehdi Army’s campaign requires a more detailed picture of the hayys. 
 
The modern-day administrative hayys of Beladiyat and Mashtal are named after the central 
neighbourhoods located within each, which are referred to hereafter as Beladiyat Proper and 
Central Mashtal.10 As discussed above, urban planners delineated both during the 1960s, when 
southeastern Baghdad’s expansion was directed along professional and class-based lines. Central 
Mashtal was founded as a quasi-suburban settlement for middle class families, some of whom 
had their roots in the Bab Sheikh area of modern-day Rusafa, and it developed through the 1960s 
                                                
9 Phillips, “Rural-to-Urban Migration”, p.421 observed of Baghdad at the middle of the twentieth century 
that the resentment was notably stronger within middle class communities adjacent to areas of sarifa 
settlement – as established residents were more aggrieved about the effects of migration on their quality of 
life than the migrants were with the squalor of their condition.  
10 Local residents would not recognize these terms, as the names “Beladiyat” and “Mashtal” are used to 
refer both to the hayys in their entirety and also to the main neighbourhoods from which they take their 
names. The modifiers added here, like that used to distinguish Central Kamaliyah from its surrounding 
‘satellite’ neighbourhoods in Chapter Six, have been employed for the purpose of clarity. An alternative 
would have been to use the numerical designations for each of the district’s administrative mahallahs 
(mahallah is the lowest unit of urban administrative organization, falling beneath the hayy, as political 
districts are divided into hayys, which are in turn divided into numbered mahallahs), but this added 
unhelpful complexity to the text. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a resident of the neighbourhood 
referred to herein as “Beladiyat Proper” would self-identify either as living simply in Beladiyat, or as a 
resident of “mahallah 738” or “mahallah 730”.  
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as a mixed-sect neighbourhood with a sizable sunni constituency.11 Beladiyat Proper, on the other 
hand, was first set aside for workers in the Baghdad municipality, growing steadily through the 
1960s and into the 1970s as groups of employees from various government ministries were 
settled there along with their families.12 The two- to three-storey homes of these principally 
residential neighbourhoods were of a high standard and local infrastructure was of good quality – 
particularly compared to contemporary efforts in Amin, Obeidy, and Kamaliyah – and they bore a 
closer resemblance to neighbourhoods below the Army Canal than to those further out toward the 
city’s margins. 
Figure 5.2 – The Neighbourhoods of Beladiyat & Mashtal 
13 
                                                
11 Information of the founding and development of Mashtal (in Arabic, “greenhouse”) was drawn primarily 
from sit-down interviews on FOB Loyalty in April 2008 with exiled sunnis, and from recurring discussions 
with the hayy’s elected representatives through the course of the spring and summer.  
12 The history of Beladiyat (in Arabic, “municipal administration”) was drawn from sit-down interviews 
with elected leaders and civil society figures from Beladiyat Proper, also conducted on FOB Loyalty during 
April 2008. Employees of the ministries of the Exterior, Commerce, and Finance were recalled to have 
comprised sizable local constituencies.  
13 Google maps imagery from May 2004, adapted by the author. 
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The open land in Central Mashtal and Beladiyat Proper’s immediate vicinity was likewise 
developed in the image of urban planners’ modernized, cosmopolitan reinterpretation of the 
mahallah. Mu’allimiin was founded in the mid-1960s for teachers and their families, while Old 
Habibiyyah grew along the border of Revolution City as a home for educated, middle class 
professionals of mixed sectarian backgrounds. The perceived success of these new 
neighbourhoods attracted increasing numbers of new residents (including a large Christian 
community that both integrated into the area’s main neighbourhoods and also secured its own 
dedicated enclave, called Tujar, near the intersection of the Army Canal and Highway 5). Central 
Mashtal, Mu’allemiin, Beladiyat Proper, and Old Habibiyyah each solidified their respective 
identities as part of central Baghdad’s eastward expansion.  
 
The oil boom of the 1970s brought further development, with infrastructural improvements to 
existing neighbourhoods, the expansion of their residential grids, and the creation of entirely new 
neighbourhoods as well. Sa’ba Nissan was founded to the west of Beladiyat Proper as an enclave 
for working class Ba’th Party functionaries, for example, while to Beladiyat Proper’s southeast 
(adjacent to the regime’s general security complex that would later be the site of FOB Loyalty) an 
apartment complex was erected into which many of Baghdad’s resident Palestinian refugees were 
relocated.14 Remaining open terrain was used by the government: the Imam air defence 
installation was built to the immediate north of Beladiyat Proper, facilities were established for 
the security services to the north of Mu’allemiin, and a racetrack was built off Beladiyat Proper’s 
southwestern edge for the personal use of Saddam Hussein’s family.15   
 
 
                                                
14 As discussed in further detail below, Palestinian refugees resident in Iraq were kept as wards of the state, 
and were not free to choose where they lived.  
15 Naming the air defence installation “al-Imam” appears to have been a further example of the regime’s 
attempt to pander to its shi’a subjects by utilizing religious nomenclature and imagery for the implements 
of war. 
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ii. The Fault Line between Centre & Periphery 
The explosive growth experienced in and around Beladiyat and Mashtal did not progress as 
envisaged by urban planners. Poor shi’a families continued to migrate to Baghdad in growing 
numbers through the 1960s and 1970s, and broad areas of eastern Baghdad were overwhelmed by 
the influx of impoverished migrant families. The residents of Central Mashtal, Beladiyat Proper, 
and Mu’allemiin thus gradually came to realize that, instead of being the advance guard of the 
city centre’s eastward expansion via orderly, state-supported middle class growth, they were now 
bound within an area of the capital that was, for all intents and purposes, being ceded by the 
government to the city’s booming shi’a underclass.  
 
However, accustomed to a middle class existence, the residents of Beladiyat and Mashtal dug in 
to defend their position in the city. A siege mentality took root, and when essential services began 
to contract and water, sewerage, and electricity infrastructure fell into decay from the mid-1980s 
onwards, local tensions developed. Traditional social prejudices intermingled with practical 
grievances about the area’s material decline, hardening the divide between eastern Baghdad’s 
outposts of middle class development and the city’s ever-growing peripheral slums.16 
 
The hardships of the sanctions era intensified both urban decay and social tensions. Local schools 
and medical facilities atrophied, the salaried middle class saw the value of its savings and the 
purchasing power of its salaries plummet, and the hayys’ claims to middle class status grew 
increasingly dubious. However, while sanctions may have reduced the economic distance 
                                                
16 Interestingly, the dividing line between Beladiyat and Mashtal and the poorer areas of southeastern 
Baghdad beyond the Army Canal was by no means rigid. On the contrary, the two hayys stood as 
accessible rungs of upward socio-economic mobility to those who achieved economic success upon 
migration to Baghdad – whereas the tonier neighbourhoods on the inner side of the Army Canal remained 
largely inaccessible. There thus appears to have been an element of insecurity to local social tensions, as 
those who had “made it” fought to preserve their gains. 
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between the underclass and the middle class, the socio-cultural divide between the shurughis and 
their “betters” in Iraqi society was broadened and deepened.17  
 
The White Lion was thus able to draw upon the accumulated frustrations and resentments of the 
shi’a underclass as it gained strength in the margins beyond Beladiyat and Mashtal. Sadr not only 
celebrated the virtue and authenticity of the shurughis, but also foretold their impending ascent to 
power and vengeance. To the downtrodden shi’a poor that rallied to his cause, the White Lion 
was thus an empowering figure who provided inspiration during a decade of extraordinary 
hardship. Among the objects of his ire, however, (most notably the shi’a devotees of Ali al-
Sistani, who were found in abundance in Beladiyat and Mashtal), the rise of the Sadrist 
movement was met with great concern. Wary of the demographic weight of the underclass, 
contemptuous of its socio-cultural norms, and fearful of its inward encroachment, the battle lines 
between Baghdad’s shi’a underclass and the city’s middle class core were drawn ever-more 
sharply, with Beladiyat and Mashtal on the front-line.  
 
II. The Contest for Beladiyat & Mashtal 
By the time of the 2003 invasion, the neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and Mashtal had been battered 
and degraded by an array of social and economic stresses, yet their foundational identities as the 
domain of the middle class remained largely intact.18 The destruction of the Ba’th regime, 
                                                
17 It remained unclear to what extent the sanctions-era nouveau riche penetrated Beladiyat and Mashtal. As 
noted by Munson, Iraq in Transition, p.40, distortions to the Iraqi economy (featuring, among other 
phenomena, the collapse of the educated middle class and the rise of regime-connected racketeers) 
prompted physical movement among neighbourhoods in Baghdad. The neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and 
Mashtal, among the more geographically and culturally accessible of Baghdad’s middle class enclaves to 
rising shi’a families, would appear to have been likely venues for such controversial population shifts, 
where “rags-to-riches Iraqis were seen as profiteers and criminals by the middle-class professionals whose 
neighbourhoods they had taken over”.  
18 It was unclear whether Old Habibiyyah survived the 1990s with its identity intact. Fieldwork 
opportunities in the neighbourhood were limited due to access constraints, and key insights were instead 
gathered during interviews conducted at Checkpoint 17 – a traffic control station run by the Iraqi National 
Police along Highway 5 immediately south of the outer canal. Several current and former residents of the 
neighbourhood spoke adamantly about Old Habibiyyah’s middle class roots, claiming that they and their 
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however, and the collapse of law and order that ensued throughout Baghdad, unleashed forces 
that would prove considerably more damaging than those of previous years. Beginning with the 
chaos that wracked Baghdad during the initial invasion, and continuing with the rise of 
kidnapping networks and criminal gangs during the months that followed, waves of violence 
swept over the hayys.19 The siege mentality that had settled upon local neighbourhoods during 
previous years was thus intensified dramatically, as a host of lethal threats proliferated.  
 
Expanding outwards from Sadr City, the Mehdi Army emerged as the most formidable of these 
threats. By networking through the underclass shi’a communities of nearby hayys such as 
Kamaliyah, Fedaliyah, and Amin, and also by riding the surge of population movement that 
emanated from the eastern boundary of Sadr City, the militia closed in upon Beladiyat and 
Mashtal. Having been weakened through the 1980s and 1990s, and then convulsed by the 
violence and instability that accompanied the fall of the Ba’th regime, the hayys were critically 
vulnerable. The Mehdi Army’s subsequent conquest of Beladiyat and Mashtal, while occurring in 
the midst of the sectarian war and featuring brutal sectarian violence, was thus viewed, by both its 
architects and its victims alike, more as the climax of a decades-old struggle between centre and 
periphery than a byproduct of sectarian tensions among local residents – marking a decisive, and 
perhaps permanent victory of the shi’a underclass.20 
 
                                                                                                                                            
families were well educated. Unspoken, yet clearly implied throughout these conversations, was bitterness 
over the Mehdi Army’s conquest of the neighbourhood and its contemporary reputation as having been 
absorbed into Sadr City.  
19 The well-known middle class neighbourhoods of Central Mashtal and Beladiyat Proper, as well as the 
Christian enclave of Tujar and Mu’allemiin, emerged among the more attractive targets for kidnappers in 
southeastern Baghdad. Their socioeconomic profiles rendered them tempting targets of opportunity, while 
their physical position on the periphery of the city centre – removed geographically from the strongholds of 
potential protectors such as the Badr militia (which was, for all intents and purposes, the militia of the shi’a 
middle class), left them exposed and vulnerable.  
20 As blended neighbourhoods where middle class shi’a and sunni families had coexisted for decades, 
Beladiyat Proper, Central Mashtal, Mu’allemiin, and Old Habibiyyah were neither hotbeds of latent 
sectarian hatred, nor founts of sectarian violence. Thus, while high levels of ostensibly “sectarian” violence 
(perpetrated, for the most part, by the Mehdi Army) brought sweeping change and extensive bloodshed to 
the area, the violence does not appear to have been the outgrowth of localized sectarian divisions. 
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i. The Opportunities of Instability & The Encroachment of the Mehdi Army 
The Mehdi Army’s advance upon Beladiyat and Mashtal began in the immediate wake of the 
2003 invasion, with the ravaging of the Ba’thist enclave of Sa’ba Nissan. By cleansing the 
neighbourhood of prominent Ba’thists and claiming the small residential grid as its own, the 
militia established a vital foothold in the hayy. Located in close proximity to Sadr City, and 
situated in the midst of open terrain into which Sadrist shi’a began to migrate, the neighbourhood 
became, in effect, a militia-founded colony. From this central location, where a prominent Sadrist 
university and cultural centre was eventually established (and where a key militant node 
developed), the Mehdi Army projected power throughout the hayy and across the Army Canal as 
well.21 
 
Having established itself in Sa’ba Nissan, the Mehdi Army gradually expanded its profile across 
the western half of Beladiyat. In the northwestern quadrant of the hayy, underclass shi’a emerged 
from the densely packed slums of Sadr City to stake claims to open land. Moving through the 
Ba’th regime’s now-abandoned air defence installation, they created a sprawling tangle of 
modern-day sarifas. In the southwestern corner of the hayy, a similar population surge occurred. 
Families pressed eastward out of Sadr City and ensconced themselves in the open areas to the 
south of Old Habibiyyah and Sa’ba Nissan, and also on the site of the Hussein family’s former 
racetrack. However, this land, which sat along the Army Canal in close proximity to the city 
centre, was valuable real estate; and it also attracted a more prosperous class of settler. Joining the 
migrants from Sadr City were significantly wealthier families (many of whom were alleged to 
                                                
21 Mehdi Army and Special Group operatives were known to move regularly within the triangle that linked 
western Beladiyat, southeastern Sadr City and areas beneath the canal in Tisa Nissan and Rusafa. 
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.3 notes that the Mehdi Army 
was able to project power into nearby Muthana, which had long been a mixed-sect, upper middle class 
neighbourhood. Kagan, The Surge, pp.41, 176 notes that Muqtada al-Sadr’s spokesman Sheikh Abd al-
Hadi al-Darraji was arrested in Beladiyat, and that the Ministry of Education workers kidnapped by the 
Mehdi Army in November 2006 (the fallout from which was central in the Sadrists’ withdrawal from the 
Maliki government) were held in Beladiyat as well.  
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have profited either during the regime’s decline in the 1990s or in the immediate turmoil of its 
collapse in 2003) who erected large new homes of their own.22 The area between Beladiyat’s 
established neighbourhoods and the Army Canal thus took on an incongruous feel, as the homes 
of the wealthy sat side-by-side with the shanties of the poor, crisscrossed by muddy, sewage-
strewn pathways and connected by tangled webs of power-lines.  
Figure 5.3 – New Construction in Southwestern Beladiyat, 2008 
23 
While the Mehdi Army actively encouraged migration into Beladiyat, it does not appear that the 
militia controlled population flows in any organized, coherent way. The Sa’ba Nissan 
neighbourhood seems to have been an exception, as it was thought to be home to a prominent 
Sadrist “realty office” charged with settling the movement’s supporters into properties seized 
                                                
22 Allegations on the sources of the more affluent settlers’ wealth came from long-time residents of 
Beladiyat Proper and from sources within the Iraqi security forces. The former were openly and 
unapologetically biased against the wealthier strand of hawasim and, as such, their allegations must be 
qualified – yet in light of the extremely limited range of methods through which wealth could have been 
accumulated from the 1990s onwards, it is likely they were substantively correct.  
23 Higher-end housing construction in southwestern Beladiyat. Photo by A. Cecil, January 2008. 
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from those that the militia killed or forcibly displaced.24 On the whole, however, migration into 
the open areas of the hayy progressed spontaneously and haphazardly over a period of years. 
Migrant families from Sadr City, joined in certain areas by wealthier counterparts (and, in time, 
by others fleeing the violence of the sectarian war), made their way into Beladiyat in a prevailing 
atmosphere of lawlessness and chaos and laid informal claim to empty pieces of land, erecting 
unlicensed homes and tapping into existing infrastructure as best they could. 
Figure 5.4 – New Construction Areas in Beladiyat & Mashtal  
25 
Despite the apparently limited role of the Mehdi Army in orchestrating migration into the hayy, 
population flows, and the forces that they generated, were instrumental in the militia’s advances. 
The parallel surges of Sadrist shi’a along the northern and southern borders of Old Habibiyyah 
                                                
24 The existence of militia-affiliated “realtors” was a phenomenon that drew significant attention from 
American and Iraqi forces (not only in Beladiyat, but across Tisa Nissan in areas where sectarian violence 
had been particularly intense), but this was difficult to formally substantiate. Direct enquiry into whether 
particular residents had been aided by the militia in their relocation to the open spaces and confiscated 
houses of the hayy was likewise impracticable, but the picture of migration to the area as having been 
piecemeal and largely uncoordinated was nonetheless supported by first-hand investigation of new 
settlement areas, which found a pervasive absence of localized social order or broader organization of any 
sort.  
25 Google maps imagery from May 2004, adapted by the author. 
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enveloped the neighbourhood, further solidifying the militia’s position in western Beladiyat. The 
Mehdi Army’s subsequent ability to project power from its bases in Sadr City and Sa’ba Nissan 
across areas of migrant-hawasim settlement enabled it to claim western Beladiyat as its own, and 
press eastward to the edges of Beladiyat Proper and Tujar.26  
 
Across Highway 5, the Mehdi Army’s advance progressed in a similarly methodical fashion. 
Pressing northwards from Amin and southward from Fedaliyah, the militia gradually expanded its 
influence. Despite the efforts of Mu’allemiin’s residents to erect defensive barriers and isolate 
themselves, a rising tide of violence enveloped the neighbourhood – in part, it appears, because of 
its exposed physical layout, as Mu’allemiin is crisscrossed by numerous avenues that cannot be 
effectively blocked. The neighbourhood thus endured devastating violence, as the partisans of the 
sectarian war (who, as detailed in Chapter Six, waged an exceptionally ferocious war for nearby 
Amin) battled for control of the area.27 The Mehdi Army’s eventual conquest thus came at such a 
price that not only were local sunnis largely eradicated and Christians compelled to flee in large 
numbers, but the neighbourhood as a whole took on a vacant, abandoned feel.  
 
Further to the north, the open area surrounding the District Council facility offered inroads into 
Central Mashtal that were similar to those provided by the hawasim settlements adjacent to 
Beladiyat Proper. From the early months of the post-Saddam era, waves of opportunistic migrants 
                                                
26 Additionally, the migrant settlements that developed on the borders of the hayy’s remaining outposts of 
middle class and minority settlement caused major infrastructural strain, as water, sewerage, and electricity 
systems succumbed to rising demand. This not only pressured the militia’s opponents in the two 
neighbourhoods, degrading their quality of life and pushing them further onto the defensive, but also 
caused localized class-based tensions to flare. The same population movements that facilitated the militia’s 
march across Beladiyat thus also reinforced its underlying message of class vengeance, potentially 
strengthening the Mehdi Army’s position by enabling militants to rally support through calls for class-
warfare. 
27 Like Beladiyat Proper and Central Mashtal, Mu’allemiin was an established, mixed-sect and multi-
religious neighbourhood where inter-communal relations were recalled to have long been positive. Its 
residents were thus not prime actors in the inter-communal violence of the post-Saddam era, as the 
principal networks involved (the Mehdi Army and Iraqi al-Qaeda) commanded limited local support. Noted 
in conversations with sunnis displaced from Central Mashtal, held on FOB Loyalty in April 2008.  
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(coming from as far away as Basra and the Deep South), had claimed its vacated buildings and 
built their own impromptu, cinder-block sarifas on its open land; before being joined in later 
years by forcibly displaced shi’a from areas of western Baghdad and Diyala Province, who 
sought refuge from sunni militants.28 Like the areas of unlicenced development in Beladiyat, the 
settlement thereafter offered both potential recruits for the militia as well as freedom of 
movement and opportunities for concealment, and facilitating attacks on the District Council 
headquarters (where American forces were co-located during much of 2007, and where the Iraqi 
National Police also maintained a regional command centre).29 
Figure 5.5 – Key Areas in and around Mashtal 
30 
 
                                                
28 The “squatter camp” was canvassed over a two-day period in August 2008, during which time a broad 
cross section of the area was interviewed. The area had been populated incrementally during the five years 
since the fall of Saddam Hussein, and was home to shi’a from all over southern Iraq, Diyala Province, and 
other areas of Baghdad. Situated well within the Mehdi Army’s sphere of control, it had been seen as a 
“safe” area for shi’a fearful of sunni militant attack.  
29 Furthermore, in a pattern similar to that seen in Beladiyat, the infrastructural stresses generated by local 
construction created fierce tensions with adjacent areas of Central Mashtal and Mu’allemiin, thereby 
reifying Sadrist rallying cries. As in Beladiyat Proper, established residents of Central Mashtal and 
Mu’allemiin were deeply resentful of the infrastructural degradation caused by their new neighbours. 
Echoing the disputes of prior decades between the city’s middle class core and its migrant periphery, local 
residents blamed the new arrivals for degrading their quality of life, and for importing crime and violence.  
30 Google maps imagery circa 2011, adapted by the author. 
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ii. Conquering the Cores of Beladiyat & Mashtal 
Having established dominance over areas of new settlement in Beladiyat and Mashtal, and having 
overrun the hayys’ more vulnerable pre-invasion neighbourhoods, the Mehdi Army set upon 
Beladiyat Proper, Central Mashtal, and the hayys’ minority enclaves. This brought the militia into 
conflict with established communities that were generally hostile, however. Examination of how 
the militia’s advance progressed, and the manner in which its civilian opponents sought to defend 
themselves, illuminated the underlying dynamics and long-term implications of the Mehdi 
Army’s campaign. 
 
Located on the far side of the Army Canal, in an area of Baghdad where the Mehdi Army 
emerged as the dominant street-level force of the post-Saddam era, the middle class and minority 
communities of Beladiyat and Mashtal were forced to mount their own local defences against the 
violence and instability of the post-Saddam era. A key tactic employed was the erection of 
physical barriers that blocked access into the neighbourhoods, through which residents attempted 
to create islands of stability. Disabled cars and felled palm trees were used to block roads, and 
“neighbourhood watch” organizations were established.31 The central neighbourhoods of the 
hayys thus took on the look and feel of fortified encampments.32 
 
Nonetheless, the militia was able to assert dominance over both Central Mashtal and Beladiyat 
Proper through a mixture of force and intrigue. With the militia having solidified its position 
                                                
31 Locally rooted groups dedicated to neighbourhood defence were noted in Tujar and Beladiyat Proper. 
Physical barriers were observed in Tujar, Beladyat Proper, Central Mashtal, and Mu’allemiin. Access 
constraints to Old Habibiyyah prevented close study of the use of barriers in that neighbourhood.  
32 As noted above, similar efforts met with less success in the more geographically exposed neighbourhood 
of Mu’allemiin. During the course of fieldwork, numerous blocked-off side streets were evident where 
miniature cul-de-sacs of stability had been created, yet the neighbourhood, as a whole, possessed an 
abandoned, vacant feeling. Furthermore, the Mehdi Army moved freely throughout Mu’allemiin, launching 
attacks on the District Council facility to its north and on American units that moved regularly along the 
east-west artery (known to American personnel as Route Florida) that ran from Highway 5 to the District 
Council facility, and onwards to the patrol base from which operations in Mashtal and Amin were 
conducted.  
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across Tisa Nissan through the sectarian cleansing of surrounding areas of Obeidy, Kamaliyah 
and Amin, and having also capitalized on population flows to extend its area of control up to the 
immediate borders of the hayys’ core neighbourhoods, localized defensive efforts were 
insufficient protection against its further encroachment. Militants were thus able to overrun both 
neighbourhoods, asserting their influence by eliminating potential opponents. 
 
Furthermore, the militia was able to find an assortment of local allies within Beladiyat Proper and 
Central Mashtal.33 From local shi’a youths for whom Muqtada’s agenda held appeal, to those 
who sought to cultivate the militia’s favor in pursuit of personal or familial advantage, to still 
others who were either driven to sectarian extremes by the atrocities of sunni militants or who 
cooperated out of fear of persecution, the Mehdi Army gathered valuable intelligence on its 
enemies.34 As a result, most sunni residents were killed or compelled to flee; Christians retreated 
to the communal enclave of Tujar or sought refuge abroad; and middle class shi’a faced an 
increasingly threatening environment. Therefore, despite the fact that the pre-invasion 
communities of the two neighbourhoods remained, on the whole, hostile to the Mehdi Army, and 
resident shi’a did not rise up collectively to aid in the targeting of their sunni neighbours, the 
                                                
33 Stories of the militia’s local operations during sectarian war, though difficult to corroborate individually, 
shared common patterns. Discussions with Iraqi Security Force personnel, with local leaders from within 
Beladiyat, and with sunnis exiled from both hayys painted a broadly coherent picture of the dynamics of 
violence. 
34 Al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, studies the dynamics of violence in mixed-sect areas 
similar to Beladiyat and Mashtal. As the core neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and Mashtal were home to 
relatively well-established communities, the sectarian violence endured was recalled to have been 
particularly personal and intimate. Individual accounts of the violence were impossible to corroborate, yet 
an array of themes were commonly cited. In the early phase of post-Saddam violence, during which the 
Mehdi Army defined itself through its opposition to American occupation, the militia was able to develop 
local contacts who shared its anti-occupation sentiments. As the sectarian war took shape, the threat of 
violence compelled others to collaborate in the militia’s targeting of sunnis, Christians, and middle class 
shi’a, as neighbours were forced to betray one another in order to save themselves. Alternatively, the desire 
to settle scores with personal or familial rivals or to position one’s self advantageously in the post-Saddam 
political order induced others to cooperate with the Mehdi Army, as collaboration created opportunities for 
enrichment and localized empowerment. 
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militia was able to draw the last bastions of middle class opposition in Tisa Nissan beyond the 
Army Canal into its sphere of control.35 
 
The Christians of Tujar likewise sought to isolate themselves physically from the dangers that 
proliferated after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Although Iraq’s Christian community was a 
marginal player in the contests for political power that fueled violence in the post-Saddam era, it 
was nonetheless subjected to an array of threats. Local residents were relatively affluent in 
comparison to others beyond the Army Canal, and kidnapping and the predations of criminal 
networks emerged as a major concern. Furthermore, as militant Muslim networks grew 
increasingly aggressive, Christians found themselves subjected to attacks by both shi’a and sunni 
groups.36  
 
The explosion of violence and the mass population movements that followed the Samarra 
bombing further reinforced the state of siege among Christians. Migration to the open terrain 
around Tujar had been the source of local tension and unrest since the earliest days after the 
regime’s fall, as the construction of new houses on the site of the racetrack to its northwest, and 
on what had previously been a public park to the immediate southwest, prompted protests from 
long-time residents. The surge of additional shi’a into the area during the spring and summer of 
2006 exacerbated these tensions, reinforcing Christian fears of being overwhelmed. For, while 
relations between local Christians and the Muslim residents of Beladiyat Proper, Central Mashtal, 
and Mu’allemiin were recalled to have been generally positive (and, moreover, shi’a families 
                                                
35 Thus, while both hayys experienced high levels of sectarian violence, the killing and forced displacement 
of local sunnis was far less the byproduct of simmering sectarian tensions among local residents than an 
instrument through which the Mehdi Army sought to weaken, and thereby ultimately overrun and displace 
the hayys’ multi-sectarian communities.  
36 Al-Khalidi and Tanner, “Sectarian Violence”, pp.23-24 discusses the threats faced by Christians from the 
various militant groups active in Iraq. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.701, in his discussion of 
Christians’ diminishing role in the Iraqi Communist Party during prior decades, notes the historically 
“exposed” position of Iraqi Christians, and identifies roots of a communal strategy to avoid attracting 
attention in pursuit of survival.  
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displaced by sectarian violence elsewhere in the city were said to have been welcomed into 
vacant homes within Tujar by remaining Christians), the hostility of the Mehdi Army and the 
encroachment of opportunistic migrants threatened their communal integrity.37 
 
Faced with an existential threat, local Christians maintained as low a profile as possible while 
working to defend their interests through official channels. Christian leaders, wary of accusations 
regarding their authenticity as Iraqis and fearful of inciting persecution for being seen 
collaborating with a Western, “Christian” occupier, kept their distance from American forces. 
Drawing instead upon the resources of the Christian diaspora, both to facilitate overseas 
migration and to support those who remained behind, local Christians attempted to quietly endure 
the conflict. Simultaneously, Christian leaders worked through local government institutions to 
halt unlicensed building on their enclave’s periphery, and to roll back the encroachment of post-
2003 population flows through appeals to local authorities. Lacking significant influence at 
higher levels of government, however, and with the rule of law unreliable in post-Saddam Iraq, 
their efforts met with limited success.38 
 
The hayys’ Palestinian population encountered a separate set of physical threats and social 
pressures. Whereas local Christians had been an integral part of the social fabric of Beladiyat and 
Mashtal, the area’s Palestinian population had been isolated, concentrated overwhelmingly in the 
purpose-built apartment complex along Highway 5 that was the Iraqi capital’s largest and most 
prominent Palestinian ghetto.39 A byproduct of the refugee flows created by the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
                                                
37 The settlement of shi’a families within Tujar was noted by civil society leaders from Beladiyat Proper 
during interviews on FOB Loyalty during March 2008.  
38 On the collapsing position of Iraq’s Christian community as a whole, see: Steven Lee Meyers, “With 
New Violence, More Christians Are Fleeing Iraq”, New York Times, December 12, 2010. 
39 The apartment towers of Beladiyat had been built during the oil-boom of the 1970s as a symbol of the 
Ba’th regime’s commitment to the Palestinian cause. As the largest single concentration of Palestinians in 
the country, it emerged as focal point for Iraq’s Palestinian community as its members struggled to navigate 
the dangers of the post-Saddam order. Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee: The Perilous Situation of 
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war, Baghdad’s Palestinian community had never been granted citizenship and its members 
lacked the legal permissions necessary to own property or make their own way in Iraqi society. 
Instead, they were relegated to a semi-privileged captivity as wards of the state, and confined to 
specific residences designated by the government where they enjoyed subsidized rents and an 
array of benefits that, over time, provoked the resentment of their Iraqi neighbours and 
landlords.40 
 
Having developed significant notoriety as preferred recipients of Saddam Hussein’s largesse and 
as ardent supporters of the Ba’th regime, the 2003 invasion unleashed a torrent of retribution. 
Across eastern Baghdad, landlords who had been forced to take on Palestinian tenants at fixed 
rents (and, thereafter, to maintain those fixed rents through the hyperinflation of the 1990s, which 
reduced the payments of many to the equivalent of a few dollars each month) celebrated the 
regime’s fall by raising rents dramatically or evicting their tenants outright.41 The Palestinians 
                                                                                                                                            
Palestinians in Iraq”, Vol. 18, No. 4, September 2006, pp.1, 8-9 estimates that there were 34,000 
Palestinians in Iraq in 2003, concentrated overwhelmingly in Baghdad. 
40 The relations between Iraq’s resident Palestinian community and the Ba’th regime are examined in 
Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee”; Ayad Rahim, “Attitudes to the West, Arabs and Fellow Iraqis”, 
Makiya, Cruelty and Silence, pp.266-268; and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Palestinian Refugees in 
Iraq”, Refugees Affairs Department, 1999, accessed via Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet: 
http://prrn.mcgill.ca/  
41 Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee”, pp.9, 15 cites Mashtal, Beladiyat, Zafaraniyyah and Baghdad 
al-Jadeeda as areas home to significant Palestinian clusters, references PLO data that 63 percent of 
residents enjoyed free housing (which was procured for them by the Iraqi government), and notes 
Palestinians resident in Mashtal whose rents increased fivefold with the fall of the regime and who faced 
growing hostility, which ultimately compelled them to flee. Clusters of Palestinians in Baghdad al-Jadeeda, 
on the other hand, were evicted outright. Local Palestinians viewed this growing array of dangers with 
great frustration, however, in light of their own view of the “preferential treatment” they had received in the 
past. For, while Saddam Hussein had been a staunch supporter of Palestinian hostilities against Israel, and 
Iraq’s Palestinian refugee population had enjoyed special subsidies and privileges, their actual position in 
the country had remained deeply problematic. Prevented from obtaining citizenship and prohibited from 
integration into Iraqi society, Iraq’s Palestinian minority had lived as hostages of the state. Housing was 
effectively free, yet it was often of poor quality. Basic amenities and essential commodities were provided 
by the state welfare system, yet economic opportunities for personal advancement were negligible. Iraq’s 
Palestinians, however celebrated rhetorically, had been kept entirely dependent upon the regime’s charity. 
As such, when the regime fell, and its protections and privileges disappeared, the Palestinians were left to 
face a wave of popular resentment that appears to have significantly outweighed the benefits accrued to 
them by virtue of their relationship with Saddam Hussein.  
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that had resided in discrete clusters throughout the area were forced to fall back upon the 
Beladiyat apartment complex, or to attempt to flee the country.  
 
Irrespective of their choice, however, the plight of Iraq’s Palestinians continued to worsen. Those 
attempting to flee to Jordan found themselves interned in squalid border camps, while those who 
took refuge in the Beladiyat apartment complex attracted the predations of shi’a militants.42 
Partisan units of the Iraqi Security Forces, such as the notorious Wolf Brigade, brought steady 
harassment (and allegations of unlawful detention and torture), while the Mehdi Army paid 
regular visits to the enclave as well.43  
 
Furthermore, the Iraqi government, motivated by lingering animosities from the Saddam era and 
the sectarianism that came to dominate domestic politics thereafter, took a pro-actively 
antagonistic stance toward the country’s Palestinians. In October 2005, for example, the shi’a 
official from the Ministry of Interior responsible for issues of displacement and migration called 
for all Palestinians to be expelled to Gaza for their alleged support of terrorism (an allegation that, 
in the case of the Palestinians of Beladiyat, appears to have been wholly unfounded).44 Likewise, 
the processes through which Palestinians were required to renew their residency documents were 
made deliberately arduous, forcing entire families to run a dangerous gauntlet of checkpoints 
                                                
42 The difficulty encountered in fleeing Iraq is discussed further in Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to 
Flee”, pp.3, 17-22, with the observation that Palestinian refugees were treated as “virtual prisoners” in the 
detention camps near the Iraqi border in Jordan, and that conditions were poor enough that hundreds chose 
to return to Iraq. The legacy of Saddam Hussein’s crimes against neighbouring Arab states, and his close 
relationship with the Palestinians (most notably, the Palestinians’ overwhelming support for Saddam 
Hussein during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War), combined to compel Jordan, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and others to look unsympathetically upon aspiring Palestinian refugees, making flight abroad 
nearly impossible. Per those who remained, the work cites a Palestinian migrant interviewed at the 
Jordanian border, who declared “the Palestinians in al-Baladiyyat neighbourhood are living like in a prison 
camp”, p.33. 
43 Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee”, pp.13, 29 offers anecdotes from Palestinians in the Beladiyat 
apartments who told of “armed men” threatening them and launching attacks in the earliest days of the 
post-Saddam era, and references Wolf Brigade operations.  
44 State persecution of Palestinians is discussed in Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee”, pp.1-2, 29-32.  
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every two months to re-register with the Ministry of the Interior.45 Palestinians were thus already 
living in a state of siege when the Samarra bombing occurred, after which shi’a attacks escalated 
to the point that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was compelled to issue a fatwa explicitly 
forbidding the killing of Palestinians.46  
 
Unlike its Christian counterpart, the Palestinian community of Beladiyat had no meaningful 
diaspora to fall back on. Having been cut off from the outside world and kept as dependents of 
the state for decades, Palestinians were isolated and exposed following Saddam’s demise. The 
long-time residents of the Beladiyat apartment complex, and those compelled to seek refuge 
therein, thus found themselves stranded in a shi’a district controlled by an aggressively hostile 
militia force, and governed by a similarly antagonistic new regime. Unable to escape abroad, the 
Palestinians were pushed into a relationship of necessity with American forces. Irrespective of 
Palestinians’ views on the American military (or resentment over the waves of persecution that 
had been unleashed upon them by the Americans’ removal of their patron), American forces 
stationed at FOB Loyalty (to the immediate south of the Beladiyat Apartments) proved to be their 




                                                
45 Noted in Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee”, p.30. P.33 relates the account of an interviewee that 
“sixteen or eighteen” Palestinians had been killed at checkpoints while attempting to reach the Interior 
Ministry. The very act of entering the Ministry of Interior facility, which was a stronghold of sectarian 
shi’a militarism during much of the post-Saddam era, was a danger in and of itself to the sunni Palestinians. 
46 Sistani’s fatwa was issued on April 30, 2006. Noted in Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee”, p.27. 
Pp.24-25 notes that the Beladiyat apartments became a focal point of violence, abductions, and murder 
after the Samarra bombing.  
47 Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere to Flee”, pp.24-25 notes the key role of American forces in defending 
the Palestinian apartment complex in the aftermath of the Samarra bombing. Relations between American 
forces and resident Palestinians were generally positive, despite the fact that the Beladiyat apartment towers 
were intermittently struck by the rocket and mortar fire of shi’a militants aiming for nearby FOB Loyalty. 
Indeed, the nearby presence of American forces was likely vital in preventing the Palestinians’ wholesale 
eradication from Beladiyat, as the Mehdi Army established a dominant presence across much of the rest of 
the district. 
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III. The Reclamation of Beladiyat & Mashtal 
As the Surge began during the early months of 2007, the Mehdi Army dominated Beladiyat and 
Mashtal. The hayys’ sunni populations had been largely eradicated, the remnants of their 
Christian and Palestinian minorities were besieged in narrow enclaves, and the shi’a middle class 
was badly battered. Sa’ba Nisan was a militant stronghold, Old Habibiyyah and Mu’allemiin had 
been effectively overrun and overwhelmed, Beladiyat Proper and Central Mashtal were 
physically degraded and under sustained militia pressure, while the sprawling new settlements in 
both hayys, where Sadrist shi’a were found in abundance and the Mehdi Army operated with 
impunity, had further altered the landscape. It thus appeared that the Mehdi Army had firmly 
conquered Beladiyat and Mashtal, and that the hayys’ absorption into the city’s underclass 
periphery might well be permanent.  
 
However, as American and Iraqi forces applied heightened pressure to the militia, they exposed 
weaknesses in its position. Not surprisingly, in Beladiyat Proper and Central Mashtal, and in the 
minority redoubts of Christians and Palestinians – places over which the Mehdi Army claimed 
suzerainty, but where it had been unable to rally significant local support – the militia was driven 
backwards. Yet, the subsequent extension of counterinsurgency operations into areas of western 
Beladiyat and eastern Mashtal, thought to be under firm militia control, found its apparent 
strength to be deceptive as well. These were areas where the Mehdi Army had appeared well 
entrenched, and where its power was thought to have been consolidated. But, from the conquered 
terrain of Mu’allemiin to the sprawling new settlement zones of both hayys, the militia failed to 
mount a coherent response to the Surge. Instead, its position deteriorated badly, and examination 





i. Counterinsurgency in Beladiyat & Mashtal 
The local counteroffensive of the Surge began in early 2007, with American and Iraqi forces 
attacking the Mehdi Army at its weakest points. Focusing initially on areas where the militia was 
least popular, and where middle class and minority residents anxiously sought the reestablishment 
of law and order, American and Iraqi forces reclaimed Beladiyat Proper, Central Mashtal, and the 
hayys’ Christian and Palestinian enclaves. After years of violence, uncertainty, and physical 
degradation, local civilians welcomed, albeit with an abundance of caution and skepticism, the 
efforts of the American military and the Iraqi government to reinstate governance, revive 
economic activity, and rebuild critical infrastructure.48  
 
American and Iraqi forces then pressed outwards into western Beladiyat and eastern Mashtal. 
These were areas that the Mehdi Army had conquered decisively, and where local residents, 
many of whom were Sadrist in their sympathies after the population transfers of previous years, 
were expected to be far less amendable to the advances of the Surge. Indeed, the momentum of 
American and Iraqi forces slowed in the face of both armed resistance and popular antipathy, and 
the militia’s enduring presence in western Beladiyat and eastern Mashtal was made evident when 
they erupted during March Madness.    
 
Yet, although western Beladiyat and eastern Mashtal would remain intermittently lethal to 
American and Iraqi personnel throughout 2008, the nature of the violence levied against the 
forces of the Surge betrayed the Mehdi Army’s vulnerability. In Beladiyat, the Sa’ba Nissan 
neighbourhood was a focal point of militant activity, and exuded a palpable hostility to American 
                                                
48 The reestablishment of security through force of arms was thus the driving force beneath early progress 
in Beladiyat and Mashtal. In light of prevailing sentiments among middle class and minority families, 
success was not a question of winning hearts and minds.  Indeed, gains in security and stability progressed 
and solidified during the course of 2008 not because of the efficacy of development initiatives or the 
achievements of the Iraqi government but, as discussed further in the conclusion, despite the limited impact 
of either.  
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personnel that was comparable to hotspots of violence further beyond the Army Canal.49 It 
appeared that the Mehdi Army (and, by extension, the rekindled Sadrist movement) had 
established itself firmly in the neighbourhood. Attempts to displace the militia thus met with 
violent reprisals, while efforts to cultivate popular support met with limited results.50   
 
However, the militia’s position in the expanses of new development along the northern and 
southern tiers of Beladiyat, and across the vast bulk of eastern Mashtal as well, proved 
considerably less formidable. These were areas that had been regarded with extreme caution 
during the initial phase of the Surge but, as noted militants fled the area in the wake of March 
Madness, local dynamics shifted significantly. American and Iraqi forces would encounter 
sporadic violence in areas of underclass shi’a settlement in both hayys, and the main arteries of 
Mu’allemiin remained treacherous due to the threat of roadside bombs, but neither eastern 
Mashtal nor western Beladiyat witnessed coordinated popular resistance on the militia’s behalf. 
On the contrary, an examination of the hayys’ areas of underclass settlement found a prevailing 
atmosphere of chaos and uncertainty, where the resident population was preoccupied, above all 
else, with self-preservation. 
 
ii. A Flawed Narrative of Class-Warfare  
As American and Iraqi forces pushed further into eastern Mashtal and western Beladiyat, the 
Mehdi Army attempted to hold its ground. Groups of shi’a militants launched mortar and rocket 
attacks on American and Iraqi facilities, emplaced roadside bombs, and mounted the occasional 
coordinated assault. Their efforts were sporadic and halting, however, and failed to check the 
                                                
49 Old Habibiyyah was likewise viewed with caution by American and Iraqi forces, though it remained 
unclear whether this was the result of the Mehdi Army having established a coherent local presence, or 
whether it was due to the militia’s ability to project power over and around the neighbourhood from Sa’ba 
Nissan and Sadr City.  
50 The non-violent inducements of counterinsurgency that were applied in western Beladiyat included 
school refurbishment, micro-grant distribution to small businesses, and efforts to improve the local power 
supply.  
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continued advance of the Surge. The overwhelming majority of the populace, meanwhile, from 
the battered remnants of Mu’allemiin’s pre-invasion population, to the migrants that inhabited the 
new settlement areas of Beladiyat and the squatter encampment adjacent to the District Council 
headquarters, withdrew into the relative safety of their homes. There was thus little, if anything, 
“popular” about the resistance that was encountered. 
 
Close study of the militia’s localized resistance to the Surge offered insights into why this was so. 
In Mu’allemiin, the answer appeared straightforward. Having conquered the area during the 
sectarian war, militants could move freely through the neighbourhood to conduct attacks on the 
forces of the Surge. They could draw little support from remaining local residents, however, 
whose socio-political sentiments generally mirrored those of their middle class and minority 
neighbours in Central Mashtal and Beladiyat Proper. Therefore, when pressure intensified on 
shi’a militants in the wake of March Madness, with key operatives fleeing southeastern Baghdad, 
levels of violence fell precipitously. The local community thereafter underwent a slow, yet 
nonetheless encouraging revival, with displaced Christians returning to their former homes, and 
the neighbourhood’s side-streets showing signs of renewed activity.51  
 
In the areas of new settlement, on the other hand, where the Mehdi Army had the opportunity to 
cultivate a broad base of support from a populace that was heavily Sadrist in its sympathies, the 
militia’s weakness appeared to stem from two main factors. The first was the character of the 
                                                
51 Following the neighbourhood’s depopulation during the sectarian war, Mu’allemiin remained a place 
where outside forces did battle. Mehdi Army and Special Group cells regularly targeted American patrols 
passing through Mu’allemiin, prompting retaliatory violence that made the neighbourhood dangerous for its 
residents. By the late-summer of 2008, however, this was beginning to change. Attacks on American 
patrols became increasingly rare after March Madness, and conversations with District Council politicians 
in September and October found that Christians were beginning to return to their former homes in western 
Mu’allemiin (though a significant number returned to find their homes occupied by squatters). Sunni 
families, on the other hand, were far slower to return to the area. Progress was thus uneven, with the side-
streets of Mu’allemiin remaining barricaded with disabled cars, palm trees, and blocks of concrete, but the 
area, on the whole, did experience a notable easing of tensions on the streets and a revival of commercial 
activity.  
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militia itself. Developing as it had through the course of the sectarian war, growing increasingly 
radical and predatory in its actions against local sunnis, Christians, and shi’a as well, the Mehdi 
Army had done much to alienate its ostensible base of support.52 The nature of the militia’s “rule” 
over these areas in the months that followed the abatement of sectarian violence, and the abuses 
perpetrated by the young men who filled its ranks – ranging from extortion and racketeering to 
kidnapping and murder – had significantly soured popular opinion.  
 
The second main factor was the lack of cohesion among the underclass shi’a migrants 
themselves. From the impoverished families that had fled the slums of Sadr City for new horizons 
in Beladiyat, to the geographically diverse and discordant group that descended upon the open 
terrain to the north of the District Council facility, the Sadrist shi’a that moved into the two hayys 
were ill-suited to form the backbone of an insurgency.53 The haphazard process through which 
migration progressed into Beladiyat and Mashtal, with individual families maneuvering 
independently to stake claims to desirable terrain, created a disjointed social environment.54 
Faced with the need to secure access to clean water and electricity in the face of fierce opposition 
from the hayys’ established communities, and finding themselves in an ungoverned, violent 
                                                
52 In a pattern that was replicated by interviewees in other areas of Tisa Nissan (notably in Kamaliyah and 
Amin), residents of the settlement area adjacent to the District Council facility spoke freely – in private 
discussions in their homes, and also in front of Iraqi National Police personnel and passersby in the street – 
about the abuses of “the militia” while simultaneously professing Sadrist sympathies. As discussed in 
greater detail in the chapters that follow, by 2008 it was commonplace among many shi’a in Tisa Nissan to 
speak of “the militia” and the Sadrist movement as distinct entities. There was thus no dissonance in 
proclaiming devotion to the memory of the White Lion (or, on occasion to Muqtada al-Sadr) to an 
American interlocutor, while speaking contemptuously of the local manifestation of the Mehdi Army. 
53 Similarly, the discordant political sympathies of the wealthier hawasim that established themselves along 
the southern tier of Beladiyat – alongside the chaotic environment in which the area’s settlement took place 
and a resulting dearth of localized communal ties – appears to have rendered the area equally infertile for 
popular insurgency. 
54 Fieldwork across the areas of new settlement in Beladiyat and Mashtal found nuclear families and 
extended families living together in individual homes, but uncovered no evidence of broader communal 
order in these spaces. Functioning “tribes” had not migrated into the open spaces of the two hayys, nor had 
coherent professional or communal groups of other sorts either moved intact to these areas or formed anew 
upon arrival. Along the southern tier of Beladiyat, migrants from Sadr City intermixed haphazardly with 
wealthier prospectors; the encampment to the north of the District Council facility housed families from 
across the country that arrived over a period of years; while even the relatively homogenous settlement area 
northwest of Beladiyat Proper, which was dominated by migrants from Sadr City, appeared to lack an 
underpinning social order. 
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environment where criminal groups and predatory militiamen reigned supreme, the migrants had 
retreated inwards into the safety of their homes, leaving civil society to languish. 
 
The resulting dearth of locally-rooted social networks or communal groups thus handicapped the 
Mehdi Army. A key feature of the militia’s expansion across Baghdad had been its ability to 
mobilize elements of the shi’a underclass, absorbing localized networks of supporters and thereby 
entrenching itself in new neighbourhoods. Weary, battered, and fearful, however, and newly 
settled among unfamiliar neighbours on unstable terrain, the Sadrist shi’a that migrated into 
western Beladiyat and eastern Mashtal were poorly positioned to play such a role. They provided 
a permissive environment in which the Mehdi Army could plan, stage, and conduct attacks, and a 
recruiting pool from which facilitators and other low-level operatives could be drawn, but the 
underclass shi’a hawasim had ultimately not been able to serve as a “fifth column”, or an 
organized component of the militia’s campaign.55 
 
Troublingly for the Mehdi Army (and the overall prospects of the rekindled Sadrist movement), 
the hayys had presented prime opportunities to exploit the class tensions at the core of Sadrist 
ideology and rally support from the newly arrived shi’a poor – but the militia appeared to have 
failed to do so. Part of this failure could be attributed to the predatory nature of the militia itself, 
as by its actions, it had alienated potential supporters. Part also stemmed from the condition of the 
shi’a underclass, however, and the manner in which the atomized state of those who migrated 
into Beladiyat and Mashtal left Sadrist civilians unable to engage coherently with the militia’s 
                                                
55 Nonetheless, echoing the defamatory narratives deployed against al-asima and the shurughis in the 1940s 
and 1950s, interviewees in Beladiyat Proper and Central Mashtal (who, importantly, were seconded at 
times by members of the Iraqi Security Forces), spoke of the underclass development areas as bastions of 
criminality and loci of an array of pernicious influences. Thus, despite evidence that the hayys had not, in 
fact, been subjected to a coordinated underclass assault by the Mehdi Army and hypothetical legions of 
shurughi supporters, the narrative of the besieged middle class persisted. Reconciliation was thus rendered 
all the more difficult, as the defeat of the Mehdi Army and the reestablishment of law and order was 
viewed not as a desired end-state, but as a precursor to a return to the pre-invasion status quo via the new 
arrivals’ eviction. 
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campaign. With the exception of the Sa’ba Nissan neighbourhood (where the militia had imported 
operatives and supporters, thereby creating a critical level of localized coherence), and areas 
along the extreme western periphery of Beladiyat that appeared, for all intents and purposes, to 
have been consumed by Sadr City, the Mehdi Army had not built a cohesive base of popular 
support. In turn, it had been unable to hold its ground when faced with the counteroffensive of the 
Surge, and had been driven from the hayys. 
Chapter 6  
 
Kamaliyah & Amin – Rallying the Masses 
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i. Kamaliyah & Amin: A Year into the Surge 
Figure 6.1 – Hayy Boundaries of Kamaliyah & Amin 
1 
At the start of 2008, Kamaliyah and Amin were in turmoil.2 Home to powerful contingents of the 
Mehdi Army, and standing, after vicious campaigns of sectarian cleansing, as the domains of the 
shi’a underclass, the hayys had violently resisted the advances of the Surge. American-led efforts 
to dislodge the militia had sparked heavy fighting in both hayys, and while the militia had been 
pushed off the streets, further progress remained elusive: violence persisted (not only against the 
forces of the Surge, but also among local residents), governance was a shambles, essential 
                                                
1 Google maps imagery from May 2004, adapted by the author. 
2 An initial survey of both hayys was conducted by the author and R. Kent in early March 2008, in 
cooperation with American military personnel from 2-16 infantry battalion. For additional contemporary 
observations on conditions in the hayys, and the attitudes of American personnel toward them, see: Finkel, 
The Good Soldiers.  
 199 
services and critical infrastructure were mired in disrepair, and residents looked on with emotions 
that ranged, for the most part, from wariness to outright hostility. As a result, Kamaliyah and 
Amin were regarded with exceptional frustration by those tasked to patrol and secure them. 
 
Whereas Kamaliyah and Amin inspired similarly negative sentiments among American 
servicemen, features particular to each hayy had created unique sets of local challenges. 
Kamaliyah, a run-down, semi-urban zone on the margins of Baghdad’s eastern periphery, had 
long been a notorious red-light district. While the Mehdi Army had eradicated the local sex trade 
when it set upon Kamaliyah’s Ba’thist pimps and gypsy prostitutes in the spring of 2003, the hayy 
maintained its decades-old stigma of danger and depravity. From its residents’ prominent role in 
the post-invasion looting that devastated Baghdad, to the Mafioso-style rule subsequently 
established by the Mehdi Army’s local affiliates, Kamaliyah remained infamous – a condition 
reinforced by the squalor of its central neighbourhood, where a network of knee- to waist-deep 
open sewers crisscrossed unpaved, potholed streets, emptying into vast, fetid pits.3 The mention 
of Kamaliyah among Baghdadis would thus elicit a mixture of amused smirks and solemn 
warnings, suggesting that the hayy demanded both derision and cautious respect. American 
personnel, on the other hand, frequently referred to the television series “The Wire” and “The 
Sopranos” when trying to explain the mixture of violence, corruption, and suffering that, in their 




                                                
3 “There can’t be any poor people in Kamaliyah” responded a businessman based in the Karrada Peninsula 
to the suggestion that Iraqi entrepreneurs might assist American-funded development projects in Central 
Kamaliyah, “they stole everything in Baghdad”. Interview by the author, FOB Rustamiyah, August 2008.  
4 Iraqi sources from central areas of Baghdad – businessmen, for example, with whom HTT personnel 
discussed the decrepit infrastructural condition of Kamaliyah, and government officials charged with the 
allocation of the city’s resources for urban development – expressed little sympathy for the hayy’s 
residents. As discussed below, the area’s long-standing reputation for criminality, which was forcefully 
reified by the role of local residents in post-invasion looting and the violence that subsequently wracked the 
city, rendered Kamaliyah an object of scorn more than sympathy. 
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Figure 6.2 – Open Sewers in Central Kamaliyah 
5 
Amin had achieved infamy of a different sort. Having developed through the latter decades of the 
twentieth century as a densely populated, hardscrabble urban grid that was home to a blend of 
working to lower class families of both Muslim sects, Amin experienced intense sectarian 
violence. The Mehdi Army and its sunni foes waged protracted offensives that featured the 
bombing of marketplaces, the public execution of civilians, and the burning of corpses tied to 
utility poles. The Mehdi Army’s ultimate victory in that contest had led to the near-elimination of 
Amin’s large sunni population. The hayy thereafter became known as a potent Mehdi Army 
stronghold where local mosques preached a fearsome brand of sectarian shi’a militarism, gangs 
of militia-affiliated youths roamed the streets, and Iranian-backed Special Group cells operated 
extensively.6  
                                                
5 Photo by the author, May 2008. 
6 Amin’s reputation for shi’a militarism was legion, and captured most poignantly during fieldwork by an 
Iraqi reporter who accompanied an American patrol through the hayy during October 2008. He recalled 
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Figure 6.3 – The Muhsin al-Hakim Mosque, Amin 
7 
The forces of the Surge had thus faced an array of formidable challenges in the two hayys. From 
the gangsters-cum-warlords of Kamaliyah to the sectarian militants of Amin, locally-rooted 
elements of the Mehdi Army laid firm claim to each. Furthermore, with contingents of youths and 
young men holding a commanding street-level presence in both hayys and the political 
sympathies of their populations understood to be overwhelmingly Sadrist, it had been inevitable 
that the reclamation of Kamaliyah and Amin would be met with sustained resistance. Indeed, the 
scope of the violence encountered as American forces set up local patrol bases in the two hayys 
during 2007 reflected the fact that the endeavour marked a direct assault on core terrain of the 
Sadrist movement, which the Mehdi Army would be loathe to concede. 
                                                                                                                                            
having ‘embedded’ with shi’a militants in Amin during 2007, observing an especially strong Iranian 
presence. Despite a major abatement of violence in the area during the summer of 2008, he spoke of the 
hayy with a mixture of fear and awe, remaining notably tense throughout.  
7 The Muhsin al-Hakim mosque, Amin, which was a central rallying point for shi’a militants. Photo by the 
author, September 2008. 
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Yet, although Kamaliyah and Amin were in violent disarray, conditions could have been worse.8 
Home to legions of underclass shi’a, and situated firmly within the Mehdi Army’s core territory 
in eastern Baghdad, Kamaliyah and Amin had presented the militia with prime opportunities to 
mobilize a mass base of support, and could have been founts of popular insurgency. However, the 
violence levied against the Surge, and the evident disposition of the hayys’ civilian populations 
toward American-led counterinsurgency efforts, suggested that the Mehdi Army had met with 
decidedly uneven results. Cadre members of the Mehdi Army, Iranian-backed Special Group 
cells, and an assortment of local actors attacked American patrols with roadside bombs and small 
arms fire, and launched mortars and rockets at American facilities, but the residents of Kamaliyah 
and Amin were not to be found standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the militia. On the contrary, 
neither hayy appeared to offer a united front against the Surge, suggesting that the Mehdi Army’s 
insurgent campaign had somehow gone awry. 
 
ii. Key Issues in Kamaliyah & Amin 
It was clear that the Mehdi Army was well established in both hayys, and that it had been able to 
generate fierce local violence. However, neither hayy appeared to be home to coherent, popular 
insurgency. The overwhelming majority of residents in Kamaliyah and Amin, despite being 
ardent supporters of Sadrist ideals, seemed instead to have retreated into the relative safety of 
their homes, leaving the Mehdi Army and its local affiliates to confront the encroachment of the 
Surge.  
 
                                                
8 Officers from 4-10 BCT staff, and senior elements 2-16 battalion staff interviewed in February 2008 at 
FOBs Loyalty and Rustamiyah respectively, raised the point that in neither hayy were American forces 
fighting against an insurgency that appeared to benefit from substantive popular participation. Likewise, 
initial interviews conducted in February 2008 of 2-16 personnel with extensive ground-level experience in 
the hayys found an array of views on prevailing popular sympathies toward the militia. Those tasked with 
operating on the streets of Amin and Kamaliyah had encountered sporadically fierce violence and displays 
of hostility from local civilians but, through the course of their experiences, many had come to believe that 
the populace was not united against them. 
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Was this impression correct? If so, why had the populace not been incorporated into the militia’s 
endeavour? Was the seeming detachment of local residents from the militia’s campaign the 
byproduct of disenchantment with the Mehdi Army? Was it a display of pragmatism by a 
populace that was able to anticipate the militia’s impending collapse? Alternatively, were 
appearances deceptive, and were the hayys in fact home to a latent popular insurgency that was 
exercising strategic patience, and waiting for Muqtada’s call to arms? 
 
Furthermore, if the Mehdi Army’s insurgent campaign had indeed faltered in Kamaliyah and 
Amin, why were counterinsurgency efforts also meeting with limited success? Intuitively, it 
followed that if the militia had somehow alienated the local population, or otherwise failed to root 
itself in a firm base of popular support, then the hayys might be receptive to the overtures of 
counterinsurgents. Yet, although American and Iraqi forces had achieved significant gains against 
local militants during the Surge’s initial year, both hayys remained mired in violence and beset by 
an array of problems. What could account for the seeming intractability of Kamaliyah and Amin, 
and for the hayys’ enduring instability? 
 
iii. March Madness in Kamaliyah & Amin 
March Madness enveloped both hayys in violence. The American units responsible for Amin and 
Kamaliyah endured a spike in casualties, Iraqi Security Forces suffered high levels of 
absenteeism and outright defections to the Mehdi Army, and the hayys, like much of Tisa Nissan 
beyond the Army Canal, descended into chaos.9 American forces were forced to engage in heavy 
                                                
9 Finkel, The Good Soldiers, Chapter 12, details the events of March Madness in Amin and Kamaliyah, and 
notes that the vast bulk of the Iraqi National Police battalion responsible for the hayys either deserted or 
defected to the enemy. 
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fighting in an effort to restore order, while speculation mounted that perhaps the hayys had, in 
fact, been insurgent strongholds all along.10 
 
However, as violence abated, conditions in Kamaliyah and Amin improved significantly. 
Through the course of the spring and summer of 2008, American forces and their counterparts in 
the newly-purged Iraqi National Police launched a series of large-scale operations in the two 
hayys. Ranging from cordon and search missions to confiscate illegal weapons to reconstruction-
minded efforts to distribute cash grants to small businesses, the forces of the Surge took daily to 
the streets of Amin and Kamaliyah. The street-level interactions that ensued with the hayys’ 
residents offered critical insights into local conditions, and while central areas of both hayys 
remained intermittently violent and the threat of roadside bombs persisted, improving trends in 
security and stability enabled American personnel to gain a significantly improved understanding 
of the dynamics of the militia’s local campaigns.11 
                                                
10 Finkel, The Good Soldiers, pp.243-244 captures the prevailing view of American military personnel 
during the violence of March Madness, noting “it was as if the residents of Kamaliyah and Fedaliyah and 
Mashtal and Amin and every other war-ruined patch of ground that the 2-16 had been trying to salvage had 
been waiting behind their closed doors, guns in one hand, EFPs in the other, for the chance to come out and 
attack.” 
11 Fieldwork in Amin and Kamaliyah was led by the author, in conjunction with American personnel from 
1-66 armor battalion and the National Police Training Team attached to the Iraqi National Police Brigade 
overseeing Tisa Nissan, and with the additional support of J. Makeur. The investigation of Kamaliyah was 
conducted primarily between April and June, and that of Amin from August to October. The residents of 
Kamaliyah and Amin proved remarkably willing to share their personal stories, their thoughts on aspects of 
local history, and their perspectives on the extraordinary turbulence endured in the hayys since the fall of 
Saddam Hussein. So-called “soft knock” clearance operations in which American and Iraqi units moved 
house-to-house through neighbourhoods to search for weapons and to assess local conditions proved 
particularly fruitful, as they allowed for five- to fifteen-minute conversations with an individual or family 
while Iraqi personnel conducted their search. Additional observations and interactions occurred with local 
civilians at checkpoints, in markets, and on patrols directed to observe and assess the varied sub-areas of 
the hayys, through which it was possible to interact with local residents. In light of the notoriety and 
suspected militia ties of prominent figures in Kamaliyah’s political leadership, however, and the wariness 
of Amin’s representatives toward American personnel, “Key Leader Engagements” of the sort conducted in 
Beladiyat and Mashtal were of limited utility. Nonetheless, with joint American-Iraqi patrols occurring 
regularly throughout the hayys, it was possible to interact with and observe a broad cross-section of their 
populations. Drawing further upon the insights of residents of neighbouring hayys, and also benefiting from 
the observations and opinions of Iraqi Security Force personnel, it was possible to examine Amin and 
Kamaliyah in detail: investigating aspects of local history and the circumstances surrounding the rise of the 
Mehdi Army, and observing popular reactions to its fall. Residents of surrounding areas of Tisa Nissan also 
proved notably eager to discuss the particular attributes of Kamaliyah and Amin, and their turbulent pre- 
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I. The Sadrist Movement’s Roots in Kamaliyah & Amin 
In light of their historical development, there was ample reason to expect that Kamaliyah and 
Amin would offer strong support to the Sadrist movement, and that the Mehdi Army might rally 
substantive local support in each hayy.12 Established during the 1960s as part of Baghdad’s 
government-directed expansion, Amin and Kamaliyah became prominent venues of migrant 
settlement in the decades that followed. Located on the capital’s eastern edge, near the outlets of 
major highways that connected Baghdad to rural, agricultural areas beyond, they absorbed tens of 
thousands of underclass shi’a migrants and took on decidedly shurughi-heavy demographic 
profiles.  
 
Developing thereafter into underserviced, marginalized areas of the Iraqi capital, they also 
became focal points for the frustrations and social tensions that were ultimately enshrined in the 
Sadrist movement. As such, while Amin and Kamaliyah were not homogenous zones of 
underclass shi’a settlement like nearby Saddam City, the Sadrist movement was able to build a 
strong foundation in the hayys during the 1990s. Drawing upon the accumulated grievances of 
local shi’a, who had suffered lifetimes of material neglect and social prejudice, the White Lion 
rallied enormous local support. Thus, when Muqtada al-Sadr set out to revive his father’s 
movement in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s fall, there was a latent, yet powerful ideological 
bond among the hayys’ shi’a residents upon which he could build. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and post-Saddam histories. Such interactions were frequently steeped in bias toward the shi’a underclass, 
particularly in discussions of Kamaliyah, but they nonetheless provided a useful resource. Lastly, 
interviews and informal conversations with personnel from the Iraqi National Police took place both in 
Iraqi government facilities and during joint operations in the neighbourhoods of Amin and Kamaliyah, 
wherein junior enlisted personnel (the great majority of whom were young, underclass shi’a from Baghdad) 
were an especially valuable source of information. 
12 Discussion of the history of Kamaliyah is drawn principally from sit-down interviews conducted by the 
author with local businessmen on the patrol base from which American forces administered the hayy in 
May and June 2008, supplemented by insights gathered during fieldwork. The history of Amin comes 
primarily from interviews by the author of long-time sunni residents of nearby Mashtal held on FOB 
Loyalty in April 2008. 
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ii. The Formation of Kamaliyah & Amin 
Kamaliyah and Amin grew rapidly during their formative decades, in a development process that 
was powered by a continually intensifying surge of underclass shi’a into Baghdad. Amin, sitting 
at the terminus of the main highway connecting Iraq’s Deep South to the capital, was an 
appealing destination for migrants. Located adjacent to the economic hub of Baghdad al-Jadeeda 
and home to its own local commerce and light industry, it offered the prospect of nearby 
employment – and its allure was such that newly arrived migrants were joined by large numbers 
of working class shi’a and sunni families from other areas of the capital, and places further afield 
as well. Amin thus became home to a multitude of tradesmen, labourers, and unskilled workers 
and their families, driving the construction of compact clusters of mostly two to four storey 
residential buildings southward from the hayy’s original settlement block (along the southern 
edge of Mu’allemiin) toward the Army Canal. 
 
Kamaliyah, as a remote and especially poor development area on the furthest reaches of eastern 
Baghdad, offered an affordable escape from the miseries of rural poverty that attracted large 
numbers of southern shi’a migrants. Located at the entry point into Baghdad of the highway that 
connects the Iraqi capital to the rural expanses of Diyala Province, it also absorbed numerous 
migrants from the mixed-sect, tribal areas northeast of the Iraqi capital.13 The hayy’s main 
neighbourhood, referred to hereafter as Central Kamaliyah, thus came to house a blend of poor 
                                                
13 Obeidy, which developed across Highway 5 from Kamaliyah, was also heavily influenced by settlement 
from rural, tribal areas north of Baghdad. The modern-day hayy takes its name from the high number of 
sunni Obeid tribesmen that established residences there, as it offered convenient transit links to their 
traditional tribal domain to the north. As discussed further below, connectivity with Diyala Province also 
lent a transient quality to Kamaliyah, as labourers moved back and forth between the city and the farmland 
of Diyala Province in search of seasonal labour. 
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shi’a and sunni families that resided in rudimentary two- to three-storey buildings, while much of 
the local labour force occupied the lower rungs of the urban economy elsewhere in the city.14  
 
Figure 6.4 – Main Routes in & out of Eastern Baghdad 
15 
Both hayys continued to expand through the 1970s and into the 1980s. In Amin, urban 
development progressed with the establishment of Oil City along the Diyala River, and the 
construction of new, purpose-built neighbourhoods for veterans of the war with Iran and the 
families of battlefield casualties.16 The hayy thus consolidated its identity as a blue-collar area of 
Baghdad that, while housing large numbers of shi’a migrants and their descendents, was home to 
                                                
14 The residents of Central Kamaliyah thus shared much in common with the traditional kasabah, the 
unskilled labourers that had long been omnipresent in Baghdad’s poorest districts. Discussed in Batatu, The 
Old Social Classes, p.18. 
15 Google maps imagery circa 2011, annotated by the author. 
16 Whereas the quality of construction in Amin generally deteriorates as one progresses southwards, the 
purpose-built neighbourhoods for veterans and the families of the wounded are of relatively high quality. 
These construction efforts were part of the broader campaign to placate the Iraqi people, particularly the 
shi’a, during the early phase of Iraq’s war with Iran. Discussed in Chapters One and Two, and noted further 
in Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p.153.  
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a diverse population and could claim connectivity to the city centre through its links to nearby 
Baghdad al-Jadeeda.  
Figure 6.5 – Key Areas in and around Amin 
17 
Whereas Amin developed into a downmarket, yet distinctly urban area that was crisscrossed by 
broad, paved avenues lined with markets, shops, and light industry, Kamaliyah remained 
significantly poorer and less developed. Although industrial zones were established to the 
immediate east of Central Kamaliyah and also further north near the outer canal, the hayy 
remained largely without basic infrastructure such as paved roads and sewers. Nonetheless, 
despite the poor condition of the area (and the notoriety it quickly acquired for prostitution and 
criminality), local growth continued.18 In addition to the expansion of Central Kamaliyah, a series 
of satellite settlements were established, referred to collectively as Riyasah. Forming, in effect, a 
                                                
17 Google maps imagery, circa 2011, adapted by the author.  
18 Gulick, “Village and City: Cultural Continuities in Twentieth Century Middle Eastern Cultures”, pp.138-
139 notes that the Baghdad municipal government destroyed the city’s red-light district in 1952-53, 
appropriating the area for a parking lot and bus stops, and dispersing the prostitute population throughout 
the city. It would appear that with the redevelopment schemes that followed, Central Kamaliyah emerged 
as one of the city’s premier hubs for the sex trade. 
 209 
ring of suburbs around the main grid of Central Kamaliyah, Riyasah was comprised of the 
Ma’mun and Mu’awaqiin neighbourhoods (which area residents recalled to have been founded in 
an effort to avoid Central Kamaliyah’s squalor), and also incorporated the far wealthier, pre-
existing enclave of Bustan (where wealthy Baghdadi families had built a cluster of large, gated 
homes in a palm grove along the Diyala River, which provided seasonal refuge from the heat of 
the city centre).19  
Figure 6.6 - The Sub-neighbourhoods of Kamaliyah 
20 
 
                                                
19 Information on the development of Central Kamaliyah’s satellite suburbs comes from conversations with 
local residents. Many were adamant in making the distinction that they did not live in Central Kamaliyah, 
but instead in their particular sub-neighbourhood. This was particularly evident in al-Bustan, where those 
long-time residents that remained (many had fled abroad in response to the violence that wracked the wider 
area during prior years) spoke contemptuously of Central Kamaliyah. 
20 Imagery from Google maps, circa 2011, which shows the extent of new development in northern 
Kamaliyah. 
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ii. Sanctions and the Sadrist Movement in Kamaliyah & Amin 
Although Amin and Kamaliyah developed in different ways, acquiring unique characteristics 
during their formative decades, the Iraqi government’s declining financial position catalyzed a 
common systemic collapse from the late 1980s. With both hayys situated on the capital’s eastern 
margins, home to large numbers of underclass shi’a and consequently unable to command a 
significant share of the regime’s increasingly limited resources, Amin and Kamaliyah fell into 
disrepair. Surging unemployment, hyperinflation, and the scarcity of staple goods catalyzed 
devastating economic shocks, while the attentions of the security services were left as the central 
pillar of governance. Kamaliyah thus deteriorated into a seedy, dilapidated wasteland on the 
capital’s distant edge, while Amin became a congested, decaying urban grid with overcrowded 
schools, crumbling infrastructure, and an increasingly destitute populace. 
 
As Amin and Kamaliyah suffered the effects of economic collapse, infrastructural degradation, 
and the retreat of the much-relied-upon state, the “revivals” of tribalism and Islam swept the two 
hayys. In the tribal sphere, with the encouragement of the regime, a contingent of sheikhs 
emerged.21 Assuming low-level administrative functions to compensate for the declining capacity 
of the state, they took on increasingly prominent roles in local society. Yet, while the tribal 
heritage of the hayys’ residents suggested that tribalism might provide a natural, authentic 
replacement for state authority (and the poorer zones of eastern Baghdad were known, like the 
slums of al-asima before them, as places where the norms and values of the tribal milieu had 
persisted with relative strength), Amin and Kamaliyah were ill-suited for an essentialist tribal 
resurgence. 
                                                
21 Recollections of the tribal “resurgence” in Amin and Kamaliyah were offered during interactions with 
local residents in their homes, principally as a byproduct of enquiries about the potential existence of tribal 
leaders with legitimate social capital who might aid in the restoration of local order and supplement the 
(quite limited) efforts of official leadership in conjunction with the Surge. As detailed further below, this 
search yielded minimal results, exposing the degraded state of tribal networks in the hayys – and of civil 
society at large. 
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Instead, Amin and Kamaliyah were prime examples of urban areas where the pressures detailed 
in Chapter One had, over the course of decades, unraveled tribal structures and degraded tribal 
coherence. From the corruption of the traditional tribal system that had prompted the mass 
abandonment of Iraq’s rural, tribal regions in the first place, to the dislocations that accompanied 
long-range migration, to the mixing-bowl effect that ensued as families had manoeuvered across 
the urban landscape in pursuit of work and better housing, the structural integrity of tribal 
networks had been irreversibly compromised.22 Furthermore, an array of powerful forces had 
undermined sheikhly leadership, including the anti-tribal teachings of Iraq’s public education 
system, the state’s monopolization of patronage through its control of the economy, and the 
aggressive predations of Ba’thist totalitarianism.23 Not only were there no geographically 
contiguous tribal enclaves evident in Amin or Kamaliyah, but there had been little prospect of 
anyone exercising significant social power, tribal or otherwise, without a direct partnership with 
the government. 
 
With Baghdad’s tribal “revival” providing limited, qualified support to the residents of Amin and 
Kamaliyah, the rise of Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr appears to have been all the more 
                                                
22 Interviewees engaged in the two hayys were commonly found to value their tribal identities, and older 
men in particular often recalled their origins in tribal areas of southern Iraq and Diyala Province, yet all 
interviewees were unequivocal in regard to the lack of either structural coherence or geographic continuity 
among local “tribes”. This was further supported by conversations at checkpoints along Highway 5, during 
which numerous interviewees recalled having moved repeatedly among different areas of Tisa Nissan, Sadr 
City, and areas outside of Baghdad during the course of their lives, and also by fieldwork in the residential 
grids of the two hayys that periodically found small clusters of family members residing in adjacent homes, 
but that failed to uncover any evidence of neighbourhoods or sub-neighbourhoods where members of a 
particular tribe resided together in a “tribal enclave” of any sort. 
23 The predations of the Ba’th regime were cited as having been notably influential in the degradation of 
sheikhly leadership and the destruction of traditional elements of civil society. When asked about the 
possible existence of respected civil society figures in Tisa Nissan, particularly tribal sheikhs, whom 
American forces might engage to compensate for the shortcomings of poorly-regarded local government 
leaders, one interviewee (an elderly man from Beladiyat Proper engaged at a Neighbourhood Council 
meeting in the spring of 2008) responded succinctly: “Saddam killed all those people”. The implications of 
this for the tribal engagement strategies of Coalition Forces were profound, and have been noted in Dodge, 
Inventing Iraq, p.161, who argues that only those with ties to the regime had been allowed to develop or 
sustain social capital. As such, he writes, “the ‘figures of influence’ that U.S. and U.K. forces are now 
using as intermediaries are almost certainly the very same individuals picked by Saddam Hussein to act as 
his eyes and ears”. On the evidence of Kamaliyah and Amin, Dodge’s assertion appears astute. 
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significant.24 The White Lion and his emissaries stood preeminent among the meagre resources 
available to the shi’a poor of Amin and Kamaliyah during the 1990s and, in response, the Sadrist 
movement was met with extraordinary local enthusiasm. Amin thus became home to a well-
organized mass following that networked through the religious institutions of its urban grid, while 
even Kamaliyah – a place not known for its piety – saw the White Lion become an iconic figure. 
 
The 1990s thus witnessed a surge in popular religiosity among the underclass shi’a of the two 
hayys, as the White Lion united local residents, at least in spirit, with millions of their co-
religionists elsewhere in the Iraqi capital and across southern Iraq.25 Emphasizing their common 
heritage as Arabs of Iraq’s tribal South, and proclaiming their impending empowerment after 
generations of prejudice and marginalization, he established an ideological movement that would 
endure beyond his death.26 Indeed, although his murder and the wave of government repression 
that followed was sufficient to check the Sadrist threat to Saddam Hussein’s regime, the battle-
lines of future conflict between the shi’a underclass and its “betters” in Iraqi society had been 
drawn.27 
                                                
24 The rise of the Sadrist movement is typically discussed as having occurred by working through the tribal 
structures of the shi’a underclass, with “Sadrist sheikhs” in Baghdad’s slums and across southern Iraq 
playing key roles in giving structure to the movement. For example, see Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, p.122; 
Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
2006), pp.95-96; and International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr”. On the evidence of Amin and 
Kamaliyah, however, it appears that the reverse may have been true in certain instances, and that “sheikhs” 
of questionable (or entirely fictive) authenticity may instead have buttressed their legitimacy and stature 
among their ostensible “tribesmen” by aligning themselves with the White Lion and serving as his 
intermediary. With respect to the pedigrees of Kamaliyah’s sheikhs, long-time residents of the Riyasah 
suburbs engaged by the author during patrols through the area in June 2008 expressed strong cynicism 
regarding prominent local leaders in the post-Saddam era, alleging that many of those whom Coalition 
Forces were now partnering with had previously been Ba’thist functionaries.  
25 As noted in the first three chapters, the fervour with which the White Lion and his emissaries were 
greeted cannot be accurately construed as a “revival” of shi’ism among the shi’a underclass, as the faith of 
many had been, at best, “informally” observed since their initial conversion to the sect. The rise of the 
Sadrist movement was thus all the more significant and remarkable, as it was an unprecedented surge not 
only of popular religiosity, but also of social unity within the shi’a underclass. 
26 Boaitey’s research on Baghdad’s shi’a underclass emphasizes the fundamental “Southernness” of the 
Sadrist movement. See, for example, unpublished manuscripts “Civil Society Part III”, and “The Gait of 9 
Nissan”. 
27 While the rise of the Sadrist movement clearly presaged the intra-shi’a clashes of the post-Saddam era, 
and was likewise instrumental in shaping Amin and Kamaliyah into welcoming terrain for the Mehdi 
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II. The Mehdi Army’s Struggle in Kamaliyah & Amin  
As Muqtada al-Sadr revived the Sadrist movement in spring of 2003, directing the Mehdi Army 
on its initial campaign to claim Baghdad’s impoverished, shi’a-dominated periphery, Amin and 
Kamaliyah became hotbeds of shi’a militarism. Drawing upon the enduring sentiments of the 
White Lion’s former devotees, and also capitalizing on the resonance of Muqtada’s impassioned 
anti-occupation rhetoric, the Mehdi Army established itself firmly in the two hayys. For, while 
Kamaliyah and Amin lacked the demographic homogeneity of nearby Sadr City, where the 
rekindled Sadrist movement could claim to represent the entirety of the resident populace, the 
militia was nonetheless able to exert a formidable street-level presence. 
 
Having established a firm foothold in Amin and Kamaliyah during the initial year of the post-
Saddam era, the Mehdi Army then consolidated its position during the sectarian war by violently 
cleansing the hayys of their sunni residents and asserting itself as their de facto ruler. However, 
while the eradication of the hayys’ sunni populations and the elimination of organized local 
opposition left the militia in uncontested control, problems emerged in each area. As the Mehdi 
Army attempted to govern Amin and Kamaliyah, it became increasingly apparent that the 
                                                                                                                                            
Army, the extent to which the Sadrist movement planted localized seeds of sectarian conflict was unclear. 
As detailed in Chapter Two, Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr was explicitly non-sectarian, ardently 
espousing both Arabism and Iraqi unity. The sunnis of Amin and Kamaliyah that had suffered decades of 
neglect and oppression alongside their fellow shi’a would thus have found much in the Sadrist message to 
which they might relate, and Sadrist shi’a in Amin, Kamaliyah, and elsewhere in Tisa Nissan engaged 
during 2008 fieldwork were adamant regarding the compatibility of the Sadrist agenda and Iraqi 
nationalism. There was a strong concern regarding bias and disingenuous misrepresentation in these 
assertions, as sectarian partisans might naturally downplay their feelings and conceal their prior actions in 
encounters with American forces, yet there did appear a genuine sincerity to the impassioned assertions 
(particularly of men in their forties and above) regarding their non-sectarian nationalism. Sunni critics of 
the Sadrist trend (who had been victimized by the Mehdi Army during the post-Saddam era) were far less 
charitable, however, describing the White Lion as a divisive demagogue, and the Mehdi Army as an Iranian 
fifth column created to pull Iraq apart. Furthermore, the extent to which radical strands of sunnism had 
spread throughout Amin and Kamaliyah during the 1990s could not be established, as the hayys’ sunni 
communities had been displaced from the area. Shi’a victims of sunni persecution often castigated their 
former oppressors as “wahabbis”, but the accuracy of this (and of the extent to which sunni militants either 
enjoyed substantive support from sunni civilians in Kamaliyah or Amin, or drew significant numbers of 
local recruits) could not be substantiated. As such, it remained unclear to what extent the surge of popular 
religiosity that occurred in Amin and Kamaliyah during the sanctions era presaged the sectarian violence of 
the post-Saddam era.  
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militia’s local characteristics were deeply corrosive to the rekindled Sadrist movement’s 
insurgent agenda. 
 
i. Victory in Kamaliyah & Amin  
The Mehdi Army made its presence felt in Kamaliyah and Amin from the earliest weeks of the 
post-Saddam era.28 In Kamaliyah, the militia began by targeting noted Ba’thists and eradicating 
the resident gypsy community, bringing a violent end to the local sex trade.29 However, the 
militia’s ability to exercise local power by preying upon its enemies did not translate into an 
ability to establish local order. On the contrary, Central Kamaliyah emerged as a major base of 
operations for the looters that were pillaging the city centre, fostering an atmosphere of 
criminalized chaos during the months that followed. Thus, while the militia steadily built up its 
local presence (in large measure by absorbing allies from among the Mafioso-style figures that 
were active in the area who, in turn, directed gangs of local youths on the militia’s behalf), 
Kamaliyah remained deeply unstable. 
 
The Mehdi Army’s beginnings were more structured in Amin, where the chaos of the initial 
invasion gave way to a more organized and politically purposeful trend in violence.30 Working 
through local mosques, the militia raised platoons of young men that played a prominent role in 
                                                
28 Accounts of the Mehdi Army’s rise in Kamaliyah were offered by local businessmen interviewed on 
American military facilities during May and June, by area residents engaged in their homes during 
fieldwork in Central Kamaliyah and the Riyasah suburbs, and by Iraqi Security Force personnel. 
29 The aggressive persecution of both groups was an early hallmark of the militia, and the Mehdi Army 
thereby asserted itself quickly in the hayy. The Mehdi Army’s annihilation of the gypsy village of 
Qawliyah, discussed in Shadid, Night Draws Near, p.437, was one of its most notorious early atrocities. 
Iraq’s gypsies had long been associated with prostitution and other “un-Islamic” vices, making them 
prominent objects of social prejudice and a target of religious militants.  
30 The militia’s campaign in Amin was detailed by members of the Iraqi National Police battalion 
responsible for the hayy (many of whom, moreover, were shi’a Baghdadis), Baghdadi interpreters attached 
to Coalition Forces, displaced former sunni residents of Mashtal interviewed on FOB Loyalty in April 
2008, and further described by local residents engaged during fieldwork. 
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early clashes with the Coalition, giving the hayy a reputation for lethality.31 Concurrently, the 
Mehdi Army also cultivated popular support among local residents. By providing much-needed 
welfare services to the public, and reportedly taking an active role in the movement of underclass 
shi’a families from Sadr City into the open terrain to the south of Amin’s core grid (where two- to 
three-storey homes were erected in large numbers, gradually filling the area between the hayy’s 
pre-invasion grid and the cement factory to the south), the militia steadily strengthened its base.32  
 
The explosion of the sectarian war brought sweeping changes to Amin and Kamaliyah. Both 
hayys were home to extreme violence, which culminated in the killing or forced displacement of 
their sizable sunni populations and the rise of the Mehdi Army to a position of total dominance.33 
However, the particular dynamics of violence in each hayy were deeply influenced by local 
factors. In Kamaliyah, the chaos of the invasion’s early days persisted through the duration of the 
conflict.34 Thus, while the local strongmen that served as the militia’s proxies led groups of young 
men on a brutal rampage against resident sunnis, and mosques such as the Imam Ali on Central 
Kamaliyah’s northwestern edge became central nodes of command and control for a religiously-
defined war of attrition against sunni civilians, shi’a families found themselves subjected to 
                                                
31 Conversations with American personnel from 4-10 BCT staff, and with staff and field personnel from 2-
16 infantry battalion, emphasized the strong legacy of anti-Coalition violence in and around Amin, which 
featured notably high IED threats along the heavily trafficked Army Canal expressway and Highway 5 
(known to American personnel as Routes “Pluto” and “Predators” respectively).  
32 Fieldwork in the area of new development that emerged between the pre-invasion southern border of 
Amin and the Army Canal (conducted in September 2008) found many local residents who claimed roots in 
Sadr City. Intermixed with other new arrivals from areas of southern Iraq (Amin’s position at the entry 
point of the main highway from the Deep South thus appears to have remained a formative influence), 
several spoke of Sadrist social services and local support prior to and during the sectarian war. The precise 
role of the militia in directing settlement into the area remained unclear, however. Rumours abounded of a 
coordinated re-settlement campaign involving Sadrist “realty” offices, and the militia had unquestionably 
established a dominant presence in the southern areas of Amin (where militia-affiliated entrepreneurs ran 
the small generators that supplied the area with electricity and controlled the distribution of propane and 
gasoline), but concrete evidence of a “colonization initiative” was elusive.  
33 Local residents engaged during fieldwork in both hayys noted that the sectarian “cleansing” of 
Kamaliyah and Amin was not wholesale, and that a small sunni minority remained scattered across the 
hayys. 
34 Resident civilians and Iraqi National Police personnel asserted that Kamaliyah had remained deeply 
turbulent throughout the post-Saddam era. The common narrative constructed by interviewees featured few 
references to either overarching political goals among the perpetrators of violence, or the criticality of 
popular sectarian hatred -- and far more discussion of opportunistic predation and killing. 
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attacks as well. Indeed, the violence of Kamaliyah’s “sectarian” war appears to have been driven 
largely by localized, material ambitions that evoked the criminality for which the hayy was 
infamous, as homes and businesses that presented attractive targets were plundered irrespective of 
their owners’ sectarian identity.35 
 
In Amin, the sectarian war proceeded with greater structure, and with greater ferocity as well. The 
Mehdi Army’s local aspirations were fiercely challenged by sunni militants, who struck 
marketplaces and other prominent civilian targets with a campaign of suicide bombings, and also 
beheaded shi’a civilians. Shi’a militants responded with their own offensive against local sunnis, 
leading to a protracted battle that inflicted devastating punishment on the entire population.  
 
As the fighting progressed, several factors combined to generate an atmosphere of singular 
virulence. First, the gruesome toll of the fighting appears to have had a radicalizing, desensitizing 
effect on local militiamen, creating a cycle of intensifying fear and hatred that, in turn, spawned 
further atrocities. Second, the scope and duration of the fighting drew in militiamen from Sadr 
City and southern Iraq, and Iranian-sponsored Special Group fighters as well.36 The mosques of 
Amin, prominent among them the Muhsin al-Hakim, thus came to espouse an exceptionally 
fearsome brand of internationalized shi’a militarism, and became not only operational bases and 
cache sites, but also sources of legitimizing ideology in one of the sectarian war’s more 
ferociously contested venues.37 
                                                
35 This was by no means unique to Kamaliyah. Munson, Iraq in Transition, p.205 observes how material 
concerns motivated elements of what was broadly characterized as “sectarian” violence in the upscale 
Mansour district of Baghdad as well.  
36 Discussions with American intelligence officers revealed that significant numbers of those detained in 
Amin were from other areas of Iraq. Noted in Boaitey, “Play and the Implications of Civil Society”, p.9. 
The role of Special Group militants and Iranian patronage in fueling violence in Amin was emphasized by 
American intelligence officers at Brigade and Battalion levels, and corroborated by discussions with 
members of the Iraqi National Police. 
37 It remained unclear whether the religious leaders within these mosques, who were understood by 
American personnel to have incited and enabled sectarian militarism in Amin, were local figures or were 
imported by the militia – or, similarly, to what extent sectarian hostility blossomed in the hayy as a function 
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ii. The Perils of Success in Kamaliyah & Amin 
Whereas the violence of the sectarian war followed distinct trajectories in Amin and Kamaliyah, 
it yielded a common outcome. By the start of 2007, both hayys sat within a broad arc of eastern 
Baghdad that was firmly held by the Mehdi Army.38 Amin and Kamaliyah, effectively cleansed 
of their sunni residents, were now integral parts of the militia’s greatly expanded domain in the 
Iraqi capital.  
 
Nonetheless, the Mehdi Army faced significant local challenges. Having positioned itself as the 
defender and benefactor of the hayys’ shi’a residents, and standing as local representative of the 
rekindled Sadrist movement, the militia had to govern its conquests. After decades of neglect and 
decay, however, and the waves of destructive violence and destabilizing population shifts that 
followed the 2003 invasion, the hayys were in a state of near-ruin. Meanwhile, the militia was 
suffering from severe internal difficulties as well, such that the abatement of sectarian violence 
did not bring a period of respite that might have enabled the militia to consolidate its gains in 
preparation for the advance of the Surge. 
 
In Kamaliyah, the problems facing the Mehdi Army were, in many ways, reflections of the hayy 
itself. The strongmen who comprised its local leadership and the gangs of young men that ran the 
streets of Central Kamaliyah were remarkably ill suited to the responsibilities of governance. 
                                                                                                                                            
of pre-existing sentiments, in response to sunni atrocities, or as a result of external shi’a agitation. 
Regardless, through the course of the sectarian war, Amin’s mosques became infamous for their role in 
supplying ideological and logistical support to the operations of shi’a militants. International Crisis Group, 
“Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.19 quotes a Sadrist supporter from Amin who notes the 
central role of mosques in directing patterns of militia activity. Local residents, displaced sunnis from 
Mashtal, and Iraqi National Police personnel recalled the central role of Sadrist mosques in giving direction 
and velocity to sectarian violence in Amin. The so-called “mosque monitoring” programmes of Coalition 
Forces, through which the Friday khutbas, or sermons, of mosques were monitored for their content, also 
reaffirmed that the mosques of Amin remained staunchly anti-Coalition and pro-Sadrist during 2008.  
38 Noted in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, pp.3-4. Sumedha 
Senanayake, “Iraq: Growing Numbers Flee Sectarian Violence”, Radio Free Europe, January 26,, 2007 
quotes sunni politician Andan al-Dulaimi’s statement that Amin had been cleansed by the Mehdi Army, as 
part of a broader campaign that was making Baghdad an increasingly shi’a city. 
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Their fighting prowess had been sufficient to drive out sunni civilians and defend the hayy from 
the incursions of sunni militants, but they did not instill feelings of security or sectarian pride 
among the populace at large.39 Nor were they equipped or inclined to lead the hayy’s 
reconstruction. Instead, with the violence of the sectarian war having driven off the owners and 
operators of local industry, and the final eradication of sunnis drying up the militia’s principal 
income stream, Kamaliyah degenerated further as the predations of its defenders were re-directed 
inward toward the local population.40 
 
Thus, while the Mehdi Army remained dominant in Kamaliyah, the populace at large was not 
effectively mobilized in support of its campaign. On the contrary, there was little evidence of 
“popular” activity of any kind in Central Kamaliyah, where civil society appeared to be in full 
retreat. The years of violence, uncertainty, and extensive population turnover that followed the 
2003 invasion had prompted local families to withdraw further from its dangerous and decrepit 
public spaces, seeking sanctuary in their homes – where the cleanliness and order (and occasional 
concentrations of remarkable wealth) stood in stark contrast to conditions beyond their doors.41  
 
                                                
39 During the course of fieldwork, no evidence was found to suggest a Robin Hood style aspect to the 
criminal-cum-militant networks active in Kamaliyah. Per the discussion raised by Juan Cole, “Marsh Arab 
Rebellion: Grievance, Mafias and Militias in Iraq”, Fourth Wadie Jwaideh Memorial Lecture, Department 
of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, Indiana University, 2008, Kamaliyah does not appear to have 
been the venue of “social banditry” a la Hobsbawm. As such, and as encountered elsewhere across Tisa 
Nissan, and as noted in the previous chapter, residents of Central Kamaliyah sought to reconcile their 
continued affinity for the memory of the White Lion and the ideals of the Sadrist movement with their 
experience under Mehdi Army rule by differentiating between “the militia” and the Sadrist movement.  
40 By early 2008, Kamaliyah’s industrial park was dormant. Plagued by erratic power supplies and the 
threat of violence, large-scale economic activity had effectively ceased in and around Central Kamaliyah.  
41 Central Kamaliyah was observed to be the most extreme example of incongruity between public disorder 
and private wealth in Tisa Nissan. Whereas its public spaces were in advanced states of decay, with pot-
holed streets, pools of sewage flooding roads and alleys, and crumbling critical infrastructure, numerous 
homes were found to contain modern appliances (the utility of which were dubious, owing to the 
neighbourhood’s limited electricity supply) and substantive evidence of material wealth. Sources in the 
Iraqi National Police made allusion to the origins of that wealth in the looting of 2003 and the area’s 
notorious criminality, yet this did not appear to be universally true. Instead, Central Kamaliyah appeared to 
be home to an assortment of families of modest means, who were focused on the preservation of order 
within their homes at the near-total exclusion of public life.  
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Likewise, the Riyasah suburbs and the hayy’s peripheral zones were far from bastions of popular 
insurgency. With the exception of Ma’mun (where the militia-affiliated elite was understood to 
congregate, prompting Americans to view the neighbourhood as “the centre of all evil in 
Kamaliyah”), and the three residential blocks to its immediate west along Highway 5 (which were 
deeply influenced by the nearby Imam Ali mosque, a hub of militant activity in Kamaliyah and 
Obeidy), the Mehdi Army did not appear to have integrated into local communities.42 In 
Mu’awaqiin and Bustan, local residents had adopted defensive postures. These were 
neighbourhoods that had sought to isolate themselves from the corrosive influences of Central 
Kamaliyah since well before the 2003 invasion, and thus while Mu’awaqiin appeared staunchly 
Sadrist, neither area was amenable to the local manifestation of the Mehdi Army.43  
 
The thousands of underclass shi’a who migrated to the open areas on Kamaliyah’s northern tier 
were not mobilized in support of the Mehdi Army either. Coming principally from Diyala 
Province, families began moving into the area from the early months of the post-Saddam era 
(with a later, sizable influx occurring in late 2006, when sunni militants escalated their activities 
in Diyala Province), erecting sizable single-family homes and creating a sprawling new 
settlement zone.44 However, in contrast to events on the southern tier of Amin, where the militia 
                                                
42 Quotation from initial survey interviews by the author with 2-16 infantry battalion, March 2008. 
American personnel from 2-16 infantry battalion, and their successors from 1-66 armor battalion, regarded 
Ma’mun as a central area of local militant leadership, from which senior leaders presided over the grid of 
Central Kamaliyah. 
43 While the residents of Mu’awaqiin expressed Sadrist sympathies and were of the movement’s core 
demographic, the residents of al-Bustan were neither. The area had been founded by far wealthier families, 
and while many had fled abroad (leaving caretakers to protect their homes), the area retained its pre-
invasion disposition. Small local shops displayed the image of Ali al-Sistani, remaining long-time residents 
were found to speak English, and the neighbourhood appeared to have preserved a sufficient measure of its 
identity to remain inhospitable to the Mehdi Army. 
44 The same features that had made Kamaliyah attractive to migrants from Diyala Province in generations 
past continued to hold true in the aftermath of the Ba’th regime’s fall, as both push and pull factors had 
brought families to the area. Some interviewees reported having moved to the area in an opportunistic 
attempt to improve their family’s position in the post-Saddam order, while others had fled sectarian 
violence. Indeed, the rise of the Awakening movement in Anbar Province drove key Iraqi al-Qaeda 
operatives to move to Diyala Province during 2006 – creating a spike in violence against area shi’a from 
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was noted to have been active in both channeling supporters into the area and facilitating their 
settlement with various service offerings, such efforts appear to have proved beyond the militia’s 
abilities in Kamaliyah.45 New arrivals were instead left to fend for themselves, and the landscape 
took on a jumbled, chaotic quality, epitomized by the dense tangles of power-lines rigged by local 
residents that hung over the dirt pathways crisscrossing the area.  
 
Thus, despite Kamaliyah’s overall demographic homogeneity after the sectarian war and the 
prevailing Sadrist sympathies of its residents, the Mehdi Army’s dominance was not matched by 
a strong base of popular support. Efforts to reinforce the militia’s position through the predations 
of local fighters and the deployment of morality police not only failed to mold Kamaliyah into a 
more manageable environment (or to impose hard-line Islamic discipline upon local residents), 
but instead provoked resentment.46 As a result, mosques such as the Imam Ali from which 
militants operated sat detached and isolated on the terrain, more like fortified fighting positions 
than integral parts of the surrounding neighbourhood.47 
                                                                                                                                            
late-2006 into 2007 that drove many into “safe” areas of Tisa Nissan. The effects of the influx of sunni 
militants into Diyala Province are noted in Kagan, The Surge, pp.84-85.  
45 The new settlement zone that sprawled northward from Riyasah was heavily trafficked by American 
forces, particularly after they relocated their local patrol base from the outskirts of Central Kamaliyah to the 
industrial park on the hayy’s northern tier in the spring of 2008. The area showed little evidence of local 
community and appeared to be home to a collection of families that moved individually to the area in 
response to either security concerns in Diyala Province or the allure free real estate in the capital.  
46 Seeking to eradicate the “un-Islamic” behaviour for which Kamaliyah was infamous, groups of black-
clad men were recalled during fieldwork to have harassed men and women in Central Kamaliyah during 
2006 and 2007. The Mehdi Army also backed a re-branding initiative that sought the abandonment of the 
name Kamaliyah in favor of al-Zahra, “The Shining One”, in a reference to the Prophet Mohammed’s 
daughter Fatima al-Zahra. It was unclear whether the Mehdi Army was responsible for the ultimate origin 
of the renaming scheme – indeed, civilian interviewees from Central Kamaliyah and its surrounding 
satellite neighbourhoods repeatedly expressed their desire to transform the hayy’s image and shed its 
terrible reputation – but regardless, the militia embraced the effort as part of a broader endeavour to reshape 
Kamaliyah. The professional-quality placards affixed to the streets of the hayy in support of the militia’s 
continued offensive against American forces referred to the area as al-Zahra, exhorting the religiosity of its 
residents. By the time of fieldwork in 2008, however, “Kamaliyah” was still used by all those encountered 
(including local Sadrist politicians in the District’s government). 
47 Pedestrian traffic in the vicinity of the Imam Ali mosque, for example, was observed to be sparse, even 
on Fridays and during religious events such as Ashura – in stark contrast to mosques elsewhere in Tisa 
Nissan. Conversations with enlisted personnel of the Iraqi National Police were further instructive on this 
point, as numerous sources asserted that it was common knowledge across much of Baghdad as to which 
mosques were nodes of violence and should thus be avoided. 
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In Amin, the Mehdi Army’s internal difficulties stemmed in part from issues specific to the hayy 
itself, yet more so from the manner in which the hayy had been conquered. Victory in the 
sectarian war had been achieved through the mobilization of local young men, the overarching 
leadership of religious militants, and the supplementary efforts of Special Group fighters. 
Collectively, they had driven sunni militants from the battlefield and cleansed the hayy of its 
sunni residents. However, the brutal excesses of that process held lingering, deleterious 
consequences. Not only did the brutality with which local sunni civilians were dispatched alienate 
popular opinion, but the character of rule imposed thereafter by militarized local gangs and 
radical sectarian militants further undermined the Mehdi Army’s support.   
 
As in Kamaliyah, the prominent role of volatile, often-predatory young men in the militia’s ranks 
did much to adversely influence popular opinion. Shi’a civilians may have been able to overlook 
their abuses for so long as they provided much-needed protection from the terror of sunni jihadis, 
but as the sectarian war cooled, relations soured between the families of Amin and their 
ostensible protectors.48 Deprived of the income stream that their now-eradicated sunni victims 
had provided, and having been further radicalized by a savagely fought sectarian battle, the 
Mehdi Army grew increasingly predatory. The social services that had previously won the militia 
an important measure of goodwill thus dried up, as young men turned upon their elders, and upon 
the populace at large.49 
 
                                                
48 As discussed further in the conclusion, the notion that the Mehdi Army’s abuses against sunni civilians 
enjoyed significant popular support among the shi’a underclass at large, particularly among older 
generations, appeared dubious – thus challenging interpretations of the sectarian war as having been the 
outgrowth of widely-held, essentialist forces. In Amin, as elsewhere across Tisa Nissan, the abuses of 
militants during the sectarian war appear to have driven shi’a civilians further into the relative safety of 
their homes, not out into the streets to take part in, or celebrate, the bloodshed.  
49 In regard to the altered posture of the militia toward local shi’a civilians, residents of the new 
development area along Amin’s southern tier engaged during September 2008 spoke with evident 
disappointment of the cessation of service provision and the increasingly predatory actions of local fighters. 
The implications of the “generation gap” that divided elder supporters of the White Lion from the youths 
and young men that came of age in the 1990s and 2000s is detailed further below. 
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At the same time, the particular brand of shi’ism that took root in the mosques of Amin also 
appears to have alienated local opinion. While the populace of Amin had become increasingly 
devout during the 1990s, the strands of Islam preached in mosques like the Muhsin al-Hakim 
went beyond the radical populism of the White Lion, entering the realm of internationalized, 
Iranian-influenced shi’a militarism. It remained unclear whether this was an outgrowth of locally-
grown radicalism or an import of the sectarian war, yet regardless, and despite whatever 
inspiration it may have provided to shi’a partisans, it appears to have far exceeded the appetite of 
the local population.     
 
The radical overreach of local militants was evident in the signage that surrounded mosques such 
as the Muhsin al-Hakim. For, although the quantity, quality, and geographic dispersion of militant 
imagery offered impressive evidence of the militia’s power, the content of those images was 
problematic. Sadrist imagery across Tisa Nissan, and more broadly throughout Iraq, commonly 
presented Muqtada al-Sadr alongside his father. Muqtada, however young and inexperienced, was 
thus displayed to the Iraqi people as the second coming of the White Lion. Often joined by 
likenesses of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein (in homage to the central figures of the shi’a faith), 
and at times Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr (a grand-uncle of Muqtada’s who, like the White Lion, 
was martyred by the former regime), images such as Figure 6.8 sought to emphasize Muqtada’s 
pedigree and burnish the image of the rekindled Sadrist movement.50 
 
In Amin, however, a shift occurred that was not observed elsewhere in the district. Figure 6.9, 
displayed prominently on the main street in front of the Muhsin al-Hakim mosque, depicts 
Muqtada not only alongside his father and the Imam Hussein, but also in the company of leading 
                                                
50 Nasr, The Shi’a Revivial, p.110 notes the specific relationship between Muqtada and Mohammed Baqir 
al-Sadr. 
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figures in international shi’a militarism: Hasan Nasrallah of Lebanese Hizballah and Ruhollah 
Khomeini, the iconic leader of the Iranian Revolution. 
Figure 6.8 – Typical Sadrist Imagery 
51 
Figure 6.9 – Sadrist Imagery in Amin 
52 
                                                
51 Sadrist imagery displayed in a private home in Central Kamaliyah. Photo by E. Peffley, September 2008. 
Featuring: (left to right) Imam Hussein, Muqtada al-Sadr, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, and the White Lion. 
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Nasrallah’s inclusion, while by far the less controversial of the two, was nonetheless troublesome. 
As the leader of a militarized political party that had dramatically advanced the position of 
Lebanon’s own long-marginalized shi’a underclass (establishing itself as one of Israel and the 
West’s most formidable foes in the process), Lebanese Hizballah was a much-lauded entity on the 
so-called Arab Street and, as noted in Chapter Three, a natural model for the Mehdi Army.53 Yet, 
while the Hizballah moniker had been appropriated by several shi’a insurgent groups in Iraq, 
Lebanese Hizballah’s Iranian pedigree made it controversial in Iraq. Anti-Iranian sentiments ran 
strong among Iraqi shi’a (particularly among those with memories of Iraq’s eight-year war with 
Iran), and the rise of Iranian influence over either Iraq or the Sadrist movement was anathema to 
many.54 
 
Whereas Lebanese Hizballah’s Iranian ties rendered the inclusion of Nasrallah controversial, the 
addition of Ruhollah Khomenei in Sadrist imagery was extraordinarily provocative. Poor to 
                                                                                                                                            
52 Sadrist imagery on the street in front of the Muhsin al-Hakeem mosque, Amin. Photo by the author, 
October 2008. Imam Hussein at centre, with (clockwise from top right) Hasan Nasrallah, Ruhollah 
Khomenei, the White Lion, and Muqtada al-Sadr. 
53 Lebanon, like Iraq, has long been home to a sizable (and growing) demographic bloc of underclass shi’a, 
concentrated in its rural, southern regions. The themes of class-based grievance and social prejudice at the 
heart of the Sadrist movement thus have parallels in the ideology of Hizballah. Furthermore, the modern-
day movement toward the empowerment of Lebanon’s shi’a underclass, spearheaded by Hizballah and 
Nasrallah, was initiated in large measure by a member of the Sadr family: Musa al-Sadr, also known as 
“the Vanished Imam”, was born and raised in Qom, Iran, educated in both Iran and Iraq, and then moved to 
Lebanon in 1960 where he established himself as a leading figure in the country’s shi’a community. He 
formed the “Supreme Islamic Shi’a Council” in an attempt to give the politically-marginalized shi’a of 
southern Lebanon a stronger voice in national politics, and then later founded the “Movement of the 
Dispossessed”, a charitable organization (with its own attached militia) that worked to further defend the 
interests of Lebanese shi’a as the nation’s civil war intensified. Musa al-Sadr’s standing was at its peak in 
1978 when he disappeared during the course of an official visit to Libya. The details of his fate have never 
been fully ascertained, leading to the creation of a myth – paralleling shi’a traditions about the “hidden 
Imam” – that he may return at some future date. 
54 Attitudes toward Hizballah thus appear to mark another implication of the generational divide that 
characterized the Mehdi Army’s campaign, with youths and young men who had no direct memory of the 
Iran war being far more eager to embrace Hizballah as an object of emulation than their elder Sadrist 
counterparts. Moreover, from the time of its creation, the Mehdi Army had sparked fear among Iraqis that 
mirrored those of many Lebanese vis-à-vis Hizballah: not only did the existence of a heavily armed 
political party independent of the state pose a serious threat to national unity and domestic stability, but 
Iran’s role in its training, funding, and operation rendered it all the more polarizing for its implications 
regarding national sovereignty.  On concerns over rising Iranian influence within the Mehdi Army, see: 
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.15 
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working class shi’a such as those in Amin had done much of the fighting, and the dying, during 
Iraq’s eight-year war against Khomeini’s Iran. The appearance of Khomeini in Mehdi Army 
imagery on the streets of Amin (only blocks away from neighbourhoods built especially for 
veterans of the Iran war and the families of the fallen), and the presentation of Muqtada al-Sadr 
and his father as ideological kin of the leader of the Iranian Revolution, thus offered insight into 
the Mehdi Army’s alienation of public opinion in Amin.55  
  
III. Social Erosion and the Fall of the Mehdi Army in Kamaliyah & Amin 
When the Surge commenced in Amin and Kamaliyah, American forces were confronted with an 
array of daunting challenges. The populations of the two hayys may not have been mobilized 
cohesively behind the militia’s campaign, but both areas were home to well-armed, locally-rooted 
groups that were committed to preserving their hard-fought gains. Furthermore, uneven popular 
sentiment toward the Mehdi Army did not translate into enthusiasm for the encroachment of 
American forces or the ascendancy of the shi’a establishment-dominated Iraqi government. On 
the contrary, with the anti-Americanism of the White Lion continuing to resonate, particularly in 
Amin, and with residents of both hayys having been neglected and scorned by the post-Saddam 
political establishment in much the same way as its predecessors in previous decades, the 
advances of counterinsurgent forces were viewed with extreme scepticism.  
 
Progress in Amin and Kamaliyah thus came slowly, and at great cost. During the initial year of 
the Surge, American forces pushed local militants onto the defensive and prompted others to flee 
Tisa Nissan, thereby affecting important steps in the reestablishment of security. Efforts to build 
                                                
55 Anti-Iranian sentiments ran strong among those who endured the conflict, and anti-Iranianism had been a 
key element of the White Lion’s rhetoric. Not only had he attacked Iranian influence in Iraq while praising 
the Arab virtues of Iraqi shi’a, but he also regularly slandered his shi’a establishment rivals (most notably 
Ali al-Sistani and the members of the Hakim family) by making allusions to their shameful “Persian” 
heritage. Disparaging references to Iran, and Iranian influence in Iraq, were encountered repeatedly during 
fieldwork in Amin, principally from men in their forties, fifties, and upwards.  
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upon these gains stalled, however. Rather than responding to counterinsurgency initiatives, Amin 
and Kamaliyah appeared intractable. Indeed, even during the months that followed March 
Madness when further, dramatic gains were made at the expense of shi’a militants, the hayys 
remained plagued by ineffective leadership, systemic infrastructural faults, and sporadically lethal 
violence.  
 
i. Counterinsurgency in Amin & Kamaliyah 
Throughout the Surge’s initial year, American forces had worked with their counterparts in the 
Iraqi National Police and the hayys’ District- and Neighbourhood-level government bodies to 
address security, development, and governance issues in Amin and Kamaliyah. Initial efforts to 
assert influence in the hayys witnessed the establishment of small, Company-sized patrol bases to 
allow American forces to maintain steady local presences, yet the potency of the Mehdi Army 
dictated that they be located on the peripheries of both hayys.56 An arduous process commenced 
thereafter, as American units fought to assert themselves within the two hayys and restore the writ 
of the Iraqi government, involving heavy fighting on the hayys’ streets and repeated attacks on 
American outposts. 
 
As American forces and their Iraqi counterparts established themselves more firmly in Amin and 
Kamaliyah, an uneasy stalemate developed. Low-level violence persisted, but by the end of 2007 
it appeared that the successful targeting of local militants and Muqtada’s calls for a ceasefire were 
combining to make Amin and Kamaliyah less dangerous.57 Nonetheless, efforts to reform 
                                                
56 In Kamaliyah, American forces commandeered an abandoned spaghetti factory on the northeastern 
border of Central Kamaliyah. In Amin, they moved between the District Council facility and a small 
compound to the north of the power station on the hayy’s eastern edge. 
57 The unilateral ceasefire that Muqtada al-Sadr imposed on the Mehdi Army in August 2007 did not lead to 
a cessation of fighting in Tisa Nissan – but it did affect an overall decline in violence. The main avenues of 
Amin’s central urban grid remained treacherous with EFPs, for example, as did the stretch of Highway 5 on 
Kamaliyah’s western edge and the Army Canal Expressway to the south of Amin. It was understood by 
American personnel that this reflected both the active presence of Special Group cells that were 
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governance and spur development achieved limited results. Governance initiatives were hindered 
by the mutual wariness that underpinned relations with local politicians (whom Americans 
regarded as ranging from ineffective to deeply corrupt and supportive of the Mehdi Army), and 
also by prevailing sympathies toward the Mehdi Army within the heavily-shi’a Iraqi National 
Police unit that was assigned to eastern Tisa Nissan.58 Development programmes also suffered as 
a result the hayys’ staggering infrastructural and economic problems, and because of the difficulty 
in mobilizing effective local leadership or active popular support. Amin thus continued to endure 
widespread electricity shortages (that were particularly embittering for local residents in light of 
the nearby presence of one of Baghdad’s primary power installations), while efforts to remedy 
Kamaliyah’s infamous sewage problem were stalled by violence and contracting difficulties.59  
 
The violence of March Madness, which erupted suddenly after an extended lull in activity during 
the winter of 2007-2008, caused considerable initial concern among American personnel. The 
ability of the militia and its affiliates to generate heavy violence in both hayys betrayed the 
fragility of gains achieved to date, not only demonstrating the enduring power of local militants 
over a year into the Surge, but also suggesting that the Mehdi Army’s position in Amin and 
                                                                                                                                            
unresponsive to Muqtada’s orders, and also the structural incoherence of the militia in the two hayys, where 
the Mehdi Army’s local affiliates pursued their own courses of action in response to the operations of 
American and Iraqi forces. 
58 Kamaliyah was especially notorious for the calibre of its politicians. The head of the Neighbourhood 
Council in 2007, who was widely understood to have accumulated his wealth and stature by robbing banks 
during the 2003 looting (and who was also acknowledged to be a local partner of the Mehdi Army), was 
eventually removed from office on a technicality when he was found to lack the high school diploma 
necessary to hold office. Tellingly, in regard to local attitudes toward tribalism, a local business leader 
interviewed in June 2008 asserted that his accumulation of wealth had “brought [him] into sheikh-hood”. 
His successor was a relative of Muqtada al-Sadr who appeared to embody much of Kamaliyah’s spirit – 
contradictory rumours abounded regarding the details of his past and his alleged ties to the Mehdi Army, 
while he transitioned seamlessly from the velour tracksuits and gold jewelry he wore on the streets of 
Kamaliyah, to the tribal garb favored for meetings with American officers, to business suits when engaged 
in official government business.  
59 Electricity shortages would persist through 2008 in Amin, generating enormous frustration among local 
residents. Apart from the public health risk posed by the canals of raw sewage in Kamaliyah, several 
municipal workers were overcome by toxic fumes and drowned in March 2008 while attempting to drain 
the swimming-pool sized pits of sewage into which the canals drained.  
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Kamaliyah might be stronger than previously appreciated.60 As violence abated in the wake of 
March Madness’ collapse, however, and American forces set about reclaiming Tisa Nissan during 
the spring and summer of 2008, conditions in Amin and Kamaliyah shifted yet again. The flight 
of noted Mehdi Army and Special Group fighters and the cessation of hostilities by prominent 
local militants led to major gains in security.61 As American forces swept through the 
neighbourhoods of Amin and Kamaliyah, working in partnership with a purged and now much-
reformed Iraqi National Police force, they encountered only occasional resistance.62  
 
However, despite remarkable improvements in security, efforts to address development and 
governance issues still made limited headway. For, while local marketplaces enjoyed a 
resurgence in Amin and Kamaliyah, and many local areas showed encouraging signs of 
revitalized activity, the hayys’ official leadership remained as ineffective as before and crippling 
infrastructural woes sat unremedied.63 The installation of a large generator in Kamaliyah’s central 
industrial park failed to spur a local economic revival, for example, while issues of corruption and 
systemic dysfunction continued to plague the power station in Amin. Indeed, frustration with the 
slow pace of progress and the perceived ineptitude, impotence, and corruption of local officials 
                                                
60 The extent to which the hayys’ populations were either sympathetic toward or actively involved in the 
Mehdi Army’s campaign was a central point of debate among American personnel prior to the March 
uprising. The hayys’ relative passivity during the late winter and early spring was seen by some as evidence 
of the militia’s weakness and of potential popular receptiveness to the advances of the Surge, while many 
suspected it was merely a demonstration of strategic patience by a populace that was awaiting instruction to 
rise up and resume hostilities. 
61 In recognition of the declining strategic position of the Mehdi Army in the wake of March Madness and 
the Mehdi Army’s defeat in Basra, noted local militants from Kamaliyah approached American personnel 
offering an informal truce in May 2008. Priority targets of American forces that had been known to operate 
in Amin, on the other hand, but who were not local to the area, were understood by intelligence officers to 
have fled for southern Iraq and/or Iran. 
62 The main roads remained dangerous with EFPs, and areas of Central Kamaliyah and Amin appeared 
hostile at times, yet both hayys proved largely calm during the operations undertaken during the spring and 
summer of 2008.  
63 Market areas within Central Kamaliyah experienced a notable surge of activity as the summer of 2008 
progressed, as did the large market centre on Third Street in Amin. Elsewhere in the hayys, American 
forces were able to renovate schools, install local generators, and provide cash grants to individual 
businesses, but they lacked the resources and leverage to address the systemic problems facing the hayys. 
Local politics, on the other hand, remained business as usual. The politics of Kamaliyah remained 
especially sordid, with one of its Neighbourhood Council representatives murdered in April. 
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reached the point that American forces largely disengaged from the local political system, seeking 
instead to pursue their objectives by working directly with the hayys’ residents. 
 
In support of this strategic shift, American personnel sought to identify and cultivate relationships 
with influential civilians who might assist in the hayys’ revitalization.64 Yet this effort, like many 
others before it in Amin and Kamaliyah, foundered. Moving from neighbourhood-to-
neighbourhood and house-to-house throughout both hayys during the spring and summer of 2008, 
no evidence was found of an underlying social order that American forces might leverage in 
pursuit of their objectives, or of local leaders who enjoyed broadly based communal influence. 
The Americans’ civil society initiative thus languished – though it did offer important insights 
into the roots of the hayys’ intractability.  
 
ii. The Degraded Terrain of Amin & Kamaliyah 
At issue was the fact that the badly degraded state of civil society in Amin and Kamaliyah had 
left the bulk of the hayys’ populations unable to coherently support either insurgency or 
counterinsurgency. With the traditional, tribal vestiges of civil society having been worn down by 
the stresses of migration and modernity, and with the Ba’th regime having methodically 
eradicated independent local leadership, there was no substantive underlying social order in the 
                                                
64 The HTT played a central role in this effort, which was inspired not only by the frustrations of American 
personnel with Tisa Nissan’s official leadership, but also by prevailing trends in counterinsurgency theory 
that advocated engagement with civil society (especially its “traditional” manifestations) and the cultivation 
of civilian support. Following the success of the Awakening movement in Anbar Province, in which local 
tribal networks had been mobilized as allies against Iraqi al-Qaeda and used to restore stability in areas 
where the Iraqi government was unable to exert sufficient power, there existed strong enthusiasm within 
the American military to replicate its achievements and rally support along tribal lines across Iraq. For an 
example from the canon of counterinsurgency, see: Richard Taylor, “Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and 
Ends to Successful Strategy”, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2005, p1 for the observation that “tribes 
are a cohesive indigenous social structure” and that “building relationships with tribes shows cultural 
awareness, respect for the local populace, and sores political capital that can be used over the long term”. 
The “Sons of Iraq” programme was one manifestation of this (discussed in Kagan The Surge, p.155), 
whereby American forces sought to mobilize and arm neighbourhood-watch style groups, typically through 
tribal frameworks. This initiative was a top priority of American forces across Baghdad yet, for reasons 
detailed below, it achieved extremely limited results in Tisa Nissan.  
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hayys. Instead, with the state having appropriated and manipulated what little remained of civil 
society during the 1990s, the fall of the old regime left the populace in a state of extreme 
atomization.  
 
With the Mehdi Army’s insurgent campaign relying heavily upon the ability to expand through 
the mobilization of local affiliates, the social condition of Amin and Kamaliyah directly 
influenced its fortunes in both hayys. The militia’s core membership possessed inherent, defining 
qualities of its own (embodied most famously by Muqtada al-Sadr and his counterparts in the 
sanctions generation). But particular features of Amin and Kamaliyah did much to dictate the 
manner in which the militia developed locally. Both hayys were home to tens of thousands of 
underclass shi’a who were devoted to the memory of the White Lion, but they were not organized 
coherently in viable social structures (whether tribal, professional, local, or otherwise). Lacking 
vital frameworks of organization and trust through which the social, religious, or political 
sentiments of the masses might be translated into substantive action, ordinary civilians were 
unable to exert a collective agency that would shape the Mehdi Army’s evolution.65  
 
There were, however, local networks that were eager and willing to contribute to the Mehdi 
Army’s campaign. In Kamaliyah, an assortment of seasoned gangsters came to the fore, while the 
radical mosques of Amin offered a framework from which the militia could build. Furthermore, 
both hayys offered platoons of young men, who responded vigorously to the style and substance 
of Muqtada al-Sadr’s message. The hayys’ “silent majorities” of ordinary shi’a families, on the 
other hand, appear to have remained marginal to the action of the post-Saddam era.66 Hiding in 
                                                
65 The architects of Ba’thist totalitarianism presumably understood this, having allowed the Sadrist 
movement to grow during the 1990s in the knowledge that the social atomization of the shi’a underclass 
would greatly inhibit the translation of Sadrist enthusiasm in to substantive action (a position that was 
validated by the utter failure of the al-Sadr intifadah in 1999).  
66 This dynamic was well understood by Iraqi National Police commanders. In a June 2008 meeting at the 
District Council facility, a senior leader of 4-1 INP clearly expressed his view on the futility of building 
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their homes, they were reduced to looking on in horror at the abuses and atrocities wrought by 
militants, while lamenting Iraq’s descent into sectarian division and bloodshed. Even their homes 
provided limited shelter, however, as families themselves had been rendered unstable by the 
pressures and stresses of prior years. With adults in the hayys speaking openly of living in fear of 
their children, the generation gap often noted in the development of the Mehdi Army thus 
betrayed the degraded condition of communities and families alike.67  
 
As a result of the Mehdi Army’s encounter with civil society in Amin and Kamaliyah, what might 
have been a mass-based insurgency of the shi’a underclass devolved into something far less 
coherent, and far less formidable.68 When the Surge advanced upon the hayys, therefore, it did not 
meet with coordinated popular resistance. This simplified American-led efforts to reestablish 
security, as the task required confronting and attacking discrete militant networks rather than 
overcoming the active, collective enmity of entire communities. However, the same underlying 
factors that had corrupted the Mehdi Army’s insurgency also undermined counterinsurgency 
initiatives: just as the bulk of the hayys’ populations had been unable to shape meaningfully the 
development of the militia, endemic social atomization (which was profoundly exacerbated by 
the violence and forced displacement of the sectarian war) precluded collective action in concert 
with the Surge.  
 
Thus, despite widespread desire for the rule of law, the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, and 
the revitalization of the local economy, the forces of the Surge remained largely unable to 
                                                                                                                                            
relationships with what he termed “good” tribal figures and members of the public – as those who were 
“bad” were the only ones with influence over trends in violence. 
67 As introduced in Chapter Three, the generation gap that developed among Iraqi shi’a was of pivotal 
importance in Amin in particular. In a trend that betrayed the extent to which the collapse of civil society 
had penetrated the nuclear family, middle-aged men from Amin (and also in Obeidy and Beladiyat) offered 
a remarkably similar confession during field interviews in their homes and sit-down meetings on FOB 
Loyalty – that they were living in fear of their children.  
68 Boaitey notes how the toxicity of the militia’s local affiliates proved poisonous to its overall campaign in 
“Civil Society pt. III”, p.26, observing how “the very practices of locality that feeds [the Mehdi Army]… is 
also a laxative”. 
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mobilize the people of Amin and Kamaliyah. On the one hand, there did not appear to be any 
sheikhs or civic leaders able to compensate for the shortcomings of the government by initiating 
grassroots efforts to administer local neighbourhoods or take ownership of development projects 
on a significant scale.69 On the other, with local residents having been aggressively conditioned 
over the course of generations to look to the state as the driver of political, economic, and even 
social action, such endeavours were all the more unlikely to take root.70 
 
The continued improvement of security conditions in Amin and Kamaliyah during the summer 
and fall of 2008 was thus not matched by comparable gains in governance or development. 
Neighbourhood- and District-level institutions remained unable to resolve the hayys’ many 
problems, while Baghdad’s central administration proved reluctant to allocate funds to such 
notoriously corrupt and troubled areas of the city.71 The goodwill achieved through gains in 
public safety was thus offset by festering discontent over continued problems with essential 
services, creating an atmosphere of frustration and disenchantment. Indeed, quality of life for 
                                                
69 Discussions with self-identified sheikhs from Central Kamaliyah (held at the District Council facility in 
August 2008) and eastern Amin (held at the District Council facility in September 2008) exposed this 
clearly. Kamaliyah’s sheikhs were openly resigned to their inability to prevent local violence, while the 
inquiry of an American officer during the latter meeting as to Amin’s sheilkhs’ ability to rally their 
“tribesmen” and provide neighbourhood-level security in the image of the Awakening was met with a 
frustrated sigh: “this is Baghdad, not Anbar” one man stated simply, and in the ensuing silence of his peers 
conveyed the impossibility of the suggestion. After decades of stresses and pressures, sheikhs were in no 
position to act as battlefield commanders or as leaders of popular militias in Amin or Kamaliyah, and there 
did not appear to be any “tribes” that might be leveraged toward military or political objectives. The Sons 
of Iraq programme thus struggled mightily, becoming a patronage vehicle for District Council members 
and city bureaucrats. Boaitey, “Civil Society pt. III”, p5 likewise discusses the “essentially reactive” power 
of sheikhs in Tisa Nissan, who were “incapable of preemption” or forward-looking agency, rendering them 
fundamentally unsuitable for the sorts of tasks that American personnel wished them to undertake.  
70 The perceived passivity of Baghdadis and the observed dearth of popular initiative was a source of much 
comment and debate among American personnel, breeding pervasive frustration in the context of faltering 
reconstruction and governance initiatives in the hayys. Discussed further in Appendix A. 
71 The city government itself, the amanat, remained plagued by its own problems of capacity and 
corruption, while powerful prejudices against the shi’a underclass (and, specifically, toward Amin and 
Kamaliyah as infamous venues of militarism and dysfunction respectively) meant that the hayys, like Tisa 
Nissan more broadly, were generally viewed with contempt as opposed to concern by city officials. 
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local residents was sufficiently unsatisfactory to provoke expressions of nostalgia for the rule of 
Saddam Hussein.72  
 
                                                
72 On two separate occasions during foot patrols in northeastern Amin during September of 2008, 
underclass shi’a male heads of household expressed their frustrations with the instability and material 
suffering of the post-Saddam era by expressing nostalgia for the Saddam era.  
Chapter 7 
 
Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr – Traction in the Remnants of Tradition 
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i. Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr: A Year into the Surge  
Figure 7.1 – Hayy Boundaries of Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
1 
In the early months of 2008, the hayys of Fedaliyah and Shawra wa Umm Jidr (hereafter referred 
to as “Shawra”) were the areas of Tisa Nissan that were least secured and least accessible to 
American forces.2 Fedaliyah was an insular, exclusively-shi’a enclave of Iraq’s much-maligned 
                                                
1 Google maps imagery from May 2004, adapted by the author. 
2 Due to access constraints detailed below, it was not possible to survey either hayy in person prior to the 
violence of late March. The initial survey of Shawra wa Umm Jidr was conducted in early April 2008 by 
the author, R. Kent, and A. Roosendaal, in conjunction with American personnel from 2-30 infantry 
battalion, but it was only possible to inspect the Rashad neighbourhood. The initial investigation of 
Fedaliyah was even more limited in scope, consisting primarily of discussions led by the author and R. 
Kent with American personnel from 4-10 BCT staff and from 2-16 infantry battalion (the latter of whom 
had been directly engaged in the administration of Fedaliyah for over a year), and drawing also upon 
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Marsh Arab community, and one of Baghdad’s most impenetrable places. This was due in part to 
the local terrain, which was crisscrossed by a tangled web of narrow, muddy lanes that were 
impassible by American vehicles. More importantly, however, it was also a result of the hayy’s 
inhabitants, who had further embellished the Marsh Arabs’ centuries-old infamy for belligerence 
by turning Fedaliyah into one of the Mehdi Army’s most important (and most feared) operational 
centres.3 Shawra, on the other hand, was a sprawling tract of land that extended northward from 
Baghdad’s outer canal. Forcibly cleansed and conquered by the Mehdi Army during the early 
years of the post-Saddam era, this remote area had thereafter been largely ignored by American 
and Iraqi forces – enabling shi’a militants to establish local strongholds and maintain critical 
transit routes between militia-held territory in eastern Baghdad and points north-northeast of the 
city.4  
 
The progress seen across much of Baghdad during the Surge’s initial year had bypassed both 
hayys almost entirely. Fedaliyah and Shawra sat firmly outside the reach of the Iraqi government, 
and the encroachment of American or Iraqi units was reliably met with violence.5 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                            
conversations with Baghdadi interpreters and Iraqis from other areas of Tisa Nissan during March and 
April 2008.  
3 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.10, emphasizes the centrality 
of Fedaliyah to the Mehdi Army: “A Baghdad merchant claimed that ‘Fudhayliya has become the Mahdi 
Army’s focal point. When a problem arises between Sadrist offices from different neighbourhoods, the 
Fudhayliya office steps in to find a solution’, Crisis Group interview, Baghdad, September 2007. In the 
words of a Baghdad student, ‘Fudhayliya is the Mahdi Army’s headquarters. It makes sense. Given how the 
Ma`dan fight against the Americans, they deserve it! They are very courageous and have no fear. The 
Americans don’t come near it; they bomb it from afar’, Crisis Group interview, Baghdad, May 2007.” 
Ma’dan is a traditional pejorative term for the Marsh Arabs, which is still widely used. As noted in 
Chapters One and Two, and discussed further below, the Marsh Arabs had long occupied the bottom rung 
of southern Mesopotamia’s traditional tribal order, and had been widely reviled for centuries on account of 
their alleged bellicosity, impiety, and general uncouthness. 
4 Located on the dividing line between the regional command structures through which the American 
military organized its forces in and around Baghdad, Shawra and its rural environs had received little 
attention since 2003. This had begun to change as the force realignments of the Surge enabled broader and 
deeper coverage of Baghdad’s periphery; yet in early 2008 much of the hayy remained uncharted territory. 
The implications of this were noted in Kagan, The Surge, p.189: “The disposition of US forces in 2006 left 
a dramatic hole east of Baghdad,” Kagan observes, “allowing Iranian weapons, secret cell leaders, and 
militia groups to flow freely through the area”.  
5 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.21, identified Fedaliyah in 
February 2008 as a “virtually impregnable” stronghold of the militia. Iraqi Security Force personnel were 
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Fedaliyah and Shawra were sufficiently inhospitable that American personnel had only been able 
to develop a limited range of first-hand insights into either hayy. 
 
Fedaliyah, a place unlike any other in the Iraqi capital, was one that outsiders were eager to 
discuss, however. The Marsh Arabs of Fedaliyah were infamous in Baghdad, and the free-flowing 
accounts of Iraqis from surrounding neighbourhoods and the ranks of the Security Forces 
catalogued their proclivity to extreme violence, the remarkable squalor in which they lived 
(which owed much to the herds of enormous water buffaloes, called jamoose, which many locals 
kept in pens attached to their homes), and their preservation of the austere tribal customs of 
traditional Marsh Arab society.6 To enter Fedaliyah (a move roundly discouraged by enlisted 
personnel of the Iraqi Police) was described as a trip backward in time: its physical landscape, 
strewn with dilapidated, single-storey houses of mud-brick, cinder-blocks, and sheet-metal, and 
pockmarked with vast lakes of raw sewage in which herds of jamoose would bathe, evoked the 
long-demolished slums of al-asima.7 Local patterns of life, on the other hand, revolved primarily 
around the maintenance of jamoose, and were marred by tribal blood feuds and revenge killings 
that recalled some of the most regressive, anachronistic aspects of Iraq’s traditional past.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
notably wary of entering Fedaliyah, which they preferred to give a wide berth. Attitudes of Iraqi policemen 
toward the hayy, which were laden with prejudices regarding the fearsome roughness and degenerate social 
norms of its residents, are catalogued in Boaitey, “Toward Fedaliyah: An Assessment”.  
6 It was common for Baghdadis to draw parallels between man and animal (with the distinction between the 
two often blurring) when describing the Marsh Arabs and their unique lifestyle, using the jamoose as an 
emblem of local culture and a metaphor for Marsh Arab life. The jamoose population of Fedaliyah was 
estimated at some 20,000 in Dransfield, Lynsey, “Soldiers Help Farmers Feed Water Buffalo”, Armed 
Forces Press Service, September 10, 2008.  
7 The hayy’s lakes of sewage, ranging from greenish-black to bright red, were the modern-day descendants 
of the “lagoons of black liquids” noted in al-asima by al-Madfai, “Baghdad”, p.61. As observed by Finkel, 
The Good Soldiers, p.71, the uniqueness of Fedaliyah was apparent even in satellite imagery, where the 
hayy stands in stark contrast to the grey and beige of Baghdad as a brown-to-orange blotch. “Fedaliyah was 
the spookiest place in the AO [Area of Operations],” Finkel writes, “an area of water buffalo farms and 
squatter hovels, so vaguely defined that even in crystal clear satellite photos it appeared blurry and 
smudged, as if it existed inside of its very own sandstorm.” Boaitey, “The Gait of 9 Nissan”, p.20, notes 
similarities between the landscape of Fedaliyah and the terrain of Iraq’s southern marshes (which were 
depicted in a painting hung in the Iraqi police station from which the hayy was administered), with 
Fedaliyah’s streams and lakes of raw sewage taking the place of the marshes themselves.  
237 





The trepidation with which outsiders approached Fedaliyah acquired an additional facet in the 
post-Saddam era, as the hayy’s Marsh Arabs established an exceptionally potent relationship with 
the Mehdi Army. Having become passionate devotees of the White Lion during the 1990s, the 
Marsh Arabs of Fedaliyah, like many of their counterparts in the slums of Basra and scattered 
                                                
8 Fedaliyah sewage pit with submerged cars, photo by the author, June 2008. 
9 The architecture of Fedaliyah, photo by E. Peffley, June 2008.  
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across southern Iraq, embraced Muqtada and his militia.10 Their fervour for the Sadrist cause and 
their prowess in battle transformed Fedaliyah into a bastion of shi’a militarism, where the Mehdi 
Army worked in concert with local tribes to export fearsome violence against American forces, 
the Iraqi government, and Baghdad’s sunnis as well.  
 
Shawra, while known to contain pockets of strong Mehdi Army support, owed much of its 
inaccessibility and its unsecured status to its location and size. Situated on Tisa Nissan’s 
northernmost edge, and covering a broad expanse of terrain stretching from eastern Baghdad’s 
outer canal toward the rural, southern reaches of Diyala Province, Shawra had been infrequently 
patrolled and essentially ungoverned until the force realignment of the Surge. Even then, the 
allocation of a single Company of American soldiers had only enabled the establishment of a 
meaningful presence in the Rashad neighbourhood in its southwestern corner. Efforts to project 
power eastward across Highway 5 or northward into the hayy’s upper tier were inhibited by 
manpower constraints, the difficulty and danger of movement along local roads, and the strong 
presence of the Mehdi Army in the immediate vicinity of Joint Security Station SUJ, the patrol 












                                                
10 While the Marsh Arabs were exclusively Sadrist in their religious sympathies, support for Muqtada al-
Sadr was not universal. Marsh Arab tribes lent political support to Iraqi Hizballah (unaffiliated with 
Lebanese Hizballah, it was a tribally-defined militant group in the southern marshes that was created by a 
prominent Marsh Arab sheikh to fight against Saddam Hussein from the mid-1980s onwards), and also to 
the Fadhila Party, an offshoot of the Sadrist movement rooted in Basra, that was founded by former 
devotees of the White Lion who did not recognize Muqtada’s authority. Fedaliyah was home to an official 
office of the Fadhila Party, the only such facility observed in Tisa Nissan. 
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Figure 7.5 – Main Settlement Areas in Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
11 
Nonetheless, American personnel active in the hayy believed that they presided over an area of 
underappreciated strategic importance. First, the hayy was a vital corridor for Mehdi Army and 
Special Group personnel, who moved men and materiel through Shawra between militia-held 
areas of eastern Baghdad and zones north and east of the capital (to include both the sectarian 
flashpoint of Baquba in Diyala Province, and the Iranian border as well).12 Second, the hayy was 
also home to potent local centres of support for the militia. The Hayy Nasser neighbourhood in 
Shawra’s southeastern quadrant had offered strong resistance to the Surge, and the hayy’s 
northern tier was likewise understood to be under firm militia control. The depth of the militia’s 
position to the north was uncertain, as American and Iraqi forces had only been able to extend a 
                                                
11 Google maps imagery circa 2011 (which shows the extent of new building beyond the boundaries of pre-
2003 neighbourhoods), adapted by the author. 
12 The importance of Shawra as a supply corridor for shi’a militants resisting the Surge in eastern Baghdad 
(and, likewise, for those previously focused on prosecuting the sectarian war) was a key point of emphasis 
among American personnel stationed at JSS SUJ. The suspected scale of movement of shi’a militants and 
Iranian weaponry, and the lack of action on the part of American or Iraqi forces to interdict either, were 
sufficient to prompt one American officer to suggest (only partially in jest) a deliberate conspiracy. These 
transit routes are noted on the map of Special Group movements provided in Cochrane, “Special Groups”, 
p.6. 
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limited presence into the area, yet it was understood that the hayy’s full reclamation would 
require significantly more resources than had been available to date. 
 
ii. Key Issues in Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr  
In Fedaliyah, local residents were renowned for their ferocity in attacking both American forces 
and sunni Baghdadis alike, and the Mehdi Army’s local command centre was a hub of city-wide 
militant activity. However, the nature of the militia’s relationship with local residents was 
unclear. How did an insular enclave of Marsh Arabs, shunned by outsiders and broadly reviled 
across Baghdad, come to host one of the Mehdi Army’s most important command centres? 
Popular prejudices against the Marsh Arabs – who had long-occupied the lowest rung of the 
traditional tribal hierarchy, and who remained social pariahs in modern Iraqi society – were 
pervasive and powerful. The centrality of Fedaliyah to the Mehdi Army’s campaign was thus 
remarkable. What had drawn the Mehdi Army to the hayy, and furthermore, what had enabled the 
militia to achieve a localized operational potency that surpassed its accomplishments elsewhere?  
 
In Shawra, it appeared that a security vacuum had enabled the Mehdi Army and associated shi’a 
militant groups to build a strong local presence. However, the exact manner in which the militia 
had established itself was unknown, as was the nature of its connections to the hayy’s residents. It 
was understood that the Mehdi Army’s conquest of Shawra had been tied to large-scale 
population transfers, which saw not only the eviction of local sunnis, but also the influx of large 
numbers of shi’a from Sadr City and elsewhere. How had the militia asserted itself in Shawra, 
what were the circumstances under which former sunni residents had been displaced, and how 
supportive was the resident population of its continued presence? Was the Mehdi Army’s evident 
strength the byproduct of substantive popular support, or was it more a consequence of the hayy’s 
neglect by American and Iraqi forces during previous years? 
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iii. March Madness in Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
Having been effectively inaccessible to American forces during the early months of 2008, 
Fedaliyah and Shawra were scenes of intense militant activity during March Madness.13 
Furthermore, whereas the weeks that followed saw American and Iraqi forces reassert firm 
control over much of Beladiyat and Mashtal and make promising early strides in Amin and 
Kamaliyah, both Fedaliyah and the vast bulk of Shawra remained impenetrable. American and 
Iraqi forces were thus compelled to hold Fedaliyah in quarantine, controlling the roads leading in 
and out of the hayy but deigning to enter; while in Shawra, American forces were able to 
reestablish themselves in Rashad, but they met stiff resistance in Hayy Nasser and remained 
unable to project significant power across the hayy’s northern tier.14  
 
The Mehdi Army thus retained both hayys through the spring of 2008, despite enduring major 
setbacks elsewhere in Tisa Nissan. Yet, as momentum in the district continued to swing in the 
favour of American and Iraqi forces, Fedaliyah and Shawra were increasingly isolated. 
Furthermore, the Mehdi Army was in full retreat on the national stage. Large-scale operations 
pressed into the core Sadrist strongholds of Sadr City and Maysan Province during May and June, 
inflicting such heavy damage on the militia that Muqtada was compelled to announce the Mehdi 
Army’s dissolution.15  
 
                                                
13 Finkel, The Good Soldiers, p.249 notes that when the Iraqi spokesman for the Baghdad Security Plan was 
kidnapped by the Mehdi Army, he was thought to have been held in Fedaliyah. 
14 Hayy Nasser attracted significant attention during the summer of 2008, as the neighbourhood became a 
fallback location for shi’a militants driven out of other areas of Tisa Nissan. It was thus transformed into a 
barricaded fighting position, with burning tyres and piles of debris blocking main access roads and 
militants operating openly on the streets, while local shi’a civilians fled in large numbers. Discussions with 
2-30 infantry battalion personnel, April 2008, JSS SUJ. Further complicating the Surge’s advance across 
Shawra were the limited resources of the Iraqi Security Forces, which lacked the manpower and equipment 
(and, arguably, the sense of urgency and operational capacity) necessary to establish order across the hayy. 
15 Operations to wall in and clear Sadr City, detailed in David Johnson, M. Wade Markel and Brian 
Shannon, “The 2008 Battle of Sadr City”, RAND Corporation, 2011; and Cochrane, “Special Groups”, 
pp.13-15, progressed through April and May, leading Muqtada to call for a truce on May 12. Operation 
Promises of Peace was then launched in June 2008 to clear the Deep South stronghold of Maysan Province. 
As detailed by Cochrane, it drove Mehdi Army fighters from the area with modest resistance.  
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In an effort to capitalize on these developments, and to reclaim two of Baghdad’s most prominent 
remaining strongholds of shi’a militarism, American and Iraqi forces launched major initiatives 
to seize control of Fedaliyah and Shawra. In Fedaliyah, results came abruptly and unexpectedly. 
On June 22, American forces and the bulk of an Iraqi National Police battalion embarked on an 
intensive, multi-day clearance of the entire hayy. Beginning on Highway 5 along the hayy’s 
western edge, and pressing eastward to the Diyala River, each home, store, warehouse, and 
jamoose enclosure was searched for weapons and wanted militants. This marked the largest 
incursion yet into Fedaliyah, and heavy fighting was anticipated. The reception afforded by the 
Marsh Arabs was entirely pacific, however, while cadre militants were found to have fled the area 
and the weapons caches thought to have been spread throughout the hayy’s jamoose enclosures 
proved elusive as well. Not only did the operation progress without hostilities, but local residents 
greeted Iraqi and American personnel warmly from the doors of their homes, with offers of tea 
and jamoose milk. 
 
Those taking part in the initial clearance of Fedaliyah, and who remained to patrol the area during 
the weeks that followed, were thus able to engage regularly with local residents in discussions, 
moving from house-to-house across the hayy.16 The Marsh Arabs’ altered posture toward the 
Surge transformed Fedaliyah into one of Tisa Nissan’s more inviting areas for ground-level 
investigation, offering an array of invaluable insights into local conditions.17 
                                                
16 Fieldwork in Fedaliyah, conducted primarily from late June through August of 2008, was led by the 
author in conjunction with American personnel from 1-66 armor battalion, and with the support of J. 
Makeur. The work of Boaitey was also invaluable to the investigation of Fedaliyah. Owing to the fact that 
Fedaliyah had long been a denied area to American personnel, to the sudden nature of its transformation, 
and to the peculiar traits of the Marsh Arabs, examination of the hayy (and the place of the Mehdi Army 
therein) became a major source of interest for American military personnel and their various civilian 
support assets. The HTT’s investigation of the hayy thus benefited significantly from the contemporary 
work of numerous other groups and individuals active in the hayy during the summer of 2008. 
17 Sit-down meetings were held with the hayy’s Neighbourhood Council representative at the District 
Council facility and, as discussed further below, important insights were gathered from observation of 
interactions between local sheikhs and American and Iraqi officers during formal meetings. Yet the 
investigation of Fedaliyah proceeded primarily through ground-level observation of, and interaction with, 
ordinary local residents. Through the duration of the summer, HTT personnel and their military 
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Efforts to assert control over Shawra, on the other hand, which intensified through the summer of 
2008, met with determined, sustained opposition. The operational tempo of American and Iraqi 
forces was thus escalated significantly from August onwards, with an additional Company of 
American soldiers relocating to the hayy in September to provide further support. Patrols were 
thereafter extended beyond the limits of Rashad with greater frequency, challenging militants in 
Hayy Nasser and meeting with uneven, yet occasionally intense, resistance in northern areas of 
the hayy.18  
 
Furthermore, as American and Iraqi forces raised their profile in Shawra, displacing militants 
from its southern tier and projecting influence further to the north, opportunities for sit-down 
meetings with local leadership emerged as well. On the one hand, the hayy’s Neighbourhood 
Council was revived after an extended period of dormancy, facilitating regular interactions with 
Shawra’s official leaders. On the other, the gradual abatement of violence was followed by 
appeals for sectarian reconciliation and the return of forcibly displaced sunnis, culminating in a 
series of meetings held among local leaders, which were mediated by the Iraqi National Police.19 
American forces were thus presented with a growing range of venues in which they could meet 
and develop relationships with prominent local residents, gaining insights into the events that had 
brought sweeping changes to the hayy since 2003. 
                                                                                                                                            
counterparts spoke with residents in their homes and places of business about Fedaliyah’s history, local 
patterns of life, and the events of the post-Saddam era – gathering a street-level view of Fedaliyah and 
attempting to understand its extraordinary transformation.  
18 By accompanying these operations, which granted access to local residents in their homes and on the 
streets of Shawra’s various sub-areas, and by drawing upon the growing resources and deepening insights 
of locally-stationed American and Iraqi units, the hayy was explored at ground-level. Fieldwork in Shawra 
was led by P. Leddy and A. Roosendaal, in conjunction with American military personnel from 2-30 
infantry battalion between August and November 2008. The Rashad neighbourhood in particular became 
increasingly stable during the course of autumn, enabling American personnel to survey the area and meet 
with local residents. 
19 These reconciliation-focused meetings, overseen by Iraqi National Police commanders and involving 
shi’a and sunni tribes rooted in Shawra’s northern tier, became a major point of focus in Tisa Nissan during 
the autumn of 2008. It was hoped that they would facilitate the return of displaced sunnis and the 
reassertion of the rule of law in what had previously been an extremely dangerous, Mehdi Army-held area, 
and that it might serve as a model for the numerous other areas around Baghdad where the sectarian war 
had witnessed similar patterns of displacement.  
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I. The Distinctiveness of Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
From the Mehdi Army’s impressive displays of localized strength during the Surge’s initial year, 
to the subsequent durability of its resistance in the months after March Madness, it was evident 
that the militia had achieved a superior potency in Fedaliyah and Shawra. In both hayys, the 
Surge met with powerful opposition, which was well entrenched in the terrain and proved 
exceptionally difficult to dislodge. An understanding of the source of this potency, and of how 
and why the Mehdi Army’s insurgent campaign in Tisa Nissan appeared to have reached its 
greatest heights in Fedaliyah and Shawra, thus offered potentially powerful insights into the 
dynamics of its broader fortunes.    
 
Close study of the Mehdi Army’s rise and fall in Fedaliyah and Shawra shows that its insurgent 
campaign was shaped in fundamental ways by the hayys’ histories, and the manner in which they 
had evolved during previous decades. While Fedaliyah and Shawra’s creation and growth owed 
much to the same migratory flows and urban development initiatives that drove the overall 
expansion of Baghdad’s eastern periphery, each had acquired distinct social and demographic 
characteristics that presented the Mehdi Army with critical advantages.  
 
i. The Foundation and Preservation of Fedaliyah  
Fedaliyah was established during the initial phase of eastern Baghdad’s government-led 
expansion, as a dedicated enclave for Marsh Arabs.20 Groups of Marsh Arabs (and their herds of 
jamoose) had been present among the early waves of mass migration to the Iraqi capital during 
the 1940s and 1950s. Settling in small clusters in slums like al-asima, interspersed among the 
masses of underclass shi’a migrants, they and their animals acquired an immediate notoriety for 
                                                
20 Information on the history of Fedaliyah was drawn principally from conversations with Marsh Arab 
sheikhs from Fedaliyah that were conducted in conjunction with official meetings held at the District 
Council facility in August 2008, sit-down interviews held on FOB Loyalty in April 2008 with sunnis who 
had been displaced from Mashtal, and discussions held with the hayy’s residents during fieldwork 
throughout the course of the summer. 
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their contamination of the landscape.21 The extraordinary amounts of waste generated by their 
herds of jamoose, and the animals’ habit of cooling themselves in vast pits thereof, featured 
prominently in the accounts of appalled observers as defining features of Baghdad’s increasingly 
wretched periphery; providing ammunition both to those who agitated for reform on the migrants’ 
behalf, as well as to those who bemoaned the corrosive influences of migration on the capital.22  
 
There was, therefore, a certain irony in the fact that Prime Minister Qassim’s sweeping urban 
development initiative – which was a fundamentally sympathetic effort to remedy the plight of 
the migrants, signifying the revolutionary regime’s commitment to “social justice” for Iraq’s 
downtrodden shi’a underclass – raised an existential threat to the Marsh Arabs’ position in the 
Iraqi capital. Requiring space to house their herds and access to ample reserves of food and water, 
eastern Baghdad’s emerging landscape of densely packed housing blocks was wholly 
inhospitable. The demolition of Baghdad’s decrepit and diseased sarifas and their replacement 
with the modern tenements of Revolution City and Shula was thus a dramatic initial step toward 
the betterment of the vast bulk of Baghdad’s migrant poor, but it imperiled the Marsh Arabs’ 
traditional way of life.  
 
To remedy the concerns of the Marsh Arabs, a parcel of land far from the city centre was 
designated for their use. The disparate communities of Marsh Arabs that had settled along the 
city’s margins thus relocated with their herds to a plot of land along the Diyala River, forming the 
                                                
21 As noted in Chapter One, Hilmi estimated that the Marsh Arabs comprised a mere 2 percent of al-
asima’s population. See: Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.278-285 for a discussion of the ma’dan in al-asima. 
Early population movements from the marshes appear to have occurred through a process of tribal 
fragmentation similar to that witnessed elsewhere across the South, in which small- to medium-sized 
kinship clusters moved to Baghdad, creating new micro-settlements of Marsh Arabs on the margins of the 
city. 
22 The attention attracted, and the emotions provoked by the Marsh Arabs and their herds, was by no means 
universally sympathetic. The encroachment of Marsh Arabs provoked both disgust and concern among the 
self-consciously modern elites who were attempting to forge a new, forward-looking Iraqi culture within 
the heart of Baghdad. The arrival of what, to them, were regarded as manifestations of the most backward 
and regressive elements of traditional Southern culture, marked a direct threat to their pursuit of modernity. 
See Hilmi, Internal Migration, pp.278-85 and al-Madfai, “Baghdad”, p.61 for related observations. 
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nucleus of Fedaliyah. There they established a localized social, cultural, and economic ecosystem 
all of their own that, through subsequent decades, became a magnet that attracted further Marsh 
Arab migrants whilst repelling all others.23  
Figure 7.6 – Jamoose Enclosure, Fedaliyah 
24 
However, as eastern Baghdad’s growth continued through the 1970s and 1980s, external 
pressures mounted on Fedaliyah. Its Marsh Arab residents grew infamous for their ties to criminal 
activity, while their steadfast adherence to rough, traditional customs and pastoral patterns of life 
inspired near-universal contempt.25 The neighbourhood thus came to be regarded as a blight on 
                                                
23 Fedaliyah’s unique ecosystem both reflected and reinforced the Marsh Arabs’ distinct patterns of life. 
Houses, which were commonly connected to sizable pens that housed jamoose, were typically built from 
mud bricks, and the pits from which dirt was exhumed for brick-making filled with various forms of human 
and animal waste, creating ponds in which the animals could cool themselves. In turn, the jamoose 
provided both income and sustenance to their owners, as their milk was famed for its health benefits and 
their dung was dried into cakes that were used for cooking and heating fuel. This cyclical interdependence 
is also noted in Cole, “Marsh Arab Rebellion”, pp.11-12 in reference to Marsh Arab habitats in southern 
Iraq. 
24 Photo by the author, June 2008. 
25 See Boiatey, “Toward Fedaliyah: An Assessment”, for further discussion of prevailing attitudes among 
Baghdadis toward local residents, who were regarded with general contempt. It was an article of faith (even 
among those somewhat sympathetic toward their position) that the Marsh Arabs and their jamoose did not 
belong in Baghdad, and that they should be relocated elsewhere. A duality emerged in the narratives of 
Baghdadis when discussing Fedaliyah: on the one hand, Marsh Arab society was said to be endemically 
violent, with blood feuds and killings rampant at the local level. On the other hand, however, it was noted 
that the people of Fedaliyah formed a coherent whole of sorts, and would fight vigorously to defend their 
enclave against outsiders. Furthermore, in a sign of the forces that separated Fedaliyah from the rest of 
Baghdad, the accumulation of wealth (which was said to reach considerable sums among the owners of 
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the urban landscape that ought to be eradicated, and the accumulation of popular enmity further 
isolated the Marsh Arabs in Fedaliyah. 
 
During the 1990s, the social prejudices that had long hounded the Marsh Arabs were 
compounded by waves of aggressive government persecution. With Saddam Hussein waging an 
all-out war against the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq (largely in response to the anti-regime 
actions of Marsh Arab groups, which reached alarming levels during and after the 1991 uprising), 
Iraq’s Marsh Arabs were besieged as never before.26 Declaring that the “marsh people” were not 
Arabs, but instead “indistinguishable from” the jamoose with which they had allegedly been 
breeding for generations, the Iraqi government attacked them both rhetorically and physically.27 
Furthermore, the Iraqi government also initiated preparations for Fedaliyah’s demolition and the 
relocation of its residents out of Baghdad across the Diyala River.28 The Marsh Arabs’ enclave in 
Baghdad, which they had struggled to maintain in the face of great adversity through prior 
decades, was thus threatened with final destruction; and the violence that emanated from the 
neighbourhood earned it the nickname shishan, meaning Chechen, in reference to the brutal 
insurgency ongoing at that time in the former Soviet Union.29 
 
                                                                                                                                            
jamoose herds) did not lead prosperous Marsh Arabs to relocate from the squalor of the hayy. Wealthy 
families instead remained in their simple homes among their animals; a habit that provoked incredulity 
among members of the Iraqi Police, but that appears to have been further instrumental in the maintenance 
of a coherent, localized social order. 
26 Cole, “Marsh Arab Rebellion”, suggests that the offensive against the Marsh Arabs could be construed as 
“genocide”, “insofar as [Saddam] destroyed their way of life and cohesion as a people”. For discussion of 
the government offensive against the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq, see: Nicholson and Clark (eds), The 
Iraqi Marshlands. Alexander Tkachenko, “The Economy of the Marshes in the 1990s”, in The Iraqi 
Marshlands, pp.55-56 notes that Marsh Arabs had been migrating in significant numbers to Baghdad and 
the cities of southern Iraq since the 1970s, and the government offensive (which peaked in 1993-1994) 
provoked a further surge in movement. Shahristani, “The Suppression and Survival of Iraqi Shi’is”, p.135 
notes that the marshes were largely drained by 1994, while an estimated 10,000 Marsh Arabs had fled to 
refugee camps in Iran.  
27 Quotations from al-Khafaji, “State Terror and the Degradation of Politics”, p.20. 
28 Plans to remove the Marsh Arabs to Diyala Province are noted in Boaitey, “Play and the Implications of 
Civil Society”, p.5.  
29 The shishan nickname, which was also applied to areas of Saddam City in recognition of the danger they 
posed, is noted in Boaitey, “Play and the Implications of Civil Society”, p.9.  
248 
In light of these intensifying stresses, Iraq’s Marsh Arabs greeted the rise of the White Lion with 
great passion. The sustained outreach of Sadrist emissaries (who made deliberate overtures to 
Marsh Arabs across Iraq, actively cultivating their support) stood in sharp contrast to the neglect 
and disdain shown previously by the elites of the clerical establishment, while the Sadrist 
message of underclass dignity and empowerment resonated profoundly. As a result, irrespective 
of their notorious reputation for impiety, the Marsh Arabs of Fedaliyah, like their counterparts 
across Iraq, embraced the Sadrist movement. Integrating Sadrist ideals into their own long-
running struggle for communal preservation, Marsh Arabs emerged among the movement’s most 
fervent and dedicated supporters – a point violently punctuated by their leading role in the 
retributive anti-regime violence that followed Sadr’s murder in 1999.30 
 
ii. The Development of Shawra wa Umm Jidr  
As a result of Shawra’s size and location, its northern and southern tiers evolved in response to 
two different sets of influences. To the south, along the edge of Baghdad’s outer canal, the Iraqi 
state drove development directly. For the purpose of containing domestic unrest, it was 
established practice in Iraq to encircle major urban areas with trusted loyalists and government 
facilities.31 With the outer canal demarcating the capital’s northeastern border, and Highway 5 the 
key route between Baghdad and points north-northeast, southern Shawra became the domain of 
the state: three prisons were built (one for women), a regional domestic security headquarters was 
established, while the ministry of agriculture and other institutions also developed sizable 
presences.32  
                                                
30 As noted in Chapter Two, Marsh Arab tribes were responsible for much of the violence during the so-
called al-Sadr intifadah that occurred after the White Lion’s murder. It remained unclear whether the 
residents of Fedaliyah contributed to the uprising, however, or the extent to which the decision to remove 
the Marsh Arabs from Baghdad was influenced by Marsh Arab anti-regime agitation. 
31 See: Ajami, The Foreigner’s Gift, p.5 for discussion of urban control and encirclement strategies. 
32 The development of southern Shawra comes from discussions with members of the hayy’s 
Neighbourhood Council, conducted on JSS SUJ by A. Roosendaal and P. Leddy during September and 
October of 2008. 
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In conjunction with the proliferation of government facilities, which reached its apex under 
Ba’thist rule, southern Shawra also acquired a small, heavily-Ba’thist residential population. The 
Rashad neighbourhood in particular became home to numerous government officials and, as a 
result, local infrastructure and essential services were maintained to a significantly higher 
standard than in surrounding areas (earning the small settlement the nickname “Tikrit”, in 
reference to the hometown of Saddam Hussein). As such, while Rashad also attracted a collection 
of relatively poor migrant families of shi’a from Diyala Province, southern Iraq, and nearby areas 
of Baghdad, the neighbourhood maintained a far more orderly feel than other areas of intensive 
migrant settlement like Kamaliyah and Amin.33  
 
To the east of Highway 5, a modest industrial base also developed during the 1970s and 1980s, 
with brick factories and textile plants occupying the terrain alongside local government 
installations. Additional residential growth then occurred in the wake of the Iran war, with the 
construction of Hayy Nasser, or “Victory Neighbourhood”.34 The neighbourhood became home to 
an assortment of lower- to middle-class shi’a and sunni families (Ba’thists prominent among 
them) and grew incrementally through the 1990s. Yet southern Shawra remained a lightly 
populated zone that was dominated by the state.35  
 
Along Shawra’s northern tier, local growth mirrored developments in the remote, adjoining zones 
of southern Diyala Province. From the drab, semi-urban settlement of Amari, to the clusters of 
                                                
33 Long-time shi’a residents of Rashad, engaged in their homes and in sit-down meetings on JSS SUJ 
during the fall of 2008, expressed nostalgia for the material quality of life enjoyed under Ba’thist rule 
(particularly as the area had fallen into abject disrepair with the collapse of the state), but noted that 
material benefits had come at the price of intense scrutiny from the security services. 
34 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, pp.194-195 observes how the regime “celebrated” the conclusion of 
the war with Iran by building neighbourhoods such as Hayy Nasser, absent any true reckoning of the war’s 
cost or the actual resources of the state. 
35 Outside of the Rashad neighbourhood, local residential infrastructure remained poorly developed and 
essential services were broadly lacking. Despite the strong local presence of the government, its 
representatives in southern Shawra were focused principally on the maintenance of order within Baghdad 
rather than the development of their immediate surroundings. The government’s most significant, sustained 
involvement in the area was thus to use the area north of Hayy Nasser as a sprawling open landfill.  
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homes that sprawled further northward along Highway 5, to the small encampments interspersed 
across the farmland near the Diyala River, northern Shawra was far removed from the 
administrative attentions and urbanizing influences of central Baghdad. Instead, the area attracted 
a collection of shi’a and sunni tribal and familial clusters, some of which blended together in the 
area’s more dense settlements, and some of which established individual enclaves across the open 
terrain.36  
 
Growing modestly as an offshoot of the major population shifts that occurred from Iraq’s 
periphery toward Baghdad during the mid- to late-twentieth century (which gave rise to many of 
the small towns and settlements on the bleak agricultural belt surrounding the Iraqi capital), 
northern Shawra remained significantly more rural and tribal than much of the rest of Baghdad. 
Indeed, in a reflection of the extent to which Shawra, as a whole, laid only the most tenuous claim 
to inclusion within the city, the area was repeatedly transferred administratively between 
Baghdad and Baquba.37 Receiving scant attention from authorities in either city, however, the 
area remained poor, underdeveloped, and underserviced by the government, with local residents 
mired in a state of relative neglect and isolation.  
 
Having absorbed substantial numbers of underclass shi’a residents during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the Sadrist movement was able to make inroads into Shawra during the 1990s. The area’s mixed 
                                                
36 Owing to access limitations arising from the remoteness of northern Shawra, and also to the ways in 
which the sectarian violence and forced population movements of 2006 and 2007 made discussion of the 
claims of various groups to particular pieces of terrain extremely contentious, key aspects of the area’s 
historical development remained unclear. However, as detailed further below, it was evident that both shi’a 
and sunni tribal groups had established enclaves across northern Shawra, and that they retained a measure 
of communal coherence and geographic cohesion not evident in Kamaliyah or Amin, for example.  
37 The decision to transfer the area between Baghdad and Baquba reflected not only the indifference of both 
urban centres toward the marginal spaces of Shawra, but also, allegedly, the periodic desire of the Ba’th 
government to bolster the numbers of party loyalists within Diyala Province by reallocating the Ba’thist 
contingent of southern Shawra. Furthermore, the hayy’s very name is suggestive of Baghdad’s attitude 
toward the area, as the region from which “Shawra” takes its name is far further north, situated well beyond 
city limits. During the post-Saddam era, local residents desirous that the government extend essential 
services and improve local infrastructure would thus refer to their particular neighbourhoods individually, 
largely eschewing the name “Shawra” – which implied the hayy’s collective inclusion in a faraway place. 
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sectarian composition dictated that support was patchy, yet the shi’a of Amari and its environs, 
like others in Rashad and Hayy Nasser, rallied to the White Lion’s call. Furthermore, still-vibrant 
tribal ties between the shi’a of Shawra’s northern tier and their counterparts in the Sadrist 
strongholds of Iraq’s Deep South appear to have facilitated the Sadrist movement’s spread 
through the area, to the extent that the 1990s witnessed the development of a local base of 
organized support that would endure well beyond the White Lion’s murder.38 
 
 
II. The Mehdi Army’s Power in Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
As Muqtada al-Sadr set about rekindling the Sadrist movement and mobilizing Iraq’s shi’a 
underclass into the Mehdi Army, Fedaliyah and Shawra presented valuable opportunities. In 
Fedaliyah, the Marsh Arabs’ enduring reverence for the White Lion combined with their 
communal desire for self-preservation (and their aggression and aptitude in battle) to yield 
formidable results. In Shawra, the militia found not only ardent allies among local shi’a, but also 
a target rich environment for the persecution of Ba’thists and the conquest of terrain. As a result, 
the Mehdi Army enjoyed enormous successes in both hayys, drawing them into the urban empire 
that it carved out across eastern Baghdad’s periphery.  
 
However, Fedaliyah and Shawra’s significance to the militia extended well beyond what might 
have been expected. With Fedaliyah an insular enclave of socio-cultural pariahs, and Shawra a 
marginal, remote region that was broadly regarded as lying beyond the city limits, the hayys were, 
in fundamental respects, unlikely hubs of militia activity. Yet, as the Mehdi Army’s insurgent 
campaign faltered elsewhere, with the militia struggling to translate the Sadrist sympathies of the 
shi’a underclass masses into coherent, substantive support, the hayys’ were found to hold 
                                                
38 As noted below, the dynamics of the sectarian war offered compelling evidence of connectivity between 
the tribal clusters of Shawra and their counterparts elsewhere in Iraq, with local intra-shi’a rivalries 
appearing to tie into tribal conflicts in the Deep South (and, moreover, to the alliances forged between 
prominent southern tribal groups and the Mehdi Army). 
252 
considerable value. As a result of features particular to the human terrain of each hayy – which 
were direct byproducts of their unique historical experiences and demographic profiles – 
Fedaliyah and Shawra proved to be the areas in Tisa Nissan where the militia was best able to 
rally and sustain potent, locally-rooted insurgency. 
 
i. The Mehdi Army Comes to Fedaliyah 
As the Mehdi Army initiated its insurgent campaign in Baghdad, the Marsh Arabs of Fedaliyah 
vividly reified stereotypes of their innate belligerence. In Baghdad, as in Basra and across key 
areas of southern Iraq, Marsh Arabs proved themselves to be among the most eager and capable 
opponents of Coalition Forces.39 As such, irrespective of any social prejudices harboured by 
leaders of the rekindled Sadrist movement, Iraq’s Marsh Arabs assumed prominent positions as 
proxy allies of the Mehdi Army – as the violent behaviour for which they had been long derided 
was found to have great utility on the battlefield.  
 
Fedaliyah’s value to the Mehdi Army then rose further during the sectarian war.40 As a purely-
shi’a enclave of passionate Sadrists, and an insular environment that was effectively impregnable 
by sunni militants, Fedaliyah offered an ideal sanctuary for shi’a partisans. The Sadrist office 
established on the hayy’s main east-west artery thus became a central command and control 
centre, from which cadre militants oversaw operations citywide.41  
                                                
39 Like Fedaliyah, the areas of Marsh Arab settlement in Basra (which grew significantly in response to the 
government offensive in the marshes during the 1990s) became areas of powerful support for the Mehdi 
Army and dangerous to Coalition Forces. Noted in Cochrane, “The Battle for Basra”, p.3. For historical 
precedent, see: Wilfred Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1964) p.49 on the 
infamy acquired by the Marsh Arabs of southern Mesopotamia during World War I, when they raided both 
British and Ottoman forces. 
40 The aggressive role of Fedaliyah’s Marsh Arabs in the sectarian war for Baghdad was emphasized by 
Iraqi Security Force personnel stationed at JSS al-Khansa, by sunnis who had been displaced from Central 
Mashtal, and by Baghdadi interpreters attached to 1-66 armor battalion. The sectarian prowess of 
Fedaliyah’s residents was also noted in International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the 
Surge”, p.10.  
41 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.3 notes Fedaliyah as a hub 
of citywide sectarian operations. 
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In addition to providing an unassailable defensive position, Fedaliyah also supplied the Mehdi 
Army with some of its most fearsome shock troops – as a result not only of the martial aptitude of 
the Marsh Arabs, but also of the vibrancy of Fedaliyah’s local tribal order. In contrast to other 
areas of Tisa Nissan, where a host of stresses had combined over the course of decades to atomize 
the population, Fedaliyah possessed a critical measure of internal social order. Its mahallah-like 
homogeneity appeared to have facilitated the preservation of communal integrity, with tribal 
leaders enjoying significant influence and prestige, while its insularity (which was reinforced by 
continuous external hostility) had helped shield traditional civil society from corrosive external 
influences.42 Therefore, when the Mehdi Army sought to rally local support, there were coherent 
structures that provided traction for offensive and defensive purposes alike. 
 
The previously shunned and scorned Marsh Arabs of Fedaliyah thus found themselves at the heart 
of the Mehdi Army’s campaign in Baghdad. Social prejudices persisted (and, indeed, appear to 
have intensified, as the Marsh Arabs’ excesses against sunni civilians provoked accusations of 
barbarism from even their Sadrist allies), yet the prominence of Fedaliyah as a bastion of shi’a 
                                                
42 While the migrations that brought Marsh Arabs families to Baghdad were characterized by patterns of 
tribal unraveling similar to that of the shi’a underclass at large, it appears that the maintenance of Fedaliyah 
as a small, homogenous enclave may have not only facilitated the preservation of remaining tribal norms 
and bonds, but also served as an incubator of sorts, enabling the re-growth of civil society. It proved 
impossible to pursue this line of inquiry in depth – and the essentialist authenticity of local tribes and 
sheikhs remained uncertain – yet local residents engaged during fieldwork spoke openly and matter-of-
factly about a legitimate local tribal order in ways not seen elsewhere in Tisa Nissan. Marsh Arab society 
was by no means immune to the pressures generated by modern Iraq, as noted by Christopher Mitchell, 
“Assault on the Marshlands”, in The Iraqi Marshlands, p.94, who cites communal collapse within ma’dan 
refugee communities forcibly displaced to refugee camps in Iran during the 1990s. Nonetheless, while it 
was a virtual certainty that Fedaliyah’s appearance of having been frozen in time was deceptive in key 
respects, it appeared that a vibrant tribal order did exist. Furthermore, in his work in the hayy, Boaitey 
found that a sense of community had emerged in Fedaliyah that was structured upon local families’ time of 
settlement.  The initial core of the neighbourhood was known as “First Fedaliyah”, arrivals of the 1960s 
constituted “Second Fedaliyah”, and subsequent settlers “Third Fedaliyah”. It was reported to be common 
knowledge which families belonged to which group and it appeared that a social hierarchy of sorts had 
formed as a result – offering further evidence of communal structure and coherence. Similarly, a local 
resident who claimed to have been among the first to settle in Fedaliyah in 1963 (interviewed by the author 
during fieldwork in July 2008) recalled how various tribal fragments had blended together to form a 
community in the hayy, emphasizing the localized nature of ma’dan solidarity. 
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militarism continued to grow.43 The combined power generated by the militia and its Marsh Arab 
kin was such that forcibly displaced shi’a from middle to working class areas of western Baghdad 
sought refuge on the hayy’s northwestern margins, enduring squalid conditions in exchange for 
guaranteed protection from sunni militants.44  
 
Retaining its importance to the Mehdi Army as sectarian violence abated, Fedaliyah became a 
key base for resistance against the Surge. Owing to the formidable capabilities of the Mehdi 
Army and its Marsh Arab allies, and also the difficulty of manoeuvering on the hayy’s 
treacherous terrain, the forces of the Surge made little headway in the hayy.45 The local Sadrist 
office instead remained a prominent operational centre for shi’a resistance, the jamoose stables 
and haystacks scattered throughout the hayy were thought to conceal a sizeable arsenal, and 
residents appeared ardently hostile to the encroachment of both the American military and the 
Iraqi government (which, like its Ba’thist predecessor, regarded the Marsh Arabs with a blend of 
contempt, concern, and irritation).   
 
ii. Taking Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
The Mehdi Army’s conquest of Shawra began in the early months of the post-Saddam era. Home 
to sizable concentrations of Ba’thists and numerous installations of Saddam Hussein’s police 
                                                
43 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists and the Surge”, p.10, notes that the exploits of 
the Marsh Arabs during the sectarian war were such as to provoke Sadrist partisans to label them 
“barbaric”. 
44 Investigation of the area of new settlement in northwestern Fedaliyah found shi’a heads of household that 
claimed to have been homeowners and prosperous businessmen in their formerly mixed-sect 
neighbourhoods of Abu Ghraib, in western Baghdad. Living in decrepit single-storey buildings on the 
outskirts of Fedaliyah, they expressed a unanimous desire to return to their former homes – but remained 
unable to do so owing to the continued threat of sunni militants (and the lament of several interviewees that 
their homes and businesses had been commandeered by sunni civilians). The plight of displaced shi’a 
living in Fedaliyah was emphasized repeatedly by International Organization for Migration, “Anbar, 
Baghdad & Diyala: Governorate Profiles, Post-February 2006  IDP Needs Assessments”, December 2007, 
accessed online: http://www.iom-iraq.net/idp.html.  
45 With the main east-west artery lined with EFPs, and many of the hayy’s unpaved side-streets too narrow 
for American vehicles, it remained exceedingly difficult for American forces to enter Fedaliyah, much less 
establish an enduring presence.  
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state, the hayy’s southern tier attracted the predatory attentions of the Mehdi Army.46 Successfully 
eradicating the functionaries of the former regime, the militia was left in de facto control over 
much of the area – leaving it well positioned to draw strength from, and to proactively influence, 
the inward surge of shi’a families that occurred from nearby areas of Sadr City, Diyala Province, 
and other areas within Baghdad.47  
 
The early years of the post-Saddam era witnessed hundreds of new homes spring up on the open 
spaces around Rashad, Hayy Nasser, and Batool, as opportunistic migrants laid claim to the 
property of the fallen regime and to land that had formerly been vacant. Modern-day sarifas of 
the sort found across northern Beladiyat and throughout much of nearby Obeidy thus proliferated, 
while larger homes were also built in Batool.48 Similar to the Mehdi Army’s advance into 
Beladiyat, therefore, the militia was able to entrench itself in southern Shawra by channeling 
operatives and supporters into the area (to Hayy Nasser in particular, which appeared to have 
been colonized in much the same way as Sa’ba Nissan), and by drawing footsoldiers and 
facilitators from among the growing pool of underclass shi’a youths.49  
 
                                                
46 Rashad and Hayy Nasser were recalled to have served as fallback points for Ba’thists fleeing persecution 
elsewhere in Tisa Nissan, but the continuation of violence against them rendered their position in Shawra 
untenable.  
47 Examination of the neighbourhoods of southern Shawra during October and November 2008 found that 
elements of their pre-invasion populations remained (especially in Rashad, where long-time shi’a residents 
lamented the collapse of local services that came with the fall of the regime and the sweeping phenomena 
of unregulated construction that ensued), but that the area had absorbed large numbers of migrants from 
various areas of Iraq. Whereas initial population flows traced primarily to nearby areas of Baghdad and its 
immediate environs, later arrivals hailed from further afield in Diyala Province, and southern Iraq as well.  
48 The eastward surge of Sadr City residents is visible in satellite imagery available online via google maps. 
The sprawl of these modern-day sarifas brought tens of thousands of new residents to Tisa Nissan, flooding 
Obeidy in particular, and exerting strong influence on southern Shawra as well. 
49 The extent to which the militia was able to guide actively population inflows across southern Shawra was 
unclear. The presence of American forces on the western edge of Rashad appears to have limited its 
presence in that neighbourhood, but the militia developed a strong contingent of support in and around 
Hayy Nasser. Like Sa’ba Nissan, the neighbourhood became a focal point of militant activity; while more 
broadly, in contrast to Beladiyat, where established, pre-invasion communities resisted the militia’s 
advance, the eradication of southern Shawra’s core constituency of Ba’thists granted the militia 
uncontested dominance across much of the hayy.  
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As the sectarian war gathered momentum, southern Shawra attracted additional population flows 
and was drawn more tightly into the militia’s embrace. The area’s peripheral position, removed 
geographically from the turmoil that was wracking much of Baghdad and Diyala Province, 
rendered it an attractive point of refuge for shi’a families. Migrants of various socio-economic 
backgrounds thus moved into the area’s expansive open spaces in growing numbers, where the 
Mehdi Army’s local power provided protection against sunni attack. Hayy Nasser also emerged 
as an important operational centre. Located at a strategic location at the entrance to eastern 
Baghdad, and having attracted a strong contingent of militants, the neighbourhood became a key 
transit node and a sanctuary for fighters – roles that it would retain as sectarian violence abated, 
and shi’a militants turned their attentions to combating the Surge.  
 
In northern Shawra, the dynamics of the militia’s rise resembled the progression of events 
elsewhere across Diyala Province’s rural expanses. Having been relatively isolated during the 
early instability of the post-Saddam era (when the main insurgent groups were focused 
principally on attacking Coalition Forces and disrupting the emerging political order), the area 
was plunged into chaos by the eruption of sectarian violence. The battle for Baghdad sparked 
numerous, tangential contests for control over mixed-sect areas on the main approaches to the 
city, and northern Shawra thus attracted the attentions of the conflict’s principal antagonists.50  
 
The fighting that ensued in northern Shawra involved a web of alliances between nationally-
oriented sectarian militant networks and local tribal groups.51 With the Mehdi Army drawing 
                                                
50 From the Taji area north of Baghdad to the so-called “Triangle of Death” to the south of the capital the 
mixed-sect villages and towns beyond the capital’s outer margins became venues of intense sectarian 
violence during 2006 and 2007, as the province (and areas in and around Baquba in partiulcar) attracted 
large numbers of sunni militants fleeing the pressure created by the Awakening in Anbar Provinces. 
Discussed in Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 2, p.431. The wider dynamics of violence in Diyala 
Province during the post-Saddam era are discussed in Kagan, The Surge, Chapters 4-6. 
51 As was the case across much of Diyala Province, the specific nature of those alliances, and the extent to 
which either external militants or local actors were ultimately responsible for instigating violence, remained 
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upon the active support of certain local shi’a tribes, and area sunnis alleged to have liaised with 
al-Qaeda affiliated militants, a series of battles occurred during the summer and fall of 2006 in 
the region between Amari and the Diyala River.52 The victory of shi’a forces drove surviving 
sunnis to seek the protection of neutral shi’a tribes, but pressure from the Mehdi Army and its 
affiliates had ultimately forced the cessation of their support. A rout thus ensued, ending with the 
disposal of sunni bodies in the nearby landfill and the exodus of approximately one thousand 
survivors to the Taji area north of Baghdad.53  
 
Consolidating ties with its tribal allies, the Mehdi Army was thereafter the dominant force in 
northern Shawra. Furthermore, it appeared that the relationship forged between the militia and its 
local affiliates created synergies that benefited both parties. For the Mehdi Army, tapping into a 
localized tribal order enabled it to entrench itself firmly in northern Shawra, providing structure 
and order to its presence; while for the militia’s tribal allies, partnership with the Mehdi Army 
enabled them to achieve a level of influence that was otherwise unobtainable.54 With American 
                                                                                                                                            
unclear and subject to significant controversy. One the one hand, militant groups such as the Mehdi Army 
and Iraqi al-Qaeda were known to make inroads into targeted areas by positioning themselves as the 
protectors of their local sectarian kin, thus capitalizing on the fears and suspicions that proliferated with the 
escalation of sectarian violence – in essence, capitalizing on opportunities that they themselves had created. 
On the other hand, however, opportunistic local actors might actively invite militant networks into their 
neighbourhoods and villages, leveraging the resources of powerful, terror-inspiring patrons in pursuit of 
personal or communal advantage. The particulars of northern Shawra remained unclear, though the two 
dominant lines of explanation focused on the notoriously strong national-level relationship between one of 
the area’s most prominent sunni tribes with Iraqi al-Qaeda (not only in Diyala Province, but also in Anbar 
Province), and the particularly close affinity between one prominent shi’a tribe and the Mehdi Army 
(which likewise extended to the national level, with the tribe playing a key role in militia operations in the 
Deep South).  
52 Accounts of the fighting, and of the various loyalties of northern Shawra’s tribal groups, were collected 
during September and October 2008 in conversations held at JSS SUJ and by telephone with the official 
leadership of the hayy (who, on the whole, claimed neutrality in the conflict), with members of the Iraqi 
Security Forces, and with surviving sunnis who had been forcibly displaced from the area. 
53 Sunnis were not entirely eradicated, however. During 2008, northern Shawra had a sunni representative 
on the Neighbourhood Council – the only sunni official in all of Tisa Nissan beyond the Army Canal. 
54 As in Fedaliyah, the essentialist authenticity of Shawra’s tribal system remained unclear. Nonetheless, 
tribally-defined groups were observed to operate in a coherent, locally-recognized fashion not evident 
across much of the rest of the district. It thus seemed that the relative neglect and isolation of decades prior 
– which had fueled local grievances regarding the poor quality of local services and infrastructure – had 
possessed benign aspects. As a small, obscure area that had, in effect, fallen between the administrative 
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and Iraqi forces largely absent from the area, the Amari neighbourhood thus became a key transit 
hub for shi’a militants that was strewn with Sadrist imagery, while the familial and tribal ties 
between residents of Amari and Hayy Nasser further consolidated the hayy’s stability as a Mehdi 
Army stronghold.55  
 
III. The Surge in Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
For more than a year, Fedaliyah and Shawra resisted the advances of the Surge. Drawing upon the 
strength of its tribal allies in both hayys, and capitalizing on its success in reshaping the terrain of 
southern Shawra (thus creating a localized base of support), the Mehdi Army mounted 
formidable, durable opposition to American-led counterinsurgency operations.56 Indeed, in a 
vivid demonstration of the exceptional localized strength of shi’a militarism, the two hayys 
remained beyond the reach of American and Iraqi forces in the wake of March Madness, when 
Sadrist-inspired resistance was collapsing elsewhere and the Mehdi Army itself was dissolved. 
 
Yet, while Fedaliyah and Shawra marked the Mehdi Army’s most impressive insurgent 
achievements in Tisa Nissan, the events surrounding the hayys’ reclamation suggested that the 
militia’s local successes were qualified. Although the eventual ability of the Surge to penetrate 
                                                                                                                                            
cracks between Baghdad and Baquba, civil society had survived (or, perhaps, been rehabilitated or 
recreated entirely) in ways not possible nearer to the core of the capital. 
55 It was understood by American intelligence officers that there was a high level of connectivity between 
Amari and Hayy Nasser, particularly among local affiliates of the Mehdi Army.  
56 The inability to capture the detailed inner workings of tribal systems in Shawra and Fedaliyah, or the 
specific dynamics through which they engaged the Mehdi Army, did not preclude the appreciation of their 
significance to the militia’s overall campaign. With the limited goal of understanding how and why the 
militia had excelled in these two hayys whilst struggling in nearby areas home to legions of Sadrist shi’a, it 
was sufficient to note that Fedaliyah and Shawra were places where civil society operated in an observably 
stronger fashion. Critical to the militia’s local fortunes, not only were Fedaliyah and northern Shawra home 
to thousands of underclass shi’a that ardently supported the Sadrist movement, but local residents were 
organized coherently along popularly accepted lines. The resulting synergies between the cadre of the 
Mehdi Army, a nationally oriented militia, and the locally rooted tribal networks of the two hayys, had 
achieved an operational coherence unmatched elsewhere in Tisa Nissan. Boiatey notes this synergy in 
respect to Fedaliyah: “Through [the Mehdi Army], Fedaliyah was ferocious. They produced a kind of 
resistance to Coalition Forces that was deeper than anything [the Mehdi Army] could have mustered up on 
its own”. Boaitey, “Toward Fedaliyah: An Assessment”, p.7. 
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Fedaliyah and Shawra during the summer and fall of 2008 was far more the result of the Mehdi 
Army’s nationwide implosion than the efficacy of local counterinsurgency initiatives, the hayys’ 
responses to the encroachment of the Surge exposed a vulnerability in the militia’s insurgent 
strategy: the harnessing of dynamic local allies had generated exceptional operational potency, 
but the militia had not effectively subsumed its proxies’ local, communal identities and priorities 
within its own. As such, the Mehdi Army was left exposed to recalculation and betrayal as its 
broader fortunes soured, with its local allies pursuing independent strategies of communal self-
preservation rather than acting as part of a cohesive whole. 
 
i. Counterinsurgency in Fedaliyah & Shawra wa Umm Jidr 
From the start of the Surge in early 2007 until the summer of 2008, American and Iraqi forces 
made minimal headway in Fedaliyah and Shawra. In Fedaliyah, the strength of local hostility 
prevented American forces from establishing a patrol base within the Marsh Arabs’ domain. 
Confined instead to Joint Security Station al-Khansa (located alongside Highway 5 to the north of 
its intersection with Fedaliyah’s main east-west artery), American units and their Iraqi 
counterparts struggled to project significant influence in the hayy.57 Shawra, meanwhile, attracted 
scant attention from American and Iraqi forces alike. Those stationed at Forward Operating Base 
Hope in the hayy’s southwestern corner (later re-named Joint Security Station SUJ) extended only 
a modest reach into Shawra’s sprawling expanse, while shi’a militants operated with impunity to 
their immediate west, north, and east.58  
 
                                                
57 From the time that 1-66 armor battalion replaced 2-16 infantry battalion (in the midst of March Madness) 
until the major incursion of late June, American personnel did not enter Fedaliyah. Prior to that period, the 
American and Iraqi Security Force presence had been light in the hayy for several months, leading to a 
détente of sorts whereby the forces of the Surge sought to contain Fedaliyah while avoiding the provocation 
of its residents.  
58 Like Ba’thist security personnel who had previously been stationed in southern Shawra, Coalition Forces 
stationed at FOB Hope had been primarily concerned with the maintenance of order within central 
Baghdad, particularly in nearby Sadr City.  
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Both hayys reacted violently to the incursions of American and Iraqi patrols, and proved 
overwhelmingly inhospitable to the non-violent, constructive inducements of counterinsurgency 
such that minimal progress was made before March Madness. Prevailing American views of 
Fedaliyah were captured in the succinct assessment of a soldier from the infantry Company that 
had administered the hayy, who described it as “a place we go to get in a gunfight”, while the vast 
bulk of Shawra remained inaccessible.59 Both hayys instead remained in the hands of shi’a 
militants, and their prominent roles in the violence that erupted during late March – as well as 
their continued hostility during the months that followed – were unsurprising to American 
personnel. When large-scale initiatives were launched to finally assert control over the hayys 
during the summer and fall, therefore, it was widely understood that this marked an intrusion 
upon shi’a militants’ strongest remaining fortifications, and that the outcome of the efforts might 
prove decisive to the fate of Tisa Nissan’s shi’a insurgency.  
 
The sudden and unexpected transformation of Fedaliyah – from a cauldron of insurgency to a 
peaceful, permissive environment for Americans – provoked amazement that was at once 
celebratory and cautious. On the one hand, the pacification of Fedaliyah marked an extraordinary 
achievement, as it represented the taming of what had been one of the Mehdi Army’s most 
impenetrable bases of operation. On the other hand, however, with the hayy having been, in 
effect, “offered up” rather than actively reclaimed, there was a palpable eeriness to Fedaliyah’s 
newfound calm.60 As American personnel and their Iraqi counterparts attempted to consolidate 
their gains, most notably through economic support to jamoose-owners (who claimed to have 
fallen on hard times when the Ba’th regime’s destruction led to the cessation of grain subsidies 
                                                
59 Interview with 2-16 infantry battalion personnel with operational experience in Fedaliyah, FOB 
Rustamiyah, March 2008. 
60 In the words of an enlisted soldier from 1-66 armor battalion in the immediate aftermath of Fedaliyah’s 
initial, uneventful clearance, it was “like someone flipped a switch” to turn off resistance. Interview by the 
author at JSS al-Khansa, June 2008. It stood to reason, therefore, that this “switch” might be flipped back 
on again.  
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necessary to feed their herds), those operating in Fedaliyah thus remained wary of an equally 
sudden return to violence, and vigilant for what the future might hold.61 
 
Progress came neither as suddenly nor as dramatically in Shawra. From mid-summer onwards, 
efforts to displace shi’a militants from Hayy Nasser brought heavy violence to the hayy’s 
southern tier. Blocking local roads with burning tyres and assorted debris, the remnants of the 
now-disbanded Mehdi Army barricaded Hayy Nasser and fought a protracted battle that 
continued into the fall, firmly establishing the area as Tisa Nissan’s most prominent remaining 
trouble spot. 
 
However, the arrival of an additional Company of American forces in September and the 
redoubled attentions of American and Iraqi forces brought significant pressure to bear at a time 
when the positions of local militants were increasingly isolated.62 Thus, while violence continued, 
momentum shifted decisively against those resisting the pressures of American and Iraqi forces – 
catalyzing changes that resonated across the hayy. With a revived Neighbourhood Council system 
providing a framework for discussion, and the heightened involvement of an increasingly 
respected Iraqi National Police leadership serving as mediator, fighting eventually gave way to 
                                                
61 In light of the cessation of price supports, local jamoose-owners claimed that they were being compelled 
to sell significant portions of their herds to slaughter in order to raise the capital needed to maintain their 
remaining stocks. However isolated Fedaliyah’s localized ecosystem may have appeared, its existence had 
required the active support of the state via extensive feed subsidies. Their cessation in 2003 thus created, 
according to local jamoose owners desirous of American financial support, an economic crisis. The 
accuracy of these claims, and the scope of the “feed crisis” in Fedaliyah proved difficult to substantiate, yet 
it was raised repeatedly as a pressing concern during street-level interactions with local residents and at 
official meetings held at the District Council facility during the summer of 2008. American efforts to aid 
jamoose owners are detailed in Dransfield, “Soldiers Help Iraqi Farmers Feed Water Buffalo”. 
62 American forces sought to utilize the non-violent inducements of counterinsurgency in southern Shawra, 
notably by supplying otherwise unavailable clean water to local residents and attempting to remedy 
endemic electricity shortages. Nonetheless, the decisive changes that occurred in Shawra appeared to stem 
principally from the application of force against local militants (situated in a broader context of defeat and 
retreat by shi’a fighters nationwide). The non-violent, positive approaches of counterinsurgency were then 
employed after the fact (to uncertain effect), in an effort to capitalize on the displacement of militants and 
to generate a measure of popular enthusiasm for the encroachment of the American military and the Iraqi 
government.  
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highly charged inter-communal manoeuvering. Forcibly displaced sunni groups worked to 
orchestrate their return, local shi’a claiming to have abstained from the violence of previous years 
sought to endear themselves to American and Iraqi forces, while the militia’s local affiliates 
likewise attempted to protect their interests and retain their hard-fought gains. 
 
ii. The Perils of Segmentation & Localism  
Critical to the efforts of American and Iraqi forces, the same social bonds that had rendered the 
hayys such prolific founts of popular insurgency also created potential problems for the militia. 
Home to coherent local groups with overriding local priorities, Fedaliyah and northern Shawra 
offered sound footing for counterinsurgency. The vitality and cohesion of tribal networks in the 
two hayys, which had been instrumental in lifting the militia to otherwise unattainable levels of 
operational potency, proved to be a double-edged sword.  
 
At issue was the fact that the relationship between the Mehdi Army’s leadership and its local 
tribal allies was not one of commander and subordinate. On the contrary, rather than resembling 
the structure of a modern military organization, the dynamic between the militia and its proxies 
evoked the segmentary tribal confederations of Mesopotamia’s traditional past.63 Fedaliyah’s 
Marsh Arabs and the shi’a tribes of northern Shawra were eager to fight for Sadrist causes for so 
long as they remained compatible with their own local, communal objectives – but, as evidenced 
during the course of the Mehdi Army’s rout and collapse during the course of 2008, they were not 
prepared to sacrifice themselves against a determined foe with overwhelmingly superior 
firepower.  
 
                                                
63 For discussion of segmentary tribal theory, which depicts tribal networks as collections of discrete, 
coherent sub-components willing and able to pursue their own individual interests while nominally part of a 
broader coalition, see Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State 
Formation in the Middle East”, and Ernest Gellner, “Tribalism and the State in the Middle East”, both in 
Tribes and State Formation.   
263 
This was most clearly evident in Fedaliyah, where the sudden change of posture by local Marsh 
Arabs appears to have betrayed the diverging priorities of local residents and dedicated militants. 
For, although the Marsh Arabs remained passionately devoted Sadrists, evidence accumulated 
that a significant break had occurred between the Marsh Arabs and the remnants of the Mehdi 
Army.  From a series of murders allegedly tied to former militia operatives, to the occurrence of a 
full-scale tribal battle that brought heavily armed factions out into the streets of the hayy, 
recurrent intra-communal violence within Fedaliyah during the summer of 2008 indicated that the 
departure of those dedicated to resistance had been, and remained, contested rather than 
consensual.  
 
Having struggled for generations to maintain their enclave in Baghdad, the nationwide collapse of 
the Mehdi Army seems to have compelled local Marsh Arabs to cease their hostilities against the 
Surge and cultivate ties with their former foes. Their hearts thus may well have remained with the 
cause of Sadrist resistance, but the preservation of their traditional way of life (and their very 
position in the city) required accommodation with a shifting strategic landscape – which was 
made most evident by the tenacity and seeming desperation with which local jamoose-owners 
pursued American officers and civilian personnel for economic support.64 
 
In Shawra, several factors contributed to the eventual collapse of resistance against the Surge. In 
and around Hayy Nasser, there were notable commonalities with events elsewhere in Tisa Nissan. 
By cleansing the area of its pre-invasion Ba’thist population, overseeing the influx of thousands 
of new shi’a residents, and concentrating its operatives in Hayy Nasser, the militia’s conquest of 
southern Shawra bore a distinct resemblance to its efforts in western Beladiyat. Hayy Nasser thus 
                                                
64 In a telling reflection of local biases, and also of the limited capacity of governance in Tisa Nissan, 
Marsh Arab sheikhs who petitioned American commanders for economic support stated bluntly that they 
viewed American forces as more likely patrons than the Iraqi government. Discussions by the author with 
self-identified sheikhs and jamoose owners of Fedaliyah, held at the District Council facility, August 2008. 
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emerged as a militia stronghold like Sa’ba Nissan, while the area’s broader social landscape – 
filled with ordinary families who had arrived in haphazard fashion from a broad array of places, 
and who remained overwhelmingly preoccupied with their own survival – resembled the hawasim 
zones of Beladiyat and Kamaliyah. 
 
In a further echo of events elsewhere in Tisa Nissan, localized resistance to the Surge remained 
the work of a relative few in southern Shawra.65 Sadrist sympathies ran strong among local shi’a, 
and the area’s prolonged neglect left civilians extremely skeptical of the inducements of 
counterinsurgent forces, but the militia’s reputation had suffered from abuses like those witnessed 
in Amin and Kamaliyah, while the local social environment resembled that of western Beladiyat 
and northern Kamaliyah. Morality police terrorized local residents, the predations of militants left 
desecrated bodies hanging from football goalposts, while a disjointed civilian populace was 
overwhelmingly focused on self-preservation. Thus, when the forces of the Surge were able to 
mass in sufficient strength to displace key militants, violence abated significantly and 
“resistance” imploded.  
 
Along Shawra’s northern tier, the inter-communal jockeying that accompanied the collapse of the 
Mehdi Army evoked aspects of both Beladiyat and Fedaliyah. Like the besieged middle class and 
minority communities of Beladiyat, sunni groups that had suffered at the hands of the Mehdi 
Army sought to redress their grievances through interaction with American and Iraqi forces. The 
Mehdi Army’s former allies, on the other hand, like their counterparts in Fedaliyah, attempted to 
distance themselves from the violence of previous years and protect their immediate, local 
interests. With the area’s various shi’a tribal groups bearing varied and contested levels of 
                                                
65 Rather than reflecting the militia’s ability to mobilize popular insurgency among the new arrivals that 
had flooded southern Shawra, the intensity of violence in and around Hayy Nasser instead appeared more a 
representation of the extent to which the area’s neglect in prior years (and its geographic position on the 
city’s outskirts, offering connectivity to militant strongholds elsewhere) had enabled shi’a militants to 
concentrate their forces and dig in to defend their gains. 
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responsibility for the violence of prior years, and local elders seeking exculpation on the grounds 
that they, like many others in Tisa Nissan, had been unable to rein in their sons’ militant passions, 
negotiations proved delicate and contentious.66 Key shi’a militants were nevertheless compelled 
to flee northwards into ungoverned areas of Diyala Province or further afield to Iran, leaving 
Shawra increasingly secure.  
 
                                                
66 As American and Iraqi forces extended their influence into northern Shawra, tribal leaders that had 
cooperated with the Mehdi Army expressed their intent to cease hostilities and their desire to seek 
reconciliation. Sporadic violence continued, however, which was attributed primarily to local youths and 
young men. The extent to which a generational split in fact occurred, or whether younger men were tasked 
with maintaining a level of violence that would be plausibly deniable, remained unclear. Hashim, 
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, pp.106-107 notes that even in the rural, allegedly “tribal” areas of 
Iraq, “sheikhs simply no longer have control over the young men of their tribes”. 
Conclusion 
 
Insurgency & Counterinsurgency on Uneven Terrain 
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i. Insurgency as a Reflection of Civil Society 
In the early years of the post-Saddam era, there appeared ample cause for optimism regarding the 
prospects of Muqtada al-Sadr and the rekindled Sadrist movement. Building on the still-potent 
legacy of the White Lion among Iraq’s underclass shi’a (who, by virtue of their demographic 
strength in Baghdad and across key areas of the oil-rich South were assured pivotal influence in 
any democratic political system), the Sadrists were presented with a remarkable opportunity.1 
With the potential to become one of Iraq’s only grassroots-supported, mass-based, political 
movements, and with their principal rivals in shi’ism’s clerical establishment and the middle and 
upper classes enduring prolonged periods of decline, the Sadrists seemed well positioned to 
realize the White Lion’s vision of underclass empowerment.2  
 
However, as evidenced most vividly by the erratic trajectory of the Mehdi Army, the rekindled 
Sadrist movement struggled to maintain its footing. This owed much to the fierce opposition of 
Coalition Forces and their allies among the shi’a elite who came to dominate the post-Saddam 
political order. Yet external hostility alone cannot account for the Sadrists’ failings, or explain the 
implosion of the Mehdi Army. Indeed, irrespective of the strength of the Sadrists’ opponents 
(whose ranks, as noted in Chapter Three, soon expanded to include Iraqi al-Qaeda), the Mehdi 
Army grew massively from 2004 onwards, Sadrist politicians won major victories in the elections 
                                                
1 As noted in Chapter Three, absent reliable census data, the exact strength of the shi’a underclass in Iraq is 
unclear. Nonetheless, after the mass displacement of sunnis from Baghdad during the sectarian war, and the 
exodus of middle-class and minority families that began in the 1980s, accelerated dramatically in the 
1990s, and then further surged in the post-Saddam era, it is a certainty that the shi’a underclass is more 
demographically powerful than ever before in the history of the Iraqi capital – potentially comprising a 
majority of the urban populace (based upon an overall estimate of Baghdad’s population at roughly six 
million, with 2 million underclass shi’a in Sadr City, and at least 1 million more spread among Shula, Tisa 
Nissan, and the marginal spaces of northeast and southeast Baghdad).  
2 As detailed in Chapters Two and Three, the sustained assaults of Saddam Hussein’s regime (as well as 
those of his proxies, which in the eyes of the establishment included the White Lion himself) had 
decimated shi’ism’s clerical elite, while the sanctions era had shattered the middle and upper classes and 
prompted a mass exodus abroad. The aspiring leaders of elite shi’a politics were thus, overwhelmingly, 
returning exiles who had spent at least a decade abroad. As a result, not only did they have an 
extraordinarily limited popular base of support upon return, but the demographic from which they might 
rally such a base was also badly degraded.  
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of 2005, and, by 2006, the rekindled Sadrist movement appeared to have established itself firmly 
as a major player in post-Saddam Iraq. 
 
Yet, due to the forces detailed through the course of this dissertation, the Sadrists’ successes 
contained the seeds of their demise. In theory, the Mehdi Army was to be the vanguard of Iraq’s 
shi’a underclass, spearheading a popular uprising of the downtrodden masses in search of 
political, religious, and social validation. In practice, however, the dearth of coherent social bonds 
among Iraq’s underclass shi’a citizenry inhibited the formation of what might otherwise have 
been a sweeping, popular movement. The militia instead came to be dominated by the likes of 
Kamaliyah’s hardened strongmen, the anachronistic ma’dan of Fedaliyah, and the sectarian 
radicals of Amin – supported by platoons of volatile young men who had come of age in an era of 
material suffering, societal collapse, and vicious violence. The Mehdi Army, which grew by 
absorbing elements of Iraqi society, was thus poisoned from within.  
 
Surveying the militia’s fortunes across Tisa Nissan, the local influence of civil society was 
striking. In Beladiyat and Mashtal, the Mehdi Army faced relatively coherent middle class and 
minority communities hostile to its advance, which compelled the militia to employ a strategy of 
peripheral encroachment. The militia thus made inroads into Beladiyat by conquering and 
colonizing Sa’ba Nissan, and by riding a demographic wave eastward out of Sadr City. In 
Mashtal, on the other hand, the militia benefited from its potency in nearby Amin and Fedaliyah, 
as well as its dominance over the settlement area north of the District Council facility, thereby 
advancing inward from the margins of the hayy.  
 
However, while the Mehdi Army was ultimately able to overcome its local opponents and assert 
its writ over the core neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and Mashtal, it could not consolidate its gains. 
The hayys’ new settlement areas, which were home to thousands of underclass shi’a, provided 
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concealment for militants and a modest supply of low-level operatives – but their residents could 
not be effectively mobilized in support of the Mehdi Army. Despite benefiting from a prime 
opportunity to capitalize on the class-based tensions at the heart of Sadrist ideology, the militia’s 
leaders failed to rally the newly-arrived shi’a poor of Beladiyat and Mashtal in support of their 
efforts, due in part to the negative qualities of the militia’s cadre, but also to the social 
atomization of their prospective local base of support.  
 
In Amin and Kamaliyah, where the White Lion reigned during the 1990s, the Mehdi Army also 
failed to effectively mobilize its base. Home at the time of the 2003 invasion to large contingents 
of Sadrist shi’a, and becoming the near-exclusive domain of the Sadrists’ demographic base after 
the Mehdi Army’s brutal campaign of sectarian cleansing, both hayys came to sit firmly within 
the militia’s urban empire. As such, the leaders of the Sadrist movement had numerous 
opportunities over a period of years to translate popular affinity for Sadrist ideals into substantive 
support for their endeavour. However, owing to the ways in which the hayys’ histories shaped 
local society – both by influencing those who came to be the Mehdi Army’s most prominent 
representatives, and also by degrading communal bonds that might have otherwise enabled the 
Sadrist masses to steer the militia’s development in a more popular direction – neither Amin nor 
Kamaliyah fulfilled its insurgent potential. 
 
Finally, in Fedaliyah and Shawra, the Mehdi Army enjoyed its greatest successes. The two hayys 
were home to fervent bases of support for the Sadrist cause. They also possessed social structures 
that enabled the militia to translate popular sentiments into substantive action. In Fedaliyah, this 
was due to the unique historical experience of the Marsh Arabs in Baghdad, and the resulting 
operational functionality (and ferocity) of resident tribes. In Shawra, this was likewise due, in 
part, to local tribal groups’ ability to have survived the fragmentary pressures of previous 
269 
decades, aided further by the Mehdi Army’s ability to conquer key areas of the hayy’s southern 
tier virtually unopposed.  
 
However, as noted in Chapter Seven, the centrality of Fedaliyah and Shawra to the Mehdi Army’s 
operations was compelling evidence of the militia’s failures elsewhere. Fedaliyah, home of the 
broadly despised Marsh Arabs, was an exceedingly unlikely command centre for an insurgent 
movement that cast itself as the vanguard of the underclass shi’a masses.3 The prominence of 
Shawra, on the other hand, particularly in the militia’s resistance against the Surge, betrayed the 
inability of shi’a militants to hold their ground in more central areas of the district. Furthermore, 
with the Mehdi Army unable to fully subsume the local, communal priorities of its allies in 
Fedaliyah and Shawra within its own, there remained the prospect of betrayal as the militia’s 
broader fortunes soured. Even the militia’s most impressive and enduring achievements in Tisa 
Nissan were thus incomplete, exposing the overall failure of its endeavour in an area of Baghdad 
that ought to have served as a springboard for further Sadrist advances in the post-Saddam era. 
 
ii. Counterinsurgency on Uneven Terrain 
The Mehdi Army’s weaknesses in Tisa Nissan created immediate opportunities for the forces of 
the Surge. As the militia was not at the head of a unified, grassroots movement, the challenges 
facing American and Iraqi forces were greatly simplified. The task of the Surge in Tisa Nissan 
was not to engage in an abstract contest for the loyalty of the populace, but rather to identify and 
pursue discrete militant networks. In short, the inducements and “arguments” of 
counterinsurgency were of modest relevance to the reestablishment of security in the district – 
                                                
3 Furthermore, in a sign of both the socio-cultural frictions that persisted between the Marsh Arabs and 
their fellow shi’a, and also the uneven quality of the Mehdi Army’s “success” in cultivating broad popular 
support even within the hayy, the non-Marsh Arab shi’a who sought refuge in Fedaliyah during the 
sectarian war claimed to have received little to no support from the local Sadrist operational centre. 
Interviews by the author and J. Makeur in IDP zones of western Fedaliyah, July and August 2008. 
270 
because the civilian population was, for the most part, uninvolved in violence, and ill positioned 
to influence its trajectory. 
  
Benefiting from the fighting prowess of its local allies and widespread popular scepticism at the 
advance of the American military and the Iraqi government, the militia was able to defend its 
position in Tisa Nissan with some success during 2007 and early 2008. However, as American 
and Iraqi forces applied intensifying pressure, the militia was forced further and further onto the 
defensive. In the core neighbourhoods of Beladiyat and Mashtal, where the bulk of the populace 
had remained hostile to its presence, the Mehdi Army was displaced in relatively short order. In 
Amin and Kamaliyah, on the other hand, and in the peripheral zones of Beladiyat and Mashtal, 
the encroachment of the Surge pushed militants off of streets that they had formerly roamed with 
impunity. Yet conflict persisted thereafter, and efforts to spur development and reform 
governance achieved minimal success. A sporadically violent stasis set in, with shi’a militants 
and the forces of the Surge trading blows, and the latter gradually wearing down the former in a 
slow-running battle of attrition.  
 
Lastly, Fedaliyah and Shawra remained insurgent strongholds throughout the first year and a half 
of the Surge. For so long as the Mehdi Army remained embedded in the local terrain, efforts to 
reclaim the hayys met with fearsome resistance. Indeed, the intensity of violence encountered in 
Fedaliyah, and the immediate vicinity of JSS SUJ in southern Shawra, rendered the population-
centric approaches of counterinsurgency impracticable in both hayys. A quarantine was thus 
established around the former, while operations stalled in the latter.4 
                                                
4 The likely costs in casualties and collateral damage that would have arisen from an attempt to forcibly 
subjugate Fedaliyah (a feat from which even Saddam Hussein had abstained) appear to have been sufficient 
to deter frontal attack during 2007 and early 2008. Furthermore, the extremely limited potential of the non-
violent inducements of counterinsurgency was widely recognized by American personnel on the ground. 
Owing to the Marsh Arabs’ pattern of life, their terrible relationship with the Iraqi government, and their 
fervent devotion to the Sadrist cause, there was no prospect whatsoever of “winning hearts and minds” and 
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The stalemate in Tisa Nissan was then broken by a nationwide offensive against the Mehdi Army 
and its affiliates in the spring and summer of 2008. Launching large-scale, conventional military 
operations in Basra, Baghdad, and the Deep South, American and Iraqi forces inflicted a 
succession of major defeats on shi’a militants. The damage incurred by the militia – paired with 
its incoherent response to the offensive and the evident lack of support it received from the shi’a 
underclass as a whole – compelled Muqtada (who likely wished to disassociate himself and his 
political future from its failings) to disband what had been the Sadrist movement’s premier 
operational entity.  
 
The progression of events on the national stage yielded dramatic results in Tisa Nissan. Within 
the structures of the Iraqi government, March Madness and its aftermath had an invaluable 
clarifying effect as to the loyalties of both local politicians and members of the Iraqi Security 
Forces. Across the district itself, the reactions of different communities were instructive as to the 
underlying dynamics of violence. In Beladiyat and Mashtal, the declining position of the Mehdi 
Army and the rising profile of the Iraqi government emboldened the remnants of pre-2003 
communities to redouble their efforts at restoring their neighbourhoods and reversing the 
advances of the hawasim. In Amin and Kamaliyah, the absence of prominent militants and the 
corresponding abatement of violence enabled the revival of local markets and a palpable easing of 
tensions on the hayys’ streets. Finally, in Fedaliyah, changes to the political landscape appeared 
to compel the Marsh Arabs to recalculate their interests and alter their posture to the Surge; while 
in Shawra, the cumulative force of counterinsurgent momentum overran the last redoubt of shi’a 
militarism and prompted a scramble to readjust to a dramatically altered strategic landscape.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
prying the Marsh Arabs away from the cause of resistance by offering material goods and services. For so 
long as the Sadrist cause remained strategically viable, the Marsh Arabs of Fedaliyah would remain among 
its fiercest advocates. 
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However, contrary to conceptions of the Surge as a triumph of full-spectrum counterinsurgency, 
the fall of the Mehdi Army in Tisa Nissan owed little to popular enthusiasm for either the Iraqi 
government or American forces. Counterinsurgent forces did not inflict a series of defeats upon 
the Mehdi Army and its affiliates in the district by winning over the loyalty and support of the 
shi’a underclass, inducing its proactive support. On the contrary, short-term security gains were 
achieved in spite of widespread scepticism on the part of much of the populace toward both the 
Americans and their Iraqi partners. Tisa Nissan’s residents welcomed the restoration of security 
(and localized initiatives to provide clean water, spur economic activity, and rehabilitate critical 
infrastructure earned a measure of appreciation), but frustration and dissatisfaction prevailed 
before, during, and after the militia’s collapse. Indeed, to the extent that a battle was fought for 
the “hearts and minds” of Tisa Nissan’s residents, pitting the Mehdi Army against the American 
military and the Iraqi government, both sides appear to have lost. Hunkered down in their homes, 
battered by years of violence and embittered by decades of official neglect, the residents of Tisa 
Nissan remained overwhelmingly pessimistic about their current condition and future prospects.  
 
The beleaguered defenders of neighbourhoods like Beladiyat Proper, Central Mashtal, and Tujar 
welcomed relief from the Mehdi Army’s encroachment, for example, but their ability to help 
consolidate the gains of the Surge was limited. Localized communal bonds had been sufficient to 
mount modestly effective neighbourhood defences, but residents were ill suited to contribute to a 
counteroffensive, or to proactively resolve the problems facing the area. The fight against shi’a 
militants was instead conducted through the day-to-day operations of American and Iraqi forces, 
who secured the hayys’ main neighbourhoods before pressing outwards to forcibly drive militants 
from their peripheries. Local residents subsequently attempted to reestablish governance and 
improve conditions in their neighbourhoods, and the core areas of the hayys marked the greatest 
successes of American-led efforts in Tisa Nissan above the Army Canal. Progress remained 
unsatisfactorily slow, however, and the increasingly-besieged hawasim development areas faced 
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mounting persecution – thus stoking class-based tensions and raising the prospect of renewed 
conflict. 
 
Areas dominated by the shi’a underclass proved even more challenging. In Amin and Kamaliyah, 
American and Iraqi forces were unable to consolidate security gains through comparable 
advances in governance and development. This was not the result of counterinsurgency 
“malpractice”, but rather an inevitable byproduct of local conditions.5 On the one hand, local 
residents had been steeped in decades of aggressive anti-Americanism (from both Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, and from the White Lion as well) and had realized decidedly uneven benefits 
from the Coalition’s removal of Saddam Hussein. On the other, protracted neglect and sporadic 
abuse at the hands of the country’s pre- and post-2003 regimes engendered widespread popular 
enmity toward the Iraqi government. American and Iraqi forces thus faced enormous odds in 
attempts to cultivate popular support. 
 
Furthermore, irrespective of popular sentiments, just as Amin and Kamaliyah had proven infertile 
ground for the mobilization of popular insurgency, the hayys were not places where “the people” 
could be leveraged effectively in support of counterinsurgency initiatives. Socially atomized, 
cowed by years of brutal violence in and around their neighbourhoods, and conditioned to defer 
initiative to the central government, the people of Amin and Kamaliyah had been effectively 
deprived of agency. As a result, their principal contribution to the Surge, like that of their 
underclass shi’a counterparts in areas of new settlement across the district, was made through 
                                                
5 The varied “non-kinetic” inducements of counterinsurgency appear to have been of only modest utility in 
Amin and Kamaliyah. Much has been written about the waste and fraud that have plagued American 
attempts at nation-building in Iraq (for an example of questionable resource allocation from the district 
adjacent to Tisa Nissan, see: Ernesto Londoño “Demise of Iraqi Water Park Illustrates Limitations, Abuse 
of US Funding Program”, The Washington Post, January 3, 2011; and for an example of small-scale fraud 
by American personnel assigned to Tisa Nissan, see: Casey Grove, “Alaska-based Soldier Admits 
Accepting Illegal Gratuities”, Anchorage Daily News, March 2, 2012) yet the Mehdi Army’s insurgent 
campaign in Tisa Nissan had imploded before American forces arrived with offers to refurbish schools and 
distribute micro-grants. 
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inaction – as they abstained from supporting the retreating militia, remaining on the sidelines of 
the conflict.6  
 
Finally, despite being home to coherent social groups that could be engaged in support of 
counterinsurgency operations, American and Iraqi forces also struggled to consolidate their gains 
in Fedaliyah and Shawra. Fedaliyah’s Marsh Arabs strove to win the favour of American forces, 
and likewise to reengage the Iraqi government in an effort to reinstate feed subsidies for their 
jamoose and preserve their enclave in Baghdad, yet little assistance was forthcoming. In a 
dynamic that plagued Tisa Nissan in its entirety, there was little prospect of an Iraqi government 
that was unable to maintain basic services in the heart of the capital extending substantive support 
to its eastern fringes – particularly to a community that occupied the lowest rung of the city’s 
social order (and, moreover, which had been at the forefront of both sectarian and insurgent 
violence). As such, apart from avoiding a bloody confrontation with American forces, the Marsh 
Arabs gained only the most modest benefits from their change of tact during the summer of 2008.  
 
Similarly, the tribes of northern Shawra could manoeuvre amongst one another for local position 
in the wake of the Mehdi Army’s collapse, but with shi’a militants still active in nearby areas of 
southern Diyala Province (where the Iraqi government’s influence was negligible, and where 
American forces exercised extremely limited power even at the peak of the Surge) the prospects 
of durable reconciliation or the return of displaced sunnis were remote. Furthermore, there was no 
prospect of the Iraqi government bringing the resources and attention to bear that would be 
                                                
6 Local residents did provide valuable intelligence that assisted in the targeting of wanted militants, but this 
owed far more to the abuses perpetrated by militants (and localized rivalries that intertwined with the 
militia’s campaign) than to any popular enthusiasm generated by American-funded development projects or 
the administrative accomplishments of the District Council. The notion that the inducements of 
counterinsurgency “won over” ardent supporters of the Mehdi Army is thus extremely dubious, as the 
motivations that compelled cooperation with the Surge traced their roots to issues more profound that 
micro-grants for small businesses or the refurbishment of schools.  
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needed to remedy the hayy’s extensive infrastructural shortcomings, leaving both northern and 
southern Shawra in a condition of festering squalor.  
 
Across Tisa Nissan, therefore, the dramatic security gains achieved during the spring and summer 
of 2008 lay in jeopardy at the close of the Surge. With American forces contracting from the 
district during 2009; the central government either unable or unwilling to extend necessary 
assistance; the district’s local representatives proving inept, corrupt, or simply unable to 
overcome the extraordinary challenges facing the area; and the populace effectively deprived of 
the capacity for independent, collective grassroots action; Tisa Nissan stagnated.7  
 
iii. Looking to the Future 
The case study of Tisa Nissan offers a variety of insights into the future of Iraq, most of them 
discouraging. On the positive side of the ledger, close study of the mechanics of violence in Tisa 
Nissan reinforces the general consensus among observers of the post-Saddam era that sectarian 
violence was not the byproduct of broadly shared or deeply-seated essentialist hatreds. 
Neighbours did not turn upon neighbours as previously-suppressed animosities percolated 
upwards from the bedrock of their traditional, primeval identities, leading to mass slaughter and 
sectarian polarization. Instead, while the turmoil that wracked Tisa Nissan fed off of decades-old 
grievances (most notably class-based conflict between the shi’a underclass and its social 
“superiors”) the violence that devastated the district was not the work of the masses, or a natural 
outgrowth of latent social forces. Iraq’s sectarian war was instead sparked by the calculations of 
                                                
7 However lamentable, these woes were accurate reflections of conditions in the district, where the district 
government’s failings were less a function of the individuals involved, and more a product of the social, 
economic, and political environment in which the system operated (or failed to do so). The notable 
corruption and duplicity of certain individuals notwithstanding, Tisa Nissan’s government was 
representative. Beladiyat, for example, was a place that was authentically led by older men concerned 
foremost with their own particular neighbourhood’s survival, and impotent to counter the threats of shi’a 
militants. Kamaliyah, likewise, was well represented by a notorious thief and self-made “sheikh” who 
would eventually be stripped of his position for lacking the equivalent of a high school diploma – only to 
be succeeded by an uncle of Muqtada al-Sadr. 
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contemporary politics, fueled by the ruthless political strategies and tactics of aspirants to power 
who rallied support by stoking identity-based fear and rivalry, and further exacerbated by the 
cynicism of those who viewed the conflict as an opportunity for personal enrichment. 
 
Tisa Nissan’s sunni citizenry was not slaughtered or forced to flee by the collective popular 
hatred of their shi’a neighbours, but by identifiable, and generally narrowly-based groups of 
militants. Wider analysis of the mechanics of the “civil war” endured in Baghdad further 
illuminates this point. There was no Gettysburg in Iraq’s civil war, nor was there a Worcester, or 
even a Tripoli. Armies did not fight armies, and “the people” did not take up arms against “the 
people” on the streets of the Iraqi capital. Furthermore, the evidence of Tisa Nissan does not 
suggest that large numbers of the forcibly displaced took to arms in search of revenge, fostering a 
large-scale cycle of retributive violence.8 Instead, established militant groups preyed principally 
upon civilians, seizing them from their homes and from checkpoints along city streets to murder 
them in an effort to further their own agendas.9 
 
Discouragingly, however, the same social degradation that prevented the Mehdi Army from 
rallying a coherent insurgent movement from within the shi’a underclass seems to have also 
presented an insurmountable obstacle to collective action that might have reformed or resisted the 
                                                
8 Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War, 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp.6, 66 discuss the victims of sectarian violence joining 
up with the Mehdi Army in pursuit of vengeance, asserting “a great many of those who are fleeing their 
homes are not peacefully resettling in a more ethnically homogenous region, but are joining vicious 
sectarian militias like Jaysh al-Mahdi in the hope of regaining their homes or at least extracting revenge on 
whoever drove them out”. On the evidence of those who resettled in Mashtal and Beladiyat, as well as their 
counterparts in northwestern Fedaliyah and northern Kamaliyah, this was not the case in Tisa Nissan. 
9 On the nature of the killing that occurred during the sectarian war for Baghdad, and its generally personal, 
non-military nature, Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 1, pp.366-368 references documentation from the 
Baghdad morgue, where “the vast majority of bodies processed had been shot execution-style. Many 
showed signs of torture – drill holes, burns, missing eyes and limbs. Others had been strangled, beheaded, 
stabbed, or beaten to death”. 
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militia, or quelled violence more broadly.10 Iraq’s “silent majority” of ordinary citizens desirous 
of peace, unity, and stability was not merely silent, but effectively irrelevant to the events of the 
post-Saddam era. Any optimism generated by the realization that blood appears to be on the 
hands of a relative few must be tempered by the implications of this observation vis-à-vis the 
collective impotence of the masses.11  
 
Taking a wider view of Iraqi politics, this same dynamic will continue to plague the democratic 
process. Maddeningly for the Iraqi people, there appears to exist broad popular support for 
national unity, yet this sentiment has not been manifested within the existing political system.12 
Dominated by narrowly-based factions that have mobilized support through the demonization of 
“the other”, electoral politics has become a force for division rather than unity. The degraded 
state of civil society continues to inhibit the formation of grassroots alternatives to the political 
elite, while the country’s depoliticization under Ba’th rule has left an absence of frameworks or 
ideologies around which popular movements might coalesce.13  
                                                
10 The degradation of civil society in Iraq, and its implications for Iraq’s future, have long-attracted 
significant attention among Iraqi dissidents and intellectuals. Makiya, Republic of Fear, p.xxx quotes from 
text of “Charter 91”, which was an effort to formulate a new vision of political and civil society: “civil 
society in Iraq has been continuously violated by the state in the name of ideology. As a consequence the 
networks through which civility is normally produced and reproduced have been destroyed. A collapse in 
values in Iraq has therefore coincided with the destruction of the public realm for uncoerced human 
association.” 
11 The overriding lesson of bloodshed in post-Saddam Iraq, particularly with respect to the sectarian war, 
has thus not been the hopelessly divided state of Iraqi society, but instead the extent to which the myriad 
fragmentary pressures of Iraq’s modern history left the many catastrophically unable to stand up to the few. 
This is noted in regard to sunni extremism in Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency, Vol. 1, p.28, who notes that 
“one key reality in Iraq is that small cadres of violent extremists can do so much to drive a nation toward 
civil war and intimidate or dominate large elements of the local population”.  
12 Fieldwork across Tisa Nissan by the author and his HTT colleagues during the course of 2008 found 
widespread nostalgia for a (perhaps idealized) past in which Iraqi nationalism united the populace, often 
paired with expressions of pan-sectarian unity. There was a clear risk of distortion in these interactions, as 
interviewees would obviously be wary of professing explicitly sectarian sentiments to uniformed 
Americans (who were, moreover, generally accompanied by Iraqi Security Force personnel). The frequency 
and intensity with which these sentiments were expressed, however, conveyed a substantive and genuine 
sincerity.  
13 Similar concerns addressed in Munson, Iraq in Transition, p15, and Mark Etherington, Revolt on the 
Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005), p.147. Munson quotes 
Etherington’s observation of “the curious absence of the majority from political debate”. Whereas Munson, 
Iraq in Transition, p.245 expresses the hope that the evident lack of cohesion and unity within identity-
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The outcome of Iraq’s transition to democracy thus remains uncertain, as there are no apparent 
avenues through which popular sentiments might be translated into substantive action. With 
Iraq’s post-Saddam political establishment having proven far more adept at “politics” than 
governance, Iraq, like Tisa Nissan, is left stagnating. As the political elites jockey with one 
another for influence behind the walls of the Green Zone, much of the country remains only 
marginally administered, while booming population growth (it is estimated that Iraq’s population 
has risen from approximately 23 million at the time of the US-led invasion to more than 28 
million in 2010, and it is projected to explode to 56 million by 2050) looms as a seemingly 
overwhelming challenge.14  
 
Looking to the shi’a underclass, the prospects of a Sadrist resurgence are unclear. To their 
advantage, Baghdad is not merely a dramatically more heavily-shi’a city than ever before, but a 
more underclass shi’a city as well. With Iraq’s middle class “weakened to the point of extinction” 
after decades of intense pressure, the field is open to their advance.15 Further working in 
Muqtada’s favour, widespread reverence for the White Lion persists, and the government 
continues to neglect Iraq’s shi’a poor.16  
 
As such, the Sadrists’ fortunes could change yet again. Muqtada’s efforts to burnish his clerical 
credentials through prolonged study in Iran, and to reform popular perceptions of him and his 
                                                                                                                                            
based blocs such as “the shi’a” and “the sunnis” might open the door for the formation of new, issue-based 
groupings (something he suggests will be “Iraq’s only hope for exceeding the bounds of the confessional 
politics that will undoubtedly lead the nation to disaster”), Tisa Nissan offers little evidence that the 
underlying social structures necessary for such groupings to spread and flourish exist. 
14 Population statistics from Cordesman, “Iraq: Creating a Strategic Partnership”, p.159. 
15 Stansfield, Iraq, p.195. For detailed treatment of the middle class exodus from Iraq, and of post-Saddam 
era migration and displacement flows more broadly, see Joseph Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugees: The New 
Crisis in the Middle East, (London: IB Tauris, 2011). 
16 Fantastic plans for the rehabilitation of Sadr City notwithstanding, Baghdad’s shi’a underclass margins 
have remained badly neglected. See: Nilgun Karatas, “Turkish Contractors to Rebuild Sadr City”, Hurriyet 
Daily News, December 10, 2010, for commentary on the awarding of a US$13.4 billion dollar contract to a 
Turkish consortium tasked with building new housing for 600,000 people within four years.  
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rekindled Sadrist initiative thus warrant close attention.17 Nonetheless, while the grievances at the 
heart of Sadrist ideology remain potent among the millions of underclass shi’a in Baghdad and 
across southern Iraq, so too do the social issues that plagued the Mehdi Army throughout its 
existence. Whether the Sadrists will attempt to rebuild and reconstitute a popular movement, or 
whether their political leaders will be drawn into the narrow world of Iraq’s political elite (as yet 
another faction that eschews mass support and instead, perhaps, comes to rely upon Iranian 
patronage and the armed might of a reformed, narrowly-based militia component), is thus 
unknown.18 What is clear, however, is that enormous obstacles confront any effort to rally the 
grassroots of Iraqi society, and that the atomized and brutalized condition of the Iraqi people will 
play a powerful, enduring role in shaping the country’s future.  
 
                                                
17 The re-branding of the rekindled Sadrist movement began in earnest during the summer and fall of 2008. 
Prominent among Muqtada’s initiatives was the replacement of the Mehdi Army with is a non-violent 
organization dedicated to outreach and educational activities called the mumehidoon, meaning “those who 
pave the way”. Cordesman, “Iraq: Creating a Strategic Partnership”, pp.iii-iv, 92-93, notes that, as of 2010, 
core elements of the rekindled Sadrist movement appeared to have remained focused on such social 
concerns, remaining ostensibly disassociated from militant action.  
18 In an indication that Muqtada and his associates have learned from the failings of the Mehdi Army, the 
loyal remnants of militia’s former core, reorganized into the Promised Day Brigades, have operated since 
2010 as a narrowly-based militant network and eschewed efforts to mobilize mass involvement. The origins 
of the group, which emerged as the successor to the Mehdi Army, is noted in Cordesman, “Iraq: Creating a 
Strategic Partnership”, p.109; while its campaign against withdrawing American forces during 2011 is 
discussed in “June the Deadliest Month for U.S. Troops in 2 Years”, Associated Press, USA Today, June 
30, 2011. 
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i. Human Terrain Mapping – Operational Context 
The area study introduced in Chapter Four and presented through Chapters Five, Six, and Seven 
draws from the observations and insights of the author, his colleagues on a Human Terrain Team 
(HTT), and personnel from the US Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) that was responsible for 
southeastern Baghdad in 2008.1 The mission and purpose of Human Terrain Teams, and the 
origins of the Human Terrain System as a whole, have been discussed in the Introduction to this 
thesis (along with references to further reading on the subject). This appendix presents an 
overview of how the author (who served as a Social Scientist, and was thus responsible for 
research design, the overall management of fieldwork, and the analysis and presentation of 
collected data) and his colleagues conducted the work upon which this thesis draws – explaining 
the context in which it was executed, and addressing practical, methodological, and ethical 
concerns. 
 
The author and his HTT colleagues were attached to the US Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 
responsible for southeastern Baghdad. The BCT, managed overall by the 4th Brigade of the 10th 
Mountain Division, was responsible for the provision of security, the furtherance of economic 
development, and the reestablishment of governance in the Rusafa, Karrada, and Tisa Nissan 
political districts. Military personnel and their various support elements (including an embedded 
Provincial Reconstruction Team, or ePRT, provided by the Department of State) thus worked 
with their respective counterparts in the Iraqi Security Forces, the elected political institutions of 
Tisa Nissan’s Neighbourhood and District Councils, the unelected administrative and technical 
offices of the Baghdad municipality, and local civil society organizations toward those objectives 
                                                
1 The contributions of individual team members have been noted in the footnotes of Chapters Five through 
Seven. In total, this dissertation draws upon the fieldwork of the author, J. Hubbard, R. Kent, P. Leddy, J. 
Makeur, and A. Roosendaal.  
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– as part of an overall strategy to transfer full responsibility to the Iraqi government during the 
course of 2008 and 2009.2 
Figure A.1 – Baghdad’s Political Districts 
3 
 
Upon arrival at Forward Operating Base Loyalty in February 2008, the author and his colleagues 
were briefed on conditions in these three political districts. Rusafa and the bulk of Karrada were 
seen to be progressing adequately toward higher standards of security, development, and 
governance, and had been marked for transition to full Iraqi control in the coming months. 
Significant challenges remained, including an active Iraqi al-Qaeda presence in a small area of 
                                                
2 During the time frame in question, Baghdad was divided into geographic sectors that were the 
responsibility of individual BCTs. The BCT assigned to each sector was responsible for the day-to-day 
management of counterinsurgency efforts and the pursuit of security, development, and governance. For a 
detailed overview of the Brigade Combat Team concept, US Army Field Manual 3-90.6, “Brigade Combat 
Team” is available online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90-6/fm3-90-
6.pdf. In regard to the overall transfer of authority to the Iraqi government, the time constraints of the Surge 
(which was to conclude in 2008) dictated that day-to-day operations in Tisa Nissan be handed over to the 
relevant elements of the Iraqi government on what was, for all intents and purposes, a pre-set timetable.   
3 Map of Baghdad’s political districts adapted from The Institute for the Study of War: 
http://www.understandingwar.org/map/baghdad-city-districts.  
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Rusafa and continued shi’a militant activity in the Zafaraniyyah area of southern Karrada, yet 
trends in stability and security were viewed as generally satisfactory. Tisa Nissan, however, 
particularly the portion of the district beyond the Army Canal, was singled out as the BCT’s 
primary problem area. It was, in the words of a senior staff officer, “not responding to 
treatment”.4  
 
In support of the BCT’s efforts to manage the challenges of Tisa Nissan, the HTT was tasked to 
produce a hayy-level “map” of the district’s human terrain that would detail the social, economic, 
political, and cultural forces beneath its seeming intractability.5 What was it about the hayys 
beyond the Army Canal that left them resistant to the counterinsurgency approaches employed, 
with apparent success, elsewhere in the BCT’s area of responsibility? What were the particular 
                                                
4 Discussion with senior BCT staff, FOB Loyalty, February 2008. As further discussed below, the HTT’s 
work was conducted with the promise of full confidentiality for both American and Iraqi sources. To the 
former, confidentiality facilitated the sharing of views and opinions by American personnel that were at 
odds with official positions. To the latter, it protected Iraqi sources from exposure in their dealings with 
American personnel.  
5 The use of Tisa Nissan’s hayys as the underlying framework of analysis shared methodological 
commonalities with the “community study” approach of sociology, as detailed in Colin Bell and Howard 
Newby, Community Studies: An Introduction to the Sociology of the Local Community, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1971); Robert Redfield, The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture, 
(Chicago: U Chicago Press, 1967); and likewise the “microsociological technique[s] of anthropology” as 
discussed in Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, (New Jersey: Pretence 
Hall, 1989), p.21. The approach taken in the work of the HTT was almost entirely qualitative, eschewing 
the quantitative approaches (most notably, those of Social Network Analysis) that are widely favoured 
within the defence establishment. For an overview Social Network Analysis, see: Stanley Wasserman and 
Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 
and John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, (London: SAGE, 2000). For examples of its use in 
a military/intelligence capacity, see: Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, (Philadelphia: UPenn 
Press, 2004), Chapter Five, which studies the core networks of al-Qaeda; and Brian Reed, Formalizing the 
Informal: A Network Analysis of an Insurgency, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Maryland – College 
Park, 2006, which details the use of social network analysis in the capture of Saddam Hussein. On efforts to 
quantify human terrain analysis within the intelligence community, see: Erik Eldredge and Andrew 
Neboshynsky, “Quantifying Human Terrain”, M.A. Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, 2008; Michael 
Gabbay, “Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 
March 2008, pp.10-12. On the limitations of qualitative approaches such as the community study 
technique, Redfield, The Little Community, p.71, notes concerns over its “impressionistic”, and thus 
subjective, nature. Furthermore, p.6 raises concerns as to whether the community study approach (which he 
discuses as related to use in rural environments) is suitable in urban areas. In the case of Baghdad, it was 
found to do so – in large measure because of the way in which the mechanics of the city’s development 
(and the associated legacy of the mahallah) created distinctive enclaves that, in turn, influenced particular, 
localized patterns of violence. The legacy of the mahhallah system on localized patterns of violence is also 
noted, albeit indirectly, in Munson, “What Lies Beneath”, p.29, in reference to sunni insurgent activity in 
western Baghdad. 
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features of local society from one neighbourhood to the next that made some areas more violent 
and unstable than others? In short, why was Tisa Nissan not responding to treatment?  
 
Aspects of eastern Baghdad’s history, and the local growth of both the shi’a underclass as well as 
the Sadrist movement, provided the substance of several early briefings to BCT staff.6 The legacy 
of the mahallah system, for example, and the forces that had combined to degrade civil society on 
eastern Baghdad’s periphery during the course of previous decades, were of particular relevance. 
Additionally, information on the position of the shi’a underclass in Iraqi society, and discussion 
of the social forces beneath the rise of the Sadrist movement, helped explain the wariness of the 
district’s population vis-à-vis the overtures of the Coalition and the establishment-dominated 
Iraqi government. 
 
Yet, while the elucidation of relevant aspects of Iraqi history provided useful contextual 
information on the district’s woes, this was insufficient to enable the HTT to make a substantive, 
sustained contribution to the BCT’s day-to-day operations. The level of detail and the depth of 
local specificity required to engage meaningfully with debates over specific concerns from one 
hayy to the next made first-hand investigation necessary. The thematic and historical issues 
outlined in the first two chapters of this work, and the arc of the Sadrists’ fortunes presented in 
Chapter Three, thus served as a foundation from which the examination of Tisa Nissan beyond 
the Army Canal began. 
 
 
                                                
6 Oral presentations to BCT staff were paired with one- to two-page papers on relevant thematic issues 
thought to affect Tisa Nissan as a whole. “The Mahallah Mentality”, for example, explained the dynamics 
beneath the city’s traditional structure, and contextualized both the wide variation in conditions from one 
neighbourhood to the next as well as proclivity of leadership figures (both in and out of government) to 
practice narrow habits of localism and patronage. The paper, as well as subsequent presentations on “The 
Unraveling of the Mahallah” and “Urban Tribalism and the Limitations of Sheikhs”, addressed many of the 
issues detailed in Chapters One and Two of this work. 
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ii. Operational Methods 
To produce a human terrain map of the district, a research plan was built in four main phases.7 
First, the author and his colleagues collected the BCT’s existing institutional knowledge and 
perceptions of Tisa Nissan, producing an initial baseline report. Second, the author analyzed this 
document for information gaps and issues warranting further exploration, which were aggregated 
into a research plan. Third, the author and his colleagues conducted fieldwork to fill the identified 
gaps, while also exploring the district for additional, previously undetected or underappreciated 
issues of concern. Fourth, the results of fieldwork were synthesized into a collection of 
documents and presentations that detailed prominent aspects of Tisa Nissan’s human terrain on a 
hayy-by-hayy basis, explaining the operational implications of the district’s features.  
 
Phase 1: Baseline Collection & Analysis 
The primary purpose of the initial phase was to capture the BCT’s cumulative institutional 
knowledge of Tisa Nissan.8 How did American military personnel view the district and its 
resident population? What did they think was happening in the neighbourhoods of Tisa Nissan, 
and why? What was their understanding of the challenges that they had faced either successfully 
or unsuccessfully in past operations, and how did they see themselves positioned to pursue their 
stated objectives?  
 
This process ran from mid-February to mid-March of 2008, during which time HTT personnel 
worked in pairs to conduct confidential, semi-structured interviews with individuals and small 
groups of interviewees who had been identified by BCT leadership as possessing potentially 
relevant information. The HTT began at the top of the BCT’s hierarchy with the senior officers 
                                                
7 As a new program within the Department of Defense, Human Terrain Teams did not have operational 
doctrine to follow. The phased methodological approach detailed below was thus developed by the author 
and R. Kent (the Team Leader of the HTT), as a way to address the particular challenges of Tisa Nissan.  
8 Phase 1 interviews in Tisa Nissan were conducted by the author, R. Kent, P. Leddy, and A. Roosendaal. 
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on Brigade staff who were responsible for disciplines such as intelligence, operations, and civil 
affairs, as well as the military and civilian personnel that staffed the ePRT. Interviews ranged 
from approximately thirty to ninety minutes, with HTT personnel asking open-ended questions to 
elicit information about what interviewees saw as objective facts, as well as their own personal 
thoughts and instincts.9 The team then progressed incrementally down the rank hierarchy to junior 
officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel within the headquarters, until all 
potentially relevant sources had been exhausted. 
 
Attention then turned to the two subordinate battalions within the BCT that were directly 
responsible for day-to-day operations in the hayys of Tisa Nissan. The district had been bisected 
along the north-south axis of Highway 5 (the main road connecting Baghdad to the city of 
Baquba in Diyala Province), with 2/16 infantry battalion responsible for the eastern half, and 2/30 
infantry battalion to the west and in Shawra wa Umm Jidr to the north. Following the same 
approach utilized at BCT headquarters, HTT personnel began by interviewing the Battalion 
Commanders and their staffs, working downwards through the rank hierarchy until all relevant 
staff personnel had been interviewed.  
 
Still working in pairs, team members then traveled to each of the outlying Company-level patrol 
bases that had been established within the hayys of Tisa Nissan. Visits to these outposts lasted 
several days, and served two main purposes. The first priority was to interview the officers, non-
commissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers who were the BCT’s primary points of contact with 
                                                
9 From a methodological perspective, there was an inherent risk in structuring research around the views 
and opinions of the BCT. Taking the BCT’s understanding of Tisa Nissan as the starting point for research 
had the potential to embed biases or misperceptions into the foundation of the research process. This risk 
was weighed against the potential benefits of gathering the information that had accumulated among the 
BCT’s numerous constituent parts through the course of their experiences in the district, however, as by 
February 2008, elements of the BCT had been resident in Tisa Nissan for more than a year. Furthermore, 
the BCTs perspective on the district was regarded as fundamentally important to the HTT’s efforts to 
engage its decision-making processes. By understanding how and why the BCT saw Tisa Nissan as it did, 
the HTT would be better positioned to contribute to internal debates and to frame its input in a manner that 
would speak directly to the thoughts and perceptions of military decision-makers.  
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the local population – some of whom, due to the Army’s system of staggered deployment 
rotations and the extended tours of the Surge, had been living and working in the district for over 
a year.10 Interviews were conducted in similar fashion as previously, with pairs of HTT personnel 
meeting with interviewees either alone or in small groups, eliciting information about the local 
area, its resident population, and notable trends or events that had occurred therein.11  
 
The second objective was to conduct an initial reconnaissance of the district. The Company-level 
patrol bases situated within the district’s hayys were the points from which the majority of day-to-
day operations were conducted, and visits enabled team members to see local neighbourhoods 
first-hand, and observe the types of operations being conducted within. Team members would 
thus participate in the various operations underway during the course of their visits to each patrol 
base, assessing the permissiveness of each area for fieldwork, evaluating potential venues for 
future engagement, and identifying prospective local sources of information.  
 
Upon completion of this initial phase, the coded, confidential responses of all those interviewed 
were analyzed and documented in an initial report. This report captured the hayys of Tisa Nissan 
as they were understood by the BCT, and conveyed both prevailing and dissenting opinions held 
toward local dynamics in each area. These documents were circulated among a selection of BCT 
personnel for feedback and clarification, made available via the BCT’s internal computer 
network, and briefed to relevant audiences.  
 
 
                                                
10 2/16 IN had deployed to Tisa Nissan in February of 2007, making it the first “Surge battalion” in 
Baghdad. Discussed in Finkel, The Good Soldiers. 
11 Maps were found to be a particularly useful elicitation tool when interviewing military personnel with 
first-hand experience in the neighbourhoods of the district. Asking interviewees to give a “guided tour” of 
the neighbourhoods in which they had worked helped prompt recollections, and gave structure to 
discussions about the different sub-areas of each hayy.  
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Phase 2: Gap Analysis & Research Planning 
A gap analysis was then conducted on the baseline assessment, creating a framework for the 
HTT’s investigation of the district.12 In light of what the BCT knew about Tisa Nissan, and the 
key features of its human terrain identified thus far, what issues warranted further investigation? 
What concerns were widely cited as problematic and insufficiently understood? Were there areas 
in which BCT personnel held conflicting opinions, or where prevailing wisdom appeared to be at 
odds with notable facts or trends? With these questions in mind, the results of the initial 
assessment were analyzed, and groups of unanswered questions were generated. These questions 
were then prioritized for their potential significance to ongoing and future operations, and used to 
construct a research plan that identified the main areas of focus from one hayy to the next.13  
 
Phase 3: Fieldwork 
Following BCT approval of the research plan in April 2008, the bulk of the team dispersed 
throughout the hayys of Tisa Nissan, where they remained, for the most part, working either alone 
or in pairs, from April to November of 2008. Embedding at the Company level, team members 
spent between four to eight weeks investigating a particular hayy.14 Findings from the field were 
periodically relayed back to BCT headquarters, while new information requirements and other 
taskings were disseminated, in turn, from BCT staff.  
 
                                                
12 Gap analysis was conducted by the author during late March 2008. The team’s research plan was then 
created by the author and R. Kent. 
13 Furthermore, as the reconnaissance conducted during initial site visits had identified potential points of 
contact with the local population, the planning process sought to match information requirements with 
potential sources known to exist in the district. It was understood that collection efforts would require 
flexibility and adaptability on the part of team members, and that previously unknown or underappreciated 
issues would emerge and necessitate the adjustment of collection priorities, but a plan was nonetheless 
created to a high level of detail to provide structure and to facilitate initial collection efforts. 
14 HTT personnel also worked closely with National Police Training Teams (NPTTs), the units responsible 
for mentoring and partnering with the 4-1 Iraqi National Police Brigade that was responsible for Tisa 
Nissan. This provided access not only to the resident population during joint operations, but also the 
opportunity to interview the policemen themselves – many of whom were underclass shi’a from Baghdad 
with personal insight into the complexities of loyalty, responsibility, and culpability that affected shi’a with 
Sadrist sympathies during the turmoil of the post-Saddam era. 
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Aspects of the HTT’s findings, as well as details of the manner in which each particular hayy was 
investigated, are presented in the footnotes of Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. Several overarching 
issues warrant discussion, however, as they pertain to concerns that affected the team’s work in 
its entirety. 
 
Issues to be addressed when conducting research in the midst of an ongoing conflict (one in 
which, moreover, the researchers were active participants) were many and varied. How to find 
and effectively engage potential sources of information; how to vet, assess, and interpret 
information collected from sources of uncertain reliability or motivation; how to pursue 
objectivity and impartiality while working in support of, and participating in, military operations; 
and how to protect sources from harm? With these questions in mind, the HTT adhered to a set of 
basic principles regarding the challenges of data acquisition, data fidelity, the pursuit of 
objectivity, and the protection of sources. 
 
Data Acquisition – Local conditions within individual hayys did much to dictate the investigative 
methods utilized. Common to all efforts, however, was the practice of HTT personnel to identify 
themselves as advisors to the American military, and to gain the informed consent of interviewees 
(a concern that has been raised by critics of the Human Terrain System, principally from the 
discipline of anthropology).15 All interactions thus began with team members (who were 
generally in military uniform, unless working within the confines of an American-controlled 
facility) explaining their objectives, and conveying that subsequent conversation was at the 
                                                
15 Critics of the Human Terrain System, have questioned the ethical practices of the program and the ability 
of HTT personnel to conduct legitimate research while attached to the military. For discussion of associated 
concerns, see: the American Anthropological Association’s “AAA Commission on the Engagement of 
Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities”, Final Report, November 4, 2007. The 
issue of informed consent and the complexities of conducting ethical fieldwork in a conflict environment 
were central themes of the training provided to HTT personnel (and, likewise, a subject of continuous and 
contentious extra-curricular debate among trainees). The concerns raised by the anthropological community 
were, in this respect, extremely influential in setting the parameters of internal debate among academics 
within the program. 
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discretion of the interviewee. Cognizant, moreover, of the possibility that an interviewee might 
wish to avoid engaging team members but be uncomfortable breaking off an encounter in the 
presence of occupying forces, collectors remained sensitive to the possibility of inadvertently 
“coercing” consent.  
 
Areas of Tisa Nissan (such as Beladiyat and Mashtal, in particular) had functioning governmental 
and civil society institutions, which provided stable venues where team members could develop 
relationships with Iraqis who, in the course of their professional lives, regularly and voluntarily 
interacted with American personnel.16 Within these more stable environments, HTT personnel 
found an array of sources eager to converse, share their personal stories, and discuss local history, 
recent events, and the various challenges confronting the district and Baghdad at large. Other 
areas (such as Kamaliyah, Amin) remained either unstable or inhospitable to American forces, 
however, lacking venues where relationships could be developed over a period of time. In these 
areas, team members were forced to rely upon relatively brief interactions with local residents in 
their homes and on the streets of their neighbourhoods, and to compensate for unsatisfactory 
depth with a broadened breadth of coverage. This approach was facilitated by the operational 
posture and tempo commonly assumed by American units in these more violent areas of the 
district, where American and Iraqi forces maintained a consistent street-level presence through 
the conduct of patrols. Regular foot-patrols through neighbourhoods such as Central Kamaliyah 
and the core grid of Amin enabled HTT personnel to interact with local residents in their homes, 
                                                
16 Political leaders and prominent local residents from areas generally amenable to the Surge were often 
comfortable meeting openly with team members at local government facilities or on American bases. After 
more than a year of counterinsurgency-inspired outreach efforts by Americans, such interactions were 
commonplace. Moreover, the subjects pursued by team members – relating to the personal stories and 
opinions of interviewees on a broad range of local, personal concerns (as distinct from the main focus of 
military personnel, which was information on the activities of militants and the progression of 
infrastructure projects) – were met with notable enthusiasm. 
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in shops, and openly on the street, in encounters that were, by the spring of 2008, commonplace 
and unremarkable.17  
 
Data Fidelity - Serious obstacles confront any attempt to collect, assess, and interpret information 
gathered in the midst of an ongoing conflict. How effectively, for example, can a uniformed, 
armed researcher traveling in the midst of a platoon of American soldiers gather accurate 
information from Iraqi civilians?18 The potential distortions arising in such an encounter were 
numerous. There was the prospect of an interviewee trying to avoid confrontation by telling the 
researcher something brief and non-controversial in the hope of quickly appeasing his 
interlocutor; that he or she might deliberately misinform a representative of the occupying 
Coalition; or that an interviewee might fabricate information in an attempt to leverage American 
power in a personal or communal dispute.19 Furthermore, there was the prospect of distortion via 
self-selection, wherein the proclivity of certain types of Iraqis (either those amenable to the 
American presence, or desirous to take advantage of it) would dominate reporting and thus skew 
the research process.  
 
                                                
17 Residents of Central Kamaliyah and the core areas of Amin and Fedaliyah – places where the Mehdi 
Army had built a strong presence, and where Sadrist sympathies were near universal –proved remarkably 
eager, on the whole, to converse with team members within the confines of their homes. The Arabic 
language skills of team members were partially responsible for the rapport that was generated, but the 
focus of team members’ inquiries (on aspects of local history and society, for example, as opposed to the 
insurgent-centric lines of questioning typically levied by American soldiers and Iraqi National Policemen) 
appeared to have been a substantially more important factor. Having spent much of the post-Saddam era 
hunkered down in their homes, finding few opportunities to vent their frustrations or share their feelings, 
the residents of Tisa Nissan proved surprisingly willing to converse freely with team members – and 
moreover, to levy sharp condemnations of the pace of “progress” in the post-Saddam era, even when in the 
presence of American and Iraqi forces.   
18 The decision to wear military uniforms or carry a weapon were made by individual team members in 
keeping with their assessment of local conditions. As a general rule, team members working in relatively 
secure environments and attending set meetings with established sources would dress in civilian clothes 
and remove armor and weapons for the interview process. When accompanying patrols through more 
dangerous areas, however, and engaging unknown persons in their homes and on the streets, team members 
would be uniformed and armed.  
19 This was a major concern facing intelligence officers as well. Discussed in Packer, Assassins’ Gate, 
pp.230-233. 
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In light of the unavoidability of these scenarios (team members regularly encountered each of the 
above situations), HTT personnel attempted to remain vigilant for them, and to learn from local 
attitudes and biases. How and when did different types of individuals react to American personnel 
in different ways? How did local attitudes appear to shift from one area or situation to the next, or 
in response to stimuli induced by political developments, military operations, or local events? In 
short, it was necessary not only to analyze the information provided by a particular interviewee, 
but also to assess and deconstruct the context in which that information was provided. 
Simultaneously, several approaches were employed by team members to mitigate the risk of 
distortions and misperception: 
 
1. Subject Matter Control: Team members avoided lines of questioning connected to 
controversial or otherwise sensitive issues, such as the specific local operations of the 
Mehdi Army or the identities of those engaged in violence. As the team’s objective was 
to explore the social forces beneath Tisa Nissan’s particular challenges rather than 
identify or pursue the specific individuals involved, team members structured interviews 
to avoid these subjects. Questioning instead focused on eliciting personal narratives and 
general observations. Common issues for exploration included the history of a particular 
neighbourhood and the circumstances that led the interviewee to reside there; local 
perceptions of changing conditions in the district in response to population flows; 
recollections of various aspects of life during the Saddam era; memories of the turbulence 
and violence of the sectarian war; and more general questions regarding patterns of life 
and local realities.  
 
2. History as a Frame of Reference: An academic grounding in Iraqi history provided an 
invaluable resource throughout the HTT’s work in Tisa Nissan, as it gave structure to the 
research planning process, facilitated rapport-building with Iraqi sources during the 
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research process, and proved instrumental in the interpretation of the data collected. Just 
as an appreciation of the legacy of the mahallah system and its modern reinterpretation in 
eastern Baghdad’s growth generated insights into localized patterns of violence, 
conversations with Iraqi sources could be initiated with reference to relevant historical 
themes. Long-time residents of poorer areas beyond the Army Canal could thus be 
engaged in conversation through reference to the memory of Abd al-Karim Qassim and 
his still-famous efforts on behalf of the city’s shi’a underclass, while conversations with 
new arrivals to the district could be initiated through reference to the circumstances 
beneath their movement from Sadr City or Diyala Province. The discussions that 
followed in either situation could then be evaluated for the manner in which they did or 
did not track with what might be expected for the residents of a particular area or the 
members of a particular identity group, and also for the extent to which current events 
marked the continuation of, or a break from, major historical trends.  
 
3. Triangulation of Perspectives: In an environment where strong socio-cultural biases and 
multi-directional political and communal rivalries had permeated society, it was useful to 
track correlations between particular markers of an interviewee’s identity and locality and 
his corresponding views. This amounted to a sort of profiling and held obvious 
limitations, but observation of the extent to which residents of particular neighbourhoods 
or demographic cohorts tracked with, or diverged from, the dominant views or opinions 
of fellow in-group members proved useful. To what extent, for example, did remaining 
long-time residents of a particular middle class neighbourhood hold common views on 
the Maliki government, the Sadrist movement, or life in the post-Saddam era as a whole? 
What were the defining values or markers of identity around which groups appeared to 
coalesce? Observations and comparisons of attitudes toward issues or events from one 
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geographic area or identity-group to the next helped illuminate both commonalities and 
fault lines in the human terrain, enabling researchers to trace patterns and trends. 
 
4. Resourcelessness: It was impossible for HTT personnel to portray themselves as 
“neutral” parties during their fieldwork, or to fully compensate for the ways in which 
their own identities as Americans affected interactions with the people of Tisa Nissan. 
Steps were taken, however, to mitigate prominent potential sources of distortion. 
Whenever possible, researchers avoided conducting research in venues where Iraqis were 
likely to see them either as conduits for patronage or as tools to be leveraged in pursuit of 
personal or communal goals. Team members thus avoided initiating interviews while 
facilitating economic development projects or brokering political arrangements, as these 
situations were thought to pose higher risks of manipulation and misrepresentation by 
local interlocutors.20 By explicitly avoiding the suggestion of quid pro quo arrangements 
in which sources would provide information in exchange for favourable treatment, team 
members attempted to limit corrupting influences on their research. 
 
5. Expectation management: A further way that team members guarded against errors in 
their work was by deliberately limiting their own objectives. The team did not set out to 
conduct an ethnography of Tisa Nissan, or to create a comprehensive picture of the 
district and its residents.21 The reporting produced by the HTT did not, and the analysis 
                                                
20 There was thus a distinction, and to some extent a conflict, between the role of the HTT as a research and 
analysis asset and its role as a facilitator of engagement between the BCT and the local populace. HTT 
personnel played both roles but, as far as was practicable, these functions were kept separate.  
21 As evident through the course of this dissertation, the HTT’s study of Tisa Nissan amounted to the 
examination of the district through the prism of its violence. Civil society and the various features and fault 
lines of the human terrain were assessed for their relevance to the objectives and interests of the American 
military – creating a picture of Tisa Nissan that was by no means comprehensive. Indeed, researchers able 
to gain an insider’s view into the communities of the district (an Iraqi sociologist of the shi’a underclass, 
for example), would likely find entirely different sets of issues to examine and data points to evaluate, 
creating a valuable counterweight to the conflict-centric study presented in this work. Nonetheless, Anton 
Blok, Honour and Violence, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp.10-11 comments on the legitimacy of this 
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contained in this dissertation does not, purport to detail how and why civil society 
operated in particular ways, or to offer an insider’s view of the district. On the contrary, 
the HTT limited itself to identifying, as self-conscious outsiders with extremely limited 
access, particular features of the district that appeared to hold relevance to the BCT’s 
pursuit of its objectives.   
 
Objectivity - The potential for inherent bias in the conduct of research on behalf of a military 
force engaged in combat operations was a further concern.22 Can a research team that is an 
integral part of one of the main parties to a conflict conduct objective research on the roots and 
dynamics of that conflict? When investigating trends in violence, and studying the social forces 
beneath the campaign of the opposition, can one reliably avoid bias against “the enemy”?  
 
One set of issues relates to the prospect of bias on the part of researchers who, owing to their role 
in support of a military engaged in combat operations, might feel compelled to depict the conflict 
in a particular light. The underlying assumptions are that researchers may feel pressured to reach 
conclusions that harmonize with official messaging; or that the military, engaged in political and 
informational campaigns alongside its conventional operations, might not allow the production of 
reports or the expression of views that question its strategies and tactics. There would exist, 
therefore, an array of direct and indirect pressures that could prevent the execution of impartial 
work.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
practice in anthropology, where investigation may be undertaken “not to find out all about [a community], 
but with reference only to a limited problem stated in advance”. Furthermore, the extraordinary stresses of 
the post-Saddam era proved illuminating in regard to the condition of civil society, making insurgent 
violence a particularly useful barometer in the qualitative measurement of communal integrity. Batatu, in 
The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, p.211, noted similarly, in reference to Iraq, that “it is in moments of great 
upheaval that societies are best studied”.  
22 For a pointed critique of the biases allegedly inherent in those who undertake academic research on 
behalf of the American government, and the assertion that any knowledge produced as a byproduct of such 
a partnership is inevitably contaminated, see Edward Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin Books, 2007) 
particularly the preface, which emphasizes the centrality of motives in academic research.  
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Working on the margins of eastern Baghdad (and thus far removed from whatever political 
pressures may have existed within the upper echelons of the military and diplomatic hierarchies 
resident in the Green Zone and in the vicinity of Baghdad International Airport), the author and 
his colleagues worked without any pressure, direct or indirect, to alter their reporting. On the 
contrary, the overriding priority of battlefield commanders and their subordinates was accuracy in 
understanding the environment in which they were operating – particularly in light of the 
frustrations encountered up to that point in Tisa Nissan. 
 
A second concern relates to the prospect that research conducted on an ongoing conflict, which is 
undertaken by active participants in that conflict, will suffer from more personal biases. At issue 
are the researchers’ inherent sympathies toward the main parties involved, particularly those 
engaged in violence against the researchers and their friends and colleagues. Can members of a 
Human Terrain Team produce an impartial, dispassionate assessment of the Mehdi Army, when 
shi’a militants are actively, and at times successfully, attempting to kill them?23  
 
The casualties incurred during the course of the team’s work rendered any pretension to genuine 
neutrality toward the Mehdi Army, Special Group cells, or local militant groups untenable. The 
HTT attempted to compensate for this bias, however, through the understanding that objective 
analysis might help avoid future casualties. This approach was understood to be imperfect (with 
acknowledgement to the methodological tenet that any enquiry will be corrupted by bias if it is 
conceived and executed instrumentally), yet under the conditions in which the HTT operated, it 
was the most effective way to pursue objectivity.24 The production of a nuanced assessment of the 
                                                
23 Nicole Suveges, a Social Scientist with the Human Terrain System working in Sadr City, was killed in 
the bombing of a District Council facility on June 24, 2008.  
24 Furthermore, there was broad understanding among American military personnel of the various 
motivations that might drive their “enemies” to take up arms. Statements along the lines of “if I lived here, 
I’d be in the militia” were commonplace among American officers and enlisted personnel alike, as the 
complexities and harsh realities of post-Saddam Baghdad were readily evident to those who experienced 
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district, which accounted for the diverging perspectives of its residents and contextualized the 
conflicting views of the competing groups therein (be they hostile, neutral, or supportive toward 
the American military presence), was pursued as an endeavour that might contribute to the 
successful navigation of Tisa Nissan’s challenges.   
 
Source Protection – The protection of sources was a central concern of the HTT. Precautionary 
guidelines were adhered to, therefore, throughout the course of the team’s work, as team 
members sought to ensure that they did not expose interviewees to harm. Formal interviews with 
Iraqis were conducted in several ways. Prominent political, economic, and civil leaders regularly 
interacted with American forces, and could thus be engaged openly in semi-public venues such as 
Neighbourhood or District Council buildings and Iraqi Security Force facilities. In other 
instances, due either to the fear of retribution by militants or, more commonly, personal rivalries 
among local peers, interviews were conducted privately – typically on American-controlled FOBs 
and patrol bases.25 Lastly, where appropriate, mobile phones were used to converse with Iraqi 
sources, obviating the need for face-to-face meetings.  
 
When gathering information on the streets of Tisa Nissan – accompanying combat patrols, for 
example, or manning checkpoints along local roads – separate procedures were followed. In such 
cases true privacy was impossible, so team members interacted with Iraqis in ways designed not 
to draw undue attention. Brief conversations could be held behind closed doors with members of 
a family, for instance, during the time it took Iraqi National Police personnel to conduct a routine 
search of their home. Alternatively, patrols to assess economic activity afforded opportunities to 
                                                                                                                                            
the city first-hand. It was, therefore, uncontroversial to produce reporting that contextualized the 
motivations of shi’a militants through reference to historical issues and contemporary politics.  
25 Due to time constraints surrounding the pacing of American visits to Iraqi government facilities (which 
often precluded holding lengthy conversations following the conduct of official business), team members 
often met prospective sources at these semi-public locations, and then invited them to a follow-up interview 
on and American-controlled facility. This ensured privacy and security, and also that the interview would 
not be interrupted.  
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interact with shopkeepers and their customers. By mid-2008, the residents of Tisa Nissan had 
grown accustomed to these aspects of the American presence in the district, and relatively brief, 
semi-public to public interactions between Americans and Baghdadis were unremarkable.  
 
Additional precautions were also taken in the team’s data management and reporting. When 
interacting repeatedly with a particular source, team members would code their notes to protect 
their source’s identity. Individual team members maintained their own databases of coded source 
notes, thereby personally ensuring that the confidentiality of their sources was preserved. In 
instances where collection efforts were conducted through brief encounters on operations within 
the district, on the other hand, sources were protected through anonymity.26 Interviews during 
neighbourhood patrols and clearance operations, for example, or at checkpoints where vehicles 
were stopped and searched for contraband, were conducted without asking for the interviewee’s 
name. Team members identified themselves as advisors to the American military, secured the 
consent of their interlocutor, and pursued lines of questioning that avoided the elicitation of 
identifying personal information. 
 
Phase 4: Reporting  
Nearing the end of the team’s deployment, an updated human terrain map was produced for the 
hayys of Tisa Nissan that reflected the team’s findings. Consisting of neighbourhood profiles, 
maps, and thematic papers on various features of the district (including issues such as the 
condition of tribal structures across eastern Baghdad, and the roots of the Sadrist movement), it 
was intended as a reference for those who would subsequently serve in Tisa Nissan. 
                                                
26 As such, the relevant references throughout this thesis do not cite the names of sources, but instead give 
the month and location of an encounter. In certain instances where aspects of a source’s identity has 
bearing upon his or her opinion (the age of a source, for example, offering insight into the generation gap 
that developed within the rekindled Sadrist movement) the relevant details have been provided, but 
anonymity is maintained. More generally, however, citations throughout this work do not reference 
information particular to an individual source or contain direct quotations. Instead, fieldwork is cited to 
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